N.M. Stat. § 52-1-54 (2026)

or workers' compensation judge; discovery costs; offer of
judgment; penalty for violations.
    A. It is unlawful for any person to receive or agree to receive any fees or payment
directly or indirectly in connection with any claim for compensation under the Workers'
Compensation Act except as provided in this section.

    B. In all cases where the jurisdiction of the workers' compensation administration is
invoked to approve a settlement of a compensation claim under the Workers'
Compensation Act, the director or workers' compensation judge, unless the claimant is
represented by an attorney, may in the director's or judge's discretion appoint an
attorney to aid the workers' compensation judge in determining whether the settlement
should be approved and, in the event of an appointment, a reasonable fee for the
services of the attorney shall be fixed by the workers' compensation judge, subject to
the limitation of Subsection I of this section.

    C. In all cases where the jurisdiction of the workers' compensation administration is
invoked to approve a settlement of a compensation claim under the Workers'
Compensation Act and the claimant is represented by an attorney, the total amount paid
or to be paid by the employer in settlement of the claim shall be stated in the settlement
papers. The workers' compensation judge shall determine and fix a reasonable fee for
the claimant's attorney, taking into account any sum previously paid, and the fee fixed
by the workers' compensation judge shall be the limit of the fee received or to be
received by the attorney in connection with the claim, subject to the limitation of
Subsection I of this section.

   D. The cost of discovery shall be borne by the party who requests it. If, however,
the claimant requests any discovery, the employer shall advance the cost of paying for
discovery up to a limit of three thousand five hundred dollars ($3,500). Beginning
January 1, 2027, the limit shall be four thousand dollars ($4,000), and beginning
January 1, 2029, the limit shall increase to four thousand five hundred dollars ($4,500).
If the claimant substantially prevails on the claim, as determined by a workers'
compensation judge, any discovery cost advanced by the employer shall be paid by that
employer. If the claimant does not substantially prevail on the claim, as determined by
a workers' compensation judge, the employer shall be reimbursed for discovery costs
advanced according to a schedule for reimbursement approved by a workers'
compensation judge.

    E. In all cases where compensation to which any person is entitled under the
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act is refused and the claimant thereafter
collects compensation through proceedings before the workers' compensation
administration or courts in an amount in excess of the amount offered in writing by an
employer five business days or more prior to the informal hearing before the
administration, the compensation to be paid the attorney for the claimant shall be fixed
by the workers' compensation judge hearing the claim or the courts upon appeal in the
amount the workers' compensation judge or courts deem reasonable and proper,
subject to the limitation of Subsection I of this section. In determining and fixing a
reasonable fee, the workers' compensation judge or courts shall take into consideration:

       (1)      the sum, if any, offered by the employer:

             (a) before the worker's attorney was employed;

             (b) after the attorney's employment but before proceedings were commenced;
and

             (c) in writing five business days or more prior to the informal hearing;

       (2)      the present value of the award made in the worker's favor; and

       (3)   any failure of a party to participate in a good-faith manner in informal claim
resolution methods adopted by the director.

   F. After a recommended resolution has been issued and rejected, but more than ten
days before a trial begins, the employer or claimant may serve upon the opposing party
an offer to allow a compensation order to be taken against the employer or claimant for
the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued,
subject to the following:

       (1)    if, within ten days after the service of the offer, the opposing party serves
written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of
acceptance together with proof of service thereof, and thereupon that compensation
order may be entered as the workers' compensation judge may direct. An offer not
accepted shall be deemed withdrawn, and evidence thereof is not admissible except in
a proceeding to determine costs. If the compensation order finally obtained by the party
is not more favorable than the offer, that party shall pay the costs incurred by the
opposing party after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer has been made but
not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer;

       (2)     when the liability of one party to another has been determined by a
compensation order, but the amount or extent of the liability remains to be determined
by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an offer, which shall have
the same effect as an offer made before trial if it is served within a reasonable time not
less than ten days prior to the commencement of hearings to determine the amount or
extent of liability;

      (3)     if the employer's offer was greater than the amount awarded by the
compensation order, the employer shall not be liable for the employer's fifty percent
share of the attorney fees to be paid the worker's attorney and the worker shall pay one
hundred percent of the attorney fees due to the worker's attorney; and

       (4)   if the worker's offer was less than the amount awarded by the
compensation order, the employer shall pay one hundred percent of the attorney fees to
be paid the worker's attorney, and the worker shall be relieved from any responsibility
for paying any portion of the worker's attorney fees.

     G. In all actions arising under the provisions of Section 52-1-56 NMSA 1978 where
the jurisdiction of the workers' compensation administration is invoked to determine the
question whether the claimant's disability has increased or diminished and the claimant
is represented by an attorney, the workers' compensation judge or courts upon appeal
shall determine and fix a reasonable fee for the services of the claimant's attorney only
if the claimant is successful in establishing that the claimant's disability has increased or
if the employer is unsuccessful in establishing that the claimant's disability has
diminished. The fee when fixed by the workers' compensation judge or courts upon
appeal shall be the limit of the fee received or to be received by the attorney for services
in the action, subject to the limitation of Subsection I of this section.

   H. In determining reasonable attorney fees for a claimant, the workers'
compensation judge shall consider only those benefits to the worker that the attorney is
responsible for securing. The value of future medical benefits shall not be considered in
determining attorney fees.

    I. Attorney fees, including, but not limited to, the costs of paralegal services, legal
clerk services and any other related legal services costs on behalf of a claimant or an
employer for a single accidental injury claim, including representation before the
workers' compensation administration and the courts on appeal, shall not exceed thirty
thousand dollars ($30,000) in calendar year 2025. Beginning January 1, 2027, the
maximum allowable attorney fees shall be thirty-two thousand dollars ($32,000), and
beginning January 1, 2029, the maximum allowable attorney fees shall increase to
thirty-four thousand dollars ($34,000). This limitation applies whether the claimant or
employer has one or more attorneys representing the claimant or employer and applies
as a cumulative limitation on compensation for all legal services rendered in all
proceedings and other matters directly related to a single accidental injury to a claimant.
The workers' compensation judge may exceed the maximum amount stated in this
subsection in awarding a reasonable attorney fee if the judge finds that a claimant, an
insurer or an employer acted in bad faith with regard to handling the injured worker's
claim and the injured worker or employer has suffered economic loss as a result.
However, in no case shall this additional amount exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000).
As used in this subsection, "bad faith" means conduct by the claimant, insurer or
employer in the handling of a claim that amounts to fraud, malice, oppression or willful,
wanton or reckless disregard of the rights of the worker or employer. Any determination
of bad faith shall be made by the workers' compensation judge through a separate fact-
finding proceeding. Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection J of this section, the
party found to have acted in bad faith shall pay one hundred percent of the additional
fees awarded for representation of the prevailing party in a bad faith action.

   J. Except as provided in Paragraphs (3) and (4) of Subsection F of this section, the
payment of a claimant's attorney fees determined under this section shall be shared
equally by the worker and the employer.

   K. It is unlawful for any person except a licensed attorney to receive or agree to
receive any fee or payment for legal services in connection with any claim for
compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act.

    L. Nothing in this section applies to agents, excluding attorneys, representing
employers, insurance carriers or the subsequent injury fund in any matter arising from a
claim under the Workers' Compensation Act.

   M. No attorney fees shall be paid until the claim has been settled or adjudged.

    N. By May 1, 2029, the advisory council on workers' compensation and occupational
disease disablement shall review the maximum allowable attorney fees and the
limitation on discovery costs that employers are required to advance. By November 1,
2029, the advisory council on workers' compensation and occupational disease
disablement shall make recommendations to the legislature on any necessary
adjustments to the maximum allowable attorney fees or the limitation on discovery costs
that employers are required to advance.

   O. Every person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction shall be fined not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) or more than five
hundred dollars ($500), to which may be added imprisonment in the county jail for a
term not exceeding ninety days.

   P. Nothing in this section shall restrict a claimant from being represented before the
workers' compensation administration by a nonattorney as long as that nonattorney
receives no compensation for that representation from the claimant.
History: 1978 Comp., § 52-1-54, enacted by Laws 1987, ch. 235, § 24; 1989, ch. 263, §
32; 1990 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 23; 1993, ch. 193, § 5; 2003, ch. 265, § 3; 2013, ch. 168, §
1; 2025, ch. 18, § 1.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Repeals and reenactments. — Laws 1987, ch. 235, § 24 repealed former 52-1-54
NMSA 1978, as reenacted by Laws 1986, ch. 22, § 18 concerning attorney's fees, cost,
penalties for violation, and enacted a new 52-1-54 NMSA 1978, effective June 19, 1987.

Compiler's notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 235, § 54A, effective June 19, 1987, repealed
Laws 1986, ch. 22, § 105 which had formerly repealed this section effective July 1,
1987.

