New York Consolidated Laws

N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30 (2026)

Justification; use of physical force in making an arrest or in preventing an escape

✓ current as of May 2026

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§ 35.30 Justification; use of physical force in making an arrest or in
          preventing an escape.
  1. A police officer or a peace officer, in the course of effecting or
attempting to effect an arrest, or of preventing or attempting to
prevent the escape from custody, of a person whom he or she reasonably
believes to have committed an offense, may use physical force when and
to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to
effect the arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody, or in
self-defense or to defend a third person from what he or she reasonably
believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force; except that
deadly physical force may be used for such purposes only when he or she
reasonably believes that:
  (a) The offense committed by such person was:
  (i) a felony or an attempt to commit a felony involving the use or
attempted use or threatened imminent use of physical force against a
person; or
  (ii) kidnapping, arson, escape in the first degree, burglary in the
first degree or any attempt to commit such a crime; or
  (b) The offense committed or attempted by such person was a felony and
that, in the course of resisting arrest therefor or attempting to escape
from custody, such person is armed with a firearm or deadly weapon; or
  (c) Regardless of the particular offense which is the subject of the
arrest or attempted escape, the use of deadly physical force is
necessary to defend the police officer or peace officer or another
person from what the officer reasonably believes to be the use or
imminent use of deadly physical force.
  2. The fact that a police officer or a peace officer is justified in
using deadly physical force under circumstances prescribed in paragraphs
(a) and (b) of subdivision one does not constitute justification for
reckless conduct by such police officer or peace officer amounting to an
offense against or with respect to innocent persons whom he or she is
not seeking to arrest or retain in custody.
  3. A person who has been directed by a police officer or a peace
officer to assist such police officer or peace officer to effect an
arrest or to prevent an escape from custody may use physical force,
other than deadly physical force, when and to the extent that he or she
reasonably believes such to be necessary to carry out such police
officer's or peace officer's direction, unless he or she knows that the
arrest or prospective arrest is not or was not authorized and may use
deadly physical force under such circumstances when:
  (a) He or she reasonably believes such to be necessary for
self-defense or to defend a third person from what he or she reasonably
believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force; or
  (b) He or she is directed or authorized by such police officer or
peace officer to use deadly physical force unless he or she knows that
the police officer or peace officer is not authorized to use deadly
physical force under the circumstances.
  4. A private person acting on his or her own account may use physical
force, other than deadly physical force, upon another person when and to
the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to
effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of a person whom
he or she reasonably believes to have committed an offense and who in
fact has committed such offense; and may use deadly physical force for
such purpose when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to:
  (a) Defend himself, herself or a third person from what he or she
reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical
force; or
  (b) Effect the arrest of a person who has committed murder,
manslaughter in the first degree, robbery, forcible rape or forcible
criminal sexual act and who is in immediate flight therefrom.
  5. A guard, police officer or peace officer who is charged with the
duty of guarding prisoners in a detention facility, as that term is
defined in section 205.00, or while in transit to or from a detention
facility, may use physical force when and to the extent that he or she
reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent the escape of a
prisoner from a detention facility or from custody while in transit
thereto or therefrom.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 72 cases (13 in the last 5 years), 1975–2024 · leading case: McCummings v. New York City Transit Auth., 177 A.D.2d 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).

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McCummings v. New York City Transit Auth., 177 A.D.2d 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). · cites it 48× “On appeal, defendant New York City Transit Authority has advanced a series of contentions which have either not been preserved or do not constitute reversible error.”

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). · cites it 2× “§ 2C-3-7 (West 1982); N. Y. Penal Law § 35.30 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); N.”

Williams v. City of New York, 811 N.E.2d 1103 (NY 2004). · cites it 3× “McCormick Preliminarily, we reject the notion that a section 205-e claim may be premised solely on a violation of the justification defenses found in the Penal Law or the Criminal Procedure Law (see Brocato v City of New York, 294 AD2d 281, 281-282 [1st Dept 2002] [Penal Law §…”

People v. Karp, 158 A.D.2d 378 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). · cites it 8× “or to prevent the escape from custody of a person whom he reasonably believes to have committed an offense and who in fact has committed such offense; and he may use deadly physical force for such purpose when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to: * * * "(b) Effect the…”

McCummings v. New York City Transit Auth., 81 N.Y.2d 923 (NY 1993). · cites it 5× “Nor, again contrary to defendant’s contentions, is there any basis for dismissal under Penal Law § 35.30. Penal Law § 35.30 sets forth the circumstances when a police officer, charged with criminal conduct for using deadly physical force in making an arrest, can claim that the…”

State v. Pine, 82 A.D.3d 1498 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). · cites it 4× “Defendant also contends that he was justified in using force to effect the arrest of the victim for crimes he committed in the apartment (see Penal Law § 35.30 [4]). 2 County Court correctly determined that the evidence could only be interpreted such that defendant was…”

Tardif v. City of New York, 991 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 2021). “N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30 (1). 13 Section 35.”

Lubecki v. City of New York, 304 A.D.2d 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). · cites it 2× “inding that a duty of care was violated; that the court erred in charging negligence as the appropriate standard of care; that the NYPD Patrol Guide and Interim Order regarding the use of deadly physical force and how to address hostage situations were improperly admitted into…”

Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 986 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). “2005); see N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30 (1); Brunette v. City of N.”

People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (NY 1986). “Nowhere in the legislative history is there any indication that "reasonably believes” was designed to change the law on the use of deadly force or establish a subjective standard. To the contrary, the Commission, in the staff comment governing arrests by police officers,…”

People v. Voliton, 630 N.E.2d 641 (NY 1994). · cites it 2× “Prior to the court's charge to the jury, defendant requested that the court adapt Penal Law § 35.30 ("Justification; use of physical force in making an arrest or in preventing an escape") to the facts of this case.”

Marcano v. City of Schenectady, 38 F. Supp. 3d 238 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). “, N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30 (1) ].”) (citing Nimely, 414 F.”

Show all 72 citing cases →

— N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30(4) — 2 cases

Pine v. Superintendent, Green Haven Corr. Facility, 103 F. Supp. 3d 263 (N.D.N.Y. 2015).

People v. Richard, 2018 NY Slip Op 8152 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).

— N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30(4)(a) — 1 case

Pine v. Superintendent, Green Haven Corr. Facility, 103 F. Supp. 3d 263 (N.D.N.Y. 2015).

— N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30(4)(b) — 1 case

Pine v. Superintendent, Green Haven Corr. Facility, 103 F. Supp. 3d 263 (N.D.N.Y. 2015).

— N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30(l)(c) — 1 case

Est. of Jackson v. City of Rochester, 705 F. Supp. 779 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.