Within three years an action -
(1) Upon a contract, obligation or liability arising out of a contract, express or implied, except those mentioned in the preceding sections or in G.S. 1-53(1).
(1a) Upon the official bond of a public officer.
(2) Upon a liability created by statute, either state or federal, unless some other time is mentioned in the statute creating it.
(3) For trespass upon real property. When the trespass is a continuing one, the action shall be commenced within three years from the original trespass, and not thereafter.
(4) For taking, detaining, converting or injuring any goods or chattels, including action for their specific recovery.
(5) For criminal conversation, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not hereafter enumerated, except as provided by G.S. 1-17(d) and (e).
(6) Against the sureties of any executor, administrator, collector or guardian on the official bond of their principal; within three years after the breach thereof complained of.
(7) Against bail; within three years after judgment against the principal; but bail may discharge himself by a surrender of the principal, at any time before final judgment against the bail.
(8) For fees due to a clerk, sheriff or other officer, by the judgment of a court; within three years from the entry of the judgment, or the issuing of the last execution thereon.
(9) For relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.
(10) Repealed by Session Laws 1977, c. 886, s. 1.
(11) For the recovery of any amount under and by virtue of the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and amendments thereto, said act being an act of Congress.
(12) Upon a claim for loss covered by an insurance policy that is subject to the three-year limitation contained in G.S. 58-44-16.
(13) Against a public officer, for a trespass, under color of his office.
(14) An action under Chapter 75B of the General Statutes, the action in regard to a continuing violation accrues at the time of the latest violation.
(15) For the recovery of taxes paid as provided in G.S. 105-381 or for the recovery of an unlawful fee, charge, or exaction collected by a county, municipality, or other unit of local government for water or sewer service or water and sewer service.
(16) Unless otherwise provided by law, for personal injury or physical damage to claimant's property, the cause of action, except in causes of actions referred to in G.S. 1-15(c), shall not accrue until bodily harm to the claimant or physical damage to his property becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent to the claimant, whichever event first occurs. Except as provided in G.S. 130A-26.3 or G.S. 1-17(d) and (e), no cause of action shall accrue more than 10 years from the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.
(17) Against a public utility, electric or telephone membership corporation, or a municipality for damages or for compensation for right-of-way or use of any lands for a utility service line or lines to serve one or more customers or members unless an inverse condemnation action or proceeding is commenced within three years after the utility service line has been constructed or by October 1, 1984, whichever is later.
(18) Against any professional land surveyor as defined in G.S. 89C-3(9) or any person acting under the surveyor's supervision and control for physical damage or economic or monetary loss due to negligence or a deficiency in the performance of surveying or platting. A cause of action for physical damage under this subdivision shall be deemed to accrue at the time of the occurrence of the physical damage giving rise to the cause of action. All actions under this subdivision shall commence within seven years from the specific last act or omission of the professional land surveyor or any person acting under the surveyor's supervision and control giving rise to the cause of action. For purposes of this subdivision, "surveying and platting" means boundary surveys, topographical surveys, surveys of property lines, and any other measurement or surveying of real property and the consequent graphic representation thereof.
(19) For assault, battery, or false imprisonment, except as provided by G.S. 1-17(d) and (e). Notwithstanding this subdivision, a plaintiff may file a civil action within two years of the date of a criminal conviction for a related felony sexual offense against a defendant for claims related to sexual abuse suffered while the plaintiff was under 18 years of age.
(20) Upon a liability for a civil penalty, civil assessment, or civil fine imposed pursuant to Chapter 20 of the General Statutes. (C.C.P., s. 34; Code, s. 155; 1889, cc. 218, 269; 1895, c. 165; 1899, c. 15, s. 71; 1901, c. 558, s. 23; Rev., s. 395; 1913, c. 147, s. 4; C.S., s. 441; 1945, c. 785; 1971, c. 939, s. 1; 1975, c. 252, ss. 2, 4; 1977, c. 886, s. 1; c. 916, s. 2; c. 946, s. 4; 1979, c. 654, s. 3; 1981, c. 702; c. 777, s. 4; 1991, c. 268, s. 1; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 742, s. 1(b); 1997-297, s. 2; 2001-175, s. 2; 2004-203, s. 15(b); 2007-491, s. 3; 2009-171, s. 5; 2010-129, s. 6; 2014-17, s. 2; 2014-44, s. 1(c); 2017-138, s. 10(a); 2019-164, s. 2; 2019-245, s. 4.2(a).)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
987
cases (
186 in the last 5 years), 1944–2026 · leading case:
Misenheimer v. Burris, 637 S.E.2d 173 (N.C. 2006).
