As used in this Article, unless the context otherwise requires, the term -
(1) "Decedent" means the person whose life is taken by the slayer as defined in subdivision (3) of this section.
(2) "Property" means any real or personal property and any right or interest therein.
(3) "Slayer" means any of the following:
a. A person who, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is convicted as a principal or accessory before the fact of the willful and unlawful killing of another person.
b. A person who has entered a plea of guilty in open court as a principal or accessory before the fact of the willful and unlawful killing of another person.
c. A person who, upon indictment or information as a principal or accessory before the fact of the willful and unlawful killing of another person, has tendered a plea of nolo contendere which was accepted by the court and judgment entered thereon.
d. A person who is found by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil action brought within two years after the death of the decedent to have willfully and unlawfully killed the decedent or procured the killing of the decedent. If a criminal proceeding is brought against the person to establish the person's guilt as a principal or accessory before the fact of the willful and unlawful killing of the decedent within two years after the death of the decedent, the civil action may be brought within 90 days after a final determination is made by a court of competent jurisdiction in that criminal proceeding or within the original two years after the death of the decedent, whichever is later. The burden of proof in the civil action is on the party seeking to establish that the killing was willful and unlawful for the purposes of this Article.
e. A juvenile who is adjudicated delinquent by reason of committing an act that, if committed by an adult, would make the adult a principal or accessory before the fact of the willful and unlawful killing of another person.
The term "slayer" does not include a person who is found not guilty by reason of insanity of being a principal or accessory before the fact of the willful and unlawful killing of another person. (1961, c. 210, s. 1; 2006-107, s. 1.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
27
cases (
4 in the last 5 years), 1968–2023 · leading case:
State v. Arrington, 819 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 2018).
State v. Arrington, 819 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 2018).
· cites it 6× “2d at 569 (stating that the trial court was not bound by any stipulation that defendant was a “slayer” for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 31A-3(3)); and In re Edmundson, 273 N.”
Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins., 213 S.E.2d 563 (N.C. 1975).
· cites it 16× “31A, enacted by Chapter 210, 1961 Session Laws, was based upon legislation submitted to the 1961 General Assembly by a Special Drafting Committee of the General Statutes Commission- (hereinafter referred to as Committee).”
State v. Young, 775 S.E.2d 291 (N.C. 2015).
· cites it 6× “Freeman explained the nature of a wrongful death action and an action pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 31A-3(3)d; read the allegation contained in the complaint to the effect that, “[i]n the early morning hours of November 3rd, 2006 Jason Young brutally murdered Michelle Young at their…”
Locust v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 591 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. 2004).
· cites it 9× “Rather, this Court relied solely on *120 case law and chapter 3 IB for the proposition that the daughters could not seek wrongful death recovery through their mother’s renunciation of interest.”
Emerson v. Cape Fear Country Club, Inc., 817 S.E.2d 402 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 3× “2d 563 , 565-66, 568-69 (1975) (considering the applicability of N.C.G.S. § 31A-3(3), in light of the Model Act upon which it was based, to a person convicted of involuntary manslaughter).”
Smith v. Indep. Life Ins., 258 S.E.2d 864 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
· cites it 2× “*276 Plaintiff in her brief abandons any contention William was a “slayer” pursuant to G.S. 31A-3(3). Plaintiff only alleges that William was culpably negligent under our common law.”
State v. Misenheimer, 282 S.E.2d 791 (N.C. 1981).
“He contends they hoped to inherit a greater portion of their father’s estate if defendant were to be disqualified as an heir because of a conviction for his father’s murder, see G.S. 31A-3 et seq., and that he should have been allowed to cross-examine them about this possible…”
Misenheimer v. Misenheimer, 325 S.E.2d 195 (N.C. 1985).
· cites it 2× “G.S. 31A-3: Definitions. As used in this Article, unless the context otherwise requires, the term .”
State Farm Life Ins. v. Allison, 493 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 2× “In North Carolina, a person can be barred from receiving life insurance proceeds by: (1) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-3 (the slayer statute) because that person is convicted of killing the insured; or (2) the common law rule that no one may profit from their own wrongdoing.”
State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am. v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985).
“” The 1975 amendment added the statutory definitions of murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree and first degree manslaughter, and added the phrase “or as a surviving joint tenant.”
Atwater v. Nortel Networks, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 610 (M.D.N.C. 2005).
“§§ 31A-3 et seq., under which a person convicted of killing is barred from acquiring any property or receiving any benefits resulting from the victim’s death; and (2) the common law rule that no one may profit from their own wrongdoing.”
Jones v. All Am. Life Ins., 316 S.E.2d 122 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 2× “Although plaintiff does not fit the statutory definition of "slayer" because she has not been convicted of killing Hilliard, G.S. 31A-3(3), she nonetheless is barred by the common law from receiving the proceeds.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-3(3) — 11 cases
State v. Arrington, 819 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 2018).
“2d at 569 (stating that the trial court was not bound by any stipulation that defendant was a “slayer” for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 31A-3(3)); and In re Edmundson, 273 N.”
Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins., 213 S.E.2d 563 (N.C. 1975).
“31A, enacted by Chapter 210, 1961 Session Laws, was based upon legislation submitted to the 1961 General Assembly by a Special Drafting Committee of the General Statutes Commission- (hereinafter referred to as Committee).”
State v. Young, 775 S.E.2d 291 (N.C. 2015).
“Freeman explained the nature of a wrongful death action and an action pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 31A-3(3)d; read the allegation contained in the complaint to the effect that, “[i]n the early morning hours of November 3rd, 2006 Jason Young brutally murdered Michelle Young at their…”
Emerson v. Cape Fear Country Club, Inc., 817 S.E.2d 402 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018).
“2d 563 , 565-66, 568-69 (1975) (considering the applicability of N.C.G.S. § 31A-3(3), in light of the Model Act upon which it was based, to a person convicted of involuntary manslaughter).”
Smith v. Indep. Life Ins., 258 S.E.2d 864 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
“*276 Plaintiff in her brief abandons any contention William was a “slayer” pursuant to G.S. 31A-3(3). Plaintiff only alleges that William was culpably negligent under our common law.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-3(3)(a) — 1 case
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-3(3)(b) — 2 cases
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31A-3(l) — 1 case
Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins., 213 S.E.2d 563 (N.C. 1975).
“31A, enacted by Chapter 210, 1961 Session Laws, was based upon legislation submitted to the 1961 General Assembly by a Special Drafting Committee of the General Statutes Commission- (hereinafter referred to as Committee).”
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