New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 41-5-3 (2026)

Definitions.

✓ current as of May 2026
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   As used in the Medical Malpractice Act:

   A. "advisory board" means the patient's compensation fund advisory board;

   B. "control" means equity ownership in a business entity that:

        (1)   represents more than fifty percent of the total voting power of the business
entity; or

       (2)    has a value of more than fifty percent of that business entity;

   C. "fund" means the patient's compensation fund;

    D. "health care provider" means a person, corporation, organization, facility or
institution licensed or certified by this state to provide health care or professional
services as a doctor of medicine, hospital, outpatient health care facility, doctor of
osteopathy, chiropractor, podiatrist, nurse anesthetist, physician's assistant, certified
nurse practitioner, clinical nurse specialist or certified nurse-midwife or a business entity
that is organized, incorporated or formed pursuant to the laws of New Mexico that
provides health care services primarily through natural persons identified in this
subsection. "Health care provider" does not mean a person or entity protected pursuant
to the Tort Claims Act [41-4-1 to 41-4-27 NMSA 1978] or the Federal Tort Claims Act;

    E. "hospital" means a facility licensed as a hospital in this state that offers in-patient
services, nursing or overnight care on a twenty-four-hour basis for diagnosing, treating
and providing medical, psychological or surgical care for three or more separate
persons who have a physical or mental illness, disease, injury or rehabilitative condition
or are pregnant and may offer emergency services. "Hospital" includes a hospital's
parent corporation, subsidiary corporations or affiliates if incorporated or registered in
New Mexico; employees and locum tenens providing services at the hospital; and
agency nurses providing services at the hospital. "Hospital" does not mean a person or
entity protected pursuant to the Tort Claims Act or the Federal Tort Claims Act;

    F. "independent outpatient health care facility" means a health care facility that is an
ambulatory surgical center, urgent care facility or free-standing emergency room that is
not, directly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controlled or under
common control with a hospital. "Independent outpatient health care facility" includes a
facility's employees, locum tenens providers and agency nurses providing services at
the facility. "Independent outpatient health care facility" does not mean a person or
entity protected pursuant to the Tort Claims Act or the Federal Tort Claims Act;

    G. "independent provider" means a doctor of medicine, doctor of osteopathy,
chiropractor, podiatrist, nurse anesthetist, physician's assistant, certified nurse
practitioner, clinical nurse specialist or certified nurse-midwife who is not an employee
of a hospital or outpatient health care facility. "Independent provider" does not mean a
person or entity protected pursuant to the Tort Claims Act or the Federal Tort Claims
Act. "Independent provider" includes:

       (1)      a health care facility that is:

          (a) licensed pursuant to the Public Health Act [Chapter 24, Article 1 NMSA
1978] as an outpatient facility;

        (b) not an ambulatory surgical center, urgent care facility or free-standing
emergency room; and

             (c) not hospital-controlled; and

       (2)    a business entity that is not a hospital or outpatient health care facility that
employs or consists of members who are licensed or certified as doctors of medicine,
doctors of osteopathy, chiropractors, podiatrists, nurse anesthetists, physician's
assistants, certified nurse practitioners, clinical nurse specialists or certified nurse-
midwives and the business entity's employees;

  H. "insurer" means an insurance company engaged in writing health care provider
malpractice liability insurance in this state;

    I. "malpractice claim" includes any cause of action arising in this state against a
health care provider for medical treatment, lack of medical treatment or other claimed
departure from accepted standards of health care that proximately results in injury to the
patient, whether the patient's claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract, and
includes but is not limited to actions based on battery or wrongful death; "malpractice
claim" does not include a cause of action arising out of the driving, flying or nonmedical
acts involved in the operation, use or maintenance of a vehicular or aircraft ambulance;

   J. "medical care and related benefits" means all reasonable medical, surgical,
physical rehabilitation and custodial services and includes drugs, prosthetic devices and
other similar materials reasonably necessary in the provision of such services;

