¹ Whether the trial court erred in denying the Appellant's pre-trial motion to suppress on October 2, 2019?

² Was the evidence sufficient to support the conviction?

³ Was the verdict contrary to the weight of the evidence?

⁴ Whether the trial court erred in overruling the Appellant's objection to the Commonwealth's peremptory strike of Potential Juror No. 1-105?

⁵ Whether the tial court erred in sustaining the Commonwealth's objection to Appellant's questioning of Agent Jena regarding the Commonwealth's decision not to present the testimony of the SWAT team members who secured entry into the Appellant's home on the day of the search of that home?" ANALYSIS Motion to Suppress Items Seized When a defendant files a motion to suppress and establishes standing, the Commonwealth is required to prove that it did not obtain the challenged evidence in violation of the defendant's rights. Commonwealth v. West, 834 A.2d 625, 629 (Pa. Super. 2003). The Commonwealth must prove by apreponderance of the evidence that so Id. at 163-169. 161Page the challenged evidence is admissible. Commonwealth v. Smith, 784 A.2d 182, 186 (Pa. Super. 2001). In Pennsylvania, "the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures." Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted). "Where there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy, Article I, Section 8and the Fourth Amendment generally require police to obtain awarrant, issued by aneutral and detached magistrate and founded upon probable cause, prior to conducting asearch or seizure of aperson and/or aperson's property, unless one of the few well delineated exceptions apply." Commonwealth v. Loughnane, 173 A.3d 733, 741 (Pa. 2017). The affidavit in support of the application for the search warrant in the instant case was not well drafted. However, the duty of areviewing court is to ensure that the issuing authority had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Commonwealth v. Singleton, 603 A.2d 1072, 1073 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). The issuing authority is only required to find a fair probability of criminal activity based upon the four corners of the affidavit of probable cause and the determination that probable cause existed must be given deference. Id. "Probable cause is based on a finding of the probability, not a prima facie showing of criminal activity, and deference is to be accorded amagistrate's finding of probable cause." Commonwealth v. Dean, 693 A.2d 1360, 1365 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). 171Page The standard for evaluating whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant is the "totality of the circumstances" test: the issuing authority must make apractical, common sense decision, whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is afair probability that contraband or evidence of acrime will be found in aparticular place. Id. The duty of areviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for ... conclud[ing] that probable cause existed." Commonwealth v. Baker, 513 Pa. 23, 26, 518 A.2d 802, 803-04 (1986) (citation omitted). In making a probable cause determination, the reviewing court must limit the inquiry to the information within the four corners of the affidavit submitted in support of probable cause when determining whether the warrant was issued upon probable cause. Commonwealth v. Arthur, 62 A.3d 424, 432 (Pa. Super. 2013). Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 203 provides, in relevant part, that: (B) No search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by one or more affidavits sworn to before the issuing authority.... The issuing authority, in determining whether probable cause has been established, may not consider any evidence outside the affidavits. (D) At any hearing on amotion for the []suppression of evidence, or for suppression of the fruits of evidence, obtained pursuant to asearch warrant, no evidence shall be admissible to establish probable cause other than the affidavits provided for in paragraph (B). Pa.R.Crim.P. 203. However, it is clear that search warrant affidavits are to be read in a common sense and realistic fashion. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (S.Ct. 181Page 1965); Commonwealth v. Billock, 289 A.2d 749 (Pa. Super. 1972). Furthermore, the affidavit is to be considered as awhole, Commonwealth v. Bryant, 372 A.2d 880 (Pa. Super. 1977), and a successful attack on part of it will not invalidate the warrant if enough remains to establish probable cause, Commonwealth v. Tucker, 384 A.2d 938 (Pa. Super. 1978). Reliability of the Confidential Informant A defendant has the right to test the veracity of the facts recited in the affidavit of probable cause. Commonwealth v. James, 69 A.3d 180, 187 (Pa. 2013). "To rule otherwise, would permit police in every case to exaggerate or expand on the facts given to the magistrate merely for the purpose of meeting the probable cause requirement, thus precluding adetached and objective determination." Commonwealth v. Hall, 302 A.2d 342, 344 (Pa. 1973). Where the issuance of awarrant is based on information provided by aconfidential informant, "[i]f the informant was reliable, the search warrant was issued with probable cause[;] if the informant was proven to be without reliability, the warrant was improperly issued." Id. at 345. In this case, the probable cause affidavit refers to two "controlled buys" using the same confidential informant who obtained crack cocaine from the premises located at 1108 Main Street, Aliquippa, Pennsylvania. Both controlled buys referenced in the probable cause affidavit occurred when the confidential informant met with the Appellant at the property located at 1108 Main Street, Aliquippa. Both of these buys were made in a carefully controlled environment and each "controlled