The 2025 amendment, effective June 20, 2025, provided for increases in the amount of
money that can be advanced by employers for discovery costs, increased the maximum
amount of attorney fees that can be collected in a worker's compensation case, and
required the advisory council on workers' compensation and occupational disease
disablement to make recommendations to the legislature regarding any necessary
adjustments to the maximum allowable attorney fees or the limitation on discovery costs
that employers are required to advance; in Subsection D, after "up to a limit of" deleted
"three thousand dollars ($3,000)" and added "three thousand five hundred dollars
($3,500). Beginning January 1, 2027, the limit shall be four thousand dollars ($4,000),
and beginning January 1, 2029, the limit shall increase to four thousand five hundred
dollars ($4,500)"; in Subsection I, after "shall not exceed" deleted "twenty-two thousand
five hundred dollars ($22,500)" and added "thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) in calendar
year 2025. Beginning January 1, 2027, the maximum allowable attorney fees shall be
thirty-two thousand dollars ($32,000), and beginning January 1, 2029, the maximum
allowable attorney fees shall increase to thirty-four thousand dollars ($34,000)"; and
added a new Subsection N and redesignated the succeeding subsections accordingly.

The 2013 amendment, effective June 14, 2013, raised the limits for attorney fees; and
in Subsection I, in the first sentence, after "shall not exceed", deleted "sixteen thousand
five hundred dollars ($16,500)" and added "twenty-two thousand five hundred dollars
($22,500)", in the fourth sentence, after "additional amount exceed", deleted "two
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500)" and added "five thousand dollars ($5,000)", and
added the seventh sentence.

The 2003 amendment, effective June 20, 2003, substituted "three thousand dollars
($3,000)" for "one thousand dollars ($1,000)" following "discovery up to a limit of" near
the middle of Subsection D; and substituted "sixteen thousand five hundred dollars
($16,500)" for "twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500)" following "shall not
exceed" at the end of the first sentence in Subsection I.

The 1993 amendment, effective June 18, 1993, made minor stylistic changes in
Subsections C and E; in Subsection F(3), substituted "worker's" for "claimant's"
following "paid the" and added "and the worker shall pay one hundred percent of the
attorney's fees due to the workers' attorney" at the end of the paragraph; in Subsection
(F)(4), substituted "worker's" for "employer's" preceding "offer", "worker's" for
"claimant's" preceding "attorney", "worker" for "claimant", and "the worker's" for "his
attorneys' " preceding "fees"; deleted "Except for attorneys' fees incurred by an agency
of the state or any political subdivision of the state" at the beginning of Subsection M;
and made a minor stylistic change in Subsection O.

The 1990 (2nd S.S.) amendment, effective January 1, 1991, inserted "discovery costs;
offer of judgment" in the section catchline; substituted "administration" for "division"
throughout the section; added present Subsections D, F and M, redesignated former
Subsection D as Subsection E and former Subsections E through L as Subsections G
through O, rewriting those subsections; and made stylistic changes.

                         I.     GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Limit on attorney fees. — The limitation on attorney fees in Section 52-1-54I NMSA
1978 of the Workers' Compensation Act does not violate workers' state constitutional
rights to equal protection and due process. Wagner v. AGW Consultants, 2005-NMSC-
016, 137 N.M. 734, 114 P.3d 1050.

Provision does not violate due process clause. — Provision for allowance of
reasonable attorney's fee does not violate the due process clauses of the federal and
state constitutions. N.M. State Hwy. Dep't v. Bible, 1934-NMSC-025, 38 N.M. 372, 34
P.2d 295.

Constitutionality of limitation on attorney fees. — The limitation on attorney fees
contained in Subsection I does not violate the due process or equal protection
guarantees of the federal or state constitutions. Mieras v. Dyncorp, 1996-NMCA-095,
122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518, cert. denied, 122 N.M. 279, 923 P.2d 1164.

Standing to challenge constitutionality of limitation. — A worker's compensation
claimant had standing to raise an equal protection challenge to the cap on attorney fees
because, following a contested trial in which she was successful, the workers'
compensation judge found that the reasonable value of the services of her attorney was
in excess of the statutory limitation. Mieras v. Dyncorp, 1996-NMCA-095, 122 N.M. 401,
925 P.2d 518, cert. denied, 122 N.M. 279, 923 P.2d 1164.

Constitutional power to regulate the practice of law encompasses the regulation
of attorney fees generally, but not regulation of attorney fees within the workers'
compensation context specifically. — Regulation of attorney fees generally falls
within the purview of the New Mexico supreme court's inherent powers and power of
superintending control, but regulation of attorney fees specifically within the workers'
compensation context does not. Pena v. State, 2025-NMSC-041.
Subsection I does not unconstitutionally curb judicial review of attorney fee
awards in the Workers' Compensation Administration. — The standard for judicial
review in the workers' compensation context requires meaningful review of an
administrative decision by the court to determine whether the litigant received a fair
hearing before an impartial tribunal, whether the decision is supported by substantial
evidence, and whether the decision is in accordance with law. Pena v. State, 2025-
NMSC-041.

52-1-54(I) NMSA 1978 infringes on the New Mexico supreme court's power to
regulate attorney fees in appeals brought from the quasi-judicial workers
compensation administration to the judiciary's courts. — By purporting to regulate
attorney fees within the courts for appeals from the workers' compensation
administration, 52-1-54(I) NMSA 1978 infringes on the New Mexico supreme court's
constitutional power to regulate the practice of law and thus is nonbinding on courts.
Pena v. State, 2025-NMSC-041.

Section should be applied to ensure adequate compensation of workmen's
(workers') compensation claimants but avoid excessive legal fees. Superintendent of
Ins. v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 1986-NMCA-012, 104 N.M. 605, 725 P.2d 581.

Law in effect at time of injury governs award. — There is no reason to distinguish an
award of attorney's fees from any other benefit to which a claimant is entitled, and the
law in effect at the time of a claimant's injury, rather than the law in effect at the time of
the award of compensation benefits, applies to a determination of the claimant's
attorney's fees. Bateman v. Springer Bldg. Materials Corp., 1989-NMCA-039, 108 N.M.
655, 777 P.2d 383, cert. denied, 108 N.M. 681, 777 P.2d 1325.

Judicial award of attorney fees and expenses. — The legislature intended for a
district court that has entered judgment on a Workers' Compensation Division
supplemental order to retain jurisdiction for purposes of awarding additional attorney's
fees and additional medical expenses. Martinez v. Southwest Moving Specialists, 1990-
NMSC-048, 110 N.M. 68, 792 P.2d 45.

Cumulative limit on amount of fees. — Under Subsection G (now Subsection I),
$12,500 (now $16,500) is a cumulative limit on the amount of attorney's fees to be
awarded for all legal services relative to a single accidental injury. Garcia v. Mt. Taylor
Millwork, Inc., 1989-NMCA-100, 111 N.M. 17, 801 P.2d 87 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 110
N.M. 282, 795 P.2d 87.

Award of attorney's fee is authorized in each case, and the award is for an amount
the trial court deems reasonable and proper. The amount awarded will not be disturbed
except for an abuse of discretion. Salazar v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 1973-NMCA-068, 85
N.M. 254, 511 P.2d 580, cert. denied, 85 N.M. 229, 511 P.2d 555.
"Economic loss". — A delay in payment does not in itself constitute an "economic
loss" within the meaning of this section. Pineda v. Grande Drilling Corp., 1991-NMCA-
004, 111 N.M. 536, 807 P.2d 234 (decided under former law).

"Present value of the award" means value computed as of date of award to the
workman (worker). Davis v. Homestake Mining Co., 1986-NMCA-082, 105 N.M. 2, 727
P.2d 941, cert. denied, 104 N.M. 702, 726 P.2d 856.

Attorney's fees are not "compensation" for the purpose of allowing attorney fees.
Archuleta v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1986-NMCA-092, 104 N.M. 769, 727 P.2d 77.

Claim initiation is court "proceeding". — Initiation of a claim for workman's (worker's)
compensation benefits is a court "proceeding." Rumpf v. Rainbo Baking Co., 1981-
NMCA-037, 96 N.M. 1, 626 P.2d 1303, cert. denied, 96 N.M. 17, 627 P.2d 412.

Award of attorneys' fees should have run to claimant and not to attorneys. Scott v.
Transwestern Tankers, Inc., 1963-NMSC-205, 73 N.M. 219, 387 P.2d 327.

Judgment of attorneys' fees by the court runs to the claimant but such award of
attorney's fees is for claimant's attorney. Reed v. Styron, 1961-NMSC-119, 69 N.M.
262, 365 P.2d 912.

Trial court's consideration of plaintiff's motion. — Where certain nonmandatory
items relied on by plaintiff were presented to the trial court by motion some two and one
half months before the trial court's letter opinion awarding $1500 as attorney's fees, it
could not be said as a matter of law that the trial court failed to consider plaintiff's motion
or that it failed to give proper weight, under the law, to the items listed in the motion.
Escobedo v. Agriculture Prods. Co., 1974-NMCA-063, 86 N.M. 466, 525 P.2d 393.

Attorney fees not taxed as costs. — This section requires attorney fees to be
compensation and not taxed as costs. Genuine Parts Co. v. Garcia, 1978-NMSC-059,
92 N.M. 57, 582 P.2d 1270.

Separate hearing on the issue of attorneys' fees is permissible, but not required.
Morgan v. Public Serv. Co., 1982-NMCA-152, 98 N.M. 775, 652 P.2d 1226; Sanchez v.
Homestake Mining Co., 1985-NMCA-022, 102 N.M. 473, 697 P.2d 156.

Claimant absent from hearing on attorney's fees. — It was not error for the workers'
compensation judge to proceed without claimant's presence at the hearing on attorney's
fees, where any information regarding a fee agreement between claimant and her
attorney could have been obtained by cross-examining the attorney. Sanchez v.
Siemens Transmission Sys., 1991-NMCA-028, 112 N.M. 236, 814 P.2d 104, rev'd on
other grounds, 1991-NMSC-093, 112 N.M. 533, 817 P.2d 726.

