Courts have cited this section in 1,014 opinions since 1953, 193 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (C)(1) (432 cases).
(A) As used in this section, "spousal support" means any payment or payments to be made to a spouse or former spouse, or to a third party for the benefit of a spouse or a former spouse, that is both for sustenance and for support of the spouse or former spouse. "Spousal support" does not include any payment made to a spouse or former spouse, or to a third party for the benefit of a spouse or former spouse, that is made as part of a division or distribution of property or a distributive award under section 3105.171 of the Revised Code.
(B) In divorce and legal separation proceedings, upon the request of either party and after the court determines the division or disbursement of property under section 3105.171 of the Revised Code, the court of common pleas may award reasonable spousal support to either party. During the pendency of any divorce, or legal separation proceeding, the court may award reasonable temporary spousal support to either party.
An award of spousal support may be allowed in real or personal property, or both, or by decreeing a sum of money, payable either in gross or by installments, from future income or otherwise, as the court considers equitable.
Any award of spousal support made under this section shall terminate upon the death of either party, unless the order containing the award expressly provides otherwise.
(C)(1) In determining whether spousal support is appropriate and reasonable, and in determining the nature, amount, and terms of payment, and duration of spousal support, which is payable either in gross or in installments, the court shall consider all of the following factors:
(a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but not limited to, income derived from property divided, disbursed, or distributed under section 3105.171 of the Revised Code;
(b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;
(c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the parties;
(d) The retirement benefits of the parties;
(e) The duration of the marriage;
(f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because that party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek employment outside the home;
(g) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;
(h) The relative extent of education of the parties;
(i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties;
(j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or earning ability of the other party, including, but not limited to, any party's contribution to the acquisition of a professional degree of the other party;
(k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience so that the spouse will be qualified to obtain appropriate employment, provided the education, training, or job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought;
(l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal support;
(m) The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted from that party's marital responsibilities;
(n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable.
(2) In determining whether spousal support is reasonable and in determining the amount and terms of payment of spousal support, each party shall be considered to have contributed equally to the production of marital income.
(D) In an action brought solely for an order for legal separation under section 3105.17 of the Revised Code, any continuing order for periodic payments of money entered pursuant to this section is subject to further order of the court upon changed circumstances of either party.
(E) If a continuing order for periodic payments of money as alimony is entered in a divorce or dissolution of marriage action that is determined on or after May 2, 1986, and before January 1, 1991, or if a continuing order for periodic payments of money as spousal support is entered in a divorce or dissolution of marriage action that is determined on or after January 1, 1991, the court that enters the decree of divorce or dissolution of marriage does not have jurisdiction to modify the amount or terms of the alimony or spousal support unless the court determines that the circumstances of either party have changed and unless one of the following applies:
(1) In the case of a divorce, the decree or a separation agreement of the parties to the divorce that is incorporated into the decree contains a provision specifically authorizing the court to modify the amount or terms of alimony or spousal support.
(2) In the case of a dissolution of marriage, the separation agreement that is approved by the court and incorporated into the decree contains a provision specifically authorizing the court to modify the amount or terms of alimony or spousal support.
(F)(1) For purposes of divisions (D) and (E) of this section and subject to division (F)(2) of this section, a change in the circumstances of a party includes, but is not limited to, any increase or involuntary decrease in the party's wages, salary, bonuses, living expenses, or medical expenses, or other changed circumstances so long as both of the following apply:
(a) The change in circumstances is substantial and makes the existing award no longer reasonable and appropriate.
(b) The change in circumstances was not taken into account by the parties or the court as a basis for the existing award when it was established or last modified, whether or not the change in circumstances was forseeable.
(2) In determining whether to modify an existing order for spousal support, the court shall consider any purpose expressed in the initial order or award and enforce any voluntary agreement of the parties. Absent an agreement of the parties, the court shall not modify the continuing jurisdiction of the court as contained in the original decree.