   K. "occurrence" means all injuries to a patient caused by health care providers'
successive acts or omissions that combined concurrently to create a malpractice claim;

    L. "outpatient health care facility" means an entity that is hospital-controlled and is
licensed pursuant to the Public Health Act as an outpatient facility, including ambulatory
surgical centers, free-standing emergency rooms, urgent care clinics, acute care
centers and intermediate care facilities and includes a facility's employees, locum
tenens providers and agency nurses providing services at the facility. "Outpatient
health care facility" does not include:

       (1)      independent providers;
       (2)    independent outpatient health care facilities; or

      (3)    individuals or entities protected pursuant to the Tort Claims Act or the
Federal Tort Claims Act;

   M. "patient" means a natural person who received or should have received health
care from a health care provider, under a contract, express or implied; and

   N. "superintendent" means the superintendent of insurance.

History: 1953 Comp., § 58-33-3, enacted by Laws 1976, ch. 2, § 3; 1977, ch. 284, § 1;
2021, ch. 16, § 1; 2021 (2nd S.S.), ch. 5, § 1; 2023, ch. 207, § 1.

                                      ANNOTATIONS

Repeals. — 2021 (2nd S.S.), ch. 5, § 3 repealed Laws 2021, ch. 16, § 1, effective
January 1, 2022.

The 2023 amendment, effective June 16, 2023, defined "control" and "independent
outpatient health care facility", and revised the definitions of "health care provider,"
"hospital," "independent provider" and "outpatient health care facility"; added a new
Subsection B and redesignated former Subsections B through D as Subsections C
through E, respectively; in Subsection D, added "'Health care provider' does not mean a
person or entity protected pursuant to the Tort Claims Act or the Federal Tort Claims
Act"; added a new Subsection F and redesignated former Subsections E through L as
Subsections G through N, respectively; in Subsection G, added "'Independent provider'
does not mean a person or entity protected pursuant to the Tort Claims Act or the
Federal Tort Claims Act"; added a new Paragraph G(1); and in Subsection L, after
"means an entity that is", added "hospital-controlled and is", and added Paragraphs L(2)
and L(3).

The 2021 (2nd S.S.) amendment, effective January 1, 2022, defined "advisory board,"
"fund," "hospital," "independent provider," "occurrence," and "outpatient health care
facility," and modified the definition of "health care provider," as used in the Medical
Malpractice Act; added new Subsections A and B and redesignated former Subsection
A as Subsection C; in Subsection C, after "physician’s assistant", added "certified nurse
practitioner, clinical nurse specialist or certified nurse-midwife or a business entity that is
organized, incorporated or formed pursuant to the laws of New Mexico that provides
health care services primarily through natural persons identified in this subsection";
added new Subsections D and E and redesignated former Subsections B through D as
Subsections F through H, respectively; added new Subsections I and J and
redesignated former Subsections E and F as Subsections K and L, respectively; and in
Subsection L, after "superintendent of insurance", deleted "of this state".

Communication between medical personnel. — Communication between medical
personnel is not a matter that requires expert knowledge to understand the standard of
care involved and a party may be able to establish that a departure from the standard of
ordinary care occurs when a clerical error affects the timeliness or accuracy of a
diagnosis. Zamora v. St. Vincent Hospital, 2014-NMSC-035.

Where plaintiff was admitted to defendant’s emergency room with abdominal pain; a
contract radiologist performed an abdominal scan on plaintiff; the radiology report
concluded that defendant had a diverticular abscess and that cancer was a possibility;
the emergency physician and surgeon never received the radiologist’s report; plaintiff
was diagnosed with colon cancer fourteen months later; plaintiff sued defendant
alleging that as a consequence of defendant’s failure through an administrative
inadequacy to forward the radiology report to the surgeon, plaintiff was treated for a
diverticular abscess, allowing the cancer to grow; and defendant claimed that plaintiff
failed to present expert testimony regarding the standard of care of communication
between medical personnel, expert testimony was not required to establish the standard
of care because the communication of the diagnosis by one doctor to another is subject
to an ordinary negligence standard of care, which does not require expert testimony.
Zamora v. St. Vincent Hospital, 2014-NMSC-035.

