(a) Any tenant or lessee of any house or land, and the assigns under the tenant or legal representatives of such tenant or lessee, who holds over and continues in the possession of the demised premises, or any part thereof, without the permission of the landlord, and after demand made for its surrender, may be removed from such premises in the manner hereinafter prescribed in any of the following cases:
(1) When a tenant in possession of real estate holds over after his term has expired.
(2) When the tenant or lessee, or other person under him, has done or omitted any act by which, according to the stipulations of the lease, his estate has ceased.
(3) When any tenant or lessee of lands or tenements, who is in arrear for rent or has agreed to cultivate the demised premises and to pay a part of the crop to be made thereon as rent, or who has given to the lessor a lien on such crop as a security for the rent, deserts the demised premises, and leaves them unoccupied and uncultivated.
(b) An arrearage in costs owed by a tenant for water or sewer services pursuant to G.S. 62-110(g) or electric service pursuant to G.S. 62-110(h) shall not be used as a basis for termination of a lease under this Chapter. Any payment to the landlord shall be applied first to the rent owed and then to charges for electric service, or water or sewer service, unless otherwise designated by the tenant.
(c) In an action for ejectment based upon G.S. 42-26(a)(2), the lease may provide that the landlord's acceptance of partial rent or partial housing subsidy payment does not waive the tenant's breach for which the right of reentry was reserved, and the landlord's exercise of such a provision does not constitute a violation of Chapter 75 of the General Statutes. (4 Geo. II, c. 28; 1868-9, c. 156, s. 19; Code, ss. 1766, 1777; 1905, cc. 297, 299, 820; Rev., s. 2001; C.S., s. 2365; 2001-502, s. 3; 2004-143, s. 2; 2011-252, s. 1; 2012-17, s. 3.)
§ 42-26.1: Expired.
Notes of Decisions
Are-100/800/801 Capitola, LLC v. Triangle Laboratories, Inc. (2001)
ncctapp · cites it 30×
“I Defendant argues the trial court erred in granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because Chapter 42, Article 3 of the North Carolina General Statutes applies to residential tenants, and, thus, the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction.”
Stanley v. Harvey (1988)
ncctapp · cites it 10×
“pH Section 42-26 allows the remedy of summary ejectment in only the following cases: “(1) When a tenant in possession of real estate holds over after his term has expired; (2) when the tenant .”
Holly Farm Foods, Inc. v. Kuykendall (1994)
ncctapp · cites it 8×
“Chapman then instituted a summary ejectment proceeding against defendants pursuant to N.C.Gen.Stat. § 42-26 and on 2 May *96 1988 the magistrate ordered defendants removed from the premises and that Chapman be placed in possession.”
Hayes v. Turner (1990)
ncctapp · cites it 5×
“The action which gave rise to this appeal was for summary ejectment under N.C.G.S. § 42-26. A court, in conducting summary ejectment proceedings, derives its jurisdiction solely from this statute, and it may exercise such jurisdiction only where a relationship of landlord and…”
Chrisalis Properties, Inc. v. Separate Quarters, Inc. (1990)
ncctapp · cites it 4×
“When defendant failed to vacate the premises, plaintiff initiated a summary ejectment action in December 1988 pursuant to G.S. 42-26 based on defendant’s breach of a condition of the lease.”
Twin City Apartments, Inc. v. Landrum (1980)
ncctapp · cites it 4×
“Defendant next contends that the summary ejectment procedure as set out in G.S. 42-26(1) and G.S. 42-32, is unconstitutional.”
Adams v. Woods (2005)
ncctapp · cites it 4×
“The summary ejectment remedy provided for in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-26 is restricted to situations where the relationship of landlord and tenant exists.”
WOODRIDGE HOMES LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. Gregory (2010)
ncctapp · cites it 4×
“At various points in its brief, Plaintiff contends that it merely attempted to terminate the lease at the end of the lease period and that Defendant was subject to removal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-26 (a)(l) since she was holding over after the term of her lease had…”
Murillo v. Daly (2005)
ncctapp · cites it 2×
“While the Murillos asserted counterclaims before the Magistrate against the summary ejectment action under G.S. 42-26(1), this Court recognized in Twin City Apartments, Inc.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-26(1) — 4 cases
Murillo v. Daly (2005)
ncctapp
“While the Murillos asserted counterclaims before the Magistrate against the summary ejectment action under G.S. 42-26(1), this Court recognized in Twin City Apartments, Inc.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-26(2) — 3 cases
Are-100/800/801 Capitola, LLC v. Triangle Laboratories, Inc. (2001)
ncctapp
“I Defendant argues the trial court erred in granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because Chapter 42, Article 3 of the North Carolina General Statutes applies to residential tenants, and, thus, the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction.”
Stanley v. Harvey (1988)
ncctapp
“pH Section 42-26 allows the remedy of summary ejectment in only the following cases: “(1) When a tenant in possession of real estate holds over after his term has expired; (2) when the tenant .”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-26(a) — 1 case
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-26(a)(1) — 1 case
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-26(a)(2) — 2 cases
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