State v. Lee, 176 S.E.2d 772 (N.C. 1970). · Go Syfert
State v. Lee, 176 S.E.2d 772 (N.C. 1970). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“eneral words follow a designation of particular subjects or things . . . includ only things of the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enumerated.”
108 citation events (55 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Hardaway (ncctapp, 2025-10-01)
Treatment trajectory · 1972 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1972 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Hardaway
N.C. Ct. App. · 2025 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
eneral words follow a designation of particular subjects or things . . . includ only things of the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enumerated.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Watts Guerra LLC v. Series 1 of Oxford Ins. Co. Nc LLC
N.C. Bus. Ct. · 2026 · confidence medium
App. 175, 191 (1994) (quoting State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 (1970)). 50.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wynn v. Frederick
N.C. · 2023 · confidence medium
Supply Co. of Durham, 328 N.C. at 656 , 403 S.E.2d at 294 ; see Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 106 , 489 S.E.2d 880, 885 (1997) (“Where words of general enumeration follow those of specific classification, the general words will be interpreted to fall within the same category as those previously designated.” (quoting Turner v. Bd. of Educ., 250 N.C. 456, 463 , 109 S.E.2d 211, 216 (1959))); State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 , 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970) (“[G]eneral words [that] follow a designation of particular subjects or things . . . includ[e] only things of the same kind, character and nat…
cited Cited as authority (rule) MASSACHUSETTS BAY INSURANCE COMPANY v. IMPACT FULFILLMENT SERVICES, LLC
M.D.N.C. · 2021 · confidence medium
App. 175, 191 , 444 S.E.2d 464, 473-74 (1994) (quoting State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 , 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Carey
N.C. · 2020 · confidence medium
In reaching this conclusion, the majority reasoned that, in light of the ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction, which provides that, “where general words follow a designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designations and as including only things of the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enumerated,” id. at 601 (quoting State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 , 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970)), the fact that “grenade” appeared in N.C.G.S. § 14- 288.8(c…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Carey
N.C. · 2020 · confidence medium
In reaching this conclusion, the majority reasoned that, in light of the ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction, which provides that, “where general words follow a designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designations and as including only things of the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enumerated,” id. at 601 (quoting State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 , 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970)), the fact that “grenade” appeared in N.C.G.S. § 14- 288.8(c…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Carey
N.C. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
CAREY Opinion of the Court “[T]he ejusdem generis rule is that where general words follow a designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designations and as including only things of the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enumerated.” State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 , 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Nickens
N.C. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 , 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970) (citation omitted); see also - 21 - STATE V.
cited Cited as authority (rule) The City of Asheville v. Frost
N.C. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
App. 766, 769 , 596 S.E.2d 881, 884 (2004) (quoting State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 , 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wake County v. Hotels.com, L.P.
N.C. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
App. 531, 536-37 , 564 S.E.2d 272, 276 (2002) (interpreting the term “misrepresentation” to be limited to knowing and intentional behavior, where the term followed the words fraud and deception); [Smith, 314 N.C. at 87 , 331 S.E.2d at 687 ] (interpreting a provision allowing the court to consider “any other factor which the court finds to be just and proper” to be limited to economic factors, where the provision followed eleven other provisions having to do with the economy of the marriage); [State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 , 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970)] (interpreting the phrase “or o…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Ex Rel. Utilities Commission v. Environmental Defense Fund (2×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
We hold that the list provided by the legislature is not an exhaustive list of all of the biomass materials included in the broad term “biomass resources.” Second, the term “biomass resources” is not limited by the doctrine of ejusdem generis. “ ‘[T]he ejusdem generis rule is that where general words follow a designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designations and as including only things of the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enumerated.�…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pitt County v. Hotels.Com, L.P.
4th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
We are guided here by the familiar ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction: “where general words follow a designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designations and as including only things of the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enumerated.” Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80 , 331 S.E.2d 682, 686-87 (1985) (quoting State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242 , 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Granville Farms, Inc. v. County of Granville
N.C. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
App. 766, 769 , 596 S.E.2d 881, 884 (2004) (quoting State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 , 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Knight v. Town of Knightdale
N.C. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 , 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re the Appeal of the Maharishi Spiritual Center of America (2×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Stat. § 105-278.4 (a)(l) requires that the property be “[o]wned by an educational institution (including a university, college, school, seminary, academy, industrial school, public library, museum, and similar institution).” I interpret the general phrase “educational institution” in relation to the express terms which follow it according to the dictates of ejusdem generis, a well established rule of statutory construction providing that “ ‘where general words follow a designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter (2×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 , 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970) (noting that the doctrine of ejusdem generis restricts the meaning of general words following a specific listing to things of the same kind, character and nature).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) North Carolina Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Century Indemnity Co.
N.C. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
We interpret the general catchall phrase “or otherwise” by reference to the doctrine of ejusdem generis, a well established rule of statutory construction providing that “ ‘where general words follow a designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designations and as including only things of the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enumerated.’ ” State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 , 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
examined Cited as authority (rule) County of Lenoir v. Moore (3×) also: Cited "see"
N.C. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Laws, c. 392, s. 6.) In addressing defendant NCDR’s contention, we interpret the general phrase “other recorded specific liens” in relation to the express terms which precede it according to the dictates of ejusdem generis, a well established rule of statutory construction providing that “ ‘where general words follow a designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designations and as including only things of the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enume…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Phipps
N.C. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 243 , 176 S.E.2d 772, 773 (1970).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Brown
N.C. · 1987 · confidence medium
State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 243 , 176 S.E. 2d 772, 773 (1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bryant (2×)
N.C. · 1986 · confidence medium
“When the words of a statute have not acquired a technical meaning, they must be construed in accordance with their common and ordinary meaning unless a definite meaning is apparent or definitely indicated by the context.” State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 243 , 176 S.E. 2d 772, 773 (1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Proposed Assessment of Additional Franchise Tax for the Taxable Quarters Ended March 31, 1980 v. Carolina Telephone & Telegraph Co.
N.C. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
In determining what is meant by the phrase “other similar charges” we are guided by the ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction, “where general words follow a designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designations and as including only things of the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enumerated.” State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 , 176 S.E. 2d 772, 774 (1970) (quoting State v. Fenner, 263 N.C. 694 , 140 S.E. 2d 349 (1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SECRETARY OF REV. v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co.
N.C. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
In determining what is meant by the phrase "other similar charges" we are guided by the ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction, "where general words follow a designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designations and as including only things of the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enumerated." State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 , 176 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1970) (quoting State v. Fenner, 263 N.C. 694 , 140 S.E.2d 349 (1965).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Brown
N.C. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
As stated in State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 245 , 176 S.E. 2d 772, 774 (1970): A motion to quash can be properly allowed on the ground that the matter charged does not constitute a criminal offense. ...
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Smith (2×)
N.C. · 1985 · confidence medium
“In the construction of statutes, the ejusdem generis rule is that where general words follow a designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designations and as including only things of the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enumerated.” State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 244 , 176 S.E. 2d 772, 774 (1970) (quoting State v. Fenner, 263 N.C. 694, 697-98 , 140 S.E. 2d 349, 352 (1965)).
examined Cited "see" State v. Gamble (4×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242 , 176 S.E.2d 772 (1970).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Greene (2×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242 , 176 S.E. 2d 772 (1970).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
State of North Carolina
v.
James Sumner Lee
Supreme Court of North Carolina.
Oct 14, 1970.
176 S.E.2d 772
Attorney General Robert Morgan and Staff Attorney Donald M. Jacobs for the State. , Pearson, Malone, Johnson & DeJarmon for defendant ap-pellee.
Moore.
MOORE, Justice.