No challenge to award without findings. — An employer who requests no findings on
the issue of attorneys fees cannot contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support an
award by the workers' compensation administration. Apodaca v. Payroll Express, Inc.,
1993-NMCA-141, 116 N.M. 816, 867 P.2d 1198.

When employer failed to request findings, it waived all arguments as to the form of
the ruling of the workers' compensation judge; however, there is no requirement that
every order setting attorney fees be supported by specific findings and since the record
was sufficiently clear to allow the appellate court to clearly understand which issues
were raised and argued to the trial court and not abandoned, the appellate court could
address those issues on the merits. Cordova v. Taos Ski Valley, Inc., 1996-NMCA-009,
121 N.M. 258, 910 P.2d 334.

Counsel's statement of hours spent on case as basis for finding. — Whether a
statement of counsel as to the number of hours spent on a case is sworn or not goes to
the weight which should be accorded the statement, and to its admissibility; the fact that
counsel's statement was not under oath should, like the fact that it was not corroborated
by other evidence, affect the weight with which the statement is taken, but it does not
make the statement an improper basis for a finding. Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
1985-NMSC-018, 102 N.M. 333, 695 P.2d 483.

The use of the phrase "or the supreme court upon appeal" in former Subsection D
of this section was merely a matter of legislative imprecision and was not meant to bar
awards of attorney fees on appeal; rather, it was to be understood as though it read
"and the supreme court upon appeal." Shahan v. Beasley Hot Shot Serv., Inc., 1978-
NMCA-014, 91 N.M. 462, 575 P.2d 1347 (decided under former law).

Compromise not set aside due to ignorance of law change. — Where a
compromise settlement has been reached without fraud or imposition, a party may not
have that compromise set aside on the basis that he was ignorant of an antecedent
change in the general law which affects the matter which has been compromised as it is
the policy of the law to favor compromise and settlement. Esquibel v. Brown Constr.
Co., 1973-NMCA-111, 85 N.M. 487, 513 P.2d 1269, cert. denied, 85 N.M. 483, 513
P.2d 1265.

Oral stipulation for compromise in court binding as written agreement. — Where
the record of the "settlement proceedings" before the trial court shows a settlement had
been reached, shows the details of the settlement and the trial court's approval of that
settlement, and the record shows the parties contemplated putting the terms of the
settlement in a written agreement to be signed by the parties, but there is nothing
showing the settlement was not to be effective until this was done, then an oral
stipulation for the compromise and settlement of claims growing out of personal injuries
made in open court in the presence of the parties and preserved in the record of the
court is as binding as a written agreement. Esquibel v. Brown Constr. Co., 1973-NMCA-
111, 85 N.M. 487, 513 P.2d 1269, cert. denied, 85 N.M. 483, 513 P.2d 1265.

Fee premature where case remanded for new trial. — Where an order reducing
plaintiff's compensation under New Mexico Workmen's (Workers') Compensation Act is
appealed from and must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial on the
application for diminution of the award for compensation, any pronouncement upon the
question of attorney's fees is premature. Ennen v. Southwest Potash Co., 1959-NMSC-
025, 65 N.M. 307, 336 P.2d 1062.

Erroneous statement regarding cost of attorney. — If reference was erroneously
made by claimant and his attorney to cost of employing counsel as explanatory of
claimant's delay in bringing suit and as to reasonableness of claimant's failure to employ
counsel during the negotiations, the error was cured by the court's direction to the jury
to disregard statements about the attorney fees and similar matters. Elsea v. Broome
Furniture Co., 1943-NMSC-036, 47 N.M. 356, 143 P.2d 572.

Claimed prejudice must be clearly shown. — If prejudice is claimed as result of
erroneous admission of evidence in the trial of a compensation claim the prejudice must
be clearly shown or it will be considered that instruction to the jury to disregard the
inadmissible evidence properly cured the error. Elsea v. Broome Furniture Co., 1943-
NMSC-036, 47 N.M. 356, 143 P.2d 572.

Fees for medical witnesses not assessed against defendant. — The court is not
required to assess against the defendants the fees allowed any medical witness and
like attorneys' fees, other fees and expenses must be borne by the parties themselves,
in the absence of a statute shifting the incidence of such expenses. Hales v. Van
Cleave, 1967-NMCA-006, 78 N.M. 181, 429 P.2d 379, cert. denied, 78 N.M. 198, 429
P.2d 657.

                                 II.    AWARD OF FEES.

Trial court shall award attorney's fees to successful claimant under certain
conditions, but the award must be made to the claimant and not to his attorney. Lloyd
v. Lloyd, 1956-NMSC-007, 60 N.M. 441, 292 P.2d 121.

Award of attorney's fee is authorized in each case. — An attorney for claimant in
prosecuting claimant's suit through the lower court and supreme court is entitled to an
allowance for compensation in addition to the compensation awarded claimant. Points
v. Wills, 1939-NMSC-041, 44 N.M. 31, 97 P.2d 374.

Where injured employee notified his employer of injury within time prescribed by law,
and the employer paid compensation for a short period of time, and thereafter refused
to pay further compensation, employee, filing and being allowed claim for such further
compensation, was entitled to attorney's fee for trial in district court. Wells v. Gulf Ref.
Co., 1938-NMSC-033, 42 N.M. 378, 79 P.2d 921.

When it is determined by the court, from the evidence before it, that a claimant is legally
entitled to benefits which have been refused him and a recovery thereof is allowed, the
court is authorized under the section to award attorney fees to the claimant and the
award for the services of appellee's attorneys, though not supported by direct evidence,
must stand. Scott v. Transwestern Tankers, Inc., 1963-NMSC-205, 73 N.M. 219, 387
P.2d 327.

"Single accidental injury" construed. — For an injury to be found accidental in New
Mexico, it must not be foreseeable, and a subsequent injury that flows from a primary
workplace injury may constitute a "single accidental injury." Martin v. State, 2025-
NMSC-044, rev'g in part A-1-CA-36527, mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App. June 24, 2020)
(nonprecedential).

Worker suffered more than one "accidental injury" within the meaning of the
Workers' Compensation Act attorney fees provision. — Where worker suffered a
workplace slip and fall on an icy sidewalk requiring knee surgery to repair damage to his
knee, after which worker developed a bacterial infection, which was treated with a
particular antibiotic via a PICC line in worker's knee, which caused worker to suffer an
unexpected allergic reaction to the antibiotic causing him to develop pneumonia which
led to cardiac and respiratory failure and oxygen deprivation and resulted in what was
classified as a traumatic brain injury, and where the subsequent removal of the PICC
line resulted in a pulmonary embolism injury, and where, after a trial before a workers'
compensation judge (WCJ) in which worker was awarded over $659,000 in medical and
disability benefits, the WCJ found that worker sustained two separate and distinct
accidents, resulting in at least two separate and distinct injuries and awarded two
attorney fee caps based on a finding of two accidental injuries, the WCJ erred in
awarding only two attorney fee caps, because the plain language of the statute
indicates a subsequent injury that flows from a primary workplace injury may constitute
a "single accidental injury" for purposes of awarding attorney fees under 52-1-54(I)
NMSA 1978, and in this case, the record supports three single accidental injuries to
worker, one primary workplace injury and two subsequent injuries. Worker was entitled
to collect an attorney fee cap for the primary injury as well as for each subsequent
accidental injury. Martin v. State, 2025-NMSC-044, rev'g in part A-1-CA-36527, mem.
op. (N.M. Ct. App. June 24, 2020) (nonprecedential).

Attorney's fees awarded even though employer does not appeal. — The statutory
authority to award attorney's fees exists even though the employer is satisfied with the
trial court judgment and an unsuccessful claimant appeals in an effort to obtain a part of
the compensation awarded to a successful claimant. Aragon v. Anaconda Mining Co.,
1982-NMCA-076, 98 N.M. 65, 644 P.2d 1054.

Attorney fees can be awarded in suit for medical expenses only. Minnerup v.
Stewart Bros. Drilling Co., 1979-NMCA-125, 93 N.M. 561, 603 P.2d 300, cert. denied,
94 N.M. 629, 614 P.2d 546 (1979), overruled on other grounds by Raines v. W.A.
Klinger & Sons, 1988-NMSC-083, 107 N.M. 668, 763 P.2d 684.

Amount of fees to be fixed and allowed by court is discretionary. Mascarenas v.
Kennedy, 1964-NMSC-179, 74 N.M. 665, 397 P.2d 312.
The award of attorney's fees in a workmen's (workers') compensation case is
discretionary with the court. Herndon v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 1978-NMSC-090, 92
N.M. 287, 587 P.2d 434.

The amount of the award is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Manzanares v.
Lerner's, Inc., 1985-NMSC-022, 102 N.M. 391, 696 P.2d 479; Smith v. Trailways, Inc.,
1986-NMCA-001, 103 N.M. 741, 713 P.2d 557.

Fees under stipulated agreement. — Although the parties entered into a stipulated
agreement, and there was no contested agreement, Paragraph F(4) was applicable,
and the workers' compensation judge erred in not holding the employer responsible for
paying one hundred percent of the worker's attorney's fees. Hise v. City of Albuquerque,
2003-NMCA-015, 133 N.M. 133 , 61 P.3d 842.

