Vandover v. Czajka, 276 A.D.2d 945 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). · Go Syfert
Vandover v. Czajka, 276 A.D.2d 945 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
36 citation events (36 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: People v. Lashway (nyappdiv, 2013-12-26)
Treatment trajectory · 2001 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2001 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Lashway (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
More significantly, County Court was not bound by the Board’s recommendation as to whether to modify defendant’s risk assessment level (see generally Matter of VanDover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 946 [2000]; Matter of New York State Bd. of Examiners of Sex Offenders v Ransom, 249 AD2d 891, 892 [1998]), and there is no evidence — nor does defendant argue— that County Court was in possession of, let alone considered, the subject documents in making its determination. 3 Instead, the court based its denial of defendant’s application on the finding that defendant had a mental abnormality, hi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Lashway (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
More significantly, County Court was not bound by the Board’s recommendation as to whether to modify defendant’s risk assessment level (see generally Matter of VanDover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 946 [2000]; Matter of New York State Bd. of Examiners of Sex Offenders v Ransom, 249 AD2d 891, 892 [1998]), and there is no evidence — nor does defendant argue— that County Court was in possession of, let alone considered, the subject documents in making its determination. 3 Instead, the court based its denial of defendant’s application on the finding that defendant had a mental abnormality, hi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Bush
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Although the Board considered defendant’s disciplinary record to be “acceptable,” County Court is not bound by the Board’s recommendation on this factor (see People v Legall, 63 AD3d 1305, 1306 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 706 [2009]; People v Arotin, 19 AD3d 845, 847 [2005]; Matter of VanDover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 946 [2000]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Bush
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Although the Board considered defendant’s disciplinary record to be “acceptable,” County Court is not bound by the Board’s recommendation on this factor (see People v Legall, 63 AD3d 1305, 1306 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 706 [2009]; People v Arotin, 19 AD3d 845, 847 [2005]; Matter of VanDover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 946 [2000]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Burke
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
While the Board’s recommendation was not binding on County Court (see People v Woodard, 63 AD3d 1655, 1655-1656 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 706 [2009]; Matter of VanDover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 946 [2000]), there are significant issues in the limited record before us as to whether it has been shown, by the requisite standard of clear and convincing evidence, that defendant presents a substantial risk of reoffense or threat to public safety {see generally Correction Law § 168-Z [5]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Johnson
NY · 2008 · confidence medium
While departures from the Board’s recommendations are of course the exception, not the rule, the possibility of such departures has been generally recognized (see Matter of VanDover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 946 [3d Dept 2000]; Matter of New York State Bd. of Examiners of Sex Offenders v Ransom, 249 AD2d 891, 892 [4th Dept 1998] [“The Board . . . serves only in an advisory capacity that is similar to the role served by a probation department in submitting a sentencing recommendation”]; see also 83 NY Jur 2d, Penal and Correctional Institutions § 319 [2d ed updated 2008] [“the court is n…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Gonzalez
N.Y. App. Div. · 2006 · confidence medium
Second, the entry of an Alford plea, without more, does not warrant the Board’s assessment of 10 points for the purported failure of defendant to accept responsibility for his conduct, particularly in view of the evidence to the contrary presented by defendant at the hearing (see Matter of Vandover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 947 [2000]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. McCormick (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
In the exercise of its discretion, however, the court may depart from the Board’s recommendation and determine the sex offender’s risk level based upon the facts and circumstances that appear in the record (see Matter of Vandover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 946 [2000]; see also Matter of New York State Bd. of Examiners of Sex Offenders v Ransom, 249 AD2d 891, 891-892 [1998]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Arotin
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
The court is not bound by the Board’s recommendation and retains discretion in determining an appropriate level (see Matter of Vandover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 946 [2000] ), so long as that level is supported by adequate evidence (compare People v Hill, 17 AD3d 715, 716 [2005], and People v Brown, supra at 832-833, with People v Dorato, supra at 581).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Douglas
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
The determination by the Board is merely a recommendation, as the sentencing court is charged with making the actual determination (see People v Stevens, 91 NY2d 270, 276 [1998]) and, in the exercise of its discretion, may depart from that recommendation and determine the sex offender’s risk level based upon the facts and circumstances that appear in the record (see Matter of Vandover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 946 [2000]; see also Matter of New York State Bd. of Examiners of Sex Offenders v Ransom, 249 AD2d 891, 891-892 [1998]; People v Agard, 6 Misc 3d 1021 [A], 2005 NY Slip Op 50142[U] , *1 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Mount
N.Y. App. Div. · 2005 · confidence medium