Malpractice claim. — The controlling inquiry in determining whether a claim constitutes
a "malpractice claim" under the Medical Malpractice Act [Chapter 41, Article 5 NMSA
1978] is whether the gravamen of the claim is predicated upon the allegation of
professional negligence. Christus St. Vincent Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-Afara, 2011-
NMCA-112.

Claim for equitable indemnification was a malpractice claim. — Where a patient
sued a medical center and a doctor who practiced at the medical center for malpractice
and the medical center sued the doctor for equitable indemnification based upon the
claim that the doctor negligently caused and was partially liable for the patient’s injuries,
the equitable indemnification claim was a malpractice claim as that term is used in the
Medical Malpractice Act [Chapter 41, Article 5 NMSA 1978]. Christus St. Vincent Reg’l
Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-Afara, 2011-NMCA-112.

Defendants other than physicians. — This section's broad definition of health care
provider is evidence that the legislature intended to impose liability beyond the context
of the physician-patient relationship. When an individual is obliged as a condition of
future or continued employment to submit to a medical examination, that examination
creates a duty between the examining health care provider and the examinee. Baer v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 1994-NMCA-124, 118 N.M. 685, 884 P.2d 841.

Negligent misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress not
"malpractice claim(s)". — Claims for negligent misrepresentation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress do not first have to be presented to the medical review
commission because they do not come within the definition of a malpractice claim.
Trujillo v. Puro, 1984-NMCA-050, 101 N.M. 408, 683 P.2d 963, cert. denied, 101 N.M.
362, 683 P.2d 44.
Malpractice required. — The New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act covers injuries
arising out of negligence and does not cover claims not based on acts of malpractice.
Cordray v. Cnty. of Lincoln, 320 F.Supp.2d 1171 (D.N.M. 2004).

Functional test to distinguish medical or professional negligence from ordinary
negligence. — If an act involves the use of special knowledge or skill to make a
judgment call as to the appropriate thing to do or not to do, then the act is of a
professional nature and claims based on the act must be brought and pursued as a
medical or professional negligence action and requires expert testimony to assess the
resultant act or failure to act. If not, the act is not of a professional nature and expert
testimony is not required. Richter v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 2014-NMCA-056,
cert. denied, 2014-NMCERT-005.

Timeliness of delivery of laboratory reports. — Expert testimony is required where a
plaintiff’s claims address the timeliness or urgency of the delivery system of laboratory
reports, including any timeliness claims that involve the efficiency and design of the
delivery system, except when the required timing is set by a known standard such as an
internal policy, contract or governmental regulation. Richter v. Presbyterian Healthcare
Servs., 2014-NMCA-056, cert. denied, 2014-NMCERT-005.

Maintenance of hospital charts. — Hospitals have a clearly established duty to
maintain their patient’s medical charts in good order, including the duty to post
completed lab tests as received. Assessing a hospital’s compliance with its charting
duties does not require expert testimony. Richter v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs.,
2014-NMCA-056, cert. denied, 2014-NMCERT-005.

Ordinary negligence in delivering laboratory reports. — Where decedent died when
decedent developed a heart arrhythmia during surgery in 2005; the heart arrhythmia
was caused by an undiagnosed condition called pheochromocytoma; in 2001, the
decedent’s physicians ordered lab tests that were diagnostic of pheochromocytoma; the
lab results were never read or acted upon by the physicians; plaintiff sued the hospital
and the laboratory for negligent delivery of the lab results in 2001; plaintiff did not raise
any matters involving urgency; and plaintiff showed that the laboratory had a routine
procedure for delivering lab report to physicians, plaintiff’s claims against the hospital
and the laboratory could be pursued as ordinary negligence claims and did not require
expert testimony. Richter v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 2014-NMCA-056, cert.
denied, 2014-NMCERT-005.