The warrant charged that defendant “did possess a machine gun or submachine gun or other like weapon, to wit: a Universal Caliber 30 Ml Carbine, Serial No. 135258, capable of firing thirty-one (31) shots, by the successive pulling of the trigger . . . in violation of G.S. 14-409.” G.S. 14-409 in pertinent part provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person ... to possess machine guns, submachine guns, or other like weapons. . . . Provided, further, that automatic shotguns and pistols or other automatic weapons that shoot less than thirty-one shots shall not be construed to be or mean a machine gun or submachine gun under this section.”

When the words of a statute have not acquired a technical meaning, they must be construed in accordance with their common and ordinary meaning unless a definite meaning is apparent or definitely indicated by the context. Greensboro v. Smith, 241 N.C. 363, 85 S.E. 2d 292; Alliance Co. v. State Hospital, 241 N.C. 329, 85 S.E. 2d 386. The usual and customary definitions of the words used in this statute are as follows: A machine gun is defined as “an automatic gun using small-arms ammunition for rapid continuous firing”; a submachine gun as “a lightweight automatic or semiautomatic portable firearm fired from the shoulder or hip”; a carbine as “a light automatic or semiautomatic military rifle” (Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary) ; and an automatic rifle as “a rifle capable commonly of either semiautomatic or full automatic fire and de[*244] signed to be fired without a mount.” (Webster’s Third New Collegiate Dictionary.)

