BERGER, Justice.

Defendant was convicted of, among other things, robbery with a dangerous

weapon. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction after it determined that the State failed to present substantial evidence that defendant, or someone with whom he was acting in concert, took the victim’s property. We are, therefore, concerned here with the sufficiency of evidence needed to survive a motion to dismiss and submit a charge to the jury.

STATE V. PERRY

Opinion of the Court

In our system of justice, the jury has dominion over questions of fact. Mindful of the jury’s sphere, a motion to dismiss should be granted only when no “reasonable inference of the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged may be drawn from the evidence.” State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99 (1980) (emphasis omitted). In this case, the trial court applied the appropriate standard and properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss. We, therefore, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. I. Factual and Procedural Background Around 8:00 p.m. on 18 May 2021, Damon Scott arrived at the apartment of Shenika Lynch with his phone, house key, and $250. When Scott attempted to enter the apartment, he was struck from behind and fell to the ground. Defendant hit Scott on the top of his head with a gun, and as Scott attempted to get to his feet, defendant and other assailants stomped on Scott. Scott recognized defendant among his attackers and saw defendant holding a gun. Scott passed out during the attack. Later that night, he woke up in the middle of the road, severely injured. Scott realized his phone, house key, and cash were missing.^[1] He flagged down a driver who drove him home where he attempted to sleep.

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Opinion of the Court

Later, after Scott woke up gagging on his own blood and struggling to breathe, his niece Lemon Collins, took him to a hospital where he was intubated and later transferred to a Level 1 Trauma Center in Charlotte. Scott was hospitalized for more than two weeks, and during that time he underwent blood transfusions and multiple surgeries. His missing possessions were never recovered. Defendant was indicted for robbery with a dangerous weapon, assault inflicting serious bodily injury, drug-related offenses, and attaining habitual felon status. At trial, the State introduced Rule 404(b) evidence related to defendant’s participation in a 2012 armed robbery. See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2025). Testimony showed that in the prior incident, defendant had “approached the victim, asked the victim for his money, . . . assaulted the victim with [a] handgun,” and then stole his wallet. The witness explained that defendant had “pistol-whipped” the victim, which the witness clarified meant “[s]triking him with the handgun on his head.” The evidence regarding this prior crime was allowed for limited purposes to prove that at the time of the alleged offenses, [defendant] had the intent, which is a necessary element of both assault inflicting serious bodily injury and robbery with a dangerous weapon, [and the evidence] is offered to the extent that [the jury] find[s] that . . . there may have existed in [defendant’s] mind a plan or scheme, design, involving the crimes he is accused of or the absence of accident or mistake. At the close of the State’s evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon, arguing that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to determine that defendant “took property from the person of another or in

STATE V. PERRY

Opinion of the Court

that person’s presence.” The trial court denied the motion. At the close of all evidence, defendant declined to put on evidence and renewed his motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning: In this case there is the evidence properly admitted about the 2012 event. And there’s a uniqueness there. It is not unheard of, but it is relatively uncommon in terms of robbery with a firearm or robbery with a dangerous weapon. There is evidence that was admitted about [defendant] approaching the subject, striking him with a firearm instead of threatening him with a firearm or in fact shooting him or firing the weapon, but using it as a blunt instrument and robbed the gentleman. That has been judicially established. I limited the evidence such that it would not be unfairly prejudicial. This allegation from Mr. Scott, if the jury chooses to believe him, is that . . . [d]efendant used the firearm as something to strike him with, a blunt force instrument to strike him in the head. And there is evidence that a reasonable jury could believe that the alleged victim’s property was missing potentially very soon thereafter. But there is a reasonable inference that those who attacked the alleged victim took the alleged victim’s property. For those reasons I deem it a question of fact for the jury, and will respectfully deny the motion. The jury found defendant guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon and assault inflicting serious bodily injury. Defendant thereafter pled guilty to attaining habitual felon status, and he was sentenced to 146 to 188 months in prison. Defendant appealed the robbery conviction to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that he, or someone with whom he was acting in concert, took Scott’s property.