Authority to require statement of employer's attorney's fees. — A worker's
compensation judge had the authority under Subsection I to require an employer's
counsel to file a pleading detailing his legal fees as a means of facilitating the legislative
policy of discouraging excessive litigation of compensation claims. Jurado v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 1996-NMCA-112, 122 N.M. 519, 927 P.2d 1057.

Award for double representation (i.e., by two attorneys) was impermissible under
this section which speaks of "attorney" in the singular. While there is no restriction on
the number of attorneys a worker may engage, a reasonable fee will be allowed only for
single representation. Archuleta v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1986-NMCA-092, 104 N.M.
769, 727 P.2d 77.

Scope of Subsection E. — Subsection D (now Subsection E) does not define the
permissible scope of compensable legal representation. Rather, that subsection
describes but one of several classes of cases in which reasonable attorney's fees may
be recovered under the Workers' Compensation Act. Sanchez v. Siemens Transmission
Sys., 1991-NMSC-093, 112 N.M. 533, 817 P.2d 726.

The amount of the award of attorney's fees is discretionary with the trial court, and
in exercising that discretion, the trial court must consider the mandatory provisions of
Subsection D. Escobedo v. Agriculture Prods. Co., 1974-NMCA-063, 86 N.M. 466, 525
P.2d 393.

Amount of award of attorneys' fees in workmen's (workers') compensation
proceeding is discretionary with the trial court and will not be disturbed except for
abuse of discretion. Hedgecock v. Vandiver, 1970-NMCA-117, 82 N.M. 140, 477 P.2d
316.

The amount of the award of attorney's fees is discretionary. — The award of
attorney fees is discretionary with the trial court and will not be disturbed except for
abuse of discretion. Adams v. Loffland Bros. Drilling Co., 1970-NMCA-114, 82 N.M. 72,
475 P.2d 466; Pacheco v. Alamo Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 1978-NMCA-057, 91 N.M.
730, 580 P.2d 498; Gearhart v. Eidson Metal Prods., 1979-NMCA-019, 92 N.M. 763,
595 P.2d 401; Marez v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 1978-NMCA-128, 93 N.M. 9, 595
P.2d 1204, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 532, 591 P.2d 286 (1979).

The workers' compensation judge, in his sound discretion and using all relevant and
statutory judicial factors, should determine whether to award attorney's fees for services
rendered prior to termination of the claimant's benefits. In so doing, due consideration
must be given to the relationship that pretermination counseling bears to the
successfully recovered award. Sanchez v. Siemens Transmission Sys., 1991-NMSC-
093, 112 N.M. 533, 817 P.2d 726.

Award of fees will not be disturbed except for abuse of discretion. — Amount of
the award of attorney fees is discretionary with the trial court, and will not be disturbed
except for abuse of discretion. Ortega v. N.M. State Hwy. Dep't, 1966-NMSC-250, 77
N.M. 185, 420 P.2d 771; Lamont v. N.M. Military Inst., 1979-NMCA-047, 92 N.M. 804,
595 P.2d 774, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 675, 593 P.2d 1078.

Only where the workers' compensation judge exceeds his or her discretion will an
appellate court upset a fee award. Sanchez v. Siemens Transmission Sys., 1991-
NMSC-093, 112 N.M. 533, 817 P.2d 726.

Even if case is settled before trial, attorney is entitled to adequate compensation
for work necessarily done on the case. Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1985-
NMSC-018, 102 N.M. 333, 695 P.2d 483.

Pre-termination attorney consultation fees. — There is no statutory impediment to
compensating attorneys for time reasonably spent counseling clients prior to termination
of benefits. Only if the employer does not wrongly terminate benefits should the
employer clearly not be liable for consultation fees. Sanchez v. Siemens Transmission
Sys., 1991-NMSC-093, 112 N.M. 533, 817 P.2d 726.

Attorneys' fees may only be awarded when there has been recovery of
compensation by the claimant. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Jarde, 1963-NMSC-
215, 73 N.M. 371, 388 P.2d 382.

The allowance of attorney fees is limited to recovery of compensation and an appellant
who has failed to sustain his claim is not entitled to a fee, in addition to the amount
allowed by the trial court, by reason of the appeal. Rowland v. Reynolds Elec. Eng'g
Co., 1951-NMSC-046, 55 N.M. 287, 232 P.2d 689.

Plaintiff's request for an award of attorney's fees is premature as attorney's fees are
awarded only when there has been an award of compensation and at this point there is
no such award. Ortiz v. Ortiz & Torres Dri-Wall Co., 1972-NMCA-005, 83 N.M. 452, 493
P.2d 418.
The recovery of compensation is a prerequisite to the allowance of attorneys' fees.
Sisneros v. Breese Indus., Inc., 1963-NMSC-166, 73 N.M. 101, 385 P.2d 960, overruled
on other grounds by American Tank & Steel Corp. v. Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052, 90
N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030.

Plaintiff's attorney in workmen's (workers') compensation proceeding is not entitled to an
attorney fee unless compensation is recovered herein. Geeslin v. Goodno, Inc., 1965-
NMSC-053, 75 N.M. 174, 402 P.2d 156.

Where the supreme court reverses a holding by the trial court that a claim under the
Workmen's (Workers') Compensation Act is premature, no attorney's fees can be
granted the appellant for his appeal if no award has yet been made. Magee v.
Albuquerque Gravel Prods. Co., 1959-NMSC-027, 65 N.M. 314, 336 P.2d 1066.

Recovery of compensation is a prerequisite to the allowance of attorneys' fees. Witt v.
Marcum Drilling Co., 1964-NMSC-029, 73 N.M. 466, 389 P.2d 403; Morgan v. Pub.
Serv. Co., 1982-NMCA-152, 98 N.M. 775, 652 P.2d 1226.

Until there has been an award of compensation at the trial court level, an allowance of
attorney's fees in a workmen's (workers') compensation case is improper. Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. Guerra, 1978-NMSC-053, 92 N.M. 47, 582 P.2d 819.

The award of attorney's fees must be predicated upon a successful recovery by the
claimant of workmen's (workers') compensation or other medical or related benefits to
which the workman (worker) is entitled. Montoya v. Anaconda Mining Co., 1981-NMCA-
113, 97 N.M. 1, 635 P.2d 1323.

Unless worker is entitled to compensation or medical benefits, an allowance of
attorney's fees is improper. Douglass v. State, 1991-NMCA-041, 112 N.M. 183, 812
P.2d 1331, cert. denied, 112 N.M. 77, 811 P.2d 575; Alcala v. Saint Francis Gardens,
1993-NMCA-134, 116 N.M. 510, 864 P.2d 326.

Although formal award of compensation not required. — A formal award of
compensation by the trial court is not required before attorney's fees are appropriate. So
long as the claimant receives compensation due to the services performed by his
attorney, such as initiating a claim for benefits after payments are refused by the
employer, the claimant is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees. Rumpf v.
Rainbo Baking Co., 1981-NMCA-037, 96 N.M. 1, 626 P.2d 1303, cert. denied, 96 N.M.
17, 627 P.2d 412.

Attorney fees not allowed unless recovery exceeds amount tendered. — An
attorney's fee shall not be allowed unless the recovery in court "exceeds the amount
tendered by the employer prior to court proceedings." Rhodes v. Cottle Constr. Co.,
1960-NMSC-130, 68 N.M. 18, 357 P.2d 672.
Evidentiary basis must support an award of attorney's fees. Jennings v. Gabaldon,
1982-NMCA-016, 97 N.M. 416, 640 P.2d 522, overruled on other grounds by Woodson
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1985-NMSC-018, 102 N.M. 333, 695 P.2d 483.

An award of fees must have evidentiary support. Candelaria v. Gen. Elec. Co., 1986-
NMCA-016, 105 N.M. 167, 730 P.2d 470, cert. quashed, 105 N.M. 111, 729 P.2d 1365.

Where plaintiff's attorneys submitted statements of services rendered, this was
"evidentiary support" for the award of attorneys fees in a workmen's (workers')
compensation case. Lopez v. K.B. Kennedy Eng'g Co., 1981-NMCA-011, 95 N.M. 507,
623 P.2d 1021.

Attorneys' affidavits of services rendered, the trial court's first-hand knowledge of the
attorneys' work on the issues and proceedings, and the outcome of that work are
sufficient evidentiary support for an award under this section. Gonzales v. Bates Lumber
Co., 1981-NMCA-052, 96 N.M. 422, 631 P.2d 328.

Amount of attorney's fees awarded is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion
under this section. Escobedo v. Agric. Prods. Co., 1974-NMCA-063, 86 N.M. 466, 525
P.2d 393.

Even when made pursuant to Subsection D (now Subsection E), the attorney's fee
award is reviewable for abuse of discretion. Provencio v. N.J. Zinc Co., 1974-NMCA-
048, 86 N.M. 538, 525 P.2d 898, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 528, 525 P.2d 888.

Record showed attorney's services. — Where, although plaintiff never offered any
specific or detailed evidence of services performed by his attorney, a reading of the
record clearly showed the attorney prepared the complaint for plaintiff, took depositions
and represented plaintiff in the trial of the case, and the record failed to show an offer of
settlement, and recovery was effected by plaintiff, plaintiff was entitled to recover
attorney's fees. Brannon v. Well Units, Inc., 1970-NMCA-130, 82 N.M. 253, 479 P.2d
533.

