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Ohio Revised Code

Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151 (2026)

Partial birth feticide

✓ current as of May 2026
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Effective:
March 22, 2019
Latest Legislation:
Senate Bill 145 - 132nd General Assembly
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(A) As used in this section:

(1) "From the body of the mother" means that the portion of the fetus' body in question is beyond the mother's vaginal introitus in a vaginal delivery.

(2) "Partial birth procedure" means the medical procedure that includes all of the following elements in sequence:

(a) Intentional dilation of the cervix of a pregnant woman, usually over a sequence of days;

(b) In a breech presentation, intentional extraction of at least the lower torso to the navel, but not the entire body, of an intact fetus from the body of the mother, or in a cephalic presentation, intentional extraction of at least the complete head, but not the entire body, of an intact fetus from the body of the mother;

(c) Intentional partial evacuation of the intracranial contents of the fetus, which procedure the person performing the procedure knows will cause the death of the fetus, intentional compression of the head of the fetus, which procedure the person performing the procedure knows will cause the death of the fetus, or performance of another intentional act that the person performing the procedure knows will cause the death of the fetus;

(d) Completion of the vaginal delivery of the fetus.

(3) "Partially born" means that the portion of the body of an intact fetus described in division (A)(3)(b) of this section has been intentionally extracted from the body of the mother.

(4) "Serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function" means any medically diagnosed condition that so complicates the pregnancy of the woman as to directly or indirectly cause the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.

(5) "Viable" has the same meaning as in section 2901.01 of the Revised Code.

(B) When the fetus that is the subject of the procedure is viable, no person shall knowingly perform a partial birth procedure on a pregnant woman when the procedure is not necessary, in reasonable medical judgment, to preserve the life or health of the mother as a result of the mother's life or health being endangered by a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.

(C) When the fetus that is the subject of the procedure is not viable, no person shall knowingly perform a partial birth procedure on a pregnant woman when the procedure is not necessary, in reasonable medical judgment, to preserve the life or health of the mother as a result of the mother's life or health being endangered by a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.

(D) Whoever violates division (B) or (C) of this section is guilty of partial birth feticide, a felony of the second degree.

(E) A pregnant woman upon whom a partial birth procedure is performed in violation of division (B) or (C) of this section is not guilty of committing, attempting to commit, complicity in the commission of, or conspiracy in the commission of a violation of those divisions.

(F) This section does not prohibit the suction curettage procedure of abortion or the suction aspiration procedure of abortion.

