Oregon Revised Statutes
Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.750 (2026)
Where there is reason for delay
✓ current as of May 2026
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135.750 Where there is reason for delay. If the defendant is not proceeded against as provided in ORS 135.745, and sufficient reason therefor is shown, the court may order the action to be continued and in the meantime may release the defendant from custody as provided in ORS 135.230 to 135.290, for the appearance of the defendant to answer the charge or action. [Formerly 134.130; 2013 c.431 §2]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 37
cases, 1980–2014 · leading case: State v. Johnson, 116 P.3d 879 (Or. 2005).
State v. Johnson, 116 P.3d 879 (Or. 2005). “” ORS 135.750 then provides: “If the defendant is not proceeded against or tried, as provided in ORS 135.”
State v. Allen, 227 P.3d 219 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). “We directed the trial court, if it concluded that defendant had not been brought to trial within a reasonable time, to determine whether it would have continued the case pursuant to ORS 135.750, 5 notwithstanding the unreasonable delay.”
Application of Haynes, 619 P.2d 632 (Or. 1980). “295 and ORS 135.750, within the limits imposed by article I, section 14 of the constitution.”
State v. Spicer, 193 P.3d 62 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). “747 and that there was not sufficient reason for the delay under ORS 135.750. We therefore reverse the convictions.”
State v. Garcia, 142 P.3d 501 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). “747, which provides: “If a defendant charged with a crime, whose trial has not been postponed upon application of the defendant or by the consent of the defendant, is not brought to trial within a reasonable period of time, the court shall order the accusatory instrument to be…”
State v. Johnson, 157 P.3d 198 (Or. 2007). “747 provides: “If a defendant charged with a crime, whose trial has not been postponed upon the application of the defendant or by the consent of the defendant, is not brought to trial within a reasonable period of time, the court shall order the accusatory instrument to be…”
State v. Davis, 237 P.3d 835 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). “747 and ORS 135.750. 1 ORS 135.747 provides: “If a defendant charged with a crime, whose trial has not been postponed upon the application of the defendant or by the consent of the defendant, is not brought to trial within a reasonable period of time, the court shall order the…”
State v. Brunoe, 131 P.3d 743 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). “First, the court must determine if the length of delay before a defendant charged with a crime was brought to trial was reasonable.”
State v. Blevins, 330 P.3d 650 (Or. Ct. App. 2014). “747, a trial court may exercise its discretion to continue the proceedings if “sufficient reason * * * [was] shown [for] * * * the action to be continued.”
State v. Person, 853 P.2d 813 (Or. 1993). “) Furthermore, the legislature in the general speedy trial statutes demonstrated its ability to enact an express provision granting the trial court own motion authority to continue cases for good cause when a defendant had not been brought to trial pursuant to the statutory…”
State v. Dykast, 712 P.2d 79 (Or. 1985). “747 or ORS 135.750. They provide: ORS 135.747 "If a defendant charged with a crime, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application or by his consent, is not brought to trial within a reasonable period of time, the court shall order the accusatory instrument to be…”
State v. Davids, 116 P.3d 894 (Or. 2005). “747 and ORS 135.750. 1 The three cases have certain issues of statutory construction in common, which we addressed in our opinion in State v.”
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