Misenheimer v. Burris, 637 S.E.2d 173 (N.C. 2006).
· cites it 193× “§§ 1-52(5) and 1-52(16) together to mean that the three year statute of limitations for criminal conversation begins to run when the tort is discovered or should have been discovered, not upon completion of the last act constituting the offense.”
Fowler v. Valencourt, 435 S.E.2d 530 (N.C. 1993).
· cites it 126× “G.S. 1-52 is hereby amended to add a new subsection as follows: "(13) against a public officer, for a trespass, under color of his office.”
White v. Consol. Plan., Inc., 603 S.E.2d 147 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 38× “Consolidated relies upon the fact that plaintiff did not file suit until August 2001, more than three years after all but two of the transactions occurred.”
Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., Inc., 398 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1990).
· cites it 80× “N.C.G.S. § 1-52 (1983). Ms. White was told by ACHD in September 1979 that its testing revealed the presence of gasoline in her well water.”
Forsyth Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 444 S.E.2d 423 (N.C. 1994).
· cites it 68× “Therefore, plaintiffs' claim was governed and barred by the statute of repose for claims involving nonapparent property damage, N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16), which provides: Unless otherwise provided by statute, for personal injury or physical damage to claimant's property, the cause of…”
Register v. White, 599 S.E.2d 549 (N.C. 2004).
· cites it 27× “We agree that this contractual language incorporates by reference the applicable limitations period for personal injury actions — here, the three-year limitations period of N.C.G.S. § 1-52. It is far from clear, however, that the parties also intended to import the accrual…”
Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town of Carthage, 813 S.E.2d 218 (N.C. 2018).
· cites it 96× “§ 1-52(15), which had been enacted by the General Assembly after the filing of the Town's initial brief, constituted a clarifying amendment to N.C.G.S. § 1-52 and barred the maintenance of plaintiffs' claims.”
Kent Stahle v. CTS Corp., 817 F.3d 96 (4th Cir. 2016).
· cites it 13× “becomes apparent” at some point in time after the injury, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52 (16); that is, it applies to latent injuries.”
Forbis v. Neal, 649 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. 2007).
· cites it 12× “N.C.G.S. § 1-52(9) provides that actions for “relief on the ground of fraud or mistake” must be brought within three years.”
Liberty Mut. Ins. v. Pennington, 573 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. 2002).
· cites it 15× “Plaintiff Liberty Mutual filed this action on 29 May 1998 requesting a judicial declaration that it was not required to provide UIM coverage to defendants because of their failure to comply with the notice provisions of the policy and to notify plaintiff of the UIM claim prior…”
Soderlund v. Kuch, 546 S.E.2d 632 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 26× “Because emotional distress claims are not specifically denominated under any limitation statute, our courts have consistently held that, “[c]auses of action for emotional distress, both intentional and negligent, are governed by the three-year statute of limitation provisions of…”
First Investors Corp. v. Citizens Bank, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 687 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
· cites it 57× “§ 1-52 applies to this particular factual situation is arguable but that no matter which subsection applies, Plaintiffs’ cause of action did not accrue until it was discovered on July 24, 1987, pursuant to N.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(1) — 185 cases
Misenheimer v. Burris, 637 S.E.2d 173 (N.C. 2006).
“§§ 1-52(5) and 1-52(16) together to mean that the three year statute of limitations for criminal conversation begins to run when the tort is discovered or should have been discovered, not upon completion of the last act constituting the offense.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(10) — 3 cases
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(11) — 1 case
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(12) — 5 cases
First Investors Corp. v. Citizens Bank, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 687 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
“§ 1-52 applies to this particular factual situation is arguable but that no matter which subsection applies, Plaintiffs’ cause of action did not accrue until it was discovered on July 24, 1987, pursuant to N.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(13) — 5 cases
Fowler v. Valencourt, 435 S.E.2d 530 (N.C. 1993).
