NC General Statutes

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50 (2026)

Six years

✓ current as of July 2026

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(a) Within six years an action -

(1) Repealed by Session Laws 1997-297, s. 1.

(2) Against an executor, administrator, collector, or guardian on his official bond, within six years after the auditing of his final account by the proper officer, and the filing of the audited account as required by law.

(3) For injury to any incorporeal hereditament.

(4) Against a corporation, or the holder of a certificate or duplicate certificate of stock in the corporation, on account of any dividend, either a cash or stock dividend, paid or allotted by the corporation to the holder of the certificate or duplicate certificate of stock in the corporation.

(5) a. No action to recover damages based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property shall be brought more than six years from the later of the specific last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action or substantial completion of the improvement.

b. For purposes of this subdivision, an action based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property includes:

1. Actions to recover damages for breach of a contract to construct or repair an improvement to real property;

2. Actions to recover damages for the negligent construction or repair of an improvement to real property;

3. Actions to recover damages for personal injury, death or damage to property;

4. Actions to recover damages for economic or monetary loss;

5. Actions in contract or in tort or otherwise;

6. Actions for contribution indemnification for damages sustained on account of an action described in this subdivision;

7. Actions against a surety or guarantor of a defendant described in this subdivision;

8. Actions brought against any current or prior owner of the real property or improvement, or against any other person having a current or prior interest therein;

9. Actions against any person furnishing materials, or against any person who develops real property or who performs or furnishes the design, plans, specifications, surveying, supervision, testing or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property, or a repair to an improvement to real property.

c. For purposes of this subdivision, "substantial completion" means that degree of completion of a project, improvement or specified area or portion thereof (in accordance with the contract, as modified by any change orders agreed to by the parties) upon attainment of which the owner can use the same for the purpose for which it was intended. The date of substantial completion may be established by written agreement.

d. The limitation prescribed by this subdivision shall not be asserted as a defense by any person in actual possession or control, as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the improvement at the time the defective or unsafe condition constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or death for which it is proposed to bring an action, in the event such person in actual possession or control either knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of the defective or unsafe condition.

e. The limitation prescribed by this subdivision shall not be asserted as a defense by any person who shall have been guilty of fraud, or willful or wanton negligence in furnishing materials, in developing real property, in performing or furnishing the design, plans, specifications, surveying, supervision, testing or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property, or a repair to an improvement to real property, or to a surety or guarantor of any of the foregoing persons, or to any person who shall wrongfully conceal any such fraud, or willful or wanton negligence.

f. This subdivision prescribes an outside limitation of six years from the later of the specific last act or omission or substantial completion, within which the limitations prescribed by G.S. 1-52 and 1-53 continue to run. For purposes of the three-year limitation prescribed by G.S. 1-52, a cause of action based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property shall not accrue until the injury, loss, defect or damage becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent to the claimant. However, as provided in this subdivision, no action may be brought more than six years from the later of the specific last act or omission or substantial completion.

g. The limitation prescribed by this subdivision shall apply to the exclusion of G.S. 1-15(c), G.S. 1-52(16) and G.S. 1-47(2).

(6) Repealed by Session Laws 2009-420, s. 1, effective October 1, 2009, and applicable to causes of action that accrue on or after that date.

(7) Recodified as G.S. 1-47(6) by Session Laws 1995 (Regular Session, 1996), c. 742, s. 1.

(b) This section applies to actions brought by a private party and to actions brought by the State or a political subdivision of the State. (C.C.P., s. 33; Code, s. 154; Rev., s. 393; C.S., s. 439; 1931, c. 169; 1963, c. 1030; 1979, c. 654, s. 2; 1981, c. 644, s. 1; 1991, c. 268, s. 2; 1995, c. 291, s. 1; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 742, s. 1(a); 1997-297, s. 1; 2009-420, s. 1.)

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 156 cases (17 in the last 5 years), 1965–2026 · leading case: Forsyth Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 444 S.E.2d 423 (N.C. 1994).

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Forsyth Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 444 S.E.2d 423 (N.C. 1994). · cites it 169× “The Court of Appeals held, and we agree, that plaintiffs' complaint was governed by the real property improvement statute of repose, N.C.G.S. § 1-50(5) (1983). N.C.G.S. § 1-50(5) is the statute of repose governing claims of defective improvements to real property against a…”

Cacha v. Montaco, Inc., 554 S.E.2d 388 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 82× “Indeed, the Court stated that "[t]he dispositive issue in the present case is whether a repair qualifies as the `last act or omission' under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-50[a](5)." Id. at 238, 515 S.”

Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., Inc., 398 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1990). · cites it 42× “Defendants Tompkins, Simmons, the Warrens, and the Estate of Riggan contend that the six-year statute of repose found in N.C.G.S. § 1-50(5) bars plaintiffs' actions against them.”

Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849 (N.C. 1988). · cites it 26× “) Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that N.C.G.S. § 1-50(6) controls. Section 1-50(6) provides: No action for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death or damage to property based upon or arising out of any alleged defect or any failure in relation to a product…”

Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 1983). · cites it 29× “Judge Cornelius granted this motion on 3 November 1980 only as to plaintiff’s claim on the ground that G.S. 1-50(5) barred her claim. Judge Cornelius denied, however, the motion as to Hilton Inns’ crossclaim on the ground the crossclaim was not barred by the statute.”

Trillium Ridge Condo. Ass'n v. Trillium Links & Vill., LLC, 764 S.E.2d 203 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 35× “§ 1 - 50(a)(5)(a), with an action based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property “[f]or purposes of this subdivision” having been defined to include an “[a]ction[] to recover damages for negligent construction or repair of an…”

Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 332 S.E.2d 67 (N.C. 1985). · cites it 39× “The dispositive issue on this appeal is whether G.S. 1-50(6) is constitutional.”

Monson v. Paramount Homes, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 47× “Thus, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50 (5) applies to CBC in the present case.”

Mahoney v. Ronnie's Road Serv., Indian Head Indus., Inc., 468 S.E.2d 279 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 50× “Plaintiffs contend the statute of repose under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50 (6) (1983 & 1995 Cum.”

Bernick v. Jurden, 293 S.E.2d 405 (N.C. 1982). · cites it 18× “The plaintiff argues, inter alia, that his warranty claims are not barred because G.S. § 1-50(6) is the applicable statute of limitations and on the facts in this case, does not bar his claims.”

Bolick v. Am. Barmag Corp., 293 S.E.2d 415 (N.C. 1982). · cites it 19× “1-50(5), which stated at that time: “No action to recover damages for an injury to property, real or personal, or for an injury to the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property .”

Bryant v. Don Galloway Homes, Inc., 556 S.E.2d 597 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 27× “"To allow the statute of repose to toll or start running anew each time a repair is made would subject a defendant to potential open-ended liability for an indefinite period of time, defeating the very purpose of statutes of repose such as N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-50(5)." [1] Id. at…”

Show all 156 citing cases →

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(1) — 1 case

State Ex Rel. Williams v. Adams, 219 S.E.2d 198 (N.C. 1975).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(2) — 1 case

Tyson v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 286 S.E.2d 561 (N.C. 1982).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(3) — 4 cases

Allen v. Sea Gate Ass'n, Inc., 460 S.E.2d 197 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).

Pottle v. Link, 654 S.E.2d 64 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).

Hawthorne v. Realty Syndicate, Inc., 259 S.E.2d 591 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).

Karner v. Roy White Flowers, Inc., 518 S.E.2d 563 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(5) — 58 cases

Forsyth Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 444 S.E.2d 423 (N.C. 1994). “The Court of Appeals held, and we agree, that plaintiffs' complaint was governed by the real property improvement statute of repose, N.C.G.S. § 1-50(5) (1983). N.C.G.S. § 1-50(5) is the statute of repose governing claims of defective improvements to real property against a…”

Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., Inc., 398 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1990). “Defendants Tompkins, Simmons, the Warrens, and the Estate of Riggan contend that the six-year statute of repose found in N.C.G.S. § 1-50(5) bars plaintiffs' actions against them.”

Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 1983). “Judge Cornelius granted this motion on 3 November 1980 only as to plaintiff’s claim on the ground that G.S. 1-50(5) barred her claim. Judge Cornelius denied, however, the motion as to Hilton Inns’ crossclaim on the ground the crossclaim was not barred by the statute.”

Monson v. Paramount Homes, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999). “Thus, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50 (5) applies to CBC in the present case.”

Rowan Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 418 S.E.2d 648 (N.C. 1992).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(5)(a) — 3 cases

Richland Run Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Chc Durham Corp., 473 S.E.2d 649 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).