Refusal to award attorney's fees not error. — Where there is no dispute as to
defendants' liability for medical prescriptions, and where there is no evidence that, in
advance of the hearing, defendants were asked to pay or refused to pay for such
prescriptions, the trial court does not err in refusing to award attorney's fees. Tafoya v.
Leonard Tire Co., 1980-NMCA-106, 94 N.M. 716, 616 P.2d 429.

Attorney's fees recoverable as separate award. — In workmen's (workers')
compensation suits, attorney's fees awarded for successful representation of injured
claimants are recoverable against the employer as a separate and distinct award, apart
from the workman's (worker's) award. Brazfield v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 1979-
NMCA-100, 93 N.M. 417, 600 P.2d 1207, cert. denied, 93 N.M. 205, 598 P.2d 1165.
Attorney's fees on appeal are authorized if the employer refuses to pay
compensation and the claimant thereafter collects compensation in the trial court. In this
situation, attorney's fees may be awarded against the employer, both in the trial court
and on appeal. Lauderdale v. Hydro Conduit Corp., 1976-NMCA-095, 89 N.M. 579, 555
P.2d 700.

Fees on cross-appeal. — Where plaintiff claims attorney fees on appeal if he won the
appeal proper or the cross-appeal, and where he received no additional compensation,
he is not entitled to attorney fees on his appeal. However, where he has successfully
defended against the cross-appeal, he is entitled to an attorney fee for such services.
Willcox v. United Nuclear Homestake Sapin Co., 1971-NMCA-126, 83 N.M. 73, 488
P.2d 123.

Fees where only result of hearing was lump-sum award. — Where plaintiff made a
demand for lump-sum settlement and the amount of compensation demanded was not
in excess of what plaintiff was first awarded and plaintiff was already receiving
maximum compensation, then although the sole result of the hearing was to lump-sum
that amount, less discount, rather than pay over a period of 500 weeks award of
employee's attorney's fee was not error. Livingston v. Loffland Bros., 1974-NMCA-047,
86 N.M. 375, 524 P.2d 991, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 372, 524 P.2d 988.

Award of fees even though prior judgment reduced. — A workman (worker) is
entitled to an award of attorney's fees in connection with a hearing to modify a prior
judgment allowing benefits, where the employer is unsuccessful in its claim that the
workman (worker) no longer has any disability, even if the prior judgment is ordered
reduced. Jaramillo v. Kaufman Plumbing & Heating Co., 1985-NMSC-089, 103 N.M.
400, 708 P.2d 312.

Attorney's fees awarded under wrong statute. — Workers' compensation division's
possible error in awarding attorney fees under the wrong statute does not make the
award error for lack of jurisdiction. Tallman v. Arkansas Best Freight, 1988-NMCA-091,
108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363, cert. denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305.

Additional fees where other rights determined. — An award to plaintiff of additional
attorney's fees for services of his attorneys in this court is not limited to instances where
those services produce increased compensation, but may be given where other rights,
sometimes of equal importance, may be determined in his favor by virtue of the appeal.
Mann v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 1954-NMSC-088, 58 N.M. 626, 274 P.2d 145.

Where right to compensation affirmatively determined. — For legal services
rendered in an appeal which affirmatively determines plaintiff's right to payment of past
compensation benefits and attorney fees, plaintiff is entitled to an additional attorney
fee. Romo v. Raton Coca Cola Co., 1981-NMCA-120, 96 N.M. 765, 635 P.2d 320.

Where additional legal services required by employer's actions. — If by conduct
prior to an appeal, an employer causes additional legal services to be rendered in an
appeal, separate and apart from the appeal itself, and the additional services rendered
benefit the workman (worker), the workman (worker) is entitled to an attorney fee for
additional services rendered. Romo v. Raton Coca Cola Co., 1981-NMCA-120, 96 N.M.
765, 635 P.2d 320.

Additional attorney's fees for employer's bad faith were not justified. Murphy v.
Duke City Pizza, Inc., 1994-NMCA-085, 118 N.M. 346, 881 P.2d 706, cert. denied, 118
N.M. 430, 882 P.2d 21.

Award of attorney fees upon a finding of bad faith. — In a workers’ compensation
case where the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) found that insurer had willfully
disregarded worker’s rights, had violated the WCJ’s orders, and knew that there was no
reasonable basis for its conduct, and where the WCJ determined that insurer’s conduct
constituted bad faith, the WCJ did not err in failing to assess attorney fees entirely to
insurer when the prior version of 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 explicitly stated that attorney fees
shall be shared equally by the worker and the employer, despite worker’s reliance on a
workers’ compensation regulation, that could be read in a manner inconsistent with 52-
1-54 NMSA 1978, to support his argument that it was reasonable to asses one hundred
percent of worker’s attorney fees to insurer. Romero v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc.,
2015-NMCA-107, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-009.

Award of attorneys fees not proper. — Where an employer terminated a claimant's
temporary benefits, alleging that the claimant failed to follow the advice of his doctor,
without seeking an order to terminate, the employer's conduct did not constitute fraud,
malice, oppression or willful, wanton or reckless disregard of the claimant's rights; thus,
the hearing officer erred in awarding attorney's fees. Cass v. Timberman Corp., 1990-
NMCA-061, 110 N.M. 158, 793 P.2d 288, rev'd on other grounds, 1990-NMSC-112, 111
N.M. 184, 803 P.2d 669.

Award not allowed where based on unsuccessful claim for lump-sum award. —
Where a demand for a lump-sum award has been refused and a claimant successfully
obtains a lump-sum award in court proceedings, attorney's fees may be awarded. An
attorney fee award based on an unsuccessful claim for a lump-sum award is erroneous
because not authorized. Morgan v. Public Serv. Co., 1982-NMCA-152, 98 N.M. 775,
652 P.2d 1226.

                        III.   FACTORS DETERMINING FEES.

This section is not based on contingent fee standard, but as the trial court did take
into consideration in fixing a reasonable fee the sum offered by the defendants and the
present value of the award made in the workman's (worker's) favor, then amount
awarded as attorney's fee was not an abuse of discretion. Trujillo v. Tanuz, 1973-
NMCA-048, 85 N.M. 35, 508 P.2d 1332.

Range of fee amount. — A useful range for trial courts to keep in mind when awarding
attorney's fees is generally between 10% to 20% of the total award depending on the
complexity of the case; the pertinent inquiry should be to determine whether the
attorney contributed anything to the case for which he should be paid. County of
Bernalillo v. Sisneros, 1994-NMCA-156, 119 N.M. 98, 888 P.2d 980.

Award is not to be set at a specific percentage of the recovery. Candelaria v.
General Elec. Co., 1986-NMCA-016, 105 N.M. 167, 730 P.2d 470, cert. quashed, 105
N.M. 111, 729 P.2d 1365.

Fee based on facts existing when services rendered. — As a general matter, the
claimant's attorney's fee should be based on the facts as to his services in the
compensation case as of the time the services were rendered, and should not be at the
mercy of subsequent or collateral events over which he has no control. Davis v.
Homestake Mining Co., 1986-NMCA-082, 105 N.M. 2, 727 P.2d 941, cert. denied, 104
N.M. 702, 726 P.2d 856.

Guidelines to determine amount to award for attorney's fees in workmen's
(workers') compensation cases include the following considerations: the chilling effect of
miserly fees upon the ability of an injured workman (worker) to obtain adequate
representation; the fees normally charged in the locality for similar legal services; and
the amount involved. Fryar v. Johnsen, 1979-NMSC-080, 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718.

In arriving at a proper attorney fee, it is proper for a trial court to consider the amount of
the compensation award, and to use a percentage of that award as one factor, along
with the requirements of this section and the Fryar factors, i.e., (1) the chilling effect of
miserly fees upon the ability of an injured workman (worker) to obtain adequate
representation; (2) the time and effort expended by the attorney; (3) the extent to which
the issues were contested; (4) the novelty and complexity of the issues involved; (5) the
fees normally charged in the locality for similar legal services; (6) the ability, experience,
skill and reputation of the attorney; (7) the relative success of the workman (worker) in
the court proceeding; (8) the amount involved; and (9) the rate of inflation. Woodson v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 1985-NMSC-018, 102 N.M. 333, 695 P.2d 483.

When determining reasonable attorney fees, the workers' compensation judge must
consider the present value of the award made in the claimant's favor. However, the
amount of the worker's award is not the sole inquiry. Other factors to consider are those
set forth in Fryar v. Johnsen, 1979-NMSC-080, 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718: success of
claimant, extent to which issues contested, complexity of the issues, experience of
attorney, cost of living, and time/effort expended. Sanchez v. Siemens Transmission
Sys., 1991-NMCA-028, 112 N.M. 236, 814 P.2d 104, rev'd on other grounds, 1991-
NMSC-093, 112 N.M. 533, 817 P.2d 726.

Factors in determining attorney's fees. — In addition to those stated in Subsection D
(now Subsection E) of this section, factors to be considered in awarding attorney's fees
include the length of the transcript of the proceedings in the trial court, the amount of the
award and the results. Gearhart v. Eidson Metal Prods., 1979-NMCA-019, 92 N.M. 763,
595 P.2d 401.
In determining the amount to award for attorney's fees in workmen's (workers')
compensation cases the courts consider the following factors: the relative success of
the workman (worker) in the court proceedings; the extent to which the issues were
contested; the complexity of the issues; the ability, standing, skill and experience of the
attorney; the rise in the cost of living; and the time and effort expended by the attorney
in the particular case. Fryar v. Johnsen, 1979-NMSC-080, 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718;
Gonzales v. Bates Lumber Co., 1981-NMCA-052, 96 N.M. 422, 631 P.2d 328.

