NC General Statutes

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-33 (2026)

Rent and costs tendered by tenant

✓ current as of July 2026
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If, in any action brought to recover the possession of demised premises upon a forfeiture for the nonpayment of rent, the tenant, before judgment given in such action, pays or tenders the rent due and the costs of the action, all further proceedings in such action shall cease. If the plaintiff further prosecutes his action, and the defendant pays into court for the use of the plaintiff a sum equal to that which shall be found to be due, and the costs, to the time of such payment, or to the time of a tender and refusal, if one has occurred, the defendant shall recover from the plaintiff all subsequent costs; the plaintiff shall be allowed to receive the sum paid into court for his use, and the proceedings shall be stayed. (4 Geo. II, c. 28, s. 4; 1868-9, c. 156, s. 26; Code, s. 1773; Rev., s. 2007; C.S., s. 2372.)

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1947–2023 · leading case: Charlotte Off. Tower Assocs. v. Carolina SNS Corp., 366 S.E.2d 905 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
Charlotte Off. Tower Assocs. v. Carolina SNS Corp., 366 S.E.2d 905 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 10× “The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in refusing to apply G.S. 42-33 to stay the order of possession.”
Couch v. ADC Realty Corp., 268 S.E.2d 237 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980). · cites it 4× “We hold that on 23 January 1979, after the order had been signed, the action was pending as to all issues, and a receiver had only been appointed to hold the property pending the outcome of the litigation.”
Menache v. Atl. Coast Mgmt. Corp., 260 S.E.2d 100 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). · cites it 3× “” Defendant contends that as a result of tendering the amounts of rent due to the court and to plaintiffs in accordance with G.S. 42-33, all proceedings ceased, and this is a defense to plaintiffs’ action.”
Hoover v. Crotts, 61 S.E.2d 705 (N.C. 1950). “G.S. 42-33. On this point plaintiff cites and relies on Midimis v.”
Green v. Lybrand, 249 S.E.2d 443 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978). · cites it 4× “42-3 must be read in conjunction with G.S. 42-33. Ryan v. Reynolds, 190 N.C. 563 , 130 S.”
Seligson v. . Klyman, 42 S.E.2d 220 (N.C. 1947). “Tbe provisions of G. S., 42-33, have no application to tbe facts of the instant record.”
Lockerby v. Cross Point NC Partners, LLC (W.D.N.C. 2023). · cites it 6× “§ 42-33 is not applicable to her leases. However, this Court is precluded from making either of those declarations.”
Winston Affordable Hous., LLC v. Roberts (N.C. 2020). · cites it 3× “See N.C.G.S. § 42-33 (2019); Hoover v. Crotts, 232 N.”
Winston Affordable Hous., LLC v. Roberts (N.C. 2020). · cites it 3× “See N.C.G.S. § 42-33 (2019); Hoover v. Crotts, 232 N.”
Wallace v. Greystar Real Est. Partners, LLC (M.D.N.C. 2022). · cites it 2× “2 The Complaint additionally seeks a declaratory judgment that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-33 is not applicable to this case.”
Wallace v. Greystar Real Est. Partners, LLC (M.D.N.C. 2022). · cites it 2× “) It additionally seeks a declaratory judgment that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-33 is not applicable to this case.”
Stines v. Carter (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). “Where the contracting parties have considered the issue, negotiated a response, and memorialized their response within the lease, the trial court appropriately should decline to apply these statutory provisions.”
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