NC General Statutes
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (2026)
Husband and wife as witnesses in criminal actions
✓ current as of July 2026
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(a) The spouse of the defendant shall be a competent witness for the defendant in all criminal actions, but the failure of the defendant to call such spouse as a witness shall not be used against him. Such spouse is subject to cross-examination as are other witnesses.
(b) The spouse of the defendant shall be competent but not compellable to testify for the State against the defendant in any criminal action or grand jury proceedings, except that the spouse of the defendant shall be both competent and compellable to so testify:
(1) In a prosecution for bigamy or criminal cohabitation, to prove the fact of marriage and facts tending to show the absence of divorce or annulment;
(2) In a prosecution for assaulting or communicating a threat to the other spouse;
(3) In a prosecution for trespass in or upon the separate lands or residence of the other spouse when living separate and apart from each other by mutual consent or court order;
(4) In a prosecution for abandonment of or failure to provide support for the other spouse or their child;
(5) In a prosecution of one spouse for any other criminal offense against the minor child of either spouse, including any child of either spouse who is born out of wedlock or adopted or a foster child.
(c) No husband or wife shall be compellable in any event to disclose any confidential communication made by one to the other during their marriage. (1856-7, c. 23; 1866, c. 43; 1868-9, c. 209; 1881, c. 110; Code, ss. 588, 1353, 1354; Rev., ss. 1634, 1635, 1636; C.S., s. 1802; 1933, c. 13, s. 1; c. 361; 1951, c. 296; 1957, c. 1036; 1967, c. 116; 1971, c. 800; 1973, c. 1286, s. 11; 1983, c. 170, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 843, s. 5; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1040, s. 1; 1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990), c. 1039, s. 4; 1991, c, 686, s. 3; 2013-198, s. 2.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 70
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1946–2021 · leading case: State v. Holmes, 412 S.E.2d 660 (N.C. 1992).
State v. Holmes, 412 S.E.2d 660 (N.C. 1992). “The State contends that N.C.G.S. § 8-57 abolishes the common law rule against the disclosure of confidential marital communications, leaving only a rule against being compelled to disclose a confidential marital communication.”
State v. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d 334 (N.C. 2009). “[3] History of the Marital Communications Privilege Section 8-57 is a product of the continually evolving common law marital privileges that historically sought to promote credibility and protect the intimacy of the marital union.”
State v. Hammonds, 541 S.E.2d 166 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). “*179 N.C.Gen.Stat. § 8-57 (1999). While recognizing that the cases and statutes pertinent to this issue "have not been models of clarity," State v.”
State v. Godbey, 792 S.E.2d 820 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016). “Defendant argued that private sex acts between a husband and wife were privileged marital communications under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (c). The trial court reserved judgment on the matter until Karen testified.”
State v. Rush, 456 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1995). “Defendant bases his contention on N.C.G.S. § 8-57, which he interprets as prohibiting the admission of out-of-court statements made by a defendant’s spouse and introduced against the defendant for the State through a third party.”
State v. Barden, 572 S.E.2d 108 (N.C. 2002). “” N.C.G.S. § 8-57(a) (2001). We have interpreted this statute to mean that the failure of defendant’s wife to testify on his behalf “shall not be used to [his] prejudice,” State v.”
State v. Thompson, 226 S.E.2d 487 (N.C. 1976). “At this point the solicitor said: “He [defendant] says after he took the girls over there to the Patio and left them he came back home and slipped up the window and crawled in the house at 2:00 o’clock in the morning; that his wife knew he came in because his wife knows…”
State v. Brown, 513 S.E.2d 57 (N.C. 1999). “After a voir dire regarding the admissibility of the statements contained in the letters, the trial court stated: If the defendant [Leroy Wentzel] claims [the statements] are privileged at the time that he is asked these questions, he will not be compelled to respond, the court…”
State v. Matsoake, 777 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). “]" We agree. The incident occurred as Hart drove to a doctor's appointment with Defendant sitting in the passenger seat.”
Misenheimer v. Burris, 637 S.E.2d 173 (N.C. 2006). “§ 8-56 (2005) (providing that in civil actions, "[n]o husband or wife shall be compellable in any event to disclose any confidential communication made by one to the other during their marriage"); N.C.G.S. § 8-57(c) (2005) (providing that in criminal actions, "[n]o husband or…”
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). “1979); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (Supp. 1977); Ohio Rev.”