Monson v. Paramount Homes, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999). “Thus, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50 (5) applies to CBC in the present case.”

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(5)(a)(1991) — 1 case

Griebel v. Andersen Corp., 489 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1992).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(5)(b) — 1 case

State Ex Rel. State Art Museum Bldg. Comm'n v. Travelers Indem. Co., 432 S.E.2d 419 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(5)(b)(9) — 2 cases

Cacha v. Montaco, Inc., 554 S.E.2d 388 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). “Indeed, the Court stated that "[t]he dispositive issue in the present case is whether a repair qualifies as the `last act or omission' under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-50[a](5)." Id. at 238, 515 S.”

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(5)(c) — 1 case

Monson v. Paramount Homes, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999). “Thus, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50 (5) applies to CBC in the present case.”

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(5)(d) — 1 case

Richland Run Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Chc Durham Corp., 473 S.E.2d 649 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(5)(e) — 1 case

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(5)(g) — 1 case

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(6) — 55 cases

Boudreau v. Baughman, 368 S.E.2d 849 (N.C. 1988). “) Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that N.C.G.S. § 1-50(6) controls. Section 1-50(6) provides: No action for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death or damage to property based upon or arising out of any alleged defect or any failure in relation to a product…”

Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 332 S.E.2d 67 (N.C. 1985). “The dispositive issue on this appeal is whether G.S. 1-50(6) is constitutional.”

Bernick v. Jurden, 293 S.E.2d 405 (N.C. 1982). “The plaintiff argues, inter alia, that his warranty claims are not barred because G.S. § 1-50(6) is the applicable statute of limitations and on the facts in this case, does not bar his claims.”

Mahoney v. Ronnie's Road Serv., Indian Head Indus., Inc., 468 S.E.2d 279 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). “Plaintiffs contend the statute of repose under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50 (6) (1983 & 1995 Cum.”

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a) — 4 cases

Bryant v. Don Galloway Homes, Inc., 556 S.E.2d 597 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). “"To allow the statute of repose to toll or start running anew each time a repair is made would subject a defendant to potential open-ended liability for an indefinite period of time, defeating the very purpose of statutes of repose such as N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1-50(5)." [1] Id. at…”

Christie v. Hartley Constr., Inc., 745 S.E.2d 60 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).

Gaston Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Shelco (N.C. Ct. App. 2022).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(3) — 5 cases

Pottle v. Link, 654 S.E.2d 64 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Gray, 789 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. 2016).

Ocracomax, LLC v. Davis, 788 S.E.2d 664 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Gray (N.C. 2016).

Adum v. Albemarle Plantation Prop. Owners Ass'n, 2021 NCBC 4 (N.C. Bus. Ct. 2021).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5) — 10 cases

Dawson v. Dept. of Env't & Nat. Resources, 694 S.E.2d 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).

KB Aircraft Acquisition, LLC v. Berry, 790 S.E.2d 559 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).

Monson v. Paramount Homes, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999). “Thus, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50 (5) applies to CBC in the present case.”

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5)(a) — 3 cases

Dawson v. Dept. of Env't & Nat. Resources, 694 S.E.2d 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5)(b) — 1 case

Dawson v. Dept. of Env't & Nat. Resources, 694 S.E.2d 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5)(b)(9) — 2 cases

Dawson v. Dept. of Env't & Nat. Resources, 694 S.E.2d 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5)(c) — 2 cases

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5)(d) — 1 case

Autry v. Bill Clark Homes (N.C. Ct. App. 2022).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5)(e) — 2 cases

Byrd v. Avco Corp. (N.C. 2026).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(5)(f) — 1 case

RPR & Assocs. v. O'Brien/Atkins Assocs., P.A., 24 F. Supp. 2d 515 (M.D.N.C. 1998).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(6) — 10 cases

Mahoney v. Ronnie's Road Serv., Indian Head Indus., Inc., 468 S.E.2d 279 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). “Plaintiffs contend the statute of repose under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50 (6) (1983 & 1995 Cum.”

Brewer v. Dodson Aviation, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (W.D. Wash. 2006).

Robinson v. Bridgestone/firestone North Am., 703 S.E.2d 883 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).

Devito v. Biomet, Inc. (E.D.N.C. 2024).

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(a)(6)(1999) — 1 case

— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(b) — 1 case

Jones v. United States, 751 F. Supp. 2d 835 (E.D.N.C. 2010).

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