NC General Statutes

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31 (2026)

Discretionary review by the Supreme Court

✓ current as of July 2026

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(a) In any cause in which appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals, including any cause heard while the Court of Appeals was sitting en banc, except a cause appealed from the North Carolina Industrial Commission, the North Carolina State Bar pursuant to G.S. 84-28, the Property Tax Commission pursuant to G.S. 105-345, the Board of State Contract Appeals pursuant to G.S. 143-135.9, the Commissioner of Insurance pursuant to G.S. 58-2-80 or G.S. 58-65-131(c), a court-martial pursuant to G.S. 127A-62, a motion for appropriate relief, or valuation of exempt property pursuant to G.S. 7A-28, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, on motion of any party to the cause or on its own motion, certify the cause for review by the Supreme Court, either before or after it has been determined by the Court of Appeals. A cause appealed to the Court of Appeals from any of the administrative bodies listed in the preceding sentence may be certified in similar fashion, but only after determination of the cause in the Court of Appeals. The effect of such certification is to transfer the cause from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court for review by the Supreme Court. If the cause is certified for transfer to the Supreme Court before its determination in the Court of Appeals, review is not had in the Court of Appeals but the cause is forthwith transferred for review in the first instance by the Supreme Court. If the cause is certified for transfer to the Supreme Court after its determination by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Except in courts-martial and motions within the purview of G.S. 7A-28, the State may move for certification for review of any criminal cause, but only after determination of the cause by the Court of Appeals.

(b) In causes subject to certification under subsection (a) of this section, certification may be made by the Supreme Court before determination of the cause by the Court of Appeals when in the opinion of the Supreme Court any of the following apply:

(1) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest.

(2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State.

(3) Delay in final adjudication is likely to result from failure to certify and thereby cause substantial harm.

(4) The work load of the courts of the appellate division is such that the expeditious administration of justice requires certification.

(5) The subject matter of the appeal is important in overseeing the jurisdiction and integrity of the court system.

(c) In causes subject to certification under subsection (a) of this section, certification may be made by the Supreme Court after determination of the cause by the Court of Appeals when in the opinion of the Supreme Court any of the following apply:

(1) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest.

(2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State.

(3) The decision of the Court of Appeals appears likely to be in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court.

Interlocutory determinations by the Court of Appeals, including orders remanding the cause for a new trial or for other proceedings, shall be certified for review by the Supreme Court only upon a determination by the Supreme Court that failure to certify would cause a delay in final adjudication which would probably result in substantial harm.

(d) The procedure for certification by the Supreme Court on its own motion, or upon petition of a party, shall be prescribed by rule of the Supreme Court. (1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1969, c. 1044; 1975, c. 555; 1977, c. 711, s. 5; 1981, c. 470, s. 2; 1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1224, s. 17; c. 1253, s. 1; 1983, c. 526, s. 3; c. 761, s. 189; 2010-193, s. 19; 2016-125, 4th Ex. Sess., s. 22(d); 2017-7, s. 3.)

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 17,192 cases (247 in the last 5 years), 1968–2026 · leading case: Gore v. Myrtle/Mueller, 653 S.E.2d 400 (N.C. 2007).

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Gore v. Myrtle/Mueller, 653 S.E.2d 400 (N.C. 2007). · cites it 12× “We granted discretionary review under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 and now answer both questions in the affirmative.”

Arnesen v. Rivers Edge Golf Club & Plantation, Inc., 781 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2015). · cites it 8× “N.C.G.S. § 7A-31(a), (b)(2) (2013); N.C. R.”

Corwin as Tr. for Beatrice Corwin Living Irrevocable Trust v. British Am. Tobacco PLC, 821 S.E.2d 729 (N.C. 2018). · cites it 3× “WAJNERT On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.”

Sykes v. Health Network Solutions, Inc., 828 S.E.2d 467 (N.C. 2019). · cites it 3× “BALDWIN, IRA RUBIN, RICHARD ARMSTRONG, BRAD BATCHELOR, JOHN SMITH, RICK JACKSON, and MARK HOOPER On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31, prior to a determination by the Court of Appeals, of orders and opinions dated 18 August 2017 and 5 April 2018 entered by Judge…”

Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of NC, 581 S.E.2d 415 (N.C. 2003). · cites it 5× “N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (2001). *178 As a preliminary matter, we observe that the only issues before us pertain to the employment provisions of the enabling legislation and the Ordinance.”

Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997). · cites it 6× “Defendants argued in the Court of Appeals that the trial court had erred by denying their motion to dismiss plaintiff-parties' educational adequacy claims as being "nonjusticiable political questions.”

State v. Lee, 811 S.E.2d 563 (N.C. 2018). · cites it 3× “GYRELL SHAVONTA LEE On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.”

Turner v. Thomas, 794 S.E.2d 439 (N.C. 2016). · cites it 3× “ficial capacity; SPECIAL AGENT DUANE DEAVER, in his individual capacity and, in the alternative, in his official capacity; ROBIN PENDERGRAFT, in her individual capacity and, in the alternative, in her official capacity; and JOHN and JANE DOE SBI SUPERVISORS, in their individual…”

Davis v. Dennis Lilly Co., 411 S.E.2d 133 (N.C. 1991). · cites it 6× “16(a), (b), it not being a basis for the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals nor before this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31. Under his third issue on appeal, Davis contends that he was entitled to recover additional APC beyond the admitted underpayment of $8,882.”

Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 747 S.E.2d 220 (N.C. 2013). · cites it 3× “COMMUNITY BANK OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.”

State v. Romano, 369 N.C. 678 (N.C. 2017). · cites it 3× “JOSEPH MARIO ROMANO On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.”

State v. Melton, 821 S.E.2d 424 (N.C. 2018). · cites it 3× “DARRELL LEE MELTON On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.”

Show all 17,192 citing cases →

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31(A) — 1 case

Eubank v. Van-Riel, 738 S.E.2d 380 (N.C. 2013).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31(A)(B)(1)(2) — 1 case

Smith v. Parmaei, 630 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. 2006).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31(B)(1)(2)(3) — 10 cases

State v. Anderson, 644 S.E.2d 358 (N.C. 2007).

State v. Gilmore, 644 S.E.2d 364 (N.C. 2007).

State v. Gentry, 623 S.E.2d 776 (N.C. 2005).

State v. McCallum, 629 S.E.2d 277 (N.C. 2006).

State v. Bodie, 634 S.E.2d 219 (N.C. 2006).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31(a) — 48 cases

Arnesen v. Rivers Edge Golf Club & Plantation, Inc., 781 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2015). “N.C.G.S. § 7A-31(a), (b)(2) (2013); N.C. R.”

Hart v. State, 774 S.E.2d 281 (N.C. 2015).

Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., Inc., 281 S.E.2d 24 (N.C. 1981).

State v. Ellis, 639 S.E.2d 425 (N.C. 2007).

Chappell v. N.C. Dep't of Transp. (N.C. 2020).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31(b) — 11 cases

Kiser v. Kiser, 385 S.E.2d 487 (N.C. 1989).

Bailey v. State, 540 S.E.2d 313 (N.C. 2000).

North Carolina State Bar v. Randolph, 386 S.E.2d 185 (N.C. 1989).

Lea Co. v. Narth Carolina Bd. of Transp., 374 S.E.2d 866 (N.C. 1989).

Akzona, Inc. v. S. Ry. Co., 334 S.E.2d 759 (N.C. 1985).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31(c) — 36 cases

Bockweg v. Anderson, 402 S.E.2d 627 (N.C. 1991).

Cauble v. City of Asheville, 336 S.E.2d 59 (N.C. 1985).

State v. Hearst, 567 S.E.2d 124 (N.C. 2002).

Peaseley v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 194 S.E.2d 133 (N.C. 1973).

State v. Walston, 780 S.E.2d 846 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31(c)(1) — 3 cases

State v. Broadnax, 650 S.E.2d 817 (N.C. 2007).

Dove v. Speller, 628 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 2006).

State v. Broadnax, 650 S.E.2d 817 (N.C. 2007).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31(c)(2) — 1 case

Mole' v. City of Durham (N.C. 2023).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31(c)(l) — 1 case

State v. Mathis, 360 N.C. 542 (N.C. 2006).

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