Ohio Revised Code

Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02 (2026)

Final orders

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(A) As used in this section:

(1) "Substantial right" means a right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.

(2) "Special proceeding" means an action or proceeding that is specially created by statute and that prior to 1853 was not denoted as an action at law or a suit in equity.

(3) "Provisional remedy" means a proceeding ancillary to an action, including, but not limited to, a proceeding for a preliminary injunction, attachment, discovery of privileged matter, suppression of evidence, a prima-facie showing pursuant to section 2307.85 or 2307.86 of the Revised Code, a prima-facie showing pursuant to section 2307.92 of the Revised Code, or a finding made pursuant to division (A)(3) of section 2307.93 of the Revised Code.

(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:

(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;

(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment;

(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial;

(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the following apply:

(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.

(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.

(5) An order that determines that an action may or may not be maintained as a class action;

(6) An order determining the constitutionality of any changes to the Revised Code made by Am. Sub. S.B. 281 of the 124th general assembly, including the amendment of sections 1751.67, 2117.06, 2305.11, 2305.15, 2305.234, 2317.02, 2317.54, 2323.56, 2711.21, 2711.22, 2711.23, 2711.24, 2743.02, 2743.43, 2919.16, 3923.63, 3923.64, 4705.15, and 5111.018 (renumbered as 5164.07 by H.B. 59 of the 130th general assembly), and the enactment of sections 2305.113, 2323.41, 2323.43, and 2323.55 of the Revised Code or any changes made by Sub. S.B. 80 of the 125th general assembly, including the amendment of sections 2125.02, 2305.10, 2305.131, 2315.18, 2315.19, and 2315.21 of the Revised Code;

(7) An order in an appropriation proceeding that may be appealed pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 163.09 of the Revised Code;

(8) An order restraining or restricting enforcement, whether on a temporary, preliminary, or permanent basis, in whole or in part, facially or as applied, of any state statute or regulation, including, but not limited to, orders in the form of injunctions, declaratory judgments, or writs ;

(9) An order that denies a motion for expedited relief pursuant to section 2747.04 of the Revised Code.

(C) When a court issues an order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial, the court, upon the request of either party, shall state in the order the grounds upon which the new trial is granted or the judgment vacated or set aside.

(D) This section applies to and governs any action, including an appeal, that is pending in any court on July 22, 1998, and all claims filed or actions commenced on or after July 22, 1998, notwithstanding any provision of any prior statute or rule of law of this state.

The Legislative Service Commission presents the text of this section as a composite of the section as amended by multiple acts of the General Assembly. This presentation recognizes the principle stated in R.C. 1.52(B) that amendments are to be harmonized if reasonably capable of simultaneous operation.

