People v. Burke, 68 A.D.3d 1175 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). · Go Syfert
People v. Burke, 68 A.D.3d 1175 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
17 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: People v. Secor (nyappdiv, 2019-04-11)
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Secor
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
Therefore, under the circumstances presented, we find that defendant established by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of mitigating factors not taken into account by the guidelines and that County Court abused its discretion in denying his request for a downward departure ( see generally People v Burke , 68 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2009]; compare People v Cathy , 134 AD3d at 1580 ; People v Fryer , 101 AD3d at 836; People v Legall , 63 AD3d at 1307 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Darrah
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · confidence medium
In classifying defendant as a risk level two sex offender, County Court did not address defendant’s request for a downward departure in the written order, as required by Correction Law § 168-n (3), or at the hearing, “precluding meaningful appellate review of the propriety of the court’s risk level assessment” (People v Miranda, 24 AD3d 909, 911 [2005]; see People v Filkins, 107 AD3d 1069, 1070-1071 [2013]; People v Burke, 68 AD3d 1175, 1177 [2009]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Walker
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Considering all of the circumstances present here, including that this offense is the only sex-related crime in the defendant’s history, his conduct while incarcerated has been acceptable, and he has completed at least one recommended treatment program, the assessment of 25 points under risk factor 2 results in an overassessment of the defendant’s risk to public safety (see People v George, 141 AD3d 1177, 1178 [2016]; People v Carter, 138 AD3d at 707-708 ; People v Marsh, 116 AD3d 680, 681-682 [2014]; cf. People v Burke, 68 AD3d 1175, 1175 [2009]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) PeoplevIzzo
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
In light of this requirement, it is necessary to remit for further review and determination of this issue (see People v Filkins, 107 AD3d 1069, 1070 [2013]; People v Burke, 68 AD3d 1175, 1177 [2009]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Izzo
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
In light of this requirement, it is necessary to remit for further review and determination of this issue (see People v Filkins, 107 AD3d 1069, 1070 [2013]; People v Burke, 68 AD3d 1175, 1177 [2009]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Izzo
N.Y. App. Div. · 2014 · confidence medium
In light of this requirement, it is necessary to remit for further review and determination of this issue (see People v Filkins, 107 AD3d 1069, 1070 [2013]; People v Burke, 68 AD3d 1175, 1177 [2009]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Filkins
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Here, in reaching a determination with respect to defendant’s application for a downward departure, County Court’s written order did not set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Correction Law § 168-n (3), and its limited oral findings were not sufficiently detailed to permit intelligent review (see People v Kennedy, 79 AD3d 1470 [2010]; People v Beames, 71 AD3d 1300, 1301 [2010]; People v Burke, 68 AD3d 1175, 1177 [2009]; People v Crowley, 64 AD3d 918, 919 [2009]). * Without a clear explanation of County Court’s findings, and considering that, as a result of…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Filkins
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Here, in reaching a determination with respect to defendant’s application for a downward departure, County Court’s written order did not set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Correction Law § 168-n (3), and its limited oral findings were not sufficiently detailed to permit intelligent review (see People v Kennedy, 79 AD3d 1470 [2010]; People v Beames, 71 AD3d 1300, 1301 [2010]; People v Burke, 68 AD3d 1175, 1177 [2009]; People v Crowley, 64 AD3d 918, 919 [2009]). * Without a clear explanation of County Court’s findings, and considering that, as a result of…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Carter
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Initially, defendant’s claims challenging the propriety of his 1991 judgment of conviction are not properly before us and will not be addressed (see People v Clavette, 96 AD3d 1178, 1179 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 851 [2012]; People v Wright, 53 AD3d 963, 963 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 710 [2008]; see also People v Ayala, 72 AD3d 1577, 1578 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 816 [2010]). 1 Defendant also challenges County Court’s designation of him as a risk level III sex offender and a predicate sex offender. 2 We note that County Court failed to issue a written order setting forth its findings of f…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Carter
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · confidence medium
Initially, defendant’s claims challenging the propriety of his 1991 judgment of conviction are not properly before us and will not be addressed (see People v Clavette, 96 AD3d 1178, 1179 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 851 [2012]; People v Wright, 53 AD3d 963, 963 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 710 [2008]; see also People v Ayala, 72 AD3d 1577, 1578 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 816 [2010]). 1 Defendant also challenges County Court’s designation of him as a risk level III sex offender and a predicate sex offender. 2 We note that County Court failed to issue a written order setting forth its findings of f…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Livingston
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court’s order adequately sets forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which its determination was based (see Correction Law § 168-n [3]; cf. People v Burke, 68 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2009]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Grimm
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
The risk assessment guidelines are not designed to punish, but “to assess the risk of a repeat offense by such sex offender and the threat posed to the public safety” (Correction Law § 168-l [5]; see People v Burke, 68 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2009]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Grimm
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
The risk assessment guidelines are not designed to punish, but “to assess the risk of a repeat offense by such sex offender and the threat posed to the public safety” (Correction Law § 168-l [5]; see People v Burke, 68 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2009]).
discussed Cited "see" People v. Modica
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
A departure from the presumptive risk level is warranted where “there exists an aggravating or mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the guidelines” (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 4 [2006]; see People v Burke, 68 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2009]; People v Walker, 47 AD3d 692, 693 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Arroyo
N.Y. App. Div. · 2022 · signal: compare · confidence medium
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of defendant's request for a downward departure ( see People v Graziano , 140 AD3d 1541, 1542-1543 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 909 [2016]; People v King , 72 AD3d 1363, 1364 [2010]; compare People v Burke , 68 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2009]).
The People of the State of New York
v.
Casey C. Burke
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
Dec 3, 2009.
68 A.D.3d 1175
Stein.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published
Stein, J.