STATE V. PERRY

Opinion of the Court

In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss and vacated defendant’s conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon, holding that “the circumstantial evidence in this case—the victim’s missing property, [d]efendant’s opportunity to commit the crime, and [d]efendant’s intent or plan to rob—even in the light most favorable to the State, is not sufficient to sustain [d]efendant’s conviction under our Supreme Court’s caselaw.” State v. Perry, No. COA23-375, 2024 WL 687053, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2024). We allowed the State’s petition for discretionary review on 13 December 2024. For the reasons discussed herein, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. II. Discussion To survive a motion to dismiss, the State faces a “low bar.” State v. Ford, 388 N.C. 713, 727 (2025) (Berger, J., concurring). “If there is more than a scintilla of competent evidence to support the allegations in the warrant or indictment, it is the court’s duty to submit the case to the jury.” State v. Horner, 248 N.C. 342, 344–45 (1958); see also State v. Dover, 381 N.C. 535, 547 (2022) (more than a scintilla of evidence simply means “the amount necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion[.]” (cleaned up)). While precedent has also articulated the standard as requiring “substantial evidence,” State v. Golder, 374 N.C. 238, 249 (2020), “[t]he terms ‘more than a scintilla of evidence’ and ‘substantial evidence’ are in reality the same,” State v. Gillard, 386 N.C. 797, 832 (2024) (quoting State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66 (1982)).

STATE V. PERRY

Opinion of the Court

“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the State and giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 582 (2004). “Moreover, circumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence.” Id. (cleaned up). “When the motion calls into question the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the question for the Court is whether a reasonable inference of defendant’s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances.” Powell, 299 N.C. at 99 (cleaned up). “[E]vidence favorable to the State is to be considered as a whole in order to determine its sufficiency. This is especially necessary . . . when the proof offered is circumstantial, for rarely will one bit of such evidence be sufficient, in itself, to point to a defendant’s guilt.” State v. Thomas, 296 N.C. 236, 244–45 (1978). Further, “[c]ontradictions and discrepancies must be resolved in favor of the State, and the defendant’s evidence, unless favorable to the State, is not to be taken into consideration.” State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452 (1988) (quoting State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 160 (1984)). In other words, if there is more than a scintilla of evidence, “whether direct or circumstantial, or a combination, to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.” Golder, 374 N.C. at 250 (cleaned up).

STATE V. PERRY

Opinion of the Court

To prove a defendant committed the offense of robbery with a dangerous weapon, the State must provide sufficient evidence of (1) an unlawful taking or an attempt to take personal property from the person or in the presence of another; (2) by use or threatened use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon; and (3) whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened. See State v. Hill, 365 N.C. 273, 275 (2011); N.C.G.S. § 14-87(a) (2025). We have noted that “it is immaterial whether the intention to commit the theft was formed before or after force was used upon the victims.” State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 352 (2002) (quoting State v. Green, 321 N.C. 594, 605 (1988)). Here, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the State’s evidence as to the first element. Specifically, defendant argued that evidence of his “opportunity” to take Scott’s property was insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals, relying on our precedent in State v. Moore, 312 N.C. 607 (1985), and State v. Baker, 338 N.C. 526 (1994), determined that the facts in this case were analogous to Moore. The court reasoned that “[u]nlike in Baker, the evidence here did not establish for how long Scott laid unconscious in the road before he awoke to discover his property missing,” and “Scott’s location in the road placed the vulnerable property in a public location inviting to passersby—like the store in Moore.” Perry, 2024 WL 687053, at *4. The Court of Appeals concluded that “evidence of a defendant’s mere opportunity to commit a crime is not sufficient to send the charge to the jury,” id. at *3 (cleaned up), and “[e]vidence of a defendant’s intent