Inasmuch as the factors that County Court relied upon to justify the upward departure from the presumptive risk level were adequately taken into account by the risk assessment instrument, under the particular circumstances herein, we conclude that the departure was not supported by clear and convincing evidence (see People v Hoppe, 12 AD3d 792, 793-794 [2004]; People v Mallory, 293 AD2d 881, 882 [2002]; Matter of Vandover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 947 [2000]; cf. People v Guaman, 8 AD3d 545, 545 [2004]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Hoppe
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · confidence medium
The prosecution had the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the basis for the requested assessment (see Correction Law § 168-d [3]; People v MacNeil, 283 AD2d 835, 836 [2001]; People v Neish, 281 AD2d 817, 817 [2001]) and County Court should only depart from the recommended risk level when the facts and circumstances provide a substantial basis for such departure (see People v Dorato, 291 AD2d 580, 580-581 [2002]; Matter of Vandover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 946 [2000]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Stevens
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · confidence medium
Contrary to defendant’s contention, the court’s determination adopting the Board’s recommendation is supported by clear and convincing evidence (see generally People v Thomas, 307 AD2d 759, 760 [2003]; People v Mallory, 293 AD2d 881 [2002]; Matter of Vandover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 947 [2000]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Thomas
N.Y. App. Div. · 2003 · confidence medium
Contrary to defendant’s contention, the court’s determination is supported by clear and convincing evidence (see generally People v Mallory, 293 AD2d 881 [2002]; Matter of Vandover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 947 [2000]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Hahlbohm
nycountyct · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
The appellate court noted that risk level determinations have traditionally been treated as civil matters, and not criminal in nature (id., citing People v Kearns, 95 NY2d 816 , 818 [2000]; People v Hernandez, 93 NY2d 261, 270 [1999]; People v Stevens, 91 NY2d 270, 276-279 [1998]; People v Cash, 242 AD2d 976, 977 [4th Dept 1997]; People v Sumpter, 177 Misc 2d 492, 497 [Crim Ct, Queens County 1998]; see generally Matter of Vandover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945 [2000]; Matter of New York State Bd. of Examiners of Sex Offenders v Ransom, 249 AD2d 891 [4th Dept 1998]) and that the legislature explicitly…
discussed Cited "see" People v. Dorato
N.Y. App. Div. · 2002 · signal: accord · confidence high
“The court, however, is not bound by the recommendation of the Board and, in the exercise of its discretion, may depart from that recommendation and determine the sex offender’s risk level based upon the facts and circumstances that appear in the record” (Matter of New York State Bd. of Examiners of Sex Offenders v Ransom, 249 AD2d 891, 891-892 ; accord, Matter of Vandover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 946 ; see, Correction Law § 168-n [3]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Wroten
N.Y. App. Div. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
Proceedings to review SORA risk level determinations made under these circumstances have been treated as civil, not criminal, in nature (see, People v Kearns, 95 NY2d 816, 818 ; People v Hernandez, 93 NY2d 261, 270 ; People v Stevens, 91 NY2d 270, 276-279 ; People v Cash, 242 AD2d 976, 977 ; People v Sumpter, 177 Misc 2d 492, 497 ; People v Salaam, 174 Misc 2d, at 730, supra; see generally, Matter of Vandover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945 ; Matter of New York State Bd. of Examiners of Sex Offenders v Ransom, 249 AD2d 891 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re Parker
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence low
Of course, . . . [t]he expectation is that the instrument will result in the proper classification in most cases so that departures will be the exception not the rule . . . [Therefore,] the . . . court may not depart from the presumptive risk level unless it concludes that there exists an aggravating or mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, not otherwise adequately taken into account by the guidelines.” (Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders, Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 4 [Nov. 1997] [hereinafter Guidelines]; see also Matter of Vandover v …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Hernandez
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence low
Of course, . . . [t]he expectation is that the instrument will result in the proper classification in most cases so that departures will be the exception not the rule . . . [Therefore,] the . . . court may not depart from the presumptive risk level unless it concludes that there exists an aggravating or mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, not otherwise adequately taken into account by the guidelines.” (Guidelines at 4; see also Matter of Vandover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945 [3d Dept 2000]; Matter of O’Brien v State of N.Y.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Wiggins
N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx Cty. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Matter of Vandover v. Czajka , 276 A.D.2d 945 (3rd Dept. 2000); Matter of O'Brien v. State of New York Division of Probation and Correctional Services , 263 A.D.2d 804, 805-06 (3rd Dept. 1999), lv. denied , 94 N.Y.2d 758 (1999); Matter of New York State Board of Examiner of Sex Offenders v. Ransom , 249 A.D.2d 891, 891-92 (4th Dept. 1998) ("The court . . . may depart from that recommendation and determine the sex offender's risk level based upon the facts and circumstances that appear in the record.
In the Matter of Edward Vandover
v.
Paul Czajka, as County Judge of Columbia County
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Oct 26, 2000.
276 A.D.2d 945
Cardona.
Cited by 30 opinions  |  Published
Cardona, P. J.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this Court pursuant to CPLR 506 [b] [1]) to annul a determination of respondent which classified petitioner under the Sex Offender Registration Act as a level three sex offender.