Defendant was convicted upon his guilty plea of one count of rape in the third degree in satisfaction of charges that, in the late night and early morning hours of July 9-10, 2005, when he was 23 years old, he engaged in sexual activity with four victims under the age of 17. As his release date from prison approached, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders presumptively classified defendant as a risk level three sex offender, based upon the number of points scored (135) on the risk assessment instrument, computed in accordance with the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C). However, the Board recommended a downward departure to risk level two. A hear[*1176] ing was held, at which defendant argued, among other things, that County Court should direct a downward departure to risk level one.[1] After the hearing, County Court ultimately declined to direct any downward departure and classified defendant as a risk level three sex offender, based upon the points it determined were properly assessed (125). Defendant appeals.

Initially, we note that, in determining an offender’s risk level, the guidelines seek to address the probability of reoffense and the harm therefrom (see Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 2 [2006]). The guidelines were developed in accordance with the statutory mandate that specific factors be addressed (see Correction Law § 168-Z [5]). However, those factors were not intended to be exclusive (see Correction Law § 168-Z [5]). Indeed, while the Board has determined that utilization of the risk assessment instrument will generally “result in the proper classification in most cases,” it also recognized “that an objective instrument, no matter how well designed, will not fully capture the nuances of every case” (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 4 [2006]). Therefore, the risk assessment guidelines provide for the possibility of a departure from the presumptive risk level in those circumstances where “there exists an aggravating or mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the guidelines” (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 4 [2006]).

Here, the Board recommended a departure to risk level two based upon its determination that the victims’ lack of consent was based solely on their ages and that their ages were not significantly disparate from defendant’s. The Board further indicated that at least one of the victims admitted that “some or most” of the sexual contact between defendant and the victims was initiated by the victims.[2] In further support of a downward departure, defendant asserted that he was intoxicated at the time of the offense and that he had subsequently completed sex offender and drug and alcohol rehabilitation treatment while incarcerated.

While the Board’s recommendation was not binding on County Court (see People v Woodard, 63 AD3d 1655, 1655-1656 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 706 [2009]; Matter of VanDover v Czajka, 276 AD2d 945, 946 [2000]), there are significant issues[*1177] in the limited record before us as to whether it has been shown, by the requisite standard of clear and convincing evidence, that defendant presents a substantial risk of reoffense or threat to public safety {see generally Correction Law § 168-Z [5]). However, County Court did not set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law underlying its determination in the written order as required by Correction Law § 168-n (3) and, in rejecting a downward departure from risk level three, only addressed the age differential between defendant and the victims in its oral decision on the record. Therefore, we are unable to discern whether County Court considered the other arguments advanced by the Board and by defendant or any other pertinent considerations in support of a downward departure, and the record is insufficient to allow “meaningful appellate review of the propriety of the court’s risk level assessment” (People v Miranda, 24 AD3d 909, 911 [2005]). Considering the long-standing and severe consequences that defendant will incur arising from his designation as a risk level three sex offender, it is imperative that the record be fully developed to ascertain whether the underlying statutory purpose of such designation will be met under the particular circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we must remit the matter to County Court (see People v Miranda, 24 AD3d at 911; see generally People v Sturdivant, 307 AD2d 382, 383 [2003]).

Rose, J.P., Kavanagh, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs, and matter remitted to the County Court of Cortland County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision.

1

On appeal, defendant is requesting a downward departure to risk level two.

2

A review of this victim’s detailed sworn written deposition indicates that at least two of the victims actively pursued and encouraged such contact.