FREEMAN, Judge.

Defendant appeals from judgment entered upon a jury verdict of guilty on the charges of felonious breaking and entering, larceny after breaking and entering, and conspiracy to commit felonious breaking and entering. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court (1) erred by denying defendant’s motions to dismiss; and (2) plainly

STATE V. WILLIAMSON

Opinion of the Court

erred by allowing the indictments and judgments of non-testifying co-defendants into evidence. After careful review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motions to dismiss, and did not plainly err by allowing into evidence the indictments and judgments of non-testifying co-defendants. We dismiss defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim without prejudice. I. Factual and Procedural Background The evidence presented at trial tended to show the following. On 22 July 2021, Nathan Glines was spending the night at his father’s duplex located at 1209 Linwood Avenue in Durham County. Nathan was sleeping in Apartment B of the duplex, connected to Apartment A, to “protect the property” due to a series of break-ins that had occurred in the surrounding community. Nathan was also there to protect a recently delivered clothes dryer, which was still in its cardboard box. Further, Nathan had a scheduled meeting with contractors at the property the next morning. Shortly after midnight, Nathan was awoken by the noise of a rock going through the window of Apartment A. Nathan then heard three male voices speaking to each other, the breaking of window glass, and the movement of the recently delivered clothes dryer. While still inside the duplex, Nathan called the police to report an active break-in. Nathan remotely activated his car alarm, ran to his car, and turned on the car’s lights while the three men were attempting to remove the dryer from the duplex. Nathan then heard three male voices speaking “really fast” and saw the three men fleeing from the neighbor’s lawn. Nathan testified that he

STATE V. WILLIAMSON

Opinion of the Court

determined the three men had removed the dryer from its cardboard box, carried it out of the bedroom in Apartment A, out of the back door of the duplex, and into the neighbor’s yard, where it was abandoned when the three departed. Officers from the Durham Police Department responded to Nathan’s call and secured the area. While inspecting the scene, investigators located a rock and broken glass in the bedroom of Apartment A and found that a large piece of cardboard had been placed over the windowsill in the bedroom. Investigators found twelve latent fingerprints on the dryer. Six of defendant’s fingerprints were discovered on the top and right-hand side of the dryer. Investigators found the fingerprints of Gary Faucette on the north window frame exterior, top, and side of the clothes dryer. Investigators also found the fingerprints of Celledric Conrad on the exterior of the north window frame. Additionally, investigators found one unidentified latent fingerprint on top of the dryer. Charges were brought against defendant, Conrad, and Faucette for the 22 July 2021 offense because of the fingerprint evidence found at the scene and the fact that the dryer was “large and unwieldy and required multiple people to carry.” On 20 September 2021, the grand jury indicted defendant for breaking and entering, larceny after breaking and entering, and conspiracy with Conrad and Faucette to commit the felony of breaking and entering. On 12 September 2022, Faucette pleaded guilty to attempted breaking or entering and felony conspiracy. Similarly, Conrad pleaded guilty to felony breaking and entering on 6 February 2023.

STATE V. WILLIAMSON

Opinion of the Court

Defendant’s matter came on for trial on 23 October 2023 in Durham County Superior Court. The State called several witnesses over the course of the trial; however, neither Conrad nor Faucette were called to testify. Crystal Denison, Assistant Superior Court Clerk of Durham County, testified about the indictments and judgments of Conrad and Faucette. During Denison’s testimony, the State moved to have State’s Exhibits 11 and 12, Conrad’s judgment and indictment, respectively, introduced into evidence as self-authenticating documents. Defendant did not object to the admission of these documents, and the evidence was admitted. Denison then began to read the judgment against Conrad to the jury. Denison stated that the offense date of Conrad’s judgment was 22 July 2021 and that Conrad had pleaded guilty to felony breaking and entering. When the State asked Denison to read Conrad’s indictment, defense counsel objected to the reading of the judgment and indictment on relevancy and hearsay grounds, which the trial court overruled. Denison then read the indictment of Conrad to the jury: A. The jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or about the date of the offense shown and in the county named above, [Conrad] unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did break and enter a building located at 1209 L[i]nwood Avenue, Apartment A, Durham, NC, with the attempt to commit a felony there in statute 14-54(a). Q. And as to Count 2 in the indictment for Celledric Conrad. A. Also, the jurors of the State upon their oath present that

