As used in sections 4113.51 to 4113.53 of the Revised Code:
(A) "Employee" means any person who performs a service for wages or other remuneration for an employer.
(B) "Employer" means any person who has one or more employees. "Employer" includes an agent of an employer, the state or any agency or instrumentality of the state, and any municipal corporation, county, township, school district, or other political subdivision or any agency or instrumentality thereof.
(C) "Person" has the same meaning as in section 1.59 of the Revised Code and also includes a public agency or any other legal entity.
(D) "Peace officer" has the same meaning as in section 2935.01 of the Revised Code.
(E) "Political subdivision" has the same meaning as in division (F) of section 2744.01 of the Revised Code.
(F) "Prosecuting authority" means the prosecuting attorney of a county or the director of law, village solicitor, or similar chief legal officer of a municipal corporation.
(G) "Inspector general" means the inspector general appointed under section 121.48 of the Revised Code.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1989–2024 · leading case: Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). · cites it 2ד2005); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4113.51 (Lexis 2001); Tenn.”
Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1990). · cites it 2דLaw § 740 (McKinney 1988); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 4113.51.53 (Baldwin 1989); McQuary v.”
Contreras v. Ferro Corp., 652 N.E.2d 940 (Ohio 1995). · cites it 2דR.C. 4113.51 provides, in part: “As used in sections 4113.”
Shingler v. Provider Servs. Holdings, L.L.C., 2018 Ohio 2740 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 2דThose provisions, in turn incorporate the requirements and remedies set forth in R.C. 4113.51 to 4113.53. R.C. 4723.33, entitled “[w]histleblower protection,” provides: A registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, dialysis technician, community health worker, or medication aide…”
Wood v. Dorcas, 757 N.E.2d 17 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2דAppellant sued appellee and the city of Sylvania, alleging wrongful dismissal from his employment, in violation of Ohio’s Whistle Blower Protection Act, R.C. 4113.51 et seq. Appellant also alleged a federal Section 1983, Title 42, U.”
Phung v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio 1994). “Phung contends that public policy creates an exception to the law regarding finality of judgments and that he falls within this exception.”
Lawson v. Ak Steel Corp., 699 N.E.2d 951 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 2דThe trial court granted the motion, finding that appellant had no cause of action because he did not allege compliance with the requirements of R.C. 4113.51, which provides the exclusive remedy for a “whistleblower” asserting a retaliation claim against an employer.”
Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 1212 (Ohio 1989). “Under the statute, if an employee becomes aware of a violation of the law by his employer or another employee which is likely to cause a risk of physical harm, is a hazard to public safety, or is a felony, he must orally notify his supervisor and file a written report…”
Wood v. Dorcas, 711 N.E.2d 291 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 4דFirst, appellant alleged that the defendants, through the actions of Dorcas, had violated R.C. 4113.51 et seq. (“Whistleblower Protection”) by dismissing appellant from employment the day after receiving the special prosecutor’s report that no criminal wrongdoing was found to…”
Berge v. Columbus Cmty. Cable Access, 736 N.E.2d 517 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999). “Plaintiff next alleges that CCCA was an agent of the city, making the city an employer under R.C.”
Thatcher v. Goodwill Indus. of Akron, 690 N.E.2d 1320 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). “All that is required for notice pleading is a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief to which the party claims to be entitled. Civ.R. 8(A). Thatcher incorporated into Count 3 of his complaint…”
Dargart v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 871 N.E.2d 608 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). “” {¶ 10} “It was error to fail to recognize that O.R.C. 4113.51 creates a distinctly different party-defendant from the Director of Transportation and affords venue outside of Franklin County for whistleblower claims.”
Wood v. Dorcas, 711 N.E.2d 291 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). “First, appellant alleged that the defendants, through the actions of Dorcas, had violated R.C. 4113.51 et seq. (“Whistleblower Protection”) by dismissing appellant from employment the day after receiving the special prosecutor’s report that no criminal wrongdoing was found to…”
Wood v. Dorcas, 757 N.E.2d 17 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). “Appellant sued appellee and the city of Sylvania, alleging wrongful dismissal from his employment, in violation of Ohio’s Whistle Blower Protection Act, R.C. 4113.51 et seq. Appellant also alleged a federal Section 1983, Title 42, U.”
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