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Opinion of the Court

or plan to take property does not itself support the inference that he followed through when presented with an opportunity,” id. at *5. But splintered, piecemeal, and formulaic comparisons to the facts of prior cases are not dispositive where precedent commands that the evidence must be considered “as a whole,” Thomas, 296 N.C. at 245, and “[c]ontradictions and discrepancies must be resolved in favor of the State,” Stone, 323 N.C. at 452 (quoting Bullard, 312 N.C. at 160). Thus, the Court of Appeals’ application of our precedent was in error. In Moore, we held that the trial court properly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the evidence “disclose[d] no more than an opportunity for [the] defendant, as well as others, to have taken the money.” 312 N.C. at 613. There, the defendant sexually assaulted a store clerk at knifepoint in the store bathroom. Id. at 608–10. During the incident, the victim’s purse was located behind the cashier’s counter. Id. at 611. When the defendant left the store, the victim fled for help, leaving her purse behind and the store unlocked and unattended for at least forty minutes until police arrived. Id. at 612. Notably, the store was located in a high-crime area described as “a vicinity in which [the victim’s] sense of insecurity caused her to keep the store’s front door locked during business hours.” Id. at 613. When the victim returned to the store “some two hours” after the assault, her wallet was missing from inside her purse. Id. at 610. Without any other evidence to indicate the defendant had taken the wallet, this Court reasoned that the bare “opportunity for [the] defendant, as well as others,” to commit

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Opinion of the Court

the crime was insufficient to send the robbery charge to the jury. Id. at 613. In Baker, conversely, “[t]he disappearance of the [victim’s] money was discovered around thirty minutes after [the] defendant was seen with the victim outside the store.” Baker, 338 N.C. at 560. We concluded that the motion to dismiss was properly denied because “[the victim’s] forceful abduction and the taking of the money are so closely related in time as to form a continuous chain of events.” Id. at 561. In the light most favorable to the State, the evidence here tended to show that defendant pistol-whipped Scott with the intent to rob him and that Scott’s possessions were on his person at the time of the assault and missing when he regained consciousness in the road. More specifically, the State’s evidence indicated that defendant was Scott’s primary assailant, striking him on the head with a gun as he entered the apartment. Not only was defendant with Scott around the time period when Scott’s possessions went missing, but he was a central force among the attackers who “started stomping [Scott] and knocked [him] out and took [him] and threw [him] out in the road.” Further, the 404(b) evidence was admitted to establish defendant’s intent to commit the robbery in this case, and the jury was properly instructed on use of this evidence.^[2] Although reasonable jurors might disagree on the ultimate question of

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Opinion of the Court

STATE V. PERRY

Opinion of the Court

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Opinion of the Court

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Opinion of the Court

alternative perpetrator. Indeed, evidence proffered to show that someone other than the defendant committed the crime charged must “point directly to the guilt of some specific person.” State v. Abbitt, 385 N.C. 28, 41 (2023) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. McNeill, 326 N.C. 712, 721 (1990)). Defendant cannot succeed on a motion to dismiss by speculating simply that “it could have been someone else.” At bottom, the Court of Appeals’ analysis overlooked the dispositive inquiry on a motion to dismiss, i.e., whether the State presented more than a scintilla of evidence to support a reasonable inference of defendant’s guilt. At this stage, the State’s evidence must be considered as a whole. The Court of Appeals, relying on rigid comparisons to distinguishable fact patterns in our prior cases failed apply the proper standard. Because the State presented more than a scintilla of evidence, or the amount necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion, the motion to dismiss was properly denied. III. Conclusion On a motion to dismiss, we are mindful that the court “is concerned only with the sufficiency of the evidence to carry the case to the jury and not with its weight.” Powell, 299 N.C. at 99. It is for the jury to serve as the ultimate arbiters of guilt, and a court should dismiss a charge only when the evidence is so lacking that no “reasonable inference of the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged may be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Here, considering the evidence as a whole and affording the State the benefit

STATE V. PERRY

Opinion of the Court

of all reasonable inferences, the State presented sufficient evidence that defendant, or someone acting in concert with defendant, took Scott’s property. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. REVERSED.