Opinion of treating physician as to negligence of another treating physician. —
Where decedent died when decedent developed a heart arrhythmia during surgery in
2005; the heart arrhythmia was caused by an undiagnosed condition called
pheochromocytoma; prior to surgery, decedent’s consulting surgeon ordered lab tests
that would have disclosed the pheochromocytoma; the consulting surgeon scheduled
surgery to be conducted by the operating surgeon; the operating surgeon conducted the
surgery before the lab results had been received and despite decedent’s high
potassium levels that posed a chance of death during surgery; and plaintiff sought to
elicit opinions from the consulting surgeon as to which acts of the operating surgeon
were negligent; the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the consulting
surgeon’s opinions as to the operating surgeon’s negligence. Richter v. Presbyterian
Healthcare Servs., 2014-NMCA-056, cert. denied, 2014-NMCERT-005.

Failure to present expert testimony on the standard of medical care. — Where
decedent died when decedent developed a heart arrhythmia during surgery in 2005; the
heart arrhythmia was caused by an undiagnosed condition called pheochromocytoma;
prior to surgery, lab tests had been ordered that would have disclosed the
pheochromocytoma; the surgeon conducted the surgery before the lab results had been
received and despite decedent’s high potassium levels that posed a chance of death
during surgery; to establish the standard of care for the surgeon’s conduct, plaintiff
offered the testimony of an interventional radiology expert who testified that there was
no standard practice that an interventional radiologist would use to address the
complication that occurred in decedent’s surgery; and plaintiff called a general surgeon
to establish the standard of care applicable to decedent’s surgery, but failed to lay a
foundation for the general surgeon’s opinion, plaintiff failed to present expert testimony
on the standard of care and the district court did not err in directing a verdict in favor of
the surgeon. Richter v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 2014-NMCA-056, cert. denied,
2014-NMCERT-005.

Comparative negligence of non-parties. — Where decedent died when decedent
developed a heart arrhythmia during surgery in 2005; the heart arrhythmia was caused
by an undiagnosed condition called pheochromocytoma; in 2001, the decedent’s
physicians ordered lab tests that were diagnostic of pheochromocytoma; the lab results
were never read or acted upon by the physicians; in 2005, prior to surgery, lab tests had
been ordered that would have disclosed the pheochromocytoma; the surgeon
conducted the surgery before the lab results had been received; and the district court
permitted the jury to compare the alleged negligence of the decedent’s 2001 physicians,
who were non-parties in the case, with the negligence of the decedent’s 2005 surgeons,
comparative negligence principles required the district court to consider the comparative
negligence of the non-party 2001 physicians. Richter v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs.,
2014-NMCA-056, cert. denied, 2014-NMCERT-005.

Law reviews. — For article, "Medical Malpractice Legislation in New Mexico," see 7
N.M.L. Rev. 5 (1976-77).

For note, "Tort Law – New Mexico Limits Recovery of Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress to Sudden, Traumatic Accidents — Fernandez v. Walgreen Hastings Co.," see
30 N.M. L. Rev. 363 (2000).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue § 16.

Right of tortfeasor initially causing injury to recover indemnity or contribution from
medical attendant causing new injury or aggravating injury in course of treatment, 8
A.L.R.3d 639.
Liability of operating surgeon for negligence of nurse assisting him, 12 A.L.R.3d 1017.

Liability for injuries or death as a result of physical therapy, 53 A.L.R.3d 1250.

Chiropractor's liability for failure to refer patient to medical practitioner, 58 A.L.R.3d 590.

Liability of anesthetist for injuries from spinal anesthetics, 90 A.L.R.3d 775.

What constitutes physician-patient relationship for malpractice purposes, 17 A.L.R.4th
132.

Liability for injury or death allegedly caused by activities of hospital "rescue team", 64
A.L.R.4th 1200.

Recovery in death action for failure to diagnose incurable disease which caused death,
64 A.L.R.4th 1232.

Medical malpractice: who are "health care providers," or the like, whose actions fall
within statutes specifically governing actions and damages for medical malpractice, 12
A.L.R.5th 1.