The word “automatic” as used in connection with a firearm is one “using either gas pressure or force of recoil and mechanical spring action for repeatedly ejecting the empty cartridge shell, introducing a new cartridge and firing it,” while a semiautomatic firearm is defined as one “employing gas pressure or force of recoil and mechanical spring action to eject the empty cartridge case after the first shot and load the next cartridge from the magazine but requiring release and another pressure of the trigger for each successive shot.” (Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary.) The technical difference then between the automatic and semiautomatic weapon is that the automatic continues to fire without further pull of the trigger while the semiautomatic requires another pull of the trigger for each successive shot. The semiautomatic is autoloading in that it is loaded automatically but does not fire automatically. The automatic both loads and fires automatically. While technically there is this difference, in ordinary usage the word “automatic” is used to describe both automatic and semiautomatic weapons.

Applying the definitions from Webster to the words of the statute (G.S. 14-409), a machine gun is automatic, a submachine gun can be automatic or semiautomatic. What then is meant by the phrase, “or other like weapons”? “In the construction of statutes, the ejusdem generis rule is that where general words follow a designation of particular subjects or things, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be, and construed as, restricted by the particular designations and as including only things of the same kind, character and nature as those specifically enumerated.” State v. Fenner, 263 N.C. 694, 140 S.E. 2d 349; State v. Smith, 265 N.C. 178, 143 S.E. 2d 293; State v. Ross, 272 N.C. 67, 157 S.E. 2d 712. Applying this rule, the statute would then read: “It shall be unlawful for any person ... to possess machine guns, submachine guns, or other automatic or semiautomatic weapons.”

The statute goes further, however, and has a proviso which excludes automatic shotguns and pistols or other automatic weapons that shoot less than 31 shots. Again, giving the usual and customary meaning to the word “automatic,” the proviso would exclude automatic weapons or semiautomatic weapons which shoot less than 31 shots. That this interpretation is correct seems apparent from the use of the words “automatic shotguns,” which[*245] ordinarily are called automatic but invariably are semiautomatic. The real reason for the exclusion under this proviso is not the difference in the rate of fire between an automatic and a semiautomatic weapon, but the more important consideration is the number of shots which can be fired without reloading. The better reasoning seems to be, and we so hold, that the General Assembly intended to include within the prohibition of the statute all weapons either automatic or semiautomatic which shoot 31 times or more and to exclude such weapons which shoot less than 31 times.

The warrant in this case charges that the defendant “did possess a machine gun or submachine gun or other like weapon, to wit: a Universal Caliber 30 Ml Carbine, Serial No. 135258, capable of firing 31 shots by the successive pulling of the trigger.” In effect this charges that the carbine in question was a semiautomatic weapon capable of firing 31 shots. The defendant contends that by the manufacturer’s specifications this carbine shoots less than 31 shots — 30 to be exact — and therefore it is expressly excluded from the operation of tire statute, and that the trial court properly allowed the motion to quash.

A motion to quash can be properly allowed on the ground that the matter charged does not constitute a criminal offense. State v. Turner, 170 N.C. 701, 86 S.E. 1019. In ruling on a motion to quash, however, the court is not permitted to consider extraneous evidence, and when the defect must be established by evidence aliunde the record, the motion must be denied. State v. Cochran, 230 N.C. 523, 53 S.E. 2d 663; State v. Cooke, 248 N.C. 485, 103 S.E. 2d 846, app. dismd. in part 359 U.S. 951, 3 L. ed. 2d 759, 79 S. Ct. 737, app. dismd. Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177, 4 L. ed. 2d 1650, 80 S. Ct. 1482, reh. den. 364 U.S. 856, 5 L. ed. 2d 80, 81 S. Ct. 29.

The warrant in this case properly charged that the carbine in question was capable of firing 31 shots. To sustain the motion to quash, it was necessary for the trial court to find from evidence dehors the record that it would fire only 30 shots. This was error.

If the defendant’s contention is correct and the carbine shoots only 30 shots, it is legal under the statute; if it shoots more, it is illegal. This is a matter to be determined in the trial,[*246] upon proper proof, and the motion to quash should have been overruled.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.