(G) If any person required to pay alimony under an order made or modified by a court on or after December 1, 1986, and before January 1, 1991, or any person required to pay spousal support under an order made or modified by a court on or after January 1, 1991, is found in contempt of court for failure to make alimony or spousal support payments under the order, the court that makes the finding, in addition to any other penalty or remedy imposed, shall assess all court costs arising out of the contempt proceeding against the person and shall require the person to pay any reasonable attorney's fees of any adverse party, as determined by the court, that arose in relation to the act of contempt.
The 20 cases that cite Ohio Rev. Code § 3105.18 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment.RelevanceNewestTreatment
“{¶ 31} In Crouser, this court held that R.C. 3105.18 is the substantive law that controls whether a trial court has authority to modify an award of spousal support.”
The case’s holding
A trial court lacks jurisdiction under a procedural rule to vacate or modify a spousal support award if the decree does not reserve continuing jurisdiction.
Later courts cite it for
“then the court must grant 'a decree of dissolution that incorporates the separation agreement.” · 1 citing court
“21773, 2004-Ohio-3844 , 2004 WL 1620723 , relying on amendments to R.C. 3105.18, held that trial courts have jurisdiction to modify an award of spousal support based on “any” change in circumstances rather than a substantial change.”
The case’s holding
A trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a spousal support order unless the decree expressly reserved jurisdiction and the court finds a substantial, unforeseen change in circumstances.
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a prior order of spousal support unless the decree of the court expressly reserved jurisdiction to make the modification and unless the court finds (1) that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred and (2) that the change was not contemplated at the time of the original decree.” · 11 citing courts
“It reasoned that, if sustenance means to sustain, the upper limit of spousal support that can be awarded in a case is the amount that is needed to allow the recipient spouse to maintain the marital standard of living.”
“Unlike the child support statute, there is no language in R.C. 3105.18 that directs the trial court to “impute” income.”
Later courts cite it for
“unlike the child support statute, however, the spousal support statute does not direct the court to consider the 'potential income' of a spouse .” · 3 citing courts
“” R.C. 3105.18(B). Absent a challenge to a particular factual finding of the trial court, this Court “‘reviews a spousal support award under an abuse of discretion standard.”
8
GREENBowen v. Bowen, 725 N.E.2d 1165 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. 1999).
“While need was previously considered under the old statutory scheme, this court has made clear “that under R.C. 3105.18, as modified in April 1991, ‘need’ is no longer the basis for a spousal support award.”
The case’s holding
A trial court lacks authority to modify a property division order to include account increases or to adopt a shared parenting plan not submitted by the parties.
Later courts cite it for
“once the fourteen factors under r.c. 3105.18 (c)(1) have been considered, the amount of spousal support is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” · 4 citing courts
“{¶ 18} Regarding spousal support, the trial court conducted an analysis pursuant to R.C. 3105.18. The court considered Chloe's age and health, the length of the marriage, Chloe's present employability, the labor market, the ease of obtaining licensure as a registered nurse or…”
Later courts cite it for
“value and divide all property in a divorce.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 3105.18 8×subsections: (B) 3× (B)(4)cited by 568 cases
Superseded by statute on other grounds: 5 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 3105.18
“I In the case sub judice, the court of *95 appeals held that R.C. 3105.18 1 “* * * mandates consideration of the standard of living of the parties established during the marriage with the apparent intent to have both parties maintain the standard of living established during the…”
The case’s holding
A trial court must specify the basis for property or alimony awards in sufficient detail to allow a reviewing court to determine the award is fair and equitable.
Later courts cite it for
“fair, equitable and in accordance with the law.” · 104 citing courts
11
GREENBuckles v. Buckles, 546 N.E.2d 950 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 1988).
cites § 3105.18 14×subsections: (B) 5×cited by 106 cases
Where it cites § 3105.18
“2 This especially is required with regard to property expressly referred to in R.C. 3105.18, whether or not that property is specifically set aside to be divided.”
The case’s holding
To the extent feasible, each party should enjoy a standard of living after marriage termination comparable to that established during the marriage, adjusted by statutory factors.
