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Oregon Revised Statutes

Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230 (2026)

Definitions for ORS 135.230 to 135.290

✓ current as of May 2026
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      135.230 Definitions for ORS 135.230 to 135.290. As used in ORS 135.230 to 135.290, unless the context requires otherwise:

      (1) “Abuse” means:

      (a) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing physical injury;

      (b) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly placing another in fear of imminent serious physical injury; or

      (c) Committing sexual abuse in any degree as defined in ORS 163.415, 163.425 and 163.427.

      (2) “Conditional release” means a nonsecurity release which imposes regulations on the activities and associations of the defendant.

      (3) “Domestic violence” means abuse between family or household members.

      (4) “Family or household members” means any of the following:

      (a) Spouses.

      (b) Former spouses.

      (c) Adult persons related by blood or marriage.

      (d) Persons cohabiting with each other.

      (e) Persons who have cohabited with each other or who have been involved in a sexually intimate relationship.

      (f) Unmarried parents of a minor child.

      (5) “Magistrate” has the meaning provided for this term in ORS 133.030.

      (6) “Personal recognizance” means the release of a defendant upon the promise of the defendant to appear in court at all appropriate times.

      (7) “Primary release criteria” includes the following:

      (a) The reasonable protection of the victim or public;

      (b) The nature of the current charge;

      (c) The defendant’s prior criminal record, if any, and, if the defendant previously has been released pending trial, whether the defendant appeared as required;

      (d) Any facts indicating the possibility of violations of law if the defendant is released without regulations; and

      (e) Any other facts tending to indicate that the defendant is likely to appear.

      (8) “Release” means temporary or partial freedom of a defendant from lawful custody before judgment of conviction or after judgment of conviction if defendant has appealed.

      (9) “Release agreement” means a sworn writing by the defendant stating the terms of the release and, if applicable, the amount of security.

      (10) “Release decision” means a determination by a magistrate, using primary and secondary release criteria, which establishes the form of the release most likely to ensure the safety of the public and the victim, the defendant’s court appearance and that the defendant does not engage in domestic violence while on release.

      (11) “Secondary release criteria” includes the following:

      (a) The defendant’s employment status and history and financial condition;

      (b) The nature and extent of the family relationships of the defendant;

      (c) The past and present residences of the defendant;

      (d) Names of persons who agree to assist the defendant in attending court at the proper time; and

      (e) Any facts tending to indicate that the defendant has strong ties to the community.

      (12) “Security release” means a release conditioned on a promise to appear in court at all appropriate times which is secured by cash, stocks, bonds or real property.

      (13) “Surety” is one who executes a security release and binds oneself to pay the security amount if the defendant fails to comply with the release agreement. [1973 c.836 §146; 1993 c.731 §4; 1997 c.313 §18]

