J-S27041-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. JAMAR CHARLES EDMONDS, Appellant No. 1520 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 25, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0000772-2014 BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 22, 2016

Appellant Jamar Charles Edmonds appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County by the Honorable John C. Tylwalk on March 25, 2015, following his convictions of Persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms, Firearms not to be carried without a license, Possession of drug paraphernalia and a violation of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.^[1] Upon our review of the record, we affirm.

The trial court aptly set forth the relevant facts and procedural history herein as follows:

____________________________________________ 1 18 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1); 6106(a)(1); 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(32), (30), respectively. *Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S27041-16 [Appellant] was charged with Possession With Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance (Heroin), Persons Not to Possess a Firearm, Firearms Not to be Carried Without a License, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Possession of a Controlled Substance (Heroin), Simple Assault, and two counts of Recklessly Endangering Another Person1 as the result of an incident which occurred on March 26, 2014. Defendant initially filed a pro se Motion to Suppress. An Amended Motion seeking suppression and dismissal of the charges was subsequently filed by counsel. We conducted a hearing on the Motion on August 27, 2014. At that hearing, Officer David Lear testified as to the circumstances which led to [Appellant’s] arrest and the confiscation of the evidence. On October 15, 2014, we issued an Order and Opinion denying [Appellant's] request for suppression. After a jury trial was conducted on February 11, 2015, [Appellant] was found guilty of Count 2 - Person Not to Possess, Manufacture, Control, Sell or Transfer Firearm, Count 3 - Firearms Not to be Carried Without a License, Count 4 - Possession of Paraphernalia, and Count 5 - Possession of Heroin. Due to the non-appearance of two Commonwealth witnesses, the Simple Assault count and the two counts of Recklessly Endangering Another Person were nol prossed. At the jury trial, Officer David Lear of the Lebanon City Police testified that on March 26, 2014, he was dispatched for a report of an individual threatening other persons with a gun at a residence located at 32 North 12th Street in the City of Lebanon. The suspect was described as a black male with a beard wearing a black top and blue pants. The suspect was reported to have just left the residence and to be heading south on 12th Street from Number 32. As Officer Lear neared the scene, he received another report that the suspect was known to the persons he had threatened and was then heading north on 12th Street toward his own residence which had a red car parked in front of it. Officer Lear proceeded to that area and observed a red vehicle parked on 12th Street. He also observed [Appellant], who fit the description of the suspect, emerging from the rear of the area near house numbers 59 and 61, which corresponded to where the red car was parked. When [Appellant] noticed Officer Lear, he walked away and turned into an alley. When Officer Lear entered the alley, he lost sight of [Appellant] for a few seconds, but then found him standing beside a vehicle which he was about to enter. After [Appellant] got into the vehicle, Officer Lear activated his lights and stopped his own vehicle. He then

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commanded the female driver, Yomara Berrios, and [Appellant] to show their hands. [Appellant], who was in the front passenger seat of the vehicle, refused to show his hands and could be seen reaching down between his legs and around the side of the seats. Office Lear was unable to see whether he was reaching for a weapon. Officer Lear repeated his commands, but [Appellant] continued to refuse to show his hands. [Appellant] got out of the vehicle and fled the scene. He was apprehended a few blocks away by other officers who arrived on the scene. After [Appellant] fled, Officer Lear had Berrios exit the vehicle while he checked it. The front passenger-side door had been left open by Defendant. When Officer Lear looked inside, he could see the butt of a pistol sticking out from under the passenger seat, where he had observed Defendant reaching. Officer Lear then spoke with Berrios, who agreed that he could search the car. Officer Lear also found a bookbag on the back seat. Berrios informed Officer Lear that the bookbag belonged to [Appellant]. Officer Lear checked it and found approximately three hundred dollars ($300.00) in currency and school items with [Appellant’s] name on them. He secured the bag at the scene. When [Appellant] was apprehended by the other officers a few blocks away, eleven glassine baggies containing a substance which was suspected to be heroin, a rubber band, an additional sixty dollars ($60.00) and two cell phones were found on his person. Detective Keith Uhrich testified that he was one of the police officers who had responded to assist Officer Lear. Detective Uhrich interviewed [Appellant] shortly after his arrest. During the interview, Defendant admitted that the gun found in Berrios' car belonged to him.^[2] The parties stipulated that [Appellant] was a person who was prohibited by law in Pennsylvania from possessing a firearm because of a prior conviction. It was also stipulated that the glassine baggies contained a total of twenty–seven (27) grams of heroin. At the trial, Berrios testified that she and [Appellant] were friends. She explained that she is the only person who drives her vehicle and that she has three children who have access to it. She further testified that the gun did not belong to her, that she had never seen it before, that it was not there before [Appellant] got in, and that she did not know it was in her car once [Appellant] had entered. She did not see [Appellant] put the gun down beneath the seat as she was facing toward the window when Officer Lear was approaching her vehicle.

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[Appellant’s] stepfather, Wilbert Lewis, testified that in March 2014 he had given [Appellant] three hundred dollars ($300.00) in cash as [Appellant] was going to pay his electric bill for him. He explained that he had arranged for [Appellant] to run the errand for him as he did not want to bring the cash to his own place of employment. [Appellant] also testified at the trial. He noted that the car belonged to Berrios. He insisted that he did not have a gun when he got into the car and that he did not know it was there. When Officer Lear told [Appellant] and Berrios to show their hands, [Appellant] ran because he did not want to go to jail. He explained that he had sniffed heroin approximately a half hour before this incident. He claimed that he admitted that the gun belonged to him during the interview because he did not want anyone else to get in trouble. [Appellant] also claimed that he did not know why he was being pursued by the police and had fled from Officer Lear because had had seen the red lights from the police vehicle. ______

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II. Should [Appellant’s] Motion for a New Trial be granted because the Trial Court erred by denying [Appellant’s] Omnibus Pretrial Motion to Suppress Evidence and Dismiss Charges?

III. Should [Appellant’s] Motion for a New Trial be granted because the jury placed too great a weight on the testimony of the [sic] Jomara Berrios? Brief of Appellant at 4.

Appellant first contends the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to convict him of the firearms charges. Our standard of review in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence is well-settled:

[W]hether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the [Commonwealth as the] verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 716 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

Section 6105(a) provides that ”a person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence or whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture a

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firearm in this Commonwealth.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). Further, a person is guilty of carrying a firearm without a license if he “carries a firearm in any vehicle or . . . concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license. . . . ” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1). The Commonwealth may prove a defendant carried a firearm inside a vehicle through evidence of either actual or constructive possession. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 67 A.3d 817, 821 (Pa.Super. 2013) (evidence was sufficient to show defendant constructively possessed firearm found in a vehicle he was driving, as required to support convictions for carrying a firearm without a license; firearm was discovered within arm’s length of where defendant had been seated).

Upon our review of Appellant’s appellate brief, we find he has waived this issue for lack of development. The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure unequivocally state that each question an appellant raises is to be supported by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority. Estate of Haiko v. McGinley, 799 A.2d 155, 161 (Pa.Super. 2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b). Appellate arguments which fail to adhere to these procedural rules may be considered waived, and arguments which are not appropriately developed are waived. The latter include those where the party has failed to cite any authority in support of a contention. Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29–30 (Pa.Super. 2006). This Court will not act as counsel and will not

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develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. Irwin Union National Bank and Trust Company v. Famous and Famous and ATL Ventures, 4 A.3d 1099, 1103 (Pa.Super. 2010).

The entirety of Appellant’s argument pertaining to this issue reads as follows:

[Appellant] asserts that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to prove that he possessed the firearm found in Berrios’ car. Specifically, [Appellant] alleges the following facts presented at trial demonstrate that he did not possess the firearm: (1) Ofc. Lear did not see [Appellant] holding a firearm prior to [Appellant] entering Berrios’ car (Notes of Trial, 22). (2) Ofc. Lear did not see [Appellant] holding a firearm while [Appellant] was inside of Berrios’ car. (N.T. 22). (3) No fingerprint or DNA analysis was presented at trial to show that [Appellants’] fingerprints or DNA were found on the firearm. (N.T. 22). (4) [Appellant] testified at trial that at no time on March 26, 2015 did he possess a firearm. (N.T. 44-45). (5) Berrios testified at trial that on March 26, 2014, she neither saw [Appellant] possess a firearm, nor did she see [Appellant] place a firearm underneath the passenger seat of her car. (N.T. 54). Brief of Appellant at 10.

As the aforementioned quotation therefrom illustrates, the argument portion of Appellant's brief does not contain meaningful discussion of, or citation to, relevant legal authority with regard to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. Such lack of analysis precludes meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, we conclude that the issue is waived for lack of J-S27041-16 development. Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088–1090 (Pa.Super. 2014). 2

Before considering the merits of Appellant’s second issue, we must first consider whether Appellant has properly preserved it for our review. As this Court has noted, a timely-filed Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement does not automatically equate to issue preservation. Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa.Super. 2008). “[T]he Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement must be sufficiently ‘concise’ and ‘coherent’ such that the trial court judge may be able to identify the issues to be raised on appeal. . . .” Id. In this regard, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) provides in pertinent part:

(4) Requirements; waiver. .... (ii) The Statement shall concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the judge. The judge shall not require the citation to authorities; however, appellant may choose to include pertinent authorities in the Statement. .... (vii) Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived. ____________________________________________

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Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) (emphasis added).

In Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa.Super. 1998), our Supreme Court held that when a trial court directs a defendant to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, “any issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be waived.” In Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686–87 (Pa.Super. 2001), this Court extended that holding to include vague 1925(b) statements and in doing so held that “a concise statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no concise statement at all.” Id. Therefore, an appellant waives any issues he attempts to raise in a Rule 1925(b) statement the vagary of which prevents the trial court from sufficiently identifying and properly addressing them. This remains true even if the trial court correctly guesses the issues the appellant wished to assert on appeal and writes an opinion pursuant to that supposition. Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908, 912 (Pa.Super. 2002).

In his concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, Appellant framed his challenge to the suppression court’s denial of his pretrial motions as follows:

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trial court erred in failing to suppress and which elements of the four charges offenses were unproven thus justifying the dismissal of those charges.

In addition, Appellant does not resolve this confusion in his appellate brief, for he frames his second issue in the statement of questions involved portion thereof in terms of the same, general language. See Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa.Super. 2006) (holding that this Court will not consider any issue if it has not been set forth in or suggested by the statement of questions involved) see also Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (stating that “[n]o question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby”). As such, this issue is arguably waived; however, to the extent a reading of the Rule 1925(b) statement and the statement of questions involved in Appellant’s brief in their totality suggest Appellant is challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the firearm obtained as a result of Officer Lear’s search of Ms. Berrios’ automobile, we will consider the merits of this claim.

In this regard, Appellant maintains Officer Lear lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him initially and thereafter conducted an illegal search of Ms. Berrios’ vehicle and Appellant’s bag. He also asserts that any evidence Officer Lear obtained from his two cell phones also should be suppressed. Finally, Appellant avers that any evidence Officers Boyle and Snavely seized

- 10 - J-S27041-16 following their search of his person should be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree.

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. [W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based upon the facts. Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 26-27 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (citations, quotations, and quotation marks omitted). This Court has held that there are three categories of interactions between police officers and citizens.

The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Fleet, 114 A.3d 840, 845 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quotation omitted).

Appellant maintains Officer Lear lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Ms. Berrios and him because he did not observe either behave in such a