Last updated January 22, 2025 at 4:00 PM

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2,577 cases (616 in the last 5 years), 1954–2026 · leading case: Thomasson v. Thomasson (Slip Opinion), 2018-Ohio-2417, 106 N.E.3d 1239.
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Thomasson v. Thomasson (Slip Opinion), 2018-Ohio-2417, 106 N.E.3d 1239. · cites it 79× “02(A)(1) defines “substantial right” as “a right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.” Carol argues that the trial court’s order violates her “right to procedural…”
In re Grand Jury Proceeding of John Doe, 2016-Ohio-8001, 82 N.E.3d 1115. · cites it 92× “Which Statutes Apply? {¶ 7} The statute that discusses final orders is R.C. 2505.02. It begins by defining “substantial right,” “special proceeding,” and “provisional remedy.”
State v. Muncie, 746 N.E.2d 1092 (Ohio 2001). · cites it 58× “The court of appeals dismissed appellant’s appeal from that order, deciding that it was not final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02. Because we hold that the trial court’s forced medication order was indeed a “final order” under R.”
Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic (Slip Opinion), 2016-Ohio-8000. · cites it 37× “We later ordered the parties to show cause why the matter should not have been dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02. Smith v. Chen, 141 Ohio St.”
State v. Muncie, 91 Ohio St. 3d 440 (2001). · cites it 62× “(R.C. 2505.02[A][3], construed.) 2. When a trial court orders an incompetent defendant to be forcibly medicated with psychotropic drugs in an effort to restore the defendant to competency, that order is final and appealable.”
State v. Lester, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142. · cites it 19× “A judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk.”
State v. Craig (Slip Opinion), 2020-Ohio-455, 151 N.E.3d 574. · cites it 22× “{¶ 10} Although our Constitution and several statutory provisions use the language “judgments or final orders” when describing appellate-court jurisdiction, Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2); R.”
Sinnott v. Aqua-Chem, Inc., 876 N.E.2d 1217 (Ohio 2007). · cites it 24× “{¶ 4} Appellants filed an appeal with the Eighth District Court of Appeals that was dismissed as premature pursuant to R.C. 2505.02. Sinnott v. Aqua-Chem, Inc. (July 12, 2006), 8th Dist.”
Stevens v. Ackman, 91 Ohio St. 3d 182 (2001). · cites it 25× “This court held in Polikoff , at the syllabus, that “[o]rders that are entered in actions that were recognized at common law or in equity and were not specially created by statute are not orders entered in special proceedings pursuant to R.C. 2505.02.” In Polikoff, 67 Ohio St.3d…”
State v. Anderson, 2014-Ohio-542, 6 N.E.3d 23. · cites it 22× “The court of appeals rejected its claim, “finding that in this particular situation where there have been multiple mistrials, the order appealed is a final, appealable order as defined by R.C. 2505.02.” 2012-Ohio-4390 , 2012 WL 4391545 , at ¶ 1.”
In re C.B., 2011-Ohio-2899, 129 Ohio St. 3d 231. · cites it 27× “2010-0180 — Submitted February 16, 2011 — Decided June 22, 2011.”
Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 541 N.E.2d 64 (Ohio 1989). · cites it 17× “In this case, we will address whether the September 4, 1987 and October 6, 1987 orders are final, appealable orders pursuant to R.C. 2505.02 and Civ. R. 54(B). R.C. 2505.”
Show all 2,577 citing cases →
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(2): 1 case
State v. Lowe, 2019-Ohio-5183.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(3): 2 cases
State v. Lowe, 2011-Ohio-3355.
State v. Lowe, 2019-Ohio-5183.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(4): 3 cases
Helbling v. Ward, 2014-Ohio-1513.
Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Co., 2024-Ohio-3187.
Davis v. Boone, 2011-Ohio-6442.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(4)(b): 1 case
State v. Ricciardi, 733 N.E.2d 291 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. 1999).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(A): 17 cases
In re The S Child., 2018-Ohio-2961.
DeVore v. Black (Slip Opinion), 2021-Ohio-3153, 185 N.E.3d 1025.
State v. Myers, 2022-Ohio-991.
State v. Awkal, 2012-Ohio-3970.
Vetter v. Twesigye, 824 N.E.2d 581 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 2005).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(A)(1): 259 cases
