Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.135
When prosecution commenced
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131.135 When prosecution commenced. A prosecution is commenced when a warrant or other process is issued, provided that the warrant or other process is executed without unreasonable delay. [1973 c.836 §7]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 33
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1984–2022 · leading case: State v. Williams
State v. Williams (2009)
“ORS 131.135 states that, for purposes of commencing a criminal prosecution within the applicable limitation period, “[a] prosecution is commenced when a warrant or other process is issued, provided that the warrant or other process is executed without unreasonable delay.”
State v. Chinn (1992)
“He argues [1] that his prosecution is time-barred under ORS 131.135 because of an unreasonable delay in executing the warrant *93 for his arrest and that the court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on that basis.”
Abbott v. Baldwin (2001)
“” The state contends that “the ‘prosecution’ against petitioner was commenced in June 1986 upon the filing of the original indictment” and that, therefore, the statute of limitations was tolled as of that time.”
State v. Coulson (2011)
“That contention was, in turn, based on the defendant's assertion that the state's prosecution against him had not been timely "commenced" for purposes of ORS 131.135 [8] because the later-filed information had terminated the prosecution commenced by the earlier-executed…”
State v. Purdom (2008)
“135 provides that “[a] prosecution is commenced when a warrant or other process is issued, provided that the warrant or other process is executed without unreasonable delay.”
State v. Washington (2014)
“” ORS 131.135. The purpose of requiring the state to execute the warrant or other process without unreasonable delay is to ensure that an accused receives adequate notice “of the decision to prosecute and the general nature of the charge so as to allow the accused to prepare…”
State v. Bigelow (2005)
“Instead, at issue in that case was ORS 131.135, which provides that a prosecution is commenced, and the statute of limitation is therefore tolled, “when a warrant or other process is issued, provided that the warrant or other process is executed without unreasonable delay.”
State v. Huskey (2000)
“” ORS 131.135. The question in this case is whether the prosecution *554 was lawfully commenced within the statute of limitations period.”
State v. Cookman (1996)
“" ORS 131.135. That occurred, in this case, on October 10, 1991.”
State v. Hinkle (2009)
“He argues that, *350 because the arrest warrant was not executed without “unreasonable delay,” as required by ORS 131.135, the prosecution was not commenced within the applicable period of limitations.”
State v. Lindquist (2004)
“He argued that the probation violation proceeding was not timely commenced because the warrant for his arrest was not executed “without unreasonable delay” in accordance with ORS 131.135. 1 The trial court denied the motion, revoked *501 defendant’s probation, and sentenced him…”
State v. Anglin (2009)
“” ORS 131.135. 1 The purpose of criminal statutes of limitation is to provide notice to a defendant of a pending prosecution.”
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