Later courts cite it for
“to the extent feasible, each party should enjoy, after termination of a marriage, a standard of living comparable to that established during the marriage as adjusted by the various factors of r.c. 3105.18.” · 10 citing courts
12
GREENOatey v. Oatey, 614 N.E.2d 1054 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1992).
cites § 3105.18 19×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 3105.18
“” Defendant’s brief in opposition argues the “Order” for interim attorney fees was entered pursuant to R.C. 3105.18(H) and constitutes a final appealable order affecting a “substantial right” made in a “special proceeding” within the scope of R.”
The case’s holding
A domestic relations court abuses its discretion by ordering an immediate wholesale sacrifice sale of marital property to fund prospective attorney fees without evidence of the reasonable value of completed services.
“And while a trial court may consider any factor it considers relevant, a party’s “need” is also not one of the enumerated factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18, nor is it the primary standard against which to evaluate the factors.”
Later courts cite it for
“although there is no prohibition against the equalization of incomes in appropriate cases, income equalization is not a factor that must be considered under r.c. 3105.18(c)(1).” · 4 citing courts
“The Temporary Support order issued on December 12, 2017 shall remain in full force and effect until the final disposition of this matter. Journal entry No. 102688361 (Feb. 26, 2018).”
Later courts cite it for
“where the record evidences the trial court's consideration of the statutory allocation factors, and 'the judgment contains details sufficient for a reviewing court to determine that the support award is fair, equitable, and in accordance with the law,' the determination will be upheld.” · 3 citing courts
“{¶ 24} Husband argues that "the most glaring of errors by the magistrate" was reasoning that "while R.C. 3105.18 does not require a spousal support award that provides the parties with an equal standard of living or a standard of living equivalent to that established during the…”
“The starting point for any court division of marital property or award of alimony is R.C. 3105.18, which provides in pertinent part: “(A) In divorce, dissolution of marriage, or alimony proceedings, the court of common pleas may allow alimony it considers reasonable to either…”
The case’s holding
A vested pension plan accumulated during marriage is a marital asset that must be considered when dividing marital assets and liabilities to ensure an equitable result.
Later courts cite it for
“after a divorce has been granted, the trial court is required to equitably divide and distribute the marital estate between the parties and thereafter consider whether an award of sustenance alimony would be appropriate.” · 3 citing courts
“Both parties were in good health. *105 {¶ 4} Appellant appealed from that judgment, and this court remanded the question of spousal support to the trial court for consideration of the factors in R.”
The case’s holding
A trial court abuses its discretion by ordering spousal support for a long duration without reserving authority to modify the amount due to changed circumstances.
Later courts cite it for
“the appropriate standard for the amount of child support is 'that amount necessary to maintain for the children the standard of living they would have enjoyed had the marriage continued.” · 9 citing courts
“{¶43} In determining whether to grant spousal support and in determining the amount and duration of the payments, the trial court must consider the factors listed in R.C. 3105.18. Robinson v. Robinson, 8th Dist.”
Later courts cite it for
“typically, the offending spouse will either profit from the misconduct or intentionally defeat the other spouse's distribution of marital assets.” · 1 citing court
20
GREENReveal v. Reveal, 798 N.E.2d 1132 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2003).
“*763 {¶ 23} Absent a statement by the domestic relations court when it orders spousal support that it considered some future change, whether the court then considered a change that subsequently occurs must be determined inferentially, by the effect of the change on the court’s…”
The case’s holding
The party seeking a reduction in spousal support bears the burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances that was not contemplated at the time of the original order.
Later courts cite it for
“the burden of showing that a reduction of spousal support is warranted is on the party who seeks the reduction.” · 4 citing courts
The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.
Citing cases by year
195219892026
One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 145 cases in 2012–2013. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation. 2 undated cases are not charted.
Organ v. Organ, 2014-Ohio-3474, 17 N.E.3d 1192.“It reasoned that, if sustenance means to sustain, the upper limit of spousal support that can be awarded in a case is the amount that is needed to allow the recipient spouse to maintain the marital standard of living.”
McCoy v. McCoy, 632 N.E.2d 1358 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1993).
Frost v. Frost, 618 N.E.2d 198 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 1992).
Waller v. Waller, 837 N.E.2d 843 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. 2005).