STATE V. WILLIAMSON

Opinion of the Court

on or about the date of the offense shown and in the county named above, [Conrad] unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did steal, take, and carry away a [clothes dryer] from the personal property of David Glines, pursuant to a violation of Section 14-54 of North Carolina General Statute 14-72(b)(2). Q. And as to Count 3. A. Also, the jurors of the State upon their oath present that on or about the date of offense shown and in the county named above, [Conrad] unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did conspire with [defendant] and [Faucette] to commit felony breaking and entering G.S. 14-54 against David and Lisa Glines. The State subsequently moved to introduce the judgment and indictment of Faucette into evidence, marked as State’s Exhibits 13 and 14, respectively. Defense counsel did not object to the admission of these exhibits, and the evidence was admitted. Denison then read the judgment and indictment of Faucette to the jury: Q. And turning now to States Exhibit 13, the record of judgment or conviction worksheet. What, if any, file number is shown in the judgment? A. 21 CRS 54434. Q. And turning to State’s Exhibit 14, what, if any, file number is shown in the indictment? A. 21 CRS 54434. Q. And with regard back to State’s Exhibit 13. At the judgment, if you could read for the jury, the two counts included in the judgment and the dates of the offense. A. Count 1 is attempted breaking and entering. July 22, 2021, and Count 2 is felony conspiracy offense date July 22,

STATE V. WILLIAMSON

Opinion of the Court

2021. Q. All right. We won’t go through the whole indictment for this, but if you could read off Count 3 that appears in State’s Exhibit 14 on the indictment for [Faucette]. A. Also, the jurors for the State, upon their oath, present that on or about the date of the offense shown and in the county named above [Faucette] unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did conspire with [defendant] and [Conrad] to commit felony breaking and entering against David and Lisa Glines. Q. And does that count correspond to the count -- the count listed in the judgment for felony conspiracy? A. Yes. At the conclusion of the trial, and after the trial court denied defendant’s motions to dismiss, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges. Defendant’s sentencing hearing took place on 18 April 2024, and the trial court sentenced defendant in the presumptive range of a minimum of 18 months and a maximum of 31 months for breaking and entering. The trial court consolidated the larceny after breaking and entering and conspiracy to commit breaking and entering, and sentenced defendant in the presumptive range of 18 months minimum and 31 months maximum to run at the expiration of the breaking and entering conviction. Defendant filed notice of appeal on 30 April 2024. II. Jurisdiction

STATE V. WILLIAMSON

Opinion of the Court

Defendant appeals from the final judgment of the Superior Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(1) and N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(a). North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) states that the notice of appeal shall specify, among other things, the court to which the appeal is taken. Defendant’s notice of appeal failed to designate the court to which the appeal is taken. This Court has found that “a defect in a notice of appeal should not result in loss of the appeal as long as the intent to appeal can be fairly inferred from the notice and the appellee is not misled by the mistake.” State v. Springle, 244 N.C. App. 760, 763 (2016) (cleaned up). The State-appellee, in the case at bar, concedes that it is not misled by this mistake. Further, the intent to appeal can be fairly inferred from the notice of appeal. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over defendant’s appeal. III. Standard of Review We review a denial of a motion to dismiss at the close of evidence de novo. State v. Collins, 283 N.C. App. 458, 465 (2022). “When the Court reviews an alleged violation of defendant’s constitutional rights, the appropriate standard of review is de novo.” State v. Glenn, 220 N.C. App. 23, 25 (2012) (cleaned up). “Where a defendant fails to preserve errors at trial, this Court reviews any alleged errors under plain error review.” State v. Koke, 264 N.C. App. 101, 107 (2019). “[T]his Court reviews whether a defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel de novo.” State v. Wilson, 236 N.C. App. 472, 475 (2014). IV. Discussion