In most instances, a lawyer's skill, ability, experience and standing in the legal
community, and the rising cost of living, as well as other recognized factors may be
judicially noticed in fixing an attorney's fee in a workmen's (workers') compensation
case. Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1985-NMSC-018, 102 N.M. 333, 695 P.2d
483.

Facility in non-English speaking claimant's own language can be a proper factor in
awarding attorney's fees and worker's counsel bears the burden of providing evidentiary
support for his assertion that his language ability actually facilitated his representation of
worker. Medina v. Honemuller Constr., Inc., 2005-NMCA-123, 138 N.M. 422, 122 P.3d
839.

Length of disability to be considered. — In determining the amount of the proper
award of attorney fees, the trial court should calculate the award in part upon the
evidence in the case indicating whether there is a likelihood that the disability will extend
beyond a six-month period. Amos v. Gilbert W. Corp., 1985-NMCA-106, 103 N.M. 631,
711 P.2d 908.

Amount of recovery is one of factors to be considered in determining the amount of
the fee to be allowed to the attorney for the claimant. Seal v. Blackburn Tank Truck
Serv., 1958-NMSC-087, 64 N.M. 282, 327 P.2d 797.

The relationship between the fee award and the recovery is but one of several important
elements that bear on the reasonableness of the attorney's fee. Sanchez v. Siemens
Transmission Sys., 1991-NMSC-093, 112 N.M. 533, 817 P.2d 726.

Review of determining fees in compensation case. — The ability, standing, skill, the
amount in controversy, its importance and the benefits derived, go to the matter of
determining fees in workmen's (workers') compensation cases. The court's award,
though not supported by direct evidence, will not be disturbed upon review unless it
plainly appears from the record that there has been an abuse of discretion. Shillinglaw
v. Owen Shillinglaw Fuel Co., 1962-NMSC-047, 70 N.M. 65, 370 P.2d 502.

Attorney's time spent and effort expended relevant but not dispositive. — The
time spent and the effort expended by the attorney, while relevant, is not always
dispositive of the amount of attorney fees to be awarded. Fryar v. Johnsen, 1979-
NMSC-080, 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718.
An award of attorney's fees may not be based solely on the amount of time the plaintiff's
attorney has expended on the litigation. Jennings v. Gabaldon, 1982-NMCA-016, 97
N.M. 416, 640 P.2d 522, overruled on other grounds by Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 1985-NMSC-018, 102 N.M. 333, 695 P.2d 483.

Amount of work expended by attorney not determinative factor in fixing a
reasonable attorney's fee. Marez v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 1978-NMCA-128, 93
N.M. 9, 595 P.2d 1204, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 532, 591 P.2d 286.

Failure to consider work performed abuse of discretion. — Although the amount of
work performed by an attorney is not determinative of the amount of his fee, the failure
to consider the work performed is an abuse of discretion. Lamont v. N.M. Military Inst.,
1979-NMCA-047, 92 N.M. 804, 595 P.2d 774, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 675, 593 P.2d
1078.

Factors not included in section for determining attorney's fees. — Subsection D
(now Subsection E) does not include among those considerations for determining a
reasonable attorney's fee the amount of work expended by a claimant's attorney, the
novelty and difficulty of the issues involved nor the amount of work performed. Lamont
v. N.M. Military Inst., 1979-NMCA-047, 92 N.M. 804, 595 P.2d 774, cert. denied, 92
N.M. 674, 593 P.2d 1078.

Failure to consider all proper factors. — Where a workers' compensation judge
refused to consider any benefit to the worker provided by his attorney in preserving both
compensation benefits and a tort recovery, there was a refusal of a proper factor in the
calculation of attorney fees. Martinez v. Eight N. Indian Pueblo Council, Inc., 1997-
NMCA-078, 123 N.M. 677, 944 P.2d 906.

Possibility of future reduction in benefits cannot be feasible consideration in the
award of attorney fees since such a possibility cannot always be anticipated. Marez v.
Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 1978-NMCA-128, 93 N.M. 9, 595 P.2d 1204, cert. denied,
92 N.M. 532, 591 P.2d 286 (1979).

Medical and hospital expenses are compensation for purpose of allowing
attorney's fees under Subsection D (now E). Schiller v. Southwest Air Rangers, Inc.,
1975-NMSC-018, 87 N.M. 476, 535 P.2d 1327.

Fee based on percentage of final award. — An appellate court cannot say as a
matter of law that the trial court abused its discretion merely because its award of
attorney's fees was based on a percentage figure of the final award. Marez v. Kerr-
McGee Nuclear Corp., 1978-NMCA-128, 93 N.M. 9, 595 P.2d 1204, cert. denied, 92
N.M. 532, 591 P.2d 286 (1979).

A trial court is not to base attorney's fees purely upon some percentage of the
workman's (worker's) recovery, but neither is a trial court prohibited from using a
percentage of the recovery as a factor in its determination of what shall constitute a
reasonable fee. Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1985-NMSC-018, 102 N.M. 333,
695 P.2d 483.

Medical expenses are compensation for purposes of determining award of
attorney's fees. Such expenses, however, are those that have already occurred, not
expenses that might occur in the future. Board of Educ. v. Quintana, 1985-NMSC-020,
102 N.M. 433, 697 P.2d 116.

Findings as to factors in awarding fees. — An award of attorney fees must have
evidentiary support. The worker's compensation judge, however, is not required to make
a finding of fact on each factor set forth for attorney fees under Fryar v. Johnsen, 1979-
NMSC-080, 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718; Sanchez v. Siemens Transmission Sys., 1991-
NMCA-028, 112 N.M. 236, 814 P.2d 104, rev'd on other grounds, 1991-NMSC-093, 112
N.M. 533, 817 P.2d 726.

Trial court must make specific findings as to each Fryar and statutory factor as to
which there is evidentiary support in determining attorney's fees. Sanchez v. Homestake
Mining Co., 1985-NMCA-022, 102 N.M. 473, 697 P.2d 156, citing Fryar v. Johnsen,
1979-NMSC-080, 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718.

Fees improperly awarded on basis of future medical needs. — Where the workers'
compensation judge improperly considered the value of future surgery in awarding
attorney's fee, that component of the fee award was set aside. Buckingham v. Health S.
Rehab. Hosp., 1997-NMCA-127, 124 N.M. 419, 952 P.2d 20.

Future medical benefits. — Medical benefits yet to be received constitute future
medical benefits, and the value of those benefits may not be considered in determining
attorney's fees even though the value of those benefits may be calculated with certainty
at present. Medina v. Hunemuller Constr., Inc., 2005-NMCA-123, 138 N.M. 472, 122
P.3d 839.

                                 IV.    FEE SHIFTING.

Fee shifting. — The purpose of Section 52-1-54F NMSA 1978 would be undercut by a
determination that parties cannot enter into settlements where the maximum medical
improvement date is to be determined at a later date due to a worker's continuing
healing process. The time and effort expended by an attorney is relevant to the amount
of an attorney fee award, not to the fee-shifting scheme in Section 52-1-54F NMSA
1978. Abeyta v. Bumper To Bumper Auto Salvage, 2005-NMCA-087, 137 N.M. 800,
115 P.3d 816.

Requirements for a valid offer of judgment. — To force the employer to pay 100% of
the attorney fees, an offer of judgment must be a valid offer under 52-1-54(F) NMSA
1978, for an amount less than the award at trial, and an offer which the employer
rejected. Baker v. Endeavor Servs., 2018-NMSC-035, rev’g Nos. 36,142 and 36,272,
mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2017) (non-precedential).
Fee shifting is mandatory if requirements of section are met. — The plain language
of the statute is clear and unambiguous and requires attorney fees to be shifted to the
rejecting party if the final compensation awarded to the offeror exceeds what was
initially offered. Baker v. Endeavor Servs., 2018-NMSC-035, rev’g Nos. 36,142 and
36,272, mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2017) (non-precedential).

Valid offer of judgment triggered the fee-shifting provision. — Where worker
suffered injuries as a result of a compensable motor vehicle accident, and where there
was a dispute as to whether worker reached maximum medical improvement (MMI),
and where employer rejected worker’s offer of judgment to settle the case, and where,
following trial, the worker’s compensation judge (WCJ) issued a compensation order
that exceeded the amount proposed in worker’s offer of judgment, the WCJ erred in
declining to order employer to pay 100% of worker’s attorney fees, because the
language in worker’s offer of judgment put employer on notice that the offer was
intended to trigger the fee-shifting provision of 52-1-54(F) NMSA 1978, and although
MMI was not yet determined and the permanent partial disability benefits and
impairment rating remained unknown at the time of worker’s offer of judgment, the
framework of what worker offered was clear, and employer was well informed as to the
scope of its liability. Baker v. Endeavor Servs., 2018-NMSC-035, rev’g Nos. 36,142 and
36,272, mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2017) (non-precedential).