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 106 cases (27 in the last 5 years), 1974–2025 · leading case: State v. Priester, 530 P.3d 118 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
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State v. Priester, 530 P.3d 118 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 3× “Although ORS 135.230 applies to statutes that govern pretrial release, it demonstrates that “domestic” can refer to a larger range of relationships than the dictionary definition contemplates.”
Application of Haynes, 619 P.2d 632 (Or. 1980). · cites it 8× “The detention of a defendant pending trial is governed by ORS 135.230 to ORS 135.295 and ORS 135.750, within the limits imposed by article I, section 14 of the constitution.”
Sexson v. Merten, 631 P.2d 1367 (Or. 1981). · cites it 10× “The statutory scheme as set forth in ORS 135.230 to 135.290 consistently emphasizes that the objective in determining what type of release to grant is that which is reasonably likely to assure the defendant’s later appearance.”
State v. Slight, 456 P.3d 366 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 9× “Additionally, in examining the interplay between pretrial release statutes, the Court of Appeals determined that the primary and secondary release criteria as set forth in ORS 135.230 concern the form of release only, and do not govern on whether release can be denied at all.”
State v. Eggers, 372 Or. 789 (Or. 2024). · cites it 3× “255 does not use the term ‘domestic violence,’ which has a specific meaning under ORS 135.230.”).5 Although the 5 In that same line of reasoning, the Court of Appeals went on to state that, “[i]ndeed[,] harassment is not a ‘crime of domestic violence’ under Oregon law because it…”
State v. Eggers, 532 P.3d 518 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 4× “255 does not use the term “domestic violence,” which has a specific meaning under ORS 135.230. Compare ORS 135.230(1) - (4) (defining “[d]omestic violence” as “abuse” or “[a]ttempting to cause or intentionally, know- ingly or recklessly causing physical injury; * * * [i]nten-…”
State v. Theriault, 452 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 3× “Defendant assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his midtrial motion to require the state to elect which of his acts it was relying on to establish the elements of that crime, and the court’s refusal to give a jury concurrence instruction.”
State v. Glaspey, 55 P.3d 562 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 6× “ourth degree is a Class C felony if the person commits the crime of assault in the fourth degree and: "(a) The person has previously been convicted of assaulting the same victim; "(b) The person has previously been convicted at least three times under this section or under…”
State v. Tally, 57 P.3d 592 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 19× “” However, release agreements fit into an overall statutory scheme, comprising ORS 135.230 to 135.295, which provides for the pretrial release of defendants in one of three ways: (1) release upon personal recognizance; (2) conditional release; or (3) security release.”
Stevens v. Bispham, 851 P.2d 556 (Or. 1993). · cites it 2× “020, to be admitted to bail, ORS 135.230 et seq., to have reciprocal discovery of pertinent information, ORS 135.”
Rico-Villalobos v. Giusto, 118 P.3d 246 (Or. 2005). · cites it 3× “Defendant requested a pretrial release hearing pursuant to the procedures set out in ORS 135.230 to 135.290, relevant portions of which we quote below.”
United States v. Isidro Moreno-Hernandez, 419 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2005). “fourth degree is a Class C felony if the person commits the crime of assault in the fourth degree and: (a) The person has previously been convicted of assaulting the same victim; (b) The person has previously been convicted at least three times under this section or under…”
Show all 106 citing cases →
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(1) — 12 cases
State v. Eggers, 532 P.3d 518 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). “255 does not use the term “domestic violence,” which has a specific meaning under ORS 135.230. Compare ORS 135.230(1) - (4) (defining “[d]omestic violence” as “abuse” or “[a]ttempting to cause or intentionally, know- ingly or recklessly causing physical injury; * * * [i]nten-…”
State v. Eggers, 372 Or. 789 (Or. 2024). “255 does not use the term ‘domestic violence,’ which has a specific meaning under ORS 135.230.”).5 Although the 5 In that same line of reasoning, the Court of Appeals went on to state that, “[i]ndeed[,] harassment is not a ‘crime of domestic violence’ under Oregon law because it…”
Sexson v. Merten, 631 P.2d 1367 (Or. 1981). “The statutory scheme as set forth in ORS 135.230 to 135.290 consistently emphasizes that the objective in determining what type of release to grant is that which is reasonably likely to assure the defendant’s later appearance.”
State v. Miles, 542 P.3d 900 (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
State v. Renard, 509 P.3d 760 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(1)(a) — 2 cases
State v. Renard, 509 P.3d 760 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
Wilson v. Laney, 504 P.3d 666 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(1)(b) — 2 cases
State v. Newton, 483 P.3d 61 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
Wilson v. Laney, 504 P.3d 666 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(10) — 3 cases
State v. Slight, 456 P.3d 366 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “Additionally, in examining the interplay between pretrial release statutes, the Court of Appeals determined that the primary and secondary release criteria as set forth in ORS 135.230 concern the form of release only, and do not govern on whether release can be denied at all.”
Chung v. Rosenblum, 550 P.3d 977 (Or. 2024).
Chung v. Rosenblum (Or. 2024).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(11) — 2 cases
Chung v. Rosenblum, 550 P.3d 977 (Or. 2024).
Chung v. Rosenblum (Or. 2024).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(12) — 3 cases
State v. Slight, 456 P.3d 366 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “Additionally, in examining the interplay between pretrial release statutes, the Court of Appeals determined that the primary and secondary release criteria as set forth in ORS 135.230 concern the form of release only, and do not govern on whether release can be denied at all.”
State v. T.A.B., 287 P.3d 1059 (Or. 2012).
State v. Taylor, 311 P.3d 953 (Or. Ct. App. 2013).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(2) — 4 cases
State v. Slight, 456 P.3d 366 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “Additionally, in examining the interplay between pretrial release statutes, the Court of Appeals determined that the primary and secondary release criteria as set forth in ORS 135.230 concern the form of release only, and do not govern on whether release can be denied at all.”
