New York Consolidated Laws

N.Y. Penal Law § 35.27 (2026)

Justification; use of physical force in resisting arrest prohibited

✓ current as of May 2026
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§ 35.27 Justification; use of physical force in resisting arrest
          prohibited.
  A person may not use physical force to resist an arrest, whether
authorized or unauthorized, which is being effected or attempted by a
police officer or peace officer when it would reasonably appear that the
latter is a police officer or peace officer.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 49 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1971–2022 · leading case: People v. Voliton, 630 N.E.2d 641 (NY 1994).
People v. Voliton, 630 N.E.2d 641 (NY 1994). · cites it 4× “Penal Law § 35.27 provides that "[a] person may not use physical force to resist an arrest, whether authorized or unauthorized , which is being effected or attempted by a police officer * * * when it would reasonably appear that the latter is a police officer" (emphasis…”
People v. Felton, 78 N.Y.2d 1063 (NY 1991). · cites it 3× “The Appellate Division affirmed noting that the People’s reliance on Penal Law § 35.27 was misplaced because that section related only to the defense of justification and did not in the circumstances of the case "provide a substantive basis for the officer’s arrest or attempted…”
United States v. Goines, 604 F. Supp. 2d 533 (E.D.N.Y 2009). · cites it 5× “Maksymenko, Penal Law § 35.27 “is not a complete bar to the right of [one wrongfully arrested] to the use of some necessary force,” 105 Misc.”
State v. Wiegmann, 714 A.2d 841 (Md. 1998). · cites it 2× “); N.Y. Penal Law § 35.27 (Consol.1984); N.D.”
People v. Commesso, 184 A.D.2d 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). · cites it 8× “The defendant argues that by referring to Penal Law § 35.27 once in the charge prior to its discussion of the elements of resisting arrest, the trial court confused the jury and led it to believe that the defendant could be found guilty of resisting arrest even if the arrest was…”
State v. Hobson, 577 N.W.2d 825 (Wis. 1998). · cites it 2× “§ 594:5 (1986); N.Y. Penal Law § 35.27 (McKinney 1987); Or.”
People v. Douglas, 160 A.D.2d 1015 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). · cites it 3× “Thus, the defendant here was not a victim of an unprovoked police attack, and in view of the fact that the uniformed officer identified himself as a police officer, the defendant was not entitled to raise a defense of justification (see, Penal Law § 35.27; People v Alston, 104…”
Glenn v. State, 849 S.E.2d 409 (Ga. 2020). “§ 594:5 ; N.Y. Penal Law § 35.27 ; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann.”
People v. Brukner, 51 Misc. 3d 354 (2015). · cites it 2× “) The People’s assertion that, in bending the Officer’s finger, the defendant violated the “no-sock” law (Penal Law § 35.27) and that this conduct could serve as the basis for the arrest and subsequent seizure of the marihuana is without merit.”
State v. Valentine, 935 P.2d 1294 (Wash. 1997). “§ 594:5 (1986); N.Y. Penal Law § 35.27 (McKinney 1987) (the dissent’s citation of People v.”
People v. Peacock, 496 N.E.2d 683 (NY 1986). “That being the case, defendant’s arrest was not "authorized,” nor did her striking his arm in reaction to the officer’s attempt to detain her constitute harassment.”
Commonwealth v. Moreira, 447 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 1983). “5 (1974); N.Y. Penal Law § 35.27 (McKinney 1975); Or.”
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