STATE V. PERRY

Riggs, J., dissenting

Justice RIGGS dissenting. I disagree with the majority’s holding that the State’s evidence suggesting that Mr. Perry took Mr. Scott’s property was sufficient for the charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon to be submitted to the jury. For that reason and because I believe this Court must step carefully to ensure that it does not render an important legal process—a motion to dismiss the State’s charges for insufficiency of the evidence— essentially pointless, I respectfully dissent. I. Factual Background On 18 May 2021, Damon Scott was invited to Shenika Lynch’s apartment. The time at which he arrived at the apartment was not clear from trial testimony. During trial, Mr. Scott testified that he arrived around 8:00 p.m.; however, in an interview conducted by a detective about a month after the incident, Mr. Scott stated that he arrived around 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m.^[1] He arrived carrying his cell phone, house key, and around $250 in cash. Shortly after arriving, Mr. Scott was struck by defendant, Demarlo Perry, and stomped by Mr. Perry and other individuals in the apartment. Mr. Scott testified that the assailants “knocked [him] out and . . . threw 1 To provide a fuller picture of what evidence was presented at trial, I am including instances in the testimony where Mr. Scott’s direct testimony at trial conflicts with the statements he made during the interview he gave to Detective John Cramer on 30 June 2021. Of course, for the purpose of a motion to dismiss, “[t]he trial court does not weigh the evidence, consider evidence unfavorable to the State, or determine any witness’ credibility.” State v. Parker, 354 N.C. 268, 278 (2001) (citing State v. Lucas, 353 N.C. 568, 581 (2001)).

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Riggs, J., dissenting

[him] out in the road.” At some point Mr. Scott lost consciousness, but the record is not clear about when this occurred. Mr. Scott testified that the last thing he recalled before passing out was being left in the middle of the road; however, he also testified that he did not know how he got outside. No evidence was presented regarding how long Mr. Scott was lying in the road. When he eventually came to, Mr. Scott flagged down a passerby to ask for a ride home. Once at home, Mr. Scott spoke with his niece and then slept, but later that night, he was taken to the hospital where his injuries required him to stay for an extended period of time. The timeline is not clear about when Mr. Scott discovered he was no longer in possession of his phone, house key, and cash. At trial, Mr. Scott testified that he realized that his items were missing when he arrived at the hospital. Notwithstanding Mr. Scott’s direct trial testimony, a detective testified that Mr. Scott told him in an interview that he noticed he was missing his possessions when he woke up in the road. Mr. Perry was indicted for multiple charges including, among others, robbery with a dangerous weapon and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. During the trial, the trial court allowed the State to introduce evidence of Mr. Perry’s prior participation in a 2012 robbery where Mr. Perry struck the victim with a handgun and took the victim’s wallet. The trial court allowed the evidence under Rule 404(b) for the purpose of showing that Mr. Perry had the intent to commit

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Riggs, J., dissenting

robbery with a dangerous weapon or that the crime was a part of a common plan. Mr. Perry moved twice to dismiss the robbery with a dangerous weapon charge, and the trial court denied the motions each time. II. Standard of Review As a threshold matter, I take this opportunity to address the State’s burden and how that burden is articulated by the majority. While the bar may be low for the State to survive a motion to dismiss, it cannot be the case that a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence is a functionally pointless motion, particularly in a case such as this.^[2] To survive a motion to dismiss, the State must present substantial evidence of each of the essential elements of the offense charged and that the defendant is the perpetrator of the offense. State v. Golder, 374 N.C. 238, 249 (2020). The test for sufficiency of the evidence is the same whether the State provides direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75 (1993). For circumstantial evidence, the trial court must decide whether a reasonable inference of the defendant’s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances. Id. If the evidence is only sufficient to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the identity of the perpetrator, then the motion to dismiss should be allowed. State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98 (1980); see also State v. Campbell, 373 N.C.