Minimum content of an offer that invokes the fee shifting provision. — At a
minimum, the documents conveying an offer of settlement must explicitly refer to
Section 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 or address each of its material requirements, including the
requirement that if the offer is accepted a judgment is to be entered against the
employer. Rivera v. Flint Energy, 2011-NMCA-119, 268 P.3d 525.

Offers of compensation order did not invoke fee shifting mechanism. — Where the
proceedings held on the day scheduled for the trial of worker’s workers’ compensation
claim focused on worker’s motion to compel discovery, no opening statements were
made, no evidence was presented, no witnesses were sworn in or gave testimony, and
the depositions and exhibits that had been submitted to the workers’ compensation
judge prior to the start of the proceedings were returned to the parties; during the
proceeding, the workers’ compensation judge stated that the case was not going to trial
on that day and that the case had been rescheduled for purposes of trial; and after the
proceeding on worker’s motion to compel discovery, employer made an offer of
compensation, the employer’s offer was timely because the trial did not commence on
the day originally scheduled for trial but after employer made its offer of compensation.
Ruiz v. Los Lunas Pub. Sch., 2013-NMCA-085.

Offer did not invoke the fee shifting provision. — Where the worker sent a letter to
the employer proposing the terms of a settlement; the letter did not mention Section 52-
1-54 NMSA 1978, state that the offer was valid only for the ten-day period required by
the statute, or indicate that the offer was to allow a compensation order to be taken
against the employer or to invoke the fee shifting provision of the statute; the employer
rejected the offer; and the compensation order awarded the worker benefits in excess of
those the worker had proposed in the letter, the letter was not a valid offer that could
invoke the fee shifting provision of the statute. Rivera v. Flint Energy, 2011-NMCA-119,
268 P.3d 525.

Offer of judgment. — Where worker suffered two injuries, each while working for
different employers, worker’s offer of judgment that did not specify a dollar amount or a
percentage of liability for which each employer would be responsible had no legal effect
because it would not have disposed of the merits of the case. Leonard v. Payday Prof'l,
2007-NMCA-128, 142 N.M. 605, 168 P.3d 177.

Compensation order required to determine attorney fees. — Where, after an offer of
judgment had been made and rejected, the employer agreed to pay for the worker’s
surgery, a compensation order is necessary to determine whether to shift attorney fees
and the workers’ compensation judge cannot dismiss the case as moot and reserve
jurisdiction to determine attorney fees. Baber v. Desert Sun Motors, 2007-NMCA-098,
142 N.M. 319, 164 P.3d 1018.

Stipulated compensation. — The fee shifting provision of Subsection F of Section 52-
1-54 NMSA 1978 applies where pursuant to a stipulated compensation order, worker
recovered benefits in excess of an earlier offer of judgment that was rejected by the
employer, despite the fact that the award was not the result of a contested hearing. Hise
v. City of Albuqueque, 2003-NMCA-015, 133 N.M. 133, 61 P.3d 842.

Refusal to give jury instruction on attorney's fees proper. — Refusal of trial court to
give jury instruction that in compensation cases attorney's fees are paid by the employer
and insurer and not by the claimant is proper. Seay v. Lea Cnty. Sand & Gravel Co.,
1956-NMSC-004, 60 N.M. 399, 292 P.2d 93.

Acceptance of hearing officer's resolution as settlement offer. — Hearing officer's
recommended resolution, which was accepted by the employer, was properly
considered as an offer of settlement within the meaning of the statute. Davis v. Los
Alamos Nat'l Lab., 1989-NMCA-023, 108 N.M. 587, 775 P.2d 1304, cert. denied, 108
N.M. 433, 773 P.2d 1240.

No fee shifting for employee's bad faith. — Although this section requires the
employer to pay all or a portion of a prevailing employee's attorney's fees, there is no
corresponding provision for shifting any portion of a prevailing employer's attorney's
fees to the worker; therefore, Subsection I could not be the basis for shifting the
employer's attorney's fees to the employee as a sanction for bad faith in pursuing a
meritless benefits claim. Carrillo v. Compusys, Inc., 2002-NMCA-099, 132 N.M. 710, 54
P.3d 551.

Fee-shifting mechanism of Subsection F unavailable. — Where employer's offer
based on a weekly compensation rate was less than the amount that was determined
on appeal worker should receive using the reinstated weekly compensation rate, the
fee-shifting mechanism of Subsection F of this section is unavailable to employer.
Medina v. Honemuller, 2005-NMCA-123, 138 N.M. 472, 122 P.3d 839.

Effect of ambiguity in defendant's written offer. — Where the defendant makes a
written offer of settlement more than 30 days prior to trial, but there is ambiguity in the
offer concerning medical expenses and weaseling in the offer concerning attorney fees,
it cannot be later held that the plaintiff failed to collect compensation in excess of the
amount offered. Aguilar v. Penasco Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 6, 1984-NMSC-004, 100 N.M.
625, 674 P.2d 515.

Offer for compensation order. — Subsection F(1) did not apply to require an
employer to pay 100% of the worker's attorneys' fee since, even assuming that the
employer made an offer for a compensation order, there was no offer that complied with
Subsection F(4), and there was no basis for the workers' compensation judge to order a
payment regimen different from that contemplated by Subsection J. Cordova v. Taos
Ski Valley, Inc., 1996-NMCA-009, 121 N.M. 258, 910 P.2d 334.

The term "amount awarded by the compensation order" in Paragraph F(4) includes
all orders that are part of the total resolution of the case, including a bad faith sanction.
Meyers v. W. Auto, 2002-NMCA-089, 132 N.M. 675, 54 P.3d 79, cert. denied, 132 N.M.
551, 52 P.3d 411.

Attorney fees not allowed unless recovery exceeds amount tendered. — Where
the employer and carrier, 30 days or more prior to trial, offered to compromise and
settle plaintiff's claim for the sum of $2420.48, which sum was to include attorney's fees,
which offer was declined, and subsequently the trial court found that plaintiff was
entitled to receive $2420.38 for doctor and hospital fees and 22 weeks of compensation,
it was held that the amount offered was not the same as the amount received, since
plaintiff's attorney's fee would have to be deducted therefrom, and consequently,
plaintiff should have been granted an award of reasonable attorney's fees consistent
with the law. Bennett v. Lane Plumbing Co., 1976-NMCA-122, 89 N.M. 790, 558 P.2d
59.

Where record showed settlement offers made to plaintiff both before suit was filed
and prior to trial, there was nothing showing the trial court failed to consider the
mandatory provisions of this section. Escobedo v. Agriculture Prods. Co., 1974-NMCA-
063, 86 N.M. 466, 525 P.2d 393.

                             V.     CHANGE OF BENEFITS.

Fees awarded where past benefits placed in jeopardy. — Employer's request for
credit for benefits paid in an action to reduce worker's compensation benefits placed all
past benefits in jeopardy, thus entitling the court to award attorney's fees to the worker
based on these past benefits after the attorney successfully established that the
employer was not entitled to credit for them. Baca v. Highlands Univ., 1992-NMSC-010,
113 N.M. 170, 824 P.2d 310.
Because worker's attorney was successful in obtaining for worker more than she would
have gotten under employer's original scheme of 21% for 140 weeks, and because
employer's litigation stance placed all benefits, even those employer had already paid,
in jeopardy, worker was entitled to a fee award for the services of her attorney in
obtaining more benefits for worker and for preserving worker's past benefits. Gomez v.
Bernalillo Cnty. Clerk's Office, 1994-NMCA-102, 118 N.M. 449, 882 P.2d 40.

The attorney's preservation of past benefits from attack by an employer constitutes a
quantifiable benefit to a worker and entitles the attorney to a fee award. County of
Bernalillo v. Sisneros, 1994-NMCA-156, 119 N.M. 98, 888 P.2d 980.

Additional attorney's fees allowed where compensation increased. — To avoid a
policy or a practice which would discourage representation or the taking of appeals
where counsel feels that an injured workman (worker) has been aggrieved at the trial
court level, and to preserve the right of an injured workman (worker) to have
representation where the employer has appealed, an appellate court should allow
additional attorney's fees where the compensation award was also increased. Herndon
v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 1978-NMSC-090, 92 N.M. 287, 587 P.2d 434.

In an appeal, a workman (worker) has the right to seek an increase in compensation
payments and if successful, he is entitled to payment of a reasonable attorney fee.
Romo v. Raton Coca Cola Co., 1981-NMCA-120, 96 N.M. 765, 635 P.2d 320.

                        VI.    REASONABLENESS OF FEES.

Fees greater than amount of compensation awarded. — Attorney's fees in an
amount equivalent to 102 percent of the present value of the worker's final award did
not place the fee award beyond the discretionary authority of the workers' compensation
judge. Sanchez v. Siemens Transmission Sys., 1991-NMSC-093, 112 N.M. 533, 817
P.2d 726.

Award of attorney's fees adequate. — Award of $150 as attorneys' fees where total
award to claimant aggregated $644.97, exclusive of attorneys' fees, was adequate.
Hedgecock v. Vandiver, 1970-NMCA-117, 82 N.M. 140, 477 P.2d 316.

