(a) When any appeal or certification to the Court of Appeals is pending, and it appears to the Commission that any part of the award appealed from is not appealed by the issues raised by such appeal, the Commission may, on action or of its own motion, render a judgment directing compliance with any portion of such award not affected by such appeal; or, if the only issue raised by such appeal is the amount of the average weekly wage, the Commission shall, on motion of the claimant, direct the payment of such portion of the compensation payable under its award as is not in dispute, if any, pending final adjudication of the undisputed portion thereof.
(b) In any claim under the provisions of this Chapter where it is conceded by all parties that the employee's claim is a compensable one and the amount is not disputed and where the only issue is which employer or employers, carrier or carriers are liable, the Commission may, where an appeal from a hearing commissioner or the full Commission is taken by one or more parties, order payment made to the employee pending outcome of the case on appeal. The order of payment shall contain the provision that if the employer or carrier ordered to pay is not ultimately liable for the amount paid, the employer or carrier will be reimbursed by the employer or carrier ultimately held liable.
(c) No payment made pursuant to the provisions of this section shall in any manner operate as an admission of liability or estoppel to deny liability by an employer or carrier.
(d) In any claim under the provisions of this Chapter wherein one employer or carrier has made payments to the employee or his dependents pending a final disposition of the claim and it is determined that different or additional employers or carriers are liable, the Commission may order any employers or carriers determined liable to make repayment in full or in part to any employer or carrier which has made payments to the employee or his dependents. (1977, c. 521, s. 2.)
Notes of Decisions
Starr v. Gaston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 663 S.E.2d 322 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 8× “Consequently, we limit our analysis to NCSBT’s contention that payments prior to the 11 October 2004 filing of the Form 33 are non-reimbursable within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-86.1 (d). The relevant provision of the Workers’ Compensation statute reads: In any claim…”
Shockley v. Cairn Studios Ltd., 563 S.E.2d 207 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 5× “N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-86.1 (d) (1999). The Commission concluded that defendants had overpaid plaintiff compensation in the amount of $67,193.”
Hieb v. Howell's Child Care Ctr., Inc., 472 S.E.2d 208 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 4× “Defendants argue that G.S. § 97-86.1(a) and (b) are the sole provisions authorizing the Commission to order payment of compensation during the pendency of an appeal, and that these provisions are inapplicable here.”
Beal v. Coastal Carriers, Inc., 794 S.E.2d 882 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 2× “The Full Commission concludes that the preponderance of the evidence of record establishes that South Carolina has jurisdiction over TWC, the insured, and that the workers' compensation insurance policy issued by Key Risk to TWC covered Plaintiff's injury, requiring Key Risk to…”
West v. Bladenboro Cotton Mills, Inc., 302 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
“97-86, which relieves employers from paying awards while they are being contested on appeal, and G.S. 97-86.1, which authorizes the Commission to require that awards not involved in an appeal be paid before the other issues raised by the appeal are decided.”
Berardi v. Craven Cnty. Schs., 688 S.E.2d 115 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 2× “§ 97-86 , which provides for supersedeas as to the decision of the Commission, except as provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-86.1 . To deal with this problem, the General Assembly enacted 2007 N.”
In re: Davis, 808 S.E.2d 369 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).
“, in which it held that "the Commission does not have the authority to find that enactments of the Legislature are unconstitutional[,]" and that: If the Commissioners feel strongly that a statute is unconstitutional and that it would clearly offend their oath to apply it, or…”
Tovar-Mauricio v. T.R. Driscoll, Inc., 753 S.E.2d 337 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 10× “General Casualty cites N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-86.1 (d), quoted below: In any claim under the provisions of this Chapter wherein one employer or carrier has made payments to the employee or his dependents pending a final disposition of the claim and it is determined that different…”
Goodson v. P. H. Glatfelter Co., 615 S.E.2d 350 (2005).
“The Commission further ordered Glatfelter to secure its obligations under the Act by either re-qualifying as a self-insurer or posting an appropriate special release bond as well as to make appropriate workers’ compensation payments to plaintiff.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-86.1(a) — 1 case
Hieb v. Howell's Child Care Ctr., Inc., 472 S.E.2d 208 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
“Defendants argue that G.S. § 97-86.1(a) and (b) are the sole provisions authorizing the Commission to order payment of compensation during the pendency of an appeal, and that these provisions are inapplicable here.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-86.1(d) — 2 cases
Shockley v. Cairn Studios Ltd., 563 S.E.2d 207 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
“N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-86.1 (d) (1999). The Commission concluded that defendants had overpaid plaintiff compensation in the amount of $67,193.”
Tovar-Mauricio v. T.R. Driscoll, Inc., 753 S.E.2d 337 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
“General Casualty cites N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-86.1 (d), quoted below: In any claim under the provisions of this Chapter wherein one employer or carrier has made payments to the employee or his dependents pending a final disposition of the claim and it is determined that different…”
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