(a) No (i) conveyance of land, (ii) contract to convey, (iii) option to purchase or convey, (iv) lease of land for more than three years, (v) right of first refusal, or (vi) right of first offer is valid to pass any property interest as against lien creditors or purchasers for a valuable consideration from the donor, bargainor, or lessor but from the time of its registration in the county where the land lies, or if the land is located in more than one county, then in each county where any portion of the land lies to be effective as to the land in that county. Unless otherwise stated either on the registered instrument or on a separate registered instrument duly executed by the party whose priority interest is adversely affected, (i) instruments registered in the office of the register of deeds have priority based on the order of registration as determined by the time of registration, and (ii) if instruments are registered simultaneously, then the instruments are presumed to have priority determined as follows:
(1) The earliest document number set forth on the registered instrument.
(2) The sequential book and page number set forth on the registered instrument if no document number is set forth on the registered instrument.
The presumption created by this subsection is rebuttable.
(b) This section shall not apply to contracts, leases or deeds executed prior to March 1, 1885, until January 1, 1886; and no purchase from any such donor, bargainor or lessor shall avail or pass title as against any unregistered deed executed prior to December 1, 1885, when the person holding or claiming under such unregistered deed shall be in actual possession and enjoyment of such land, either in person or by his tenant, at the time of the execution of such second deed, or when the person claiming under or taking such second deed had at the time of taking or purchasing under such deed actual or constructive notice of such unregistered deed, or the claim of the person holding or claiming thereunder. (Code, s. 1245; 1885, c. 147, s. 1; Rev., s. 980; C.S., s. 3309; 1959, c. 90; 1975, c. 507; 2003-219, s. 2; 2005-212, s. 2; 2021-91, s. 10.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
82
cases (
8 in the last 5 years), 1945–2026 · leading case:
Runyon v. Paley, 416 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. 1992).
Runyon v. Paley, 416 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. 1992).
· cites it 9× “N.C.G.S. § 47-18 provides: No . . . conveyance of land .”
Hill v. Pinelawn Mem'l Park, Inc., 282 S.E.2d 779 (N.C. 1981).
· cites it 7× “47-18 which provides: No conveyance of land, or contract to convey, or option to convey, or lease of land for more than three years shall be valid to pass any property interest as against lien creditors or purchasers for a valuable consideration from the donor, bargainor or…”
New Bar P'ship v. Martin, 729 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 6× “*304 On 22 July 2011, FMW moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that New Bar’s right of first refusal was invalid under the Connor Act, N.C. Gen Stat. § 47-18, and, in the alternative, had expired in 2009 under the common law rule against…”
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. AMH Roman Two NC, LLC, 859 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2017).
“See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 47-18 , 47-20. The very purpose of the race recording statute is “to enable purchasers to rely with safety upon the examination of the records.”
In Re Suggs, 355 B.R. 525 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006).
· cites it 4× “In its brief, MERS relies on North Carolina General Statute § 47-18 to argue that the Trustee and other creditors may not obtain a lien against the property since the deed was never recorded.”
Watson v. Millers Creek Lumber Co., Inc., 631 S.E.2d 839 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 4× “Summary Judgment: Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in granting defendant Counts' motion for summary judgment while simultaneously denying their motion.”
In Re Matter of on George, 825 S.E.2d 19 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 4× “Indeed, the language in Section 1-108 is a little different than other statutes which provide protection to purchasers of real estate.”
Lawing v. Jaynes, 206 S.E.2d 162 (N.C. 1974).
· cites it 5× “To what extent, if any, did the option agreement, which was recorded in March of 1964, constitute constructive notice to defendants McLean that plaintiffs had exercised their option and had instituted an action to compel specific performance? G.S. 47-18 (a) provides: “No…”
Perkins v. Langdon, 74 S.E.2d 634 (N.C. 1953).
· cites it 4× “22-2, or our recording laws, G.S. 47-18), is valid in law and enforceable against a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the lease.”
Henkel v. Triangle Homes, Inc., 790 S.E.2d 602 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 8× “Defendant's argument relies on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47-18 (a), North Carolina's recordation statute, which provides: No (i) conveyance of land, or (ii) contract to convey, or (iii) option to convey, or (iv) *605 lease of land for more than three years shall be valid to pass any…”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47-18(a) — 8 cases
Runyon v. Paley, 416 S.E.2d 177 (N.C. 1992).
“N.C.G.S. § 47-18 provides: No . . . conveyance of land .”
Lawing v. Jaynes, 206 S.E.2d 162 (N.C. 1974).
“To what extent, if any, did the option agreement, which was recorded in March of 1964, constitute constructive notice to defendants McLean that plaintiffs had exercised their option and had instituted an action to compel specific performance? G.S. 47-18 (a) provides: “No…”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47-18(b) — 1 case
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