Kaechele v. Kaechele, 518 N.E.2d 1197 (Ohio 1988).“I In the case sub judice, the court of *95 appeals held that R.C. 3105.18 1 “* * * mandates consideration of the standard of living of the parties established during the marriage with the apparent intent to have both parties maintain the standard of living established during the…”
Buckles v. Buckles, 546 N.E.2d 950 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 1988).“2 This especially is required with regard to property expressly referred to in R.C. 3105.18, whether or not that property is specifically set aside to be divided.”
Salpietro v. Salpietro, 2023-Ohio-169, 205 N.E.3d 1203.“{¶ 30} The trial court cannot consider any single R.C. 3105.18(C) factor in isolation. Kaechele at paragraph one of the syllabus.”
Hunley v. Hunley, 2020-Ohio-5053.“{¶ 24} Husband argues that "the most glaring of errors by the magistrate" was reasoning that "while R.C. 3105.18 does not require a spousal support award that provides the parties with an equal standard of living or a standard of living equivalent to that established during the…”
Walpole v. Walpole, 2013-Ohio-3529.“And while a trial court may consider any factor it considers relevant, a party’s “need” is also not one of the enumerated factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18, nor is it the primary standard against which to evaluate the factors.”
Reveal v. Reveal, 798 N.E.2d 1132 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2003).“*763 {¶ 23} Absent a statement by the domestic relations court when it orders spousal support that it considered some future change, whether the court then considered a change that subsequently occurs must be determined inferentially, by the effect of the change on the court’s…”
Berthelot v. Berthelot, 796 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. 2003).“Both parties were in good health. *105 {¶ 4} Appellant appealed from that judgment, and this court remanded the question of spousal support to the trial court for consideration of the factors in R.”
Smoyer v. Smoyer, 2019-Ohio-3461.“{¶ 18} Regarding spousal support, the trial court conducted an analysis pursuant to R.C. 3105.18. The court considered Chloe's age and health, the length of the marriage, Chloe's present employability, the labor market, the ease of obtaining licensure as a registered nurse or…”
Gentile v. Gentile, 2013-Ohio-1338.“{¶43} In determining whether to grant spousal support and in determining the amount and duration of the payments, the trial court must consider the factors listed in R.C. 3105.18. Robinson v. Robinson, 8th Dist.”
Falah v. Falah, 2017-Ohio-1087, 87 N.E.3d 763.“” R.C. 3105.18(B). Absent a challenge to a particular factual finding of the trial court, this Court “‘reviews a spousal support award under an abuse of discretion standard.”
Schwieterman v. Schwieterman, 2020-Ohio-4881.“Legal Standard {¶68} R.C. 3105.18 governs the award of spousal support in divorce cases.”
La Spisa v. La Spisa, 2023-Ohio-3467, 225 N.E.3d 398.“The Temporary Support order issued on December 12, 2017 shall remain in full force and effect until the final disposition of this matter. Journal entry No. 102688361 (Feb. 26, 2018).”
Collins v. Collins, 2011-Ohio-2087.“Unlike the child support statute, there is no language in R.C. 3105.18 that directs the trial court to “impute” income.”
Morris v. Morris, 2016-Ohio-5002, 69 N.E.3d 664.“{¶ 31} In Crouser, this court held that R.C. 3105.18 is the substantive law that controls whether a trial court has authority to modify an award of spousal support.”
Mandelbaum v. Mandelbaum, 2009-Ohio-1222, 905 N.E.2d 172.“21773, 2004-Ohio-3844 , 2004 WL 1620723 , relying on amendments to R.C. 3105.18, held that trial courts have jurisdiction to modify an award of spousal support based on “any” change in circumstances rather than a substantial change.”
Condit v. Condit, 943 N.E.2d 1041 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2010).
Okos v. Okos, 739 N.E.2d 368 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 2000).
Bowen v. Bowen, 725 N.E.2d 1165 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. 1999).“While need was previously considered under the old statutory scheme, this court has made clear “that under R.C. 3105.18, as modified in April 1991, ‘need’ is no longer the basis for a spousal support award.”
Sections that the same cases cite. The first number is counted among the 100 cases that cite § 3105.18 most heavily: how many of them are also among the other section’s own 20 leading cases.