STATE V. WILLIAMSON

Opinion of the Court

Defendant raises two arguments on appeal. First, defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motions to dismiss the breaking and entering and conspiracy charges. Second, defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred by allowing the indictments and judgments of non-testifying co-defendants into evidence. We address each argument in turn. A. Motions to Dismiss Defendant first contends that the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motions to dismiss, arguing that the State could not prove with absolute certainty that defendant’s fingerprints were not placed on the dryer at some point prior to the commission of the crime. Defendant argues that the State’s case is “based on conjecture that merely raises a suspicion as to defendant’s commission of the offense.” We disagree. “Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.” State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 595, (2002) (citation omitted). “[W]hether the evidence presented constitutes substantial evidence is a question of law for the court.” State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66 (1982) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The terms “more than a scintilla of evidence”

STATE V. WILLIAMSON

Opinion of the Court

and “substantial evidence” are in reality the same and simply mean that the evidence must be existing and real, not just seeming or imaginary. Id. (cleaned up) . The “general rule” is that if there is “any evidence tending to prove the fact in issue, or which reasonably conduces to its conclusion as a fairly logical and legitimate deduction, and not merely raises a suspicion or conjecture in regard to it, the case should be submitted to the jury.” Id. (citing State v. Johnson, 199 N.C. 429, 431 (1930)). When “evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.” State v. Dover, 381 N.C. 535, 547 (2022) (cleaned up). “Fingerprint evidence, standing alone, is sufficient to withstand a motion [to dismiss] only if there is substantial evidence of circumstances from which the jury can find that the fingerprints could only have been impressed at the time the crime was committed.” State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 491–92 (1977) (emphasis added) (cleaned up). “The trial court is [n]ot required to determine that the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence prior to denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss.” State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 101 (1980) Here, defendant maintains that the State failed to present substantial evidence of his identity as the perpetrator. Specifically, defendant contends that “our

STATE V. WILLIAMSON

Opinion of the Court

State’s appellate courts have identified a variety of relevant circumstances that may show that a perpetrator’s fingerprints were only impressed at the time committed,” and that none of those relevant circumstances are present here. Our Supreme Court stated in State v. Irick, that other circumstances constituting such substantial evidence “include statements by the defendant that he had never been on the premises” and “statements by prosecuting witnesses that they had never seen the defendant before or given him permission to enter the premises.” 291 N.C. at 492 (cleaned up). Although Nathan testified that he was unable to identify the perpetrators, and the only fingerprint evidence connected to defendant personally appeared on the dryer, there exists substantial evidence of other circumstances that tend to show that defendant was one of the perpetrators and that defendant’s fingerprints could only have been impressed at the time the crime was committed. The evidence in this case, taken in the light most favorable to the State, tends to show that: (1) Nathan was staying at the duplex, in part, to protect the clothes dryer that had just been delivered; (2) the dryer was in the bedroom of Apartment A and was still in its cardboard box prior to the offenses in question; (3) Nathan was awoken and heard three voices in Apartment A, the breaking of glass, and the transportation of the dryer; (4) the dryer was very large, unwieldy, and required multiple people to carry it; (5) Nathan activated his car’s alarm, heard three voices talking “really fast” and saw the three men running from the neighbor’s lawn; (6) the dryer had been removed - 10 - STATE V. WILLIAMSON Opinion of the Court from its cardboard box, carried out of the bedroom in Apartment A, out of the back door of the duplex, and into the neighbor’s yard, where it was left when the three men departed; (7) the police arrived shortly after Nathan made the 911 call and investigators arrived shortly thereafter; and (8) six of defendant’s fingerprints were found on the top and right-hand side of the clothes dryer. Considered in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable mind might accept these circumstances as adequate to support the conclusion that defendant was one of the perpetrators and that defendant’s fingerprints could only have been impressed at the time the crime was committed. While defendant maintains that the State could not prove with absolute certainty that defendant’s fingerprints were not imprinted on the dryer at some point prior to the commission of the crime, the trial court is not required to determine that the evidence presented must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence prior to denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Powell, 299 N.C. at 101. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motions to dismiss the breaking and entering and conspiracy charges.^[1] B. Indictments and Judgments of Conrad and Faucette