Thomasson v. Thomasson (Slip Opinion), 2018-Ohio-2417, 106 N.E.3d 1239. “02(A)(1) defines “substantial right” as “a right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.” Carol argues that the trial court’s order violates her “right to procedural…”
State v. Lester, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142. “A judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk.”
Gehm v. Timberline Post & Frame, 112 Ohio St. 3d 514 (2007).
Crown Servs., Inc. v. Miami Valley Paper Tube Co. (Slip Opinion), 2020-Ohio-4409, 166 N.E.3d 1115.
In re S Child., 2018-Ohio-5010, 126 N.E.3d 239.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(A)(2): 139 cases
Stevens v. Ackman, 91 Ohio St. 3d 182 (2001). “This court held in Polikoff , at the syllabus, that “[o]rders that are entered in actions that were recognized at common law or in equity and were not specially created by statute are not orders entered in special proceedings pursuant to R.C. 2505.02.” In Polikoff, 67 Ohio St.3d…”
Thomasson v. Thomasson (Slip Opinion), 2018-Ohio-2417, 106 N.E.3d 1239. “02(A)(1) defines “substantial right” as “a right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.” Carol argues that the trial court’s order violates her “right to procedural…”
In re Est. of Geanangel, 761 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. 2002).
Stevens v. Ackman, 91 Ohio St. 3d 182 (2001).
Myers v. City of Toledo, 852 N.E.2d 1176 (Ohio 2006).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(A)(3): 232 cases
In re Grand Jury Proceeding of John Doe, 2016-Ohio-8001, 82 N.E.3d 1115. “Which Statutes Apply? {¶ 7} The statute that discusses final orders is R.C. 2505.02. It begins by defining “substantial right,” “special proceeding,” and “provisional remedy.”
State v. Muncie, 746 N.E.2d 1092 (Ohio 2001). “The court of appeals dismissed appellant’s appeal from that order, deciding that it was not final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02. Because we hold that the trial court’s forced medication order was indeed a “final order” under R.”
State v. Muncie, 91 Ohio St. 3d 440 (2001). “(R.C. 2505.02[A][3], construed.) 2. When a trial court orders an incompetent defendant to be forcibly medicated with psychotropic drugs in an effort to restore the defendant to competency, that order is final and appealable.”
State v. Anderson, 2014-Ohio-542, 6 N.E.3d 23. “The court of appeals rejected its claim, “finding that in this particular situation where there have been multiple mistrials, the order appealed is a final, appealable order as defined by R.C. 2505.02.” 2012-Ohio-4390 , 2012 WL 4391545 , at ¶ 1.”
Gehm v. Timberline Post & Frame, 112 Ohio St. 3d 514 (2007).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(A)(3)(a): 1 case
In re Special Docket No. 73958, 115 Ohio St. 3d 425 (2007).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(A)(3)(b): 1 case
State v. Verbanac, 2022-Ohio-3743, 199 N.E.3d 610.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(A)(4): 4 cases
Empower Aviation, L.L.C. v. Butler Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 924 N.E.2d 862 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2009).
Kraus v. Maurer, 740 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 2000).
GrafTech Internatl. Ltd. v. Pac. Emps. Ins. Co., 2016-Ohio-1377.
Am. Env't Grp., Ltd. v. H.M. Miller Constr. Co., 2014-Ohio-4681.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(A)(4)(a): 1 case
In re E.H., 2016-Ohio-1186.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(A)(4)(b): 1 case
In re E.H., 2016-Ohio-1186.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B): 576 cases
Thomasson v. Thomasson (Slip Opinion), 2018-Ohio-2417, 106 N.E.3d 1239. “02(A)(1) defines “substantial right” as “a right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.” Carol argues that the trial court’s order violates her “right to procedural…”
State v. Craig (Slip Opinion), 2020-Ohio-455, 151 N.E.3d 574. “{¶ 10} Although our Constitution and several statutory provisions use the language “judgments or final orders” when describing appellate-court jurisdiction, Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2); R.”
State v. Muncie, 746 N.E.2d 1092 (Ohio 2001). “The court of appeals dismissed appellant’s appeal from that order, deciding that it was not final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02. Because we hold that the trial court’s forced medication order was indeed a “final order” under R.”