buy" was discussed in great 191Page detail in the affidavit of probable cause. Both "controlled buys" were made after a telephone exchange with the Appellant. The execution of the controlled buys establishes the reliability of the confidential informant or informants. Commonwealth v. Dean, 693 A.2d 1360, 1366, n. 4(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (despite alack of "facts in the affidavit that allege that the informant had been used in the past or that he had intimate knowledge of appellant, the fact that such information was corroborated by the police with acontrolled buy provides substantial reliability"). In Dean, the defendant claimed that the search warrant used to gain entry to his residence was not supported by probable cause because the affidavit contained only "vague assertions by a confidential informant without setting forth the basis for the informant's knowledge and without providing for that informant's reliability...." Id. at 1365. The Superior Court concluded that the information in the affidavit established probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of the search warrant. Id. at 1366 & n. 4. In Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 45 A.3d 1123, 1127 (Pa.Super.2012), the Court determined that an officer's affidavit set forth sufficient information to provide a substantial basis for amagistrate to conclude that probable cause existed to issue asearch warrant after using aconfidential informant to complete acontrolled narcotics purchase. Id. The Hawkins Court held, however, that if probable cause is to be based, in part, on a controlled purchase, an officer must take "adequate precautions to ensure substantial reliability of the controlled buy [will] corroborate information already obtained." Id. at 1129. The search warrant in this case states that the officer was aware that the 201Page confidential informant "provided information against their own penal interest; he/she has cooperated with law enforcement on aprevious investigation that resulted in the seizure of illegal drugs and the arrest(s) of drug traffickers, has provided facts and details in this (and previous) investigation that have been independently corroborated by law enforcement. "51 The confidential informant identified the Appellant by his nickname, "Pat", and he/she further provided the address of the Appellant. The officer was able to verify that "Pat" was identified as the Appellant and the officer noted in the probable cause affidavit that he had prior knowledge that "Patrick has acriminal history including two prior convictions for Possession with Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance (Felony) on 09/09/2004 and 07/22/2009. "52 This information is found to be sufficient additional information which was corroborated by the controlled buys that were summarized in the affidavit of probable cause. Other cases have held that information provided by aconfidential informant that is corroborated by a controlled buy support a finding of probable cause. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Baker, 615 A.2d 23 (Pa. 1992) (Facts sufficient to establish probable cause for issuance of search warrant where informant's information implicating defendant as seller was corroborated by police officer's first-hand observations when he gave informant money to purchase cocaine and saw informant enter residence and return from residence with cocaine); Commonwealth v. Luton, 672 A.2d 819, 821 (Pa. Super. 1996) (Police-conducted "controlled buy" sufficiently corroborated neighbors' observations 51 SH, Ex. Iat ¶4. si Id. at ¶5. 211 Page alleging drug operations from defendant's home); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 517 A.2d 1311 (Pa.Super.1986) (Finding an abundance of probable cause where acontrolled buy was conducted within 48 hours of the execution of the search wherein defendant left residence and met with informant who returned to police with drugs). The facts recited in the warrant in this case are similar to those in Dean: within 48 hours before application for the warrant, aconfidential informant was searched and found to be free of any controlled substance and money. The Cl was given bills whose serial numbers had been recorded. The CI stated he or she would buy crack cocaine from Appellant by meeting him in the alley behind his residence located at 1108 Main Street, Aliquippa. The transactions took place and the affiant recovered crack cocaine from the informant on two occasions. Because of the similarity between the facts averred in the affidavit in this case and those in Dean, the execution of the controlled buys in this case is afactor that establishes the reliability of the confidential informant. Staleness The Appellant also avers that the information contained within the search warrant was "stale" and contained material defects, thereby rendering the Search Warrant invalid. The staleness and defect issues are related in that Appellant argues that clerical errors that led to the failure to include the date of the second controlled purchase, January 30, 2019, in the sequential paragraphs of the affidavit of probable cause presented a factual circumstance to the issuing authority that referenced only a controlled purchase that 221Page occurred on January 15, 2019, 17 days before the application for and issuance of the February 1, 2019 search warrant. "The requisite probable cause [for asearch warrant] must exist at the time the warrant is issued and be based on facts closely related in time to the date of issuance." Commonwealth v. T. Jones, 484 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Pa. 1984). "Settled Pennsylvania law establishes that stale information cannot provide probable cause in support of awarrant." Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d 147, 158 (Pa. Super. 