(G) This section does not apply to any person who performs or attempts to perform a legal abortion if the act that causes the death of the fetus is performed prior to the fetus being partially born even though the death of the fetus occurs after it is partially born.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases, 2000–2019 · leading case: Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. Martin Haskell, Md v. Bob Taft, Governor Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney Gen. Mathias H. Heck, Jr., 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004).
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Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. Martin Haskell, Md v. Bob Taft, Governor Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney Gen. Mathias H. Heck, Jr., 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004). · cites it 39× “The plaintiffs claim that Ohio’s new partial birth abortion statute, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2919.151 (Anderson 2002) (the Act), is likewise unconstitutional, because: (1) it does not contain an adequate health exception; and (2) it imposes an “undue burden” upon a woman seeking to…”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2000). · cites it 94× “Given that divisions (B) and (C) of § 2919.151 are written separately, however, the Defendants argue that division (C), the pre-viability ban, may be severed from the Act.”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2001). · cites it 62× “” 6 Ohio Rev.Code § 2919.151(A)(1). The phrases “suction curettage procedure of abortion,” “suction aspiration procedure of abortion,” “dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion” and “dilation and extraction procedure of abortion” are not defined in the Act.”
Jacobson v. Kaforey (Slip Opinion), 2016 Ohio 8434 (Ohio 2016). · cites it 4× “53(B) (“A woman upon whom a partial birth procedure is performed in violation of division (B) or (C) of section 2919.151 of the Revised Code, the father of the child if the child was not conceived by rape, or the parent of the woman if the woman is not eighteen years of age or…”
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006). “2003) (upholding Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.151 (Anderson 2002)); see also Planned Parenthood of Cent.”
Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. Dewine, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1060 (S.D. Ohio 2014). · cites it 2× “3d at 444 (quoting Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2919.151(B), (Q) (emphasis added).”
State v. Bales, 2013 Ohio 4957 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 2× “13, or section 2919.151, 2919.17, or 2919.18 of the Revised Code, may be punished as a violation of section 2919.”
Women's Med. v. Taft (6th Cir. 2003). · cites it 6× “” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.151 (B) (post- exception comport with this constitutional standard? viability) and (C) (pre-viability); Ohio Rev.”
Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. Yost, 375 F. Supp. 3d 848 (2019). “See Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151(G). The State cites Plaintiffs' ability to comply with this court's TRO as evidence that statute does not impose an undue burden.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151(A)(1) — 3 cases
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. Martin Haskell, Md v. Bob Taft, Governor Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney Gen. Mathias H. Heck, Jr., 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004). “The plaintiffs claim that Ohio’s new partial birth abortion statute, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2919.151 (Anderson 2002) (the Act), is likewise unconstitutional, because: (1) it does not contain an adequate health exception; and (2) it imposes an “undue burden” upon a woman seeking to…”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2000). “Given that divisions (B) and (C) of § 2919.151 are written separately, however, the Defendants argue that division (C), the pre-viability ban, may be severed from the Act.”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2001). “” 6 Ohio Rev.Code § 2919.151(A)(1). The phrases “suction curettage procedure of abortion,” “suction aspiration procedure of abortion,” “dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion” and “dilation and extraction procedure of abortion” are not defined in the Act.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151(A)(2) — 2 cases
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2001). “” 6 Ohio Rev.Code § 2919.151(A)(1). The phrases “suction curettage procedure of abortion,” “suction aspiration procedure of abortion,” “dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion” and “dilation and extraction procedure of abortion” are not defined in the Act.”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2000). “Given that divisions (B) and (C) of § 2919.151 are written separately, however, the Defendants argue that division (C), the pre-viability ban, may be severed from the Act.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151(A)(3) — 3 cases
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. Martin Haskell, Md v. Bob Taft, Governor Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney Gen. Mathias H. Heck, Jr., 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004). “The plaintiffs claim that Ohio’s new partial birth abortion statute, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2919.151 (Anderson 2002) (the Act), is likewise unconstitutional, because: (1) it does not contain an adequate health exception; and (2) it imposes an “undue burden” upon a woman seeking to…”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2001). “” 6 Ohio Rev.Code § 2919.151(A)(1). The phrases “suction curettage procedure of abortion,” “suction aspiration procedure of abortion,” “dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion” and “dilation and extraction procedure of abortion” are not defined in the Act.”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2000). “Given that divisions (B) and (C) of § 2919.151 are written separately, however, the Defendants argue that division (C), the pre-viability ban, may be severed from the Act.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151(A)(3)(b) — 3 cases
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. Martin Haskell, Md v. Bob Taft, Governor Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney Gen. Mathias H. Heck, Jr., 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004). “The plaintiffs claim that Ohio’s new partial birth abortion statute, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2919.151 (Anderson 2002) (the Act), is likewise unconstitutional, because: (1) it does not contain an adequate health exception; and (2) it imposes an “undue burden” upon a woman seeking to…”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2001). “” 6 Ohio Rev.Code § 2919.151(A)(1). The phrases “suction curettage procedure of abortion,” “suction aspiration procedure of abortion,” “dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion” and “dilation and extraction procedure of abortion” are not defined in the Act.”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2000). “Given that divisions (B) and (C) of § 2919.151 are written separately, however, the Defendants argue that division (C), the pre-viability ban, may be severed from the Act.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151(A)(3)(c) — 2 cases
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2001). “” 6 Ohio Rev.Code § 2919.151(A)(1). The phrases “suction curettage procedure of abortion,” “suction aspiration procedure of abortion,” “dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion” and “dilation and extraction procedure of abortion” are not defined in the Act.”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2000). “Given that divisions (B) and (C) of § 2919.151 are written separately, however, the Defendants argue that division (C), the pre-viability ban, may be severed from the Act.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151(A)(4) — 3 cases
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. Martin Haskell, Md v. Bob Taft, Governor Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney Gen. Mathias H. Heck, Jr., 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004). “The plaintiffs claim that Ohio’s new partial birth abortion statute, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2919.151 (Anderson 2002) (the Act), is likewise unconstitutional, because: (1) it does not contain an adequate health exception; and (2) it imposes an “undue burden” upon a woman seeking to…”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2001). “” 6 Ohio Rev.Code § 2919.151(A)(1). The phrases “suction curettage procedure of abortion,” “suction aspiration procedure of abortion,” “dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion” and “dilation and extraction procedure of abortion” are not defined in the Act.”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2000). “Given that divisions (B) and (C) of § 2919.151 are written separately, however, the Defendants argue that division (C), the pre-viability ban, may be severed from the Act.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151(A)(5) — 3 cases
