§ 5533. Infancy, insanity or imprisonment.
(a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided by statute, insanity or imprisonment does not extend
the time limited by this subchapter for the commencement of a matter.
(b) Infancy.--
(1) (i) If an individual entitled to bring a civil action is an unemancipated minor at the
time the cause of action accrues, the period of minority shall not be deemed a portion
of the time period within which the action must be commenced. Such person shall have
the same time for commencing an action after attaining majority as is allowed to others
by the provisions of this subchapter.
(ii) As used in this paragraph, the term "minor" shall mean any individual who has not
yet attained 18 years of age.
(2) (i) If an individual entitled to bring a civil action arising from sexual abuse is under
18 years of age at the time the cause of action accrues, the individual shall have
a period of 37 years after attaining 18 years of age in which to commence an action
for damages regardless of whether the individual files a criminal complaint regarding
the sexual abuse.
(i.1) If an individual entitled to bring a civil action arising from sexual abuse is at
least 18 and less than 24 years of age at the time the cause of action occurs, the
individual shall have until attaining 30 years of age to commence an action for damages
regardless of whether the individual files a criminal complaint regarding the sexual
abuse.
(ii) For the purposes of this paragraph, the term "sexual abuse" shall include, but not
be limited to, the following sexual activities between an individual who is 23 years
of age or younger and an adult, provided that the individual bringing the civil action
engaged in such activities as a result of forcible compulsion or by threat of forcible
compulsion which would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution:
(A) sexual intercourse, which includes penetration, however slight, of any body part or
object into the sex organ of another;
(B) deviate sexual intercourse, which includes sexual intercourse per os or per anus;
and
(C) indecent contact, which includes any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts
of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire in either person.
(iii) For purposes of this paragraph, "forcible compulsion" shall have the meaning given
to it in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101 (relating to definitions).
(Apr. 28, 1978, P.L.202, No.53, eff. 60 days; May 30, 1984, P.L.337, No.67, eff. 30
days; June 28, 2002, P.L.518, No.86, eff. 60 days; Nov. 26, 2019, P.L.641, No.87,
eff. Nov. 26, 2019)
2019 Amendment. Act 87 amended subsec. (b)(2). See sections 9 and 10(1) and (2) of Act 87 in the appendix
to this title for special provisions relating to severability and applicability.
2002 Amendment. Act 86 amended subsec. (b). Section 3 of Act 86 provided that the amendment of subsec.
(b) shall not be applied to revive an action which has been barred by an existing
statute of limitations on the effective date of Act 86.
Notes of Decisions
Dalrymple v. Brown (1997)
pa · cites it 6×
“[2] 42 Pa.C.S. § 5533 (1984) provides as follows: (b) Infancy.”
Sheldon Stephens v. Kevin Clash (2015)
ca3 · cites it 3×
“Stephens concedes that his sexual battery claim is timely only if Pennsylvania’s statute governing claims alleging childhood sexual abuse, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5533, extends the time in which he may bring his claim.”
Chancellor v. Pottsgrove School District (2007)
paed · cites it 2×
“” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533 (b)(2)(I). If this tolling rule applies here, then Plaintiffs claims against Oakes are not time-barred.”
Fancsali v. University Health Center (2000)
pa · cites it 4×
“to remain in limbo until the end of July of 2012," combined with its implicit decision in the defendants' favor regarding the request to discontinue, suggests that the determinative factor in the court's exercise of its discretion was the possibility that due to the "Minority…”
D. S.-W. v. United States (2020)
ca3
“In doing so, counsel relied on a Pennsylvania statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533 (b)(1), which tolls a minor plaintiff’s action until she turns eighteen.”
Santos Ex Rel. Beato v. United States (2009)
ca3
“§ 5524 (West 2004), her filing was timely because a Pennsylvania statute, 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5533(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (West 2004), tolls the statute of limitations in a civil action brought on behalf of a minor until she reaches her majority at the age of 18 years.”
Clark v. Jeter (1988)
scotus
“In re Mengel, 287 Pa. Super. 186 , 429 A. 2d 1162 (1981).”
Chen v. Chen (2006)
pa · cites it 2×
“See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5533(b). As we granted allocatur and decide this case on grounds unrelated to the statute of limitations, we need not comment regarding this issue.”
LARTHEY BY LARTHEY v. Bland (1987)
pa · cites it 4×
“This amended section to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5533 was not effective until thirty days after May 30, 1984.”
East v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (2003)
pa · cites it 2×
“This appeal presents a question of first impression: whether the Minority Tolling Statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5533(b), 1 is applica *20 ble to a claim for benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act 2 (Act).”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533(a) — 22 cases
Dalrymple v. Brown (1997)
pa
“[2] 42 Pa.C.S. § 5533 (1984) provides as follows: (b) Infancy.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533(b) — 32 cases
Fancsali v. University Health Center (2000)
pa
“to remain in limbo until the end of July of 2012," combined with its implicit decision in the defendants' favor regarding the request to discontinue, suggests that the determinative factor in the court's exercise of its discretion was the possibility that due to the "Minority…”
Chen v. Chen (2006)
pa
“See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5533(b). As we granted allocatur and decide this case on grounds unrelated to the statute of limitations, we need not comment regarding this issue.”
East v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (2003)
pa
“This appeal presents a question of first impression: whether the Minority Tolling Statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5533(b), 1 is applica *20 ble to a claim for benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act 2 (Act).”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533(b)(1) — 4 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533(b)(1)(i) — 4 cases
Santos Ex Rel. Beato v. United States (2009)
ca3
“§ 5524 (West 2004), her filing was timely because a Pennsylvania statute, 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5533(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (West 2004), tolls the statute of limitations in a civil action brought on behalf of a minor until she reaches her majority at the age of 18 years.”
Sheldon Stephens v. Kevin Clash (2015)
ca3
“Stephens concedes that his sexual battery claim is timely only if Pennsylvania’s statute governing claims alleging childhood sexual abuse, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5533, extends the time in which he may bring his claim.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533(b)(2) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533(b)(2)(f) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533(b)(2)(i) — 6 cases
Sheldon Stephens v. Kevin Clash (2015)
ca3
“Stephens concedes that his sexual battery claim is timely only if Pennsylvania’s statute governing claims alleging childhood sexual abuse, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5533, extends the time in which he may bring his claim.”
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533(b)(2)(ii) — 2 cases
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533(b)(i) — 1 case
— 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5533(b)(l)(i) — 1 case
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