No municipality, county, local or regional zoning authority, or other political subdivision, shall, without the payment of just compensation in accordance with the provisions that are applicable to the Department of Transportation as provided in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of G.S. 136-131, remove or cause to be removed any outdoor advertising adjacent to a highway on the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways or a highway on the Federal-aid Primary Highway System for which there is in effect a valid permit issued by the Department of Transportation pursuant to the provisions of Article 11 of Chapter 136 of the General Statutes and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto. (1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1147, ss. 1, 2; 1983, c. 318, s. 1; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1024, s. 1; 1989, c. 166, s. 1; 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 725, s. 1; 1998-23, s. 7; 1998-212, s. 27.5(a); 2002-11, s. 1.)
Notes of Decisions
Morris Commc'ns Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment for Gastonia, 583 S.E.2d 419 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 4× “" N.C. Gen.Stat. § 136-131.1 (2001). However, in the present case, the City did not "remove or cause to be removed" the sign, and accordingly this provision is inapposite.”
MCC Outdoor, LLC v. Town of Wake Forest, 729 S.E.2d 694 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 6× “Plaintiff then sued the Town, alleging that it was entitled to just compensation for the removal of its sign, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-131.1 . It also alleged that the Town had effected a taking without paying just compensation and that plaintiff was also entitled to…”
Nat'l Advert. Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 478 S.E.2d 248 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 4× “See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-131.1 (1993). Be that as it may, assuming for sake of argument that the DOT is required under the OACA, as stated in Givens , to pay just compensation for signs it removes, this requirement only applies when the DOT removes the sign pursuant to exercise…”
Lamar OCI South Corp. v. Stanly Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 650 S.E.2d 37 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 20× “]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-131.1 (2005). Because we conclude that the County's ordinance is preempted by State law, we need not reach Lamar's contention that the Board's decision was not supported by competent evidence and was arbitrary as a matter of law.”
Naegele Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 440 S.E.2d 842 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 3× “” On 22 November 1991, defendant notified plaintiff by letter that removal of those billboards located along Federal Aid Interstate and Federal Aid Primary Highways (Exhibit A) required compensation upon removal, pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes § 136-131.”
Appalachian Outdoor Advert. Co. v. Town of Boone, 406 S.E.2d 297 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
“Defendant further argues that plaintiff may not circumvent the requirements of that statute by filing a complaint *506 under § 136-131.1 for just compensation when the just compensation argument was made before the Board and rejected.”
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