In 1996, petitioner was convicted upon his plea of guilty to the crimes of sexual abuse in the first degree, sexual abuse in the second degree (four counts), sodomy in the second degree[*946] and promoting a sexual performance by a child. The abuse of the young child, which occurred over a period of several years, included acts of sexually deviant intercourse, fondling of the victim’s breasts, buttocks and vagina while she slept, and photographing her nude. Petitioner was sentenced to a prison term of U/2 to 4V2 years and released on parole at the age of 79.

In preparation of his release, petitioner was evaluated by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders in order to determine his risk level classification for recommitting a sexual offense pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C [hereinafter SORA]). While petitioner’s point total as reflected in the assessment instrument presumptively placed him in the classification of a level two sex offender (moderate risk), the Board recommended that he be designated a level one sex offender (low risk) due to his advanced age, early acceptance of responsibility for his actions and willingness to seek treatment. The Board gave weight to letters written on petitioner’s behalf by his adult daughters attesting to his character and indicating that he had not subjected them to sexual contact. Following a hearing, respondent classified petitioner as a level three sex offender (high risk) resulting in this CPLR article 78 proceeding.

Initially, we note that respondent has abandoned his procedural objections to the petition in light of the Court of Appeals’ decision in People v Kearns (95 NY2d 816). Accordingly, we proceed to the merits of petitioner’s claims. Under SORA, the Board is charged with the responsibility of making a recommendation to the sentencing court concerning a sex offender’s risk of recommitting a sexual offense based upon certain guidelines (see, Correction Law § 168-Z). “The court, however, is not bound by the recommendation of the Board and, in the exercise of its discretion, may depart from that recommendation and determine the sex offender’s risk level based upon the facts and circumstances that appear in the record” (Matter of New York State Bd. of Examiners of Sex Offenders v Ransom, 249 AD2d 891, 891-892).

In the instant case, respondent chose not to adopt the Board’s recommendation for a number of reasons. He found that petitioner’s acceptance of responsibility for his actions was a factor that had already been considered in connection with the initial assessment presumptively placing him in risk level two and should not be counted again. He further found that petitioner’s advanced age was not a mitigating factor because he committed the crimes when he was in his 70s. Lastly, re[*947] spondent was not persuaded that the letters written by petitioner’s daughters warranted a downward departure. In light of these considerations, we cannot say that respondent abused his discretion in declining to adopt the Board’s recommendation that petitioner be classified as a level one sex offender.

We reach a different conclusion, however, with respect to respondent’s upward departure from the presumptive risk assessment of level two to level three. In that regard, we note that the risk level assessment must be supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record (see, Correction Law § 168-n [3]; see also, People v Marinconz, 178 Misc 2d 30, 33). Petitioner scored a total of 100 points on the assessment instrument presumptively placing him within level two (moderate risk). Respondent determined that he should be categorized a violent sexual predator and placed in risk level three because he did not fully accept responsibility for his actions, blaming his conduct on his medical problems, sexual performance problems, marital difficulties and stress. The record, however, does not contain clear and convincing evidence in that regard. To the contrary, Richard Hamill, a psychologist who evaluated petitioner, opined that he possessed a high degree of guilt and remorse, was honest and open with the details of his sexual offenses and did not exhibit a predatory pattern, rendering him a minimal risk of reoffending. Karen Albertuzzi, a family therapist, similarly noted that petitioner expressed deep regrets concerning the events leading to his imprisonment. In addition, the presentence report disclosed that petitioner accepted responsibility for his actions and was repulsed by his own behavior. Furthermore, the record reveals that petitioner participated in various treatment programs while in prison and was receptive to counseling. In light of the foregoing, respondent’s determination classifying petitioner as a level three sex offender is annulled and he is reclassified as a level two sex offender.

Crew III, Spain, Carpinello and Graffeo, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is annulled, on the facts, without costs, and petition granted to the extent of reclassifying petitioner as a level two sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C).