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. Martin Haskell, Md v. Bob Taft, Governor Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney Gen. Mathias H. Heck, Jr., 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004). “The plaintiffs claim that Ohio’s new partial birth abortion statute, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2919.151 (Anderson 2002) (the Act), is likewise unconstitutional, because: (1) it does not contain an adequate health exception; and (2) it imposes an “undue burden” upon a woman seeking to…”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2001). “” 6 Ohio Rev.Code § 2919.151(A)(1). The phrases “suction curettage procedure of abortion,” “suction aspiration procedure of abortion,” “dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion” and “dilation and extraction procedure of abortion” are not defined in the Act.”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2000). “Given that divisions (B) and (C) of § 2919.151 are written separately, however, the Defendants argue that division (C), the pre-viability ban, may be severed from the Act.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151(A)(6) — 2 cases
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2000). “Given that divisions (B) and (C) of § 2919.151 are written separately, however, the Defendants argue that division (C), the pre-viability ban, may be severed from the Act.”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2001). “” 6 Ohio Rev.Code § 2919.151(A)(1). The phrases “suction curettage procedure of abortion,” “suction aspiration procedure of abortion,” “dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion” and “dilation and extraction procedure of abortion” are not defined in the Act.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151(B) — 4 cases
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. Martin Haskell, Md v. Bob Taft, Governor Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney Gen. Mathias H. Heck, Jr., 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004). “The plaintiffs claim that Ohio’s new partial birth abortion statute, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2919.151 (Anderson 2002) (the Act), is likewise unconstitutional, because: (1) it does not contain an adequate health exception; and (2) it imposes an “undue burden” upon a woman seeking to…”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2000). “Given that divisions (B) and (C) of § 2919.151 are written separately, however, the Defendants argue that division (C), the pre-viability ban, may be severed from the Act.”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2001). “” 6 Ohio Rev.Code § 2919.151(A)(1). The phrases “suction curettage procedure of abortion,” “suction aspiration procedure of abortion,” “dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion” and “dilation and extraction procedure of abortion” are not defined in the Act.”
Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. Dewine, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1060 (S.D. Ohio 2014). “3d at 444 (quoting Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2919.151(B), (Q) (emphasis added).”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151(C) — 3 cases
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2000). “Given that divisions (B) and (C) of § 2919.151 are written separately, however, the Defendants argue that division (C), the pre-viability ban, may be severed from the Act.”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2001). “” 6 Ohio Rev.Code § 2919.151(A)(1). The phrases “suction curettage procedure of abortion,” “suction aspiration procedure of abortion,” “dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion” and “dilation and extraction procedure of abortion” are not defined in the Act.”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. Martin Haskell, Md v. Bob Taft, Governor Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney Gen. Mathias H. Heck, Jr., 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004). “The plaintiffs claim that Ohio’s new partial birth abortion statute, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2919.151 (Anderson 2002) (the Act), is likewise unconstitutional, because: (1) it does not contain an adequate health exception; and (2) it imposes an “undue burden” upon a woman seeking to…”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151(D) — 3 cases
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2000). “Given that divisions (B) and (C) of § 2919.151 are written separately, however, the Defendants argue that division (C), the pre-viability ban, may be severed from the Act.”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. Martin Haskell, Md v. Bob Taft, Governor Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney Gen. Mathias H. Heck, Jr., 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004). “The plaintiffs claim that Ohio’s new partial birth abortion statute, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2919.151 (Anderson 2002) (the Act), is likewise unconstitutional, because: (1) it does not contain an adequate health exception; and (2) it imposes an “undue burden” upon a woman seeking to…”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2001). “” 6 Ohio Rev.Code § 2919.151(A)(1). The phrases “suction curettage procedure of abortion,” “suction aspiration procedure of abortion,” “dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion” and “dilation and extraction procedure of abortion” are not defined in the Act.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151(F) — 3 cases
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. Martin Haskell, Md v. Bob Taft, Governor Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney Gen. Mathias H. Heck, Jr., 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004). “The plaintiffs claim that Ohio’s new partial birth abortion statute, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2919.151 (Anderson 2002) (the Act), is likewise unconstitutional, because: (1) it does not contain an adequate health exception; and (2) it imposes an “undue burden” upon a woman seeking to…”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2000). “Given that divisions (B) and (C) of § 2919.151 are written separately, however, the Defendants argue that division (C), the pre-viability ban, may be severed from the Act.”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2001). “” 6 Ohio Rev.Code § 2919.151(A)(1). The phrases “suction curettage procedure of abortion,” “suction aspiration procedure of abortion,” “dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion” and “dilation and extraction procedure of abortion” are not defined in the Act.”
— Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151(G) — 4 cases
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. Martin Haskell, Md v. Bob Taft, Governor Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney Gen. Mathias H. Heck, Jr., 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004). “The plaintiffs claim that Ohio’s new partial birth abortion statute, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2919.151 (Anderson 2002) (the Act), is likewise unconstitutional, because: (1) it does not contain an adequate health exception; and (2) it imposes an “undue burden” upon a woman seeking to…”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 162 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2001). “” 6 Ohio Rev.Code § 2919.151(A)(1). The phrases “suction curettage procedure of abortion,” “suction aspiration procedure of abortion,” “dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion” and “dilation and extraction procedure of abortion” are not defined in the Act.”
Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Taft, 114 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D. Ohio 2000). “Given that divisions (B) and (C) of § 2919.151 are written separately, however, the Defendants argue that division (C), the pre-viability ban, may be severed from the Act.”
Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. Yost, 375 F. Supp. 3d 848 (2019). “See Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.151(G). The State cites Plaintiffs' ability to comply with this court's TRO as evidence that statute does not impose an undue burden.”
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