Stevens v. Ackman, 91 Ohio St. 3d 182 (2001). “This court held in Polikoff , at the syllabus, that “[o]rders that are entered in actions that were recognized at common law or in equity and were not specially created by statute are not orders entered in special proceedings pursuant to R.C. 2505.02.” In Polikoff, 67 Ohio St.3d…”
Redding v. United States Parachute Assn., Inc., 2023-Ohio-884.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(1): 472 cases
State v. Craig (Slip Opinion), 2020-Ohio-455, 151 N.E.3d 574. “{¶ 10} Although our Constitution and several statutory provisions use the language “judgments or final orders” when describing appellate-court jurisdiction, Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2); R.”
CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Roznowski (Slip Opinion), 2014-Ohio-1984, 11 N.E.3d 1140.
In re S Child., 2018-Ohio-5010, 126 N.E.3d 239.
In re C.B., 2011-Ohio-2899, 129 Ohio St. 3d 231. “2010-0180 — Submitted February 16, 2011 — Decided June 22, 2011.”
Crown Servs., Inc. v. Miami Valley Paper Tube Co. (Slip Opinion), 2020-Ohio-4409, 166 N.E.3d 1115.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(1)(4)(B): 1 case
Woods v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 2018-Ohio-603, 108 N.E.3d 120.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(2): 332 cases
Thomasson v. Thomasson (Slip Opinion), 2018-Ohio-2417, 106 N.E.3d 1239. “02(A)(1) defines “substantial right” as “a right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.” Carol argues that the trial court’s order violates her “right to procedural…”
Stevens v. Ackman, 91 Ohio St. 3d 182 (2001). “This court held in Polikoff , at the syllabus, that “[o]rders that are entered in actions that were recognized at common law or in equity and were not specially created by statute are not orders entered in special proceedings pursuant to R.C. 2505.02.” In Polikoff, 67 Ohio St.3d…”
Wilhelm-Kissinger v. Kissinger, 2011-Ohio-2317, 950 N.E.2d 516.
In re S Child., 2018-Ohio-5010, 126 N.E.3d 239.
Walburn v. Dunlap, 2009-Ohio-1221, 904 N.E.2d 863.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(3): 80 cases
VIL Laser Sys., L.L.C. v. Shiloh Indus., Inc., 119 Ohio St. 3d 354 (2008).
In re A.J.S., 897 N.E.2d 629 (Ohio 2008).
Gasper v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2019-Ohio-1150, 133 N.E.3d 1037.
Welly v. Welly, 2015-Ohio-4804.
Superior Off. Space, L.L.C. v. Carpenter, 2023-Ohio-967, 211 N.E.3d 259.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(4): 322 cases
In re Grand Jury Proceeding of John Doe, 2016-Ohio-8001, 82 N.E.3d 1115. “Which Statutes Apply? {¶ 7} The statute that discusses final orders is R.C. 2505.02. It begins by defining “substantial right,” “special proceeding,” and “provisional remedy.”
State v. Muncie, 746 N.E.2d 1092 (Ohio 2001). “The court of appeals dismissed appellant’s appeal from that order, deciding that it was not final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02. Because we hold that the trial court’s forced medication order was indeed a “final order” under R.”
Thomasson v. Thomasson (Slip Opinion), 2018-Ohio-2417, 106 N.E.3d 1239. “02(A)(1) defines “substantial right” as “a right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect.” Carol argues that the trial court’s order violates her “right to procedural…”
State v. Muncie, 91 Ohio St. 3d 440 (2001). “(R.C. 2505.02[A][3], construed.) 2. When a trial court orders an incompetent defendant to be forcibly medicated with psychotropic drugs in an effort to restore the defendant to competency, that order is final and appealable.”
State ex rel. Thomas v. McGinty (Slip Opinion), 2020-Ohio-5452, 172 N.E.3d 824.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(4)(1): 1 case
McGuire v. Zarla, 2012-Ohio-2976.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(4)(a): 90 cases
Sinnott v. Aqua-Chem, Inc., 876 N.E.2d 1217 (Ohio 2007). “{¶ 4} Appellants filed an appeal with the Eighth District Court of Appeals that was dismissed as premature pursuant to R.C. 2505.02. Sinnott v. Aqua-Chem, Inc. (July 12, 2006), 8th Dist.”
In re Grand Jury Proceeding of John Doe, 2016-Ohio-8001, 82 N.E.3d 1115. “Which Statutes Apply? {¶ 7} The statute that discusses final orders is R.C. 2505.02. It begins by defining “substantial right,” “special proceeding,” and “provisional remedy.”
