312.230
Limitations on proceedings affecting foreclosure sale; payments required with
first pleading; effect as statute of prescription. (1) Every action, suit or
proceeding, commenced for the purpose of determining the validity of a sale of
real property on foreclosure for delinquent taxes, or to quiet title against
such sale, or to remove the cloud thereof, or to recover possession of the
property, shall be commenced within two years from the date of the judgment of
foreclosure and sale to the county.
(2)
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, in every such action, suit or
proceeding any person claiming to be the owner of the property, as against the
county or grantee, shall pay into court with the first pleading the amount
charged against the property in the judgment of foreclosure, plus the amount or
amounts that would otherwise have been assessed and levied against said
property as taxes from the date of the said judgment to the time of the filing
of such action, suit or proceeding, together with any penalties and interest
that would have accrued thereon as by statute provided. In every such action,
suit or proceeding any person claiming to be the owner of the property as
against any person holding title from the county, shall pay into court with the
first pleading the amount charged against the property in the judgment of
foreclosure, together with interest thereon at the rate of six percent per year
from the date of the judgment to the date of filing the pleading.
(3) For all
purposes this section shall be construed as a statute of prescription as well
as a statute of limitation. [Amended by 1961 c.718 §2; 2003 c.576 §428; 2005
c.94 §70]
Notes of Decisions
Shasta View Irrigation Dist. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 986 P.2d 536 (Or. 1999).
· cites it 8× “2d 749 (public would not be served if claim of Port of Newport, as a public body, were barred by statute of limitations in ORS 312.230); cf. Withers et al v. Reed, 194 Or.”
Hood River Cnty. v. Dabney, 423 P.2d 954 (Or. 1967).
· cites it 5× “Plaintiff also asserted that defendants were barred from attacking the foreclosure proceeding by ORS 312.230 (1), which provides that a proceeding to determine the validity of a tax foreclosure “shall be commenced within two years from the date of the judgment and decree of…”
Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 306 P.3d 628 (Or. 2013).
· cites it 2× “220, which provided that a decree of foreclosure for delinquent taxes “is conclusive evidence of its regularity and validity in all collateral proceedings,” and ORS 312.230, which barred any action challenging a tax foreclosure decree, unless it was commenced within specified…”
Hogue v. Olympic Bank, 708 P.2d 605 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 2× “220, which provided, as relevant, that a decree of foreclosure for delinquent taxes “is conclusive evidence of its regularity and validity in all collateral proceedings” and ORS 312.230, which barred any action challenging a tax foreclosure decree, unless it was commenced *26…”
Hull v. Klamath Cnty. (In re Hull), 591 B.R. 25 (Bankr. D. Or. 2018).
“ORS 312.230(1). Thus, a bankruptcy court ruling that allowed for avoidance of a deed recorded pursuant to ORS 312.”
Johnson v. State, 423 P.2d 964 (Or. 1967).
· cites it 12× “We think the state did and could acquire adversely and, therefore, we will not consider the foreclosure proceedings. Before proceeding to state the reason for our decision, we call attention to the specific two year statute of limitation directed at tax foreclosure proceedings,…”
Chizek v. Port of Newport, 450 P.2d 749 (Or. 1969).
“The second statute, the statute of limitation, ORS 312.230, however, does not have this exception.”
Peer v. Claremont, 188 F. Supp. 641 (D. Or. 1960).
“The plaintiff did not tender into court with the first pleading the amount charged against the property in the judgment and decree of foreclosure, together with interest, as required by ORS 312.230. The Oregon Supreme Court in Keerins Bros.”
W. Tree Farms, Inc. v. Hood River Cnty., 448 P.2d 518 (Or. 1968).
“① Assuming, without deciding, that the notice was not adequate to satisfy due process requirements, nevertheless plaintiff was barred from attacking the tax foreclosure proceedings by the running of the statute of limitations prescribed in ORS 312.”
Evergreen Timber Co. v. Clackamas Cnty., 385 P.2d 1009 (Or. 1963).
“This authorization is implicit in the enactment of ORS 312.230 (1), which reads as follows: ① “Every action, suit or proceeding, commenced for the purpose of determining the validity of a sale of real property on foreclosure for delinquent taxes, or to quiet title against such…”
Evergreen Timber Co. v. Hood River Cnty., 423 P.2d 963 (Or. 1967).
“Dabney, decided this day, involving the same statute as applied to similar defects in the same foreclosure, we find no basis for holding ORS 312.230 (1) unconstitutional. Affirmed.”
Cascade Tree Farms, Inc. v. Clackamas Cnty., 442 P.2d 606 (Or. 1968).
“Since foreclosure proceedings were without defect and the decree rendered was valid, it is not necessary to consider the applicability of the statute of limitations prescribed in ORS 312.230. The decree of the trial court is affirmed.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 312.230(1) — 5 cases
Hull v. Klamath Cnty. (In re Hull), 591 B.R. 25 (Bankr. D. Or. 2018).
“ORS 312.230(1). Thus, a bankruptcy court ruling that allowed for avoidance of a deed recorded pursuant to ORS 312.”
W. Tree Farms, Inc. v. Hood River Cnty., 448 P.2d 518 (Or. 1968).
“① Assuming, without deciding, that the notice was not adequate to satisfy due process requirements, nevertheless plaintiff was barred from attacking the tax foreclosure proceedings by the running of the statute of limitations prescribed in ORS 312.”
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