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216, 221 (2019) (“Under well-settled caselaw, evidence of a defendant’s mere opportunity to commit a crime is not sufficient to send the charge to the jury.”). In contrast, if the record developed at trial contains substantial evidence, whether direct or circumstantial or both, to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, then the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied. Golder, 374 N.C. at 250. “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the State and giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 582 (2004) (emphasis added). Courts evaluate whether the State has carried its burden by utilizing the above rules in what our courts have called the “substantial evidence” test or the “more than a scintilla of evidence” test, and our precedent states these are the same. See, e.g., State v. Weinstein, 224 N.C. 645, 648 (1944) (“The rule is that the motion for judgment of nonsuit must be denied if there be any substantial evidence—more than a scintilla—to prove the allegations of the bill.”); Powell, 299 N.C. at 99 (“The terms ‘more than a scintilla of evidence’ and ‘substantial evidence’ are in reality the same . . . .”); State v. Smith, 40 N.C. App. 72, 78 (1979) (providing an overview of how the test has been articulated by this Court and concluding, “To this day, it appears that the ‘more than a scintilla of evidence’ test and the ‘substantial evidence’ test are in reality only one test which is most frequently designated the ‘substantial evidence

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test’ ”). But see State v. Agnew, 294 N.C. 382, 396 (1978) (Exum, J., dissenting) (asserting that “more than a scintilla of evidence” is not the true test, rather, the test is whether there is “substantial evidence—direct, circumstantial, or both—to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the accused committed it” (quoting State v. Stewart, 292 N.C. 219, 224 (1977))). Yet even with precedent asserting that these articulations of the test are one and the same, in application the focus on a “scintilla,” as the majority employs in this case, has the potential to effectively obviate any work that a court may ever do to hold the State to any standard of sufficiency of the evidence on a motion to dismiss. That would be wrong in both a practical and a precedential sense. For example, in Powell, this Court elaborated on those terms and announced that “the evidence must be existing and real, not just seeming or imaginary.” 299 N.C. at 99. Further, this Court has stated that “[s]ubstantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion.” State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294, 301 (2002) (citing State v. Frogge, 351 N.C. 576, 584 (2000)). A motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence is an important procedural tool that serves as a safeguard against unfounded charges reaching the jury leading to potentially unwarranted convictions.^[3] Therefore, it is important that this tool not lose all use.

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Riggs, J., dissenting

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Riggs, J., dissenting

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Riggs, J., dissenting

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Riggs, J., dissenting

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Riggs, J., dissenting

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Riggs, J., dissenting

caselaw states that “[w]here evidence ‘is proffered to show that someone other than the defendant committed the crime charged, admission of the evidence must do more than create mere conjecture of another’s guilt in order to be relevant,’ ” State v. Abbitt, 385 N.C. 28, 40 (2023) (quoting State v. McNeill, 326 N.C. 712, 721 (1990)), that legal statement is irrelevant to the case at hand. Mr. Perry’s argument is simply that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to create a timeline narrow enough to support a reasonable inference that Mr. Perry had more than just an opportunity to be the perpetrator of this offense. The State bears the burden of presenting sufficient evidence and, unless we implicitly overrule Moore and Murphy, the State had the burden here to establish a timeline tight enough to make reasonable for a jury the inference that it was Mr. Perry, and not someone else, who committed the crime. The State could have elicited testimony from the passerby who gave Mr. Scott a ride home, from his niece who he chatted with once he arrived at home, or from hospital staff.^[5] If the State had done so, my position in this matter may have been different because evidence that

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Riggs, J., dissenting

narrowed the timeline on opportunity would affect the reasonableness of the inference jurors were asked to make. But as it stands, I would hold that the State failed to carry its burden. Accordingly, on these facts, the State has failed to meet its burden to show that Mr. Perry was the perpetrator of the robbery offense and the Court of Appeals did not err in vacating Mr. Perry’s conviction of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. Justice EARLS joins in this dissenting opinion.