Venue of wrongful death action, 58 A.L.R.5th 535.

Coverage of professional-liability or -indemnity policy for sexual contact with patients by
physicians, surgeons, and other healers, 60 A.L.R.5th 239.

70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 62.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 43 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case: Leger v. Gerety, 2022 NMSC 007 (N.M. 2021).
Leger v. Gerety, 2022 NMSC 007 (N.M. 2021). · cites it 48× “In reaching this holding, the Court of Appeals’ majority focused on the definitions section of the MMA, § 41-5-3 (1977). Leger, 2019-NMCA- 033, ¶ 25.”
Baker v. Hedstrom, 2012 NMCA 73 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 32× “The MMA defines “health care provider” as “a person, corporation, organization, facility[,] or institution licensed or certified by this state to provide health care or professional services as a doctor of medicine, hospital, outpatient health care facility, doctor of…”
Leger v. Gerety, 444 P.3d 1036 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 58× “In analyzing the definition of “malpractice claim” in 12 the context of the MMA as a whole and the policy implications flowing from its 13 interpretation, our Supreme Court noted several factors impacting the analysis, 14 including the following: (a) “the nonmedical nature of…”
Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013 NMSC 043 (N.M. 2013). · cites it 18× “The Court ultimately concluded that the plain language of the definition of “health care provider” in Section 41-5-3(A) of the MMA literally excludes Defendants, but that adhering to the literal language of the definition “would conflict with the overall legislative purpose” and…”
Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of New Mexico, P. C., 918 P.2d 1321 (N.M. 1996). · cites it 4× “She bolsters this concept of “occurrence” by attempting to draw an identity between an “act of malpractice” in the above-quoted phrase from Section 41-5-13, and a “malpractice claim” defined in Section 41-5-3(C): “ ‘malpractice claim ’ includes any cause of action arising in…”
Trujillo v. Puro, 683 P.2d 963 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 6× “See NMSA 1978, Section 41-5-3(C) (Repl.Pamp.1982). Thus, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the malpractice claims, as defined by the Medical Malpractice Act, asserted in Counts I (malpractice) and III (battery).”
Wilschinsky Ex Rel. Wilschinsky v. Medina, 775 P.2d 713 (N.M. 1989). · cites it 4× “After language explicating the range of allowable patient claims, the definition under Section 41-5-3(C) continues: "`[M]alpractice claim' does not include a cause of action arising out of the driving, flying or nonmedical acts involved in the operation, use or maintenance of a…”
Salopek v. Friedman, 2013 NMCA 87 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 4× “In turn, a “health care provider” is a person, corporation, organization, facility[,] or institution licensed or certified by this state to provide health care or professional services as a doctor of medicine, hospital, outpatient health care facility, doctor of osteopathy,…”
Beverly Haceesa, Individually, & First Fin. Trust Co., as Conservator for Shenoel Haceesa, a Minor v. United States, 309 F.3d 722 (1st Cir. 2002). · cites it 2× “” N.M. Stat. § 41-5-3(A). “ ‘Malpractice claim’ includes any cause of action arising in this state against a health care provider for medical treatment, lack of medical treatment or other claimed departure from accepted standards of health care .”
MacKey Ex Rel. MacKey v. Burke, 694 P.2d 1359 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 6× “Medical Malpractice Act “Representative” is not defined in the definitional section of the Medical Malpractice Act, Section 41-5-3; its definition in this context is not discussed in any New Mexico appellate opinion.”
Armijo v. Tandysh, 646 P.2d 1245 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). · cites it 3× “Section 41-5-3(C), N.M.S.A.1978, defines a malpractice claim as including “any cause of action arising in this state against a health care provider * * * whether the patient’s claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract, and includes but is not limited to actions based…”