State v. Muncie, 746 N.E.2d 1092 (Ohio 2001). “The court of appeals dismissed appellant’s appeal from that order, deciding that it was not final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02. Because we hold that the trial court’s forced medication order was indeed a “final order” under R.”
Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic (Slip Opinion), 2016-Ohio-8000. “We later ordered the parties to show cause why the matter should not have been dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02. Smith v. Chen, 141 Ohio St.”
Youngstown City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State, 2017-Ohio-555.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(4)(b): 105 cases
Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic (Slip Opinion), 2016-Ohio-8000. “We later ordered the parties to show cause why the matter should not have been dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02. Smith v. Chen, 141 Ohio St.”
In re Special Grand Jury Investigation, 2018-Ohio-760, 107 N.E.3d 793.
In re Grand Jury Proceeding of John Doe, 2016-Ohio-8001, 82 N.E.3d 1115. “Which Statutes Apply? {¶ 7} The statute that discusses final orders is R.C. 2505.02. It begins by defining “substantial right,” “special proceeding,” and “provisional remedy.”
DMS Constr. Ents., L.L.C. v. Homick, 2020-Ohio-4919.
Sinnott v. Aqua-Chem, Inc., 876 N.E.2d 1217 (Ohio 2007). “{¶ 4} Appellants filed an appeal with the Eighth District Court of Appeals that was dismissed as premature pursuant to R.C. 2505.02. Sinnott v. Aqua-Chem, Inc. (July 12, 2006), 8th Dist.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(4)(t): 1 case
Nester v. Lima Mem'l Hosp., 745 N.E.2d 1153 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2000).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(5): 37 cases
Lycan v. Cleveland (Slip Opinion), 2016-Ohio-422, 51 N.E.3d 593.
Oakley v. Ohio State Univ. Wexner Med. Ctr., 2019-Ohio-3557.
Lycan v. Cleveland, 2022-Ohio-4676, 218 N.E.3d 913.
Lycan v. Cleveland, 2019-Ohio-3510, 142 N.E.3d 210.
Smith v. Ohio State Univ., 2024-Ohio-764, 247 N.E.3d 288.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(6): 12 cases
Young v. Durrani, 2016-Ohio-5526, 61 N.E.3d 34.
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Jones, 2016-Ohio-513, 60 N.E.3d 448.
Superior Off. Space, L.L.C. v. Carpenter, 2023-Ohio-967, 211 N.E.3d 259.
State v. Powell, 2019-Ohio-4286, 148 N.E.3d 51.
Paganini v. Cataract Eye Ctr. of Cleveland, 2025-Ohio-275, 262 N.E.3d 1161.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(7): 10 cases
State ex rel. Bohlen v. Halliday (Slip Opinion), 2021-Ohio-194, 172 N.E.3d 114.
State ex rel. Ohio History Connection v. Moundbuilders Country Club Co., 2020-Ohio-276, 143 N.E.3d 614.
Mill Creek Metro. Dist. Bd. of Commrs. v. Less, 2022-Ohio-1289, 188 N.E.3d 641.
Superior Off. Space, L.L.C. v. Carpenter, 2023-Ohio-967, 211 N.E.3d 259.
State v. Powell, 2019-Ohio-4286, 148 N.E.3d 51.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(8): 3 cases
Gemmell v. Evergreen Site Holdings, Inc., 2025-Ohio-2258.
Newman v. Durrani, 2025-Ohio-5329.
Doe v. Columbus, 2026-Ohio-1095.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(9): 1 case
Gemmell v. Evergreen Site Holdings, Inc., 2025-Ohio-2258.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(Ip): 1 case
State v. Muncie, 746 N.E.2d 1092 (Ohio 2001). “The court of appeals dismissed appellant’s appeal from that order, deciding that it was not final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02. Because we hold that the trial court’s forced medication order was indeed a “final order” under R.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(a): 1 case
Helbling v. Ward, 2014-Ohio-1513.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(B)(l): 1 case
State ex rel. Cook v. Seneca Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 889 N.E.2d 153 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2008).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(C): 1 case
In re Z.L., 2024-Ohio-2913.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.02(D): 3 cases
Haynes v. City of Franklin, 732 N.E.2d 1060 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist. 1999).
Chamberlain v. AK Steel Corp., 696 N.E.2d 569 (Ohio 1998).
Chamberlain v. AK Steel Corp., 82 Ohio St. 3d 389 (1998).
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