Johnson v. Maass, 778 P.2d 508 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
State v. Croghan, 986 P.2d 579 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
Curtiss v. Dep't of Corr., 157 P.3d 279 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(3) — 20 cases
State v. Priester, 530 P.3d 118 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). “Although ORS 135.230 applies to statutes that govern pretrial release, it demonstrates that “domestic” can refer to a larger range of relationships than the dictionary definition contemplates.”
State v. Eggers, 372 Or. 789 (Or. 2024). “255 does not use the term ‘domestic violence,’ which has a specific meaning under ORS 135.230.”).5 Although the 5 In that same line of reasoning, the Court of Appeals went on to state that, “[i]ndeed[,] harassment is not a ‘crime of domestic violence’ under Oregon law because it…”
State v. Miles, 542 P.3d 900 (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
Sexson v. Merten, 631 P.2d 1367 (Or. 1981). “The statutory scheme as set forth in ORS 135.230 to 135.290 consistently emphasizes that the objective in determining what type of release to grant is that which is reasonably likely to assure the defendant’s later appearance.”
State ex rel. Juv. Dep't v. C. M. C., 259 P.3d 938 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(4) — 10 cases
State v. Priester, 530 P.3d 118 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). “Although ORS 135.230 applies to statutes that govern pretrial release, it demonstrates that “domestic” can refer to a larger range of relationships than the dictionary definition contemplates.”
State v. Hatchell, 519 P.3d 563 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
State v. McKarge, 335 P.3d 1279 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
Vasilash v. Cain, 454 P.3d 818 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
State v. Ball, 416 P.3d 301 (Or. 2018).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(4)(c) — 3 cases
State v. McKarge, 335 P.3d 1279 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
State v. Sky, 340 Or. App. 774 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
State v. Sky, 340 Or. App. 774 (Or. Ct. App. 2025).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(4)(d) — 1 case
State v. Sturgeon, 291 P.3d 808 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(4)(e) — 1 case
State v. Newton, 483 P.3d 61 (Or. Ct. App. 2021).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(5) — 1 case
Knutson v. Cupp, 601 P.2d 129 (Or. 1979).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(6) — 4 cases
State v. Slight, 456 P.3d 366 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “Additionally, in examining the interplay between pretrial release statutes, the Court of Appeals determined that the primary and secondary release criteria as set forth in ORS 135.230 concern the form of release only, and do not govern on whether release can be denied at all.”
Gillmore v. Pearce, 731 P.2d 1039 (Or. 1987).
Mercy Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Douglas Cnty., 559 P.2d 1286 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
Application of Liberman, 650 P.2d 83 (Or. 1982).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(6)(g) — 3 cases
Sexson v. Merten, 631 P.2d 1367 (Or. 1981). “The statutory scheme as set forth in ORS 135.230 to 135.290 consistently emphasizes that the objective in determining what type of release to grant is that which is reasonably likely to assure the defendant’s later appearance.”
Gillmore v. Pearce, 731 P.2d 1039 (Or. 1987).
Application of Liberman, 650 P.2d 83 (Or. 1982).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(7) — 4 cases
State v. Slight, 456 P.3d 366 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “Additionally, in examining the interplay between pretrial release statutes, the Court of Appeals determined that the primary and secondary release criteria as set forth in ORS 135.230 concern the form of release only, and do not govern on whether release can be denied at all.”
Chung v. Rosenblum, 550 P.3d 977 (Or. 2024).
Sexson v. Merten, 631 P.2d 1367 (Or. 1981). “The statutory scheme as set forth in ORS 135.230 to 135.290 consistently emphasizes that the objective in determining what type of release to grant is that which is reasonably likely to assure the defendant’s later appearance.”
Chung v. Rosenblum (Or. 2024).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(7)(a) — 1 case
State v. Glaspey, 55 P.3d 562 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). “ourth degree is a Class C felony if the person commits the crime of assault in the fourth degree and: "(a) The person has previously been convicted of assaulting the same victim; "(b) The person has previously been convicted at least three times under this section or under…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(8) — 8 cases
Sexson v. Merten, 631 P.2d 1367 (Or. 1981). “The statutory scheme as set forth in ORS 135.230 to 135.290 consistently emphasizes that the objective in determining what type of release to grant is that which is reasonably likely to assure the defendant’s later appearance.”
State v. Tally, 57 P.3d 592 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). “” However, release agreements fit into an overall statutory scheme, comprising ORS 135.230 to 135.295, which provides for the pretrial release of defendants in one of three ways: (1) release upon personal recognizance; (2) conditional release; or (3) security release.”
State v. Slight, 456 P.3d 366 (Or. Ct. App. 2019). “Additionally, in examining the interplay between pretrial release statutes, the Court of Appeals determined that the primary and secondary release criteria as set forth in ORS 135.230 concern the form of release only, and do not govern on whether release can be denied at all.”
State v. McColly, 435 P.3d 715 (Or. 2019).
State v. Duvall, 67 P.3d 424 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(9) — 5 cases
State v. Grcich, 939 P.2d 649 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
State v. Tally, 57 P.3d 592 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). “” However, release agreements fit into an overall statutory scheme, comprising ORS 135.230 to 135.295, which provides for the pretrial release of defendants in one of three ways: (1) release upon personal recognizance; (2) conditional release; or (3) security release.”
State v. Duvall, 67 P.3d 424 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
State v. Croghan, 986 P.2d 579 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
State v. Taylor, 311 P.3d 953 (Or. Ct. App. 2013).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.230(l)(a) — 1 case
State v. Bigsby, 342 P.3d 93 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
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