State v. Hogervorst, 566 P.2d 828 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977). · cites it 2× “As used in these statutes, including § 41-5-3(C), supra, witness means a person called to give evidence regarding matters under inquiry by the grand jury.”
— N.M. Stat. § 41-5-3(0) — 1 case
New Mexico Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger, 137 P.3d 619 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
— N.M. Stat. § 41-5-3(A) — 17 cases
Baker v. Hedstrom, 2012 NMCA 73 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). “The MMA defines “health care provider” as “a person, corporation, organization, facility[,] or institution licensed or certified by this state to provide health care or professional services as a doctor of medicine, hospital, outpatient health care facility, doctor of…”
Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013 NMSC 043 (N.M. 2013). “The Court ultimately concluded that the plain language of the definition of “health care provider” in Section 41-5-3(A) of the MMA literally excludes Defendants, but that adhering to the literal language of the definition “would conflict with the overall legislative purpose” and…”
Beverly Haceesa, Individually, & First Fin. Trust Co., as Conservator for Shenoel Haceesa, a Minor v. United States, 309 F.3d 722 (1st Cir. 2002). “” N.M. Stat. § 41-5-3(A). “ ‘Malpractice claim’ includes any cause of action arising in this state against a health care provider for medical treatment, lack of medical treatment or other claimed departure from accepted standards of health care .”
Leger v. Gerety, 444 P.3d 1036 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018). “In analyzing the definition of “malpractice claim” in 12 the context of the MMA as a whole and the policy implications flowing from its 13 interpretation, our Supreme Court noted several factors impacting the analysis, 14 including the following: (a) “the nonmedical nature of…”
Siebert v. Okun, 485 P.3d 1265 (N.M. 2021).
— N.M. Stat. § 41-5-3(C) — 27 cases
Leger v. Gerety, 2022 NMSC 007 (N.M. 2021). “In reaching this holding, the Court of Appeals’ majority focused on the definitions section of the MMA, § 41-5-3 (1977). Leger, 2019-NMCA- 033, ¶ 25.”
Leger v. Gerety, 444 P.3d 1036 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018). “In analyzing the definition of “malpractice claim” in 12 the context of the MMA as a whole and the policy implications flowing from its 13 interpretation, our Supreme Court noted several factors impacting the analysis, 14 including the following: (a) “the nonmedical nature of…”
Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of New Mexico, P. C., 918 P.2d 1321 (N.M. 1996). “She bolsters this concept of “occurrence” by attempting to draw an identity between an “act of malpractice” in the above-quoted phrase from Section 41-5-13, and a “malpractice claim” defined in Section 41-5-3(C): “ ‘malpractice claim ’ includes any cause of action arising in…”
Trujillo v. Puro, 683 P.2d 963 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984). “See NMSA 1978, Section 41-5-3(C) (Repl.Pamp.1982). Thus, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the malpractice claims, as defined by the Medical Malpractice Act, asserted in Counts I (malpractice) and III (battery).”
Wilschinsky Ex Rel. Wilschinsky v. Medina, 775 P.2d 713 (N.M. 1989). “After language explicating the range of allowable patient claims, the definition under Section 41-5-3(C) continues: "`[M]alpractice claim' does not include a cause of action arising out of the driving, flying or nonmedical acts involved in the operation, use or maintenance of a…”
— N.M. Stat. § 41-5-3(D) — 1 case
Murphy v. United States (D.N.M. 2020).
— N.M. Stat. § 41-5-3(E) — 2 cases
Leger v. Gerety, 2022 NMSC 007 (N.M. 2021). “In reaching this holding, the Court of Appeals’ majority focused on the definitions section of the MMA, § 41-5-3 (1977). Leger, 2019-NMCA- 033, ¶ 25.”
Leger v. Gerety, 444 P.3d 1036 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018). “In analyzing the definition of “malpractice claim” in 12 the context of the MMA as a whole and the policy implications flowing from its 13 interpretation, our Supreme Court noted several factors impacting the analysis, 14 including the following: (a) “the nonmedical nature of…”
— N.M. Stat. § 41-5-3(I) — 1 case
Grano v. Keating (N.M. Ct. App. 2025).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.