“G.S. 1-52 is hereby amended to add a new subsection as follows: "(13) against a public officer, for a trespass, under color of his office.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(15) — 1 case
Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town of Carthage, 813 S.E.2d 218 (N.C. 2018).
“§ 1-52(15), which had been enacted by the General Assembly after the filing of the Town's initial brief, constituted a clarifying amendment to N.C.G.S. § 1-52 and barred the maintenance of plaintiffs' claims.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) — 110 cases
Misenheimer v. Burris, 637 S.E.2d 173 (N.C. 2006).
“§§ 1-52(5) and 1-52(16) together to mean that the three year statute of limitations for criminal conversation begins to run when the tort is discovered or should have been discovered, not upon completion of the last act constituting the offense.”
Forsyth Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 444 S.E.2d 423 (N.C. 1994).
“Therefore, plaintiffs' claim was governed and barred by the statute of repose for claims involving nonapparent property damage, N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16), which provides: Unless otherwise provided by statute, for personal injury or physical damage to claimant's property, the cause of…”
Register v. White, 599 S.E.2d 549 (N.C. 2004).
“We agree that this contractual language incorporates by reference the applicable limitations period for personal injury actions — here, the three-year limitations period of N.C.G.S. § 1-52. It is far from clear, however, that the parties also intended to import the accrual…”
Kent Stahle v. CTS Corp., 817 F.3d 96 (4th Cir. 2016).
“becomes apparent” at some point in time after the injury, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52 (16); that is, it applies to latent injuries.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(17) — 1 case
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(19) — 3 cases
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(2) — 56 cases
Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town of Carthage, 813 S.E.2d 218 (N.C. 2018).
“§ 1-52(15), which had been enacted by the General Assembly after the filing of the Town's initial brief, constituted a clarifying amendment to N.C.G.S. § 1-52 and barred the maintenance of plaintiffs' claims.”
Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., Inc., 398 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1990).
“N.C.G.S. § 1-52 (1983). Ms. White was told by ACHD in September 1979 that its testing revealed the presence of gasoline in her well water.”
Liberty Mut. Ins. v. Pennington, 573 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. 2002).
“Plaintiff Liberty Mutual filed this action on 29 May 1998 requesting a judicial declaration that it was not required to provide UIM coverage to defendants because of their failure to comply with the notice provisions of the policy and to notify plaintiff of the UIM claim prior…”
Misenheimer v. Burris, 637 S.E.2d 173 (N.C. 2006).
“§§ 1-52(5) and 1-52(16) together to mean that the three year statute of limitations for criminal conversation begins to run when the tort is discovered or should have been discovered, not upon completion of the last act constituting the offense.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(3) — 11 cases
Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., Inc., 398 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1990).
“N.C.G.S. § 1-52 (1983). Ms. White was told by ACHD in September 1979 that its testing revealed the presence of gasoline in her well water.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(4) — 14 cases
First Investors Corp. v. Citizens Bank, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 687 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
“§ 1-52 applies to this particular factual situation is arguable but that no matter which subsection applies, Plaintiffs’ cause of action did not accrue until it was discovered on July 24, 1987, pursuant to N.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(4)(2007) — 1 case
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(5) — 159 cases
Misenheimer v. Burris, 637 S.E.2d 173 (N.C. 2006).
“§§ 1-52(5) and 1-52(16) together to mean that the three year statute of limitations for criminal conversation begins to run when the tort is discovered or should have been discovered, not upon completion of the last act constituting the offense.”
Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., Inc., 398 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1990).
“N.C.G.S. § 1-52 (1983). Ms. White was told by ACHD in September 1979 that its testing revealed the presence of gasoline in her well water.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(5)(1996) — 1 case
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(6) — 2 cases
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(7) — 1 case
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(9) — 101 cases
Forbis v. Neal, 649 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. 2007).
“N.C.G.S. § 1-52(9) provides that actions for “relief on the ground of fraud or mistake” must be brought within three years.”
Forsyth Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 444 S.E.2d 423 (N.C. 1994).
“Therefore, plaintiffs' claim was governed and barred by the statute of repose for claims involving nonapparent property damage, N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16), which provides: Unless otherwise provided by statute, for personal injury or physical damage to claimant's property, the cause of…”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(a) — 1 case
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(c) — 1 case
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.