No abuse of discretion. — Where the worker’s counsel secured benefits for the worker
in the amount of $86,037; the workers’ compensation judge awarded worker’s attorney
$15,00 in attorney fees to be borne fifty-fifty by each side; there were no settlement
offers and the award was substantially the result of worker’s attorney’s efforts; the
issues, which were complex and novel, involved the determination of the worker’s
average weekly wage in a multiple employment situation; and the record showed that
the employer used sharp practices, the attorney fee was not unreasonable. Vinyard v.
Palo Alto, Inc., 2013-NMCA-001, 293 P.3d 191.
Awarding to plaintiff $1,000 as an attorney's fee pursuant to this section does not shock
the conscience of the court and was no abuse of discretion. Trujillo v. Tanuz, 1973-
NMCA-048, 85 N.M. 35, 508 P.2d 1332.

The award of attorney's fees is discretionary and will not be disturbed in the absence of
an abuse of discretion. Where, although the trial may have been short and the issues
not complex, disability was thoroughly contested, and in addition, counsel gained very
substantial results for the claimant, the appellate court would not say as a matter of law,
that the $4,250 awarded claimant as attorney's fees, based on 15% of his total
recovery, was an abuse of discretion. Gallegos v. Duke City Lumber Co., 1975-NMCA-
039, 87 N.M. 404, 534 P.2d 1116.

Where the record in this case shows a hearing on defendants' motion for summary
judgment and two trials and the proceedings show the claim was contested on the
issues of employment in New Mexico, filing of the claim within the proper time, the
extent of disability and the recovery for certain medical bills, there was no abuse of
discretion by the trial court in setting the attorney fee at $2,600 with an additional award
to plaintiff of $1,000 for the services of his attorney in representing him in this appeal.
Reed v. Fish Eng'g Corp., 1966-NMSC-183, 76 N.M. 760, 418 P.2d 537.

Award of compensation affirmed, and an additional award was given to plaintiff of
$1,250 for the services of his attorney in this appeal. Quintana v. East Las Vegas Mun.
Sch. Dist., 1971-NMCA-029, 82 N.M. 462, 483 P.2d 936; Brown v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 1970-NMCA-132, 82 N.M. 424, 483 P.2d 305.

Hearing officer did not abuse his discretion in refusing to award attorney's fees in a lump
sum payable by the employer and, instead, awarding attorney's fees to be paid out of
the claimant's bi-weekly compensation. Strong v. Sysco Corp./Nobel Sysco, 1989-
NMCA-051, 108 N.M. 639, 776 P.2d 1258.

Where it was rational for the workers' compensation judge (WCJ) to decide that
"claimant had not established the employer's bad faith, and there was a basis on which
the WCJ could find that claimant's counsel's alleged expenditure of time was
unreasonable and unnecessary, the amount of fees awarded was not an abuse of
discretion. Sosa v. Empire Roofing Co., 1990-NMCA-097, 110 N.M. 614, 798 P.2d 215.

No fee where no increase in compensation. — Where plaintiff was successful in
removing a limitation upon compensation benefits and successful in requiring a remand
for a decision concerning compensation benefits from the time compensation was
terminated until the date of entry of judgment, but these two successes did not yet
increase his compensation, no attorney's fees were awarded for these two items on
appeal; for two other successful points of appeal which resulted in a financial benefit to
plaintiff, he was awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $1500. Escobedo v.
Agriculture Prods. Co., 1974-NMCA-063, 86 N.M. 466, 525 P.2d 393.
Since the plaintiff recovered less than the amount offered in settlement the trial court
properly held that he is not entitled to an attorney's fee. Hales v. Van Cleave, 1967-
NMCA-006, 78 N.M. 181, 429 P.2d 379, cert. denied, 78 N.M. 198, 429 P.2d 657; Davis
v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 1989-NMCA-023, 108 N.M. 587, 775 P.2d 1304, cert. denied,
108 N.M. 433, 773 P.2d 1240.

Where appellee offered the exact amount for which judgment was subsequently
entered, the court had no power under the section to grant attorneys' fees. Lee v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 1960-NMSC-003, 66 N.M. 351, 348 P.2d 271.

Where no final judgment has been previously rendered, attorney's fees for hearing
resulting in judgment reducing previously stipulated disability are controlled by
Subsection D (now E) rather than Subsection E (now G) of this section. Turrieta v.
Creamland Quality Chekd Dairies, Inc., 1966-NMSC-252, 77 N.M. 192, 420 P.2d 776.

Subsection E (now Subsection G) is restricted in its effect to proceedings seeking
either reduction or increase of disability payments subsequent to the entry of judgment
in a compensation case pursuant to Section 52-1-56 NMSA 1978. Turrieta v.
Creamland Quality Chekd Dairies, Inc., 1966-NMSC-252, 77 N.M. 192, 420 P.2d 776.

Where employer had terminated compensation and medical services, and both
were obtained through court proceedings at which counsel represented claimant, there
was no evidence of an abuse of discretion by the trial court in awarding attorney's fees
of $4,500. Provencio v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 1974-NMCA-048, 86 N.M. 538, 525 P.2d
898, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 528, 525 P.2d 888.

Review of reasonableness of fees precluded where defendants failed to request
findings of fact. — Where defendants failed to request findings of fact, conclusions of
law and failed to include any evidence in the record on attorney's fees, this precluded
review of the question of the reasonableness of the fees awarded in the trial court.
Lopez v. K.B. Kennedy Eng'g Co., 1981-NMCA-011, 95 N.M. 507, 623 P.2d 1021.

Award was not excessive. — Where an award of attorneys fees of $30,000 was equal
to 63% of the worker’s benefits award; the case involved complex medical issues
requiring the depositions of fourteen attending physicians; all issues were hotly
contested, including causation and degree of disability; the present value of the worker’s
award was $61, 392; the worker’s attorney expended 395.9 hours on the case; the
attorney’s normal hourly rate was $95; no written offers of settlement were made by the
employer before or after the informal and formal hearings; prior to either party retaining
counsel, the employer offered $50,000 in settlement, but withdrew the offer at the
informal hearing, and the worker was partially successful in the worker’s claim. There
are sufficient findings to suggest the award of attorney fees. Fuyat v. Los Alamos Nat.
Laboratory, 1991-NMCA-045, 112 N.M. 102, 811 P.2d 1313.

Award held not excessive. — An award of $15,000 in attorney fees, which was about
23% of the compensation award, was not excessive. Candelaria v. General Elec. Co.,
1986-NMCA-016, 105 N.M. 167, 730 P.2d 470, cert. quashed, 105 N.M. 111, 729 P.2d
1365.

Excessive fee reduced. — Where the trial of the case consumed less than one day,
the transcript contained 135 pages of which 103 consisted of the bill of exceptions,
claimant testified and called three other witnesses and the defendants called one
defense witness, a fee of $2500 was excessive and was reduced to $1,750. Seal v.
Blackburn Tank Truck Serv., 1958-NMSC-087, 64 N.M. 282, 327 P.2d 797.

Considering the issues in the case, the length of the transcript of the proceedings in the
trial court, together with the amount of the award and results achieved on behalf of
appellee, there was an abuse of discretion and award of $3,000 attorney's fee was
excessive to the extent of $1,000. Ortega v. N.M. State Hwy. Dep't, 1966-NMSC-250,
77 N.M. 185, 420 P.2d 771.

Failure to comply with procedural rules. — The award of attorney's fees for obtaining
past-due disability benefits was reversed where the record did not show compliance
with rules and procedures in requesting a fee pursuant to Subsection C, or whether this
ground was relied upon by the worker's compensation judge. Buckingham v. Health S.
Rehab. Hosp., 1997-NMCA-127, 124 N.M. 419, 952 P.2d 20.

Attorney's fee deemed excessive. — Where the attorney for the plaintiff filed a motion
to dismiss the appeal, a four-page memorandum brief in support of this motion and a
15-page answer brief, in which only 14 cases were cited, the fee of $14,435.75 is
excessive to the extent of $1,500. Fryar v. Johnsen, 1979-NMSC-080, 93 N.M. 485, 601
P.2d 718.

Increase in disability. — Where a disability has increased in the sense that it will
continue to the end of the period for which Section 52-1-42 NMSA 1978 allows
compensation, three years longer than the district court last predicated, the plaintiff's
disability has increased, within the meaning of Subsection E of this section. Martinez v.
Ralph Johnson Rig, Inc., 1978-NMCA-047, 91 N.M. 717, 580 P.2d 485.

Law reviews. — For comment on Johnson v. C & H Constr. Co., 78 N.M. 423, 432 P.2d
267 (Ct. App. 1967), see 8 Nat. Resources J. 522 (1968).

For survey, "Workmen's Compensation," see 6 N.M. L. Rev. 413 (1976).

For article, "Survey of New Mexico Law, 1979-80: Workmen's Compensation," see 11
N.M.L. Rev. 235 (1981).

For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to workmen's compensation, see 13
N.M.L. Rev. 495 (1983).

For article, "Survey on New Mexico Law, 1982-83: Workmen's Compensation," see 14
N.M.L. Rev. 211 (1984).
For note, "Workers' Compensation Law - Bad Faith Refusal of an Insurer To Pay
Workers' Compensation Benefits: Russell v. Protective Insurance Company," see 20
N.M.L. Rev. 757 (1990).

For survey of 1990-91 workers' compensation law, see 22 N.M.L. Rev. 845 (1992).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers' Compensation
§§ 457, 459.

Attorney's compensation for services in connection with claim under Workmen's
Compensation Act, 159 A.L.R. 912.

Excessiveness or inadequacy of attorney's fees in matters involving commercial and
general business activities, 23 A.L.R.5th 241.

101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §§ 817 to 822.