Marriages may be dissolved and the parties thereto divorced from the bonds of matrimony on the application of either party, if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for one year, and the plaintiff or defendant in the suit for divorce has resided in the State for a period of six months. A divorce under this section shall not be barred to either party by any defense or plea based upon any provision of G.S. 50-7, a plea of res judicata, or a plea of recrimination. Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 50-11, or of the common law, a divorce under this section shall not affect the rights of a dependent spouse with respect to alimony which have been asserted in the action or any other pending action.
Whether there has been a resumption of marital relations during the period of separation shall be determined pursuant to G.S. 52-10.2. Isolated incidents of sexual intercourse between the parties shall not toll the statutory period required for divorce predicated on separation of one year. (1931, c. 72; 1933, c. 163; 1937, c. 100, ss. 1, 2; 1943, c. 448, s. 3; 1949, c. 264, s. 3; 1965, c. 636, s. 2; 1977, c. 817, s. 1; 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1190, s. 1; 1979, c. 709, s. 1; 1981, c. 182; 1983, c. 613, s. 2; c. 923, s. 217; 1987, c. 664, s. 2.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
114
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 1943–2024 · leading case:
Scott v. Scott, 442 S.E.2d 493 (N.C. 1994).
Scott v. Scott, 442 S.E.2d 493 (N.C. 1994).
· cites it 30× “In this action for divorce, defendant contends the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's entry of judgment of divorce based on one year's separation pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50-6. We disagree and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.”
Romulus v. Romulus, 715 S.E.2d 308 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 7× “3A(3), is not defined by the statutory provisions regarding alimony, but has been addressed by our courts in the context of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-6 , which addresses absolute divorce.”
Banner v. Banner, 358 S.E.2d 110 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 14× “Banner to defend a stale abandonment claim, when he was already entitled to a divorce based on one year’s continuous separation pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50-6. In light of these factors the trial court’s denial of Mrs.”
Carpenter v. Carpenter, 93 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. 1956).
· cites it 11× “There is no question but that the divorce decree is valid if in fact the Shavers separated on 1 January, 1944, and lived separate and apart continuously thereafter.”
Bruce v. Bruce, 339 S.E.2d 855 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
· cites it 9× “1-56, applies in an action for absolute divorce under G.S. 50-6. The defendant contends that it does and therefore bars both the claim for absolute divorce and the claim for equitable distribution.”
Swygert v. Swygert, 264 S.E.2d 902 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
· cites it 7× “*179 Plaintiff-wife relies upon the reference in defendant’s counterclaim to the allegations of abandonment contained in his original answer, as well as upon these conclusions of law, in support for her argument that defendant-husband was granted a divorce upon a ground not pled.”
Stark v. Janaki Ratashara, 628 S.E.2d 471 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 5× “On 27 November 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint for absolute divorce on the ground of one-year separation, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-6 . On 13 January 2003, defendant filed her answer, and stated that “the claims for alimony and equitable distribution pending *450 this…”
Scott v. Scott, 417 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 10× “N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-6 . Defendant argues that she suffers from an incurable mental illness and therefore the exclusive means by which plaintiff can obtain a divorce is pursuant to N.”
McCutchen v. McCutchen, 612 S.E.2d 162 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 8× “In addition, Byron did not file for divorce from plaintiff until 26 September 2000, one year and seventeen days after the date he was permitted to do so under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50-6. The trial court ruled and the majority's opinion affirms that plaintiff's claim against defendant…”
Mayer v. Mayer, 311 S.E.2d 659 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 4× “Therefore, the bilateral divorce obtained by Doris Mayer should be recognized since it does not offend the public policy of North Carolina — that is, the grounds upon which the divorce was granted, irreconcilable differences, are substantially equivalent to those of a divorce…”
Adams v. Adams, 374 S.E.2d 450 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 8× “Rather, we think it the intent of our legislature, and we so hold, that voluntary sexual intercourse by a spouse with a third party during the period of separation required by Section 50-6 is adultery as contemplated by Section 50-16.”
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