2011). "There is no hard and fast rule regarding what constitutes stale information; such determinations must be made on acase-by-case basis." Commonwealth v. Vergotz, 616 A.2d 1379, 1382 (Pa. Super. 1992), appeal denied, 627 A.2d 179 (Pa. 1993). The court applies a reasonableness standard when it determines the time limits to be placed on search warrants. Id. "Importantly, age of the information supporting a warrant application is a factor in determining probable cause. If too old, the information is stale, and probable cause may no longer exist. Age alone, however, does not determine staleness. The determination of probable cause is not merely an exercise in counting the days or even months between the facts relied on and the issuance of the warrant. Rather, we must also examine the nature of the crime and the type of evidence." Janda, supra, at 158-59 (internal citations omitted). "Mere lapse of time between discovery of criminal activity and issuance of the warrant will not necessarily dissipate probable cause." Commonwealth v. Dennis, 618 A.2d 972, 981 (Pa. Super. 1992), appeal denied, 634 a.2d 218 (Pa. 1993). The suppression or exclusion of evidence is a"most extreme remedy" that can be justified 231Page only when it is necessary to vindicate fundamental rights or to correct or deter police abuse. Commonwealth vDennis, 618 A.2d 972, 981 (Pa. Super. 1992). The trial court found that information in the "Date of Violation" box of the search warrant, when read in conjunction with the total application for search warrant, supported, through a reasonable, common sense interpretation of the available information, that the last criminal violation referred to in the affidavit of probable cause occurred no later than 48 hours before application for the search was made by Agent Jena. Under these circumstances, it cannot reasonably be suggested that information a day or two old, as here, is "stale." Commonwealth v. Albert, 399 A.2d 1106 (Pa. Super. 1979) (4 days); Commonwealth v. Allen, 324 A.2d 437 (Pa. Super. 1974) (9 days); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 323 A.2d 799 (Pa. Super. 1974) (9 days). The search warrant application in the instant case did not have the date and time of the second controlled buy specifically indicated on affidavit of probable cause. However, the application indicated that the most recent event occurred within forty-eight (48) hours of the application for search warrant. Additionally, Agent Jena testified that the second controlled buy occurred on January 30, 2020 and it was due to aclerical error that the date was omitted when copying the information between computer applications. s3 Although the case law is clear that "[i]n determining whether the warrant is supported by probable cause, the [issuing authority] may not consider any evidence outside the four-corners of the affidavit." Commonwealth v. Sharp, 683 A.2d 1219, 1223 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citations omitted). The standard for evaluating asearch warrant 53 SHT at 17-18. 241Page is a"totality of the circumstances" test as adopted in Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985). The issuing authority must make a"practical common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the `veracity' and `basis of knowledge' of person supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Commonwealth v. Dean, 693 A.2d 1360, 1365 (Pa. Super. 1997)(citations, quotations, and emphasis omitted). At the conclusion of the October 2, 2019 suppression hearing in this case, the trial court determined that paragraphs 21-23 of the affidavit of probable cause contained clerical errors. However, the trial court concluded that sufficient detail regarding the date of the alleged most recent violation was provided elsewhere within the application for search warrant presented to the issuing authority. Namely, the "Date[s] of Violation" box on the first page of the search warrant application advised the issuing authority of a violation that occurred within the "48 hours." In Commonwealth v. Ryerson, 817 A.2d 510 (Pa. Super. 2003), the affidavit of probable cause did not specifically state the date that the officer observed the contraband. Id. However, the application for the search warrant did indicate the date of the violation in question. Id. The Superior Court held that although the affidavit of probable cause did not specifically state the date the contraband was observed, the fact the application for search warrant did include a date in which the contraband was observed and that application for search warrant was before the issuing authority at the time the search warrant was issued, the information was not stale and the search warrant was valid. Id. 251Page This combination of facts which point to acourse of dealing that continued up to within 48 hours of the application for the search warrant is another fact which makes the search warrant in this case sufficient to "survive the staleness charge." Commonwealth v. Baker, 513 Pa. 23, 29-30, 518 A.2d 802, 805 (1986). In Baker, the Supreme Court reasoned that "the numerous occasions on which the informant had contact with the defendant were indicative of acourse of dealing between the informant and the actor which supplied the veracity and basis of knowledge for [the informant's] information about the crime at hand." Id. In that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that in viewing the application for the warrant in that case which did not identify the timing of the history of the dealings between the informant and the defendant "in its totality ..., the warrant was properly issued." Id. The issuing authority in the instant case had the information before him at the time the search warrant was sought that the most recent activity occurred within forty-eight (48) hours of the issuance of the search warrant and that the recent activity was part of the course of dealings between the Appellant and the confidential informant. The affidavit of probable cause in this case explains how the matter was called to the attention of the investigating authorities, the steps taken to verify the tip, and the timing of the investigation. Based upon the totality of circumstances, the trial court concluded that the affidavit of probable cause set forth sufficient information to provide asubstantial basis for the issuing authority to conclude that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant and that the warrant was not stale. 