State v. McQueen, 377 S.E.2d 38 (N.C. 1989). “The result of your testimony today, after being subpoenaed as a witness, you're doing it voluntarily, out of no threats.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57(a) — 5 cases
State v. Barden, 572 S.E.2d 108 (N.C. 2002). “” N.C.G.S. § 8-57(a) (2001). We have interpreted this statute to mean that the failure of defendant’s wife to testify on his behalf “shall not be used to [his] prejudice,” State v.”
State v. Holmes, 412 S.E.2d 660 (N.C. 1992). “The State contends that N.C.G.S. § 8-57 abolishes the common law rule against the disclosure of confidential marital communications, leaving only a rule against being compelled to disclose a confidential marital communication.”
State v. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d 334 (N.C. 2009). “[3] History of the Marital Communications Privilege Section 8-57 is a product of the continually evolving common law marital privileges that historically sought to promote credibility and protect the intimacy of the marital union.”
State v. Hammonds, 541 S.E.2d 166 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). “*179 N.C.Gen.Stat. § 8-57 (1999). While recognizing that the cases and statutes pertinent to this issue "have not been models of clarity," State v.”
State v. Martin, 412 S.E.2d 134 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57(b) — 7 cases
State v. Holmes, 412 S.E.2d 660 (N.C. 1992). “The State contends that N.C.G.S. § 8-57 abolishes the common law rule against the disclosure of confidential marital communications, leaving only a rule against being compelled to disclose a confidential marital communication.”
State v. McQueen, 377 S.E.2d 38 (N.C. 1989). “The result of your testimony today, after being subpoenaed as a witness, you're doing it voluntarily, out of no threats.”
State v. Rush, 456 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1995). “Defendant bases his contention on N.C.G.S. § 8-57, which he interprets as prohibiting the admission of out-of-court statements made by a defendant’s spouse and introduced against the defendant for the State through a third party.”
State v. Hammonds, 541 S.E.2d 166 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). “*179 N.C.Gen.Stat. § 8-57 (1999). While recognizing that the cases and statutes pertinent to this issue "have not been models of clarity," State v.”
State v. Godbey, 792 S.E.2d 820 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016). “Defendant argued that private sex acts between a husband and wife were privileged marital communications under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (c). The trial court reserved judgment on the matter until Karen testified.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57(b)(2) — 2 cases
State v. Harris (N.C. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Harris (N.C. Ct. App. 2021).
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57(b)(5) — 1 case
State v. Godbey, 792 S.E.2d 820 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016). “Defendant argued that private sex acts between a husband and wife were privileged marital communications under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57 (c). The trial court reserved judgment on the matter until Karen testified.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57(c) — 16 cases
State v. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d 334 (N.C. 2009). “[3] History of the Marital Communications Privilege Section 8-57 is a product of the continually evolving common law marital privileges that historically sought to promote credibility and protect the intimacy of the marital union.”
State v. Holmes, 412 S.E.2d 660 (N.C. 1992). “The State contends that N.C.G.S. § 8-57 abolishes the common law rule against the disclosure of confidential marital communications, leaving only a rule against being compelled to disclose a confidential marital communication.”
State v. Brown, 513 S.E.2d 57 (N.C. 1999). “After a voir dire regarding the admissibility of the statements contained in the letters, the trial court stated: If the defendant [Leroy Wentzel] claims [the statements] are privileged at the time that he is asked these questions, he will not be compelled to respond, the court…”
State v. Matsoake, 777 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). “]" We agree. The incident occurred as Hart drove to a doctor's appointment with Defendant sitting in the passenger seat.”
Misenheimer v. Burris, 637 S.E.2d 173 (N.C. 2006). “§ 8-56 (2005) (providing that in civil actions, "[n]o husband or wife shall be compellable in any event to disclose any confidential communication made by one to the other during their marriage"); N.C.G.S. § 8-57(c) (2005) (providing that in criminal actions, "[n]o husband or…”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57(e) — 1 case
State v. Rush, 456 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1995). “Defendant bases his contention on N.C.G.S. § 8-57, which he interprets as prohibiting the admission of out-of-court statements made by a defendant’s spouse and introduced against the defendant for the State through a third party.”
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