As used in this Chapter the following words and phrases have the meanings indicated unless the context clearly requires another meaning:
(1) "Condemnation" means the procedure prescribed by law for exercising the power of eminent domain.
(2) "Condemnor" means those listed in G.S. 40A-3.
(3) "Eminent domain" means the power to divest right, title or interest from the owner of property and vest it in the possessor of the power against the will of the owner upon the payment of just compensation for the right, title or interest divested.
(4) "Judge" means a resident judge of the superior court in the district where the cause is pending, or special judge residing in said district, or a judge of the superior court assigned to hold the courts of said district or an emergency or special judge holding court in the county where the cause is pending.
(5) "Owner" includes the plural when appropriate and means any person having an interest or estate in the property.
(6) "Person" includes the plural when appropriate and means a natural person, and any legal entity capable of owning or having interest in property.
(7) "Property" means any right, title, or interest in land, including leases and options to buy or sell. "Property" also includes rights of access, rights-of-way, easements, water rights, air rights, and any other privilege or appurtenance in or to the possession, use, and enjoyment of land. (1981, c. 919, s. 1.)
Notes of Decisions
Reese v. Mecklenburg Cnty., 685 S.E.2d 34 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 2× “2d 71, 73 (2002) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-2(7)), cert. denied and disc.”
Dare Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Sakaria, 492 S.E.2d 369 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 3× “Plaintiff, on the other hand, interprets “date of taking” to mean “the date that title vests in the Board or the date that the Board obtains the right of possession, whichever is earlier.”
Piedmont Triad Reg'l Water Auth. v. Lamb, 564 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 4× “Plaintiff moved for a new trial pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rules 59(a)(5), (6) and (7) (2001) which was denied.”
City of Winston-Salem v. Yarbrough, 451 S.E.2d 358 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 2× “N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-2 (1984) provides that, for purposes of eminent domain, an owner is “any person having an interest or estate in the property,” and property means “any right, title, or interest in land.”
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Tillett, 343 S.E.2d 188 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
“40A-19; G.S. 40A-2(7). This second issue of trespass must await resolution on remand of the status of title to the larger remaining fractional interest in the disputed property.”
City of Durham v. Woo, 497 S.E.2d 457 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 2× “We first observe that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-2(7) (1984) defines the term “property” as used in Chapter 40A to mean “any right, title, or interest in land, including leases and options to buy or sell.”
In Re Lee, 354 S.E.2d 759 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 2× “" G.S. § 40A-2(7). This definition is broad enough to include profits a'prendre, requiring just compensation to the owner of that interest when the right to enter upon lands is lost through condemnation.”
Davis v. Forsyth Cnty., 453 S.E.2d 231 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 2× “” Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-2 (1984), the successor to Chapter 40, “person” is defined as “a natural person and any legal entity capable of owning or having interest in land.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-2(1) — 1 case
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-2(3) — 1 case
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-2(5) — 1 case
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-2(7) — 6 cases
Reese v. Mecklenburg Cnty., 685 S.E.2d 34 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
“2d 71, 73 (2002) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-2(7)), cert. denied and disc.”
Piedmont Triad Reg'l Water Auth. v. Lamb, 564 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
“Plaintiff moved for a new trial pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rules 59(a)(5), (6) and (7) (2001) which was denied.”
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Tillett, 343 S.E.2d 188 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
“40A-19; G.S. 40A-2(7). This second issue of trespass must await resolution on remand of the status of title to the larger remaining fractional interest in the disputed property.”
City of Durham v. Woo, 497 S.E.2d 457 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
“We first observe that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 40A-2(7) (1984) defines the term “property” as used in Chapter 40A to mean “any right, title, or interest in land, including leases and options to buy or sell.”
In Re Lee, 354 S.E.2d 759 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
“" G.S. § 40A-2(7). This definition is broad enough to include profits a'prendre, requiring just compensation to the owner of that interest when the right to enter upon lands is lost through condemnation.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.