2b1Page Sufficiency of the Evidence The standard of review for evaluating asufficiency of the evidence claim is well- settled. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient to enable the fact finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Further, the trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Jordan, 2019 PA Super 173 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 29, 2019)(citations omitted). "[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence." Commonwealth v. Colon- Plaza, 136 A.3d 521, 525-26 (Pa. Super. 2016). It is within the province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded to each witness's testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792-93 (Pa. Super. 2015). Possession of aFirearm Prohibited Appellant first alleges that his conviction should be reversed because the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence that the Appellant possessed the firearm at issue. The Appellant contended that the only evidence presented by the Commonwealth regarding the possession of the firearm stemmed from the statement made by the Appellant to Agent Jena and that the statement was not voluntary. Appellant then alleges that the finding that Appellant possessed the firearm in question is also 271Page against the weight of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth for essentially the same reasons as cited in his sufficiency of evidence claim. The standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence is well- settled law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 582 (Pa. Super. 2001). The standard applied is "whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact- finder to find every element of the crime beyond areasonable doubt." Id. at 582 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 650 A.2d 420, 424 (Pa. 1994)). When applying this test, the court "may not weigh the evidence and substitute [its] judgment for the fact-finder." DiStevano, 782 A.2d at 582. Additionally, the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth "need not preclude every possibility of innocence." Id. Notably, in making adetermination, "the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence." Commonwealth v. Gooding, 818 A.2d 546, 549 (Pa. Super. 2003)(intemal citations omitted). To establish Persons Not to Possess Firearms, the Commonwealth must prove beyond areasonable doubt that adefendant (1) has been convicted of certain enumerated offenses, or otherwise satisfies certain conditions, and (2) possesses, uses, controls, sells, transfers, or manufactures (or obtains alicense to do so) afirearm. 18 Pa.C.S. §6105(a). Commonwealth v. Gomez, 2019 PA Super 359, 224 A.3d 1095, 1101 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019), re-argument denied (Feb. 18, 2020), appeal denied, 142 MAL 2020, 2020 WL 3496372 (Pa. June 29, 2020). 281Page Here, the jury clearly had sufficient evidence to find Appellant guilty of the only remaining charge of Persons Not to Possess a Firearm as charged in the Criminal Information. During the trial, Appellant and the Commonwealth stipulated to the fact that the Appellant was aperson prohibited from possessing or controlling afirearm because of his prior convictions. During the trial, Agent Jena testified that on the date of in incident he was engaging in the execution of asearch warrant on the Appellant's residence and that he spoke with the Appellant on the date of the incident. During that conversation, Appellant advised Agent Jena that there was a firearm under the mattress in the bedroom. Additionally, Agent Jena testified that while he was talking with the Appellant, other agents were searching entirety of the residence to find contraband. All rooms of the residence were to be searched for contraband, which included the Appellant's bedroom. Agent Jena testified that afirearm was found by him under the mattress on top of the box springs in an upstairs bedroom that also contained the photo identification of the Appellant. The weapon was presented as evidence at trial. Furthermore, the Appellant made a written statement during the time of the execution of the search warrant that stated "The cop came to my house for acause Idon't know, but they found a gun under the bed, which Itold them it was mine. "54 This statement was presented to the jury at trial. In order to convict adefendant for possession of afirearm by aprohibited person, the Commonwealth must prove the defendant was previously convicted of a specific 14 Id. at 74. 29 [Page offense enumerated in section 6105. Commonwealth v. Jemison, 98 A.3d 1254, 1261 (Pa. 2014). Possession of afirearm is an essential element of the statute at issue in this particular case. Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 757 (Pa. Super. 2014). The Appellant concedes that he had aprior conviction that prohibited him from possession of afirearm. He argues that the Commonwealth failed to establish that he possessed a firearm. However, there is testimony that the firearm was found in Appellant's bedroom and that Appellant's identification card was also found in the same bedroom. The Commonwealth may prove possession through constructive possession. To establish constructive possession of contraband, the Commonwealth must show that the Appellant had "conscious dominion" over the contraband, that is, "the power to control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control." Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. 2004). The "intent to maintain a conscious dominion may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances," and "constructive possession may be found in one for more actors where the item in issue is in an area of joint control and equal access." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 26 A.3d 1078, 1094 (Pa. 2011) (citations and brackets omitted). The firearm was found under the mattress in the Appellant's bedroom where the Appellant's Pennsylvania Identification Card was found. The Appellant directed Agent Jena to the exact spot in abedroom that was in use by the occupants of that home where the firearm was eventually found and then the Appellant wrote astatement admitting that the firearm was owned by him. 301Page The Appellant argues that his written statement was not voluntary and therefore was not an admission of his possession of the firearm. The jury heard evidence of the Appellant's action in waiving his Miranda rights and in agreeing to talk to Agent Jena. The jury determined that the statements of the Appellant made to Agent Jena were voluntary and the jury was instructed with regards to the voluntariness of the Appellant's statement. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that Appellant violated Persons Not to Possess Firearms. Weight of the Evidence The Appellant next challenges the verdict as against the weight of the evidence. The standard of review for aclaim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is as follows: A motion for anew trial based on a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of amere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice. It has often been stated that anew trial should be awarded when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and the award of anew trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail. Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations omitted). An Appellant concedes that sufficient evidence supports the verdict in atrue challenge to the weight of the evidence and instead questions which evidence the fact-finder should have believed. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 105 A.3d 742, 758 (Pa. Super. 2014). For that 311Page reason, the trial court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, and may instead use its discretion in concluding whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 n.3 (Pa. 2000). The issue of the constitutional admissibility of a defendant's statement to the police is to be submitted to the jury for its resolution.... [T]he jury's determination of involuntariness is to be based on the totality of the circumstances...." Commonwealth v. Cox, 546 Pa. 515, 686 A.2d 1279, 1286-1287 (1996) (citations omitted). In this case, the oral and written statements were given after the Appellant was advised of his Miranda rights. He was not handcuffed when he gave the written statement. Counsel for the Appellant elicited facts concerning the manner of entry into the Appellant's home, the manner in which Appellant's family was secured, the number of law enforcement officials that entered the home that day and, Agent Jena's reference to the possibility of the Appellant's spouse as being apotential co-defendant for the possession of the firearm. The jury was instructed on the requirement that they must find the statements of the Appellant to be voluntary and counsel for Appellant forcibly argued the issue of voluntariness during his closing argument. Appellant has not identified any facts that are of greater weight than the facts established by the Commonwealth's evidence. The direct and circumstantial evidence discussed above was not so ambiguous and uncertain that the jury verdict somehow shocked the conscience of the trial court. Since the Appellant has not demonstrated that the guilty verdict was against the weight of the evidence, Appellant's allegations arc without merit. 321Page ALLEGED TRIAL ERRORS Appellant's Objection to the Peremptory Strike of aJuror Appellant also argues that the jury selection process in this case violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (S. Ct. 1986). The basis for that claim is that the Commonwealth violated Batson by striking an African-American member of the venire and that the Commonwealth should have been required to challenge the juror for cause when the basis is inherent bias or inability to be impartial. Appellant relies Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Pa. 461 (Pa. Super. 1978) as a basis for his argument regarding the procedural requirement to challenge for cause as opposed to aperemptory challenge. Appellant states that according to Jones the proper procedure to reject ajuror for inherent bias that would affect the ability of that juror to be impartial is to challenge for Cause. Id. However, in Jones, the defendant was challenging the court's refusal to grant defendant's challenge for cause and forcing him to use a peremptory challenge in order to remove the juror, which resulted in the defendant using all of his peremptory challenges before all jurors were empaneled. Id. In Commonwealth v. Jackson, 562 A2d 338 (Pa. Super. 