NC General Statutes

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-96 (2026)

Road or street not used within 15 years after dedication deemed abandoned; declaration of withdrawal recorded; joint tenants or tenants in common; defunct corporations

✓ current as of July 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section NCLEGncleg.gov (official) JustiaChapter 136 CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

(a) Every strip, piece, or parcel of land that has been at any time dedicated to public use as a road, highway, street, avenue, or for any other purpose whatsoever, by a deed, grant, map, plat, or other means, and that has not been actually opened and used by the public within 15 years after its dedication is conclusively presumed to have been abandoned by the public for the purposes for which it was dedicated; and no person shall have any right or cause of action thereafter to enforce any public or private easement in the land.

(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, no abandonment of any public or private right or easement shall be presumed until the dedicator or a person claiming under the dedicator files or causes to be recorded in the register's office of the county where the land lies a declaration withdrawing the strip, piece, or parcel of land from the public or private use to which it was dedicated.

(c) When the fee simple title is vested in tenants in common or joint tenants of any land embraced within the boundaries of a road, highway, street, avenue, or other land dedicated for any public purpose whatsoever, as described in this section, any one or more of the cotenants, on the cotenant's behalf and on behalf of the other cotenants, may execute and cause to be registered in the office of the register of deeds of the county where the land is situated the declaration of withdrawal provided for in this section. Under Chapter 46A (Partition) of the General Statutes and Article 29A (Judicial Sales) of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, and on petition of any one or more of the cotenants, the land thereafter may be partitioned by sale only as between or among the cotenants, irrespective of who may be in actual possession of the land. In the partition proceeding, any cotenant may object to the withdrawal certificate and the court shall thereupon order the certificate cancelled of record.

(d) When any corporation has dedicated any strip, piece, or parcel of land in the manner set out in this section, and the dedicating corporation is no longer in existence, the corporation is conclusively presumed to have no further right, title, or interest in the land, regardless of the provisions of conveyances from the corporation, or those holding under the corporation, retaining title and interest in the land. The right, title, and interest in the land is conclusively presumed to be vested in those persons owning lots or parcels of land adjacent to it, subject to the provisions of this section.

(e) This section does not apply in any of the following circumstances:

(1) When the continued use of any strip of land dedicated for street or highway purposes is necessary to afford convenient ingress or egress to any lot or parcel of land sold and conveyed by the dedicator of the street or highway.

(2) When the public dedication is part of a future street shown on the street plan adopted pursuant to G.S. 136-66.2. Upon request, a city shall adopt a resolution indicating that the dedication described in the proposed declaration of withdrawal is or is not part of the street plan adopted under G.S. 136-66.2. This resolution shall be attached to the declaration of withdrawal and shall be registered in the office of the register of deeds of the county where the land is situated. (1921, c. 174; C.S., ss. 3846(rr), 3846(ss), 3846(tt); 1939, c. 406; 1953, c. 1091; 1957, c. 517; 1987, c. 428, s. 1; 2020-23, s. 16.)

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 35 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1944–2022 · leading case: Steadman v. Town of Pinetops, 112 S.E.2d 102 (N.C. 1960).
Steadman v. Town of Pinetops, 112 S.E.2d 102 (N.C. 1960). · cites it 11× “The appellants contend that the facts found by the court below as set out hereinabove in paragraphs 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 14 and¡ 16, do not support the conclusion that the receiver is vested with title to all property rights of The Macclesfield Company ‘and, therefore, the…”
Nelms v. Davis, 632 S.E.2d 823 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 6× “; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-96 (2005) (allowing for withdrawal of dedicated right-of-way after fifteen years of non-use unless such right-of-way is “necessary to afford convenient ingress or egress to any lot or parcel of land sold and conveyed by the dedicator of such street or…”
Janicki v. Lorek, 120 S.E.2d 413 (N.C. 1961). · cites it 12× “” The assignments raise two questions: (1) Is there an applicable statute of limitations pleaded and, if so, does it bar plaintiffs’ cause of action? (2) Do the stipulations, admissions in the pleadings, and issues as answered support the judgment? Decision in this case involves…”
Waterway Drive Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Town of Cedar Point, 737 S.E.2d 126 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 12× “” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-96 (2011)(emphasis added).”
Food Town Stores, Inc. v. City of Salisbury, 265 S.E.2d 123 (N.C. 1980). · cites it 2× “Petitioners ground this contention on the possibility that these unmaintained portions of the street system may at some time in the future be withdrawn from dedication under G.S. 136-96. This contention is without merit.”
Wright v. Town of Matthews, 627 S.E.2d 650 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2× “See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-96 (2005) (providing for the recording of a declaration of withdrawal of a previous dedication of land for use as a public road).”
Stephens v. Dortch, 558 S.E.2d 889 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 8× “Defendants argue the trial court’s conclusion that the Withdrawal of Dedication did not terminate plaintiffs’ easement is inconsistent with the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-96 (1999). That statute provides that when any piece of land dedicated to public use as a…”
Wofford v. North Carolina State High. Comm'n, 140 S.E.2d 376 (N.C. 1965). · cites it 3× “Under certain circumstances the seller-dedicator or other lot owners may abandon and close a street or a portion of a street.”
Emick v. Sunset Beach & Twin Lakes, Inc., 638 S.E.2d 490 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 3× “Defendants argue they withdrew North Shore Drive in 1999 by filing a “Withdrawal” pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 136-96 and 160A-299. We reject this theory.”
Singleton v. Sunset Beach & Twin Lakes, Inc., 556 S.E.2d 657 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 6× “This document purports to withdraw the offer of dedication of North Shore Drive as depicted in the 1965 map, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-96 (1999). It is not clear from the record whether the 1976 Gore Map is consistent with the way in which the eastern end of the island…”
Russell v. Coggin, 62 S.E.2d 70 (N.C. 1950). · cites it 3× “136-96, that land “dedicated to public use as a road, highway, street, avenue, or for any other purpose whatsoever, by any deed, grant, map, plat, or other means, which shall not have been actually opened and used by the public within twenty years from and after dedication…”
Andrews v. Country Club Hills, Inc., 195 S.E.2d 584 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973). · cites it 8× “136-96 provides for withdrawal of dedication to public use: “Every strip, piece, or parcel of land which shall have been at any time dedicated to public use as a road, highway, street, avenue, or for any other purpose whatsoever, by a deed, grant, map, plat, or other means,…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.