1989), the Superior Court defined the primary function of the peremptory challenge as "to allow parties to strike prospective jurors who they have good reason to believe might be biased but who are not so clearly and obviously partial that they could otherwise be excluded from the panel." Id. (citations omitted). "[A] peremptory challenge need not be supported by the same quantum of proof as would be necessary for achallenge for cause." Id. The reasons 331Page for the challenge need not rise to the level of a"for cause" challenge. Commonwealth v. Jones, 668 A.2d 491, 519 n. 31 (Pa. 1995). Furthermore, as recited in Jackson, Batson did not disturb the holding in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (S.Ct. 1965) that the government has a right to exercise its challenges in any manner it chooses so long as their use does not serve racially discriminatory ends. Jackson, 562 A.2d at 355. The Jackson Court further stated that it did not question the statement that: [t]he essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without areason stated, without inquiry, and without being subject to the court's control. While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for areal or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable. It is often exercised upon the "sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another," upon a juror's "habits and associations," or upon the feeling that "the bare question of [a juror's] indifference may sometimes provoke aresentment. Id. (citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 220). For the forgoing reasons, the Commonwealth's use of aperemptory challenge as opposed to achallenge for cause is not procedurally improper and the Trial court must now analyze the Appellant's objection to the Commonwealth's peremptory challenge by applying the three part test set forth in Batson. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (S. Ct. 1986), the Supreme Court of the United States held that aprosecutor's challenge to potential jurors solely on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution." Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 470, 484 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). 341Page Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (S. Ct. 1986), the prosecutor's proffered explanation must consist of "`legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 20. This is abroad category. "[T]he prosecutor's explanation need not rise to alevel justifying exercise of achallenge for cause." Id. at 1723. "` [T]here are any number of bases' on which aprosecutor may reasonably believe that it is desirable to strike ajuror who is not excusable for cause." Id. at 1724 n. 20 (citation omitted). When adefendant makes aBatson challenge during jury selection: First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the circumstances give rise to an inference that the prosecutor stuck on or more prospective jurors on account of race; second, if the prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror(s) at issue; and third, the trial court must then make the ultimate determination of whether the defense has carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Commonwealth v. Watkins, 108 A.3d 692, 708 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). The first step in the Batson analysis is determining whether Appellant made "a prima facie showing that the circumstances give rise to an inference that the prosecutor struck one or more prospective jurors on account of race[.]" Watkins, 108 A.3d at 708 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has explained: To establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination[,] the defendant must show that he is amember of acognizable racial group, that the prosecutor exercised aperemptory challenge or challenges to remove from the venire amember of the defendant's race; and that other relevant circumstances combine to raise and inference that the prosecutor removed the juror(s) for racial reasons. Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 602 (Pa. 2008) (internal alterations, ellipsis, footnote, and citation omitted). 351Page In the instant case, Appellant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Appellant is African-American and the Commonwealth struck an African-American prospective juror. The second step in the Batson analysis is the determination of whether the Commonwealth provides arace-neutral explanation for striking the prospective juror. Watkins, 108 A.3d at 708 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has explained as follows: The second prong of the Batson test, involving the prosecution's obligation to come forward with arace-neutral explanation of the challenges once a prima facie case is proven, does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. Rather, the issue at that stage is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless adiscriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. Commonwealth v. Harris, 817 A.2d 1033, 1043 (Pa. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Commonwealth proffered race-neutral explanations for striking the prospective juror in question. The Commonwealth stated that it struck Juror No. 1-105 for two race-neutral reasons. First, the juror had indicated that someone very close to her was a defendant in a double homicide case and that the results of that case left her "unhappy with the decision" and essentially the justice system. Secondly, that the juror believed that police officers will lie to get convictions. The Commonwealth stated that it had abelief that the potential juror could not be impartial due the concerns that she brought to the attention of the parties. 361Page The third step in aBatson analysis involves determining if the defense carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Watkins, 108 A.3d at 708 (citation omitted). "It is at this stage that the persuasiveness of the facially-neutral explanation proffered by the Commonwealth is relevant." Commonwealth v. Towles, 106 A.3d 591, 601 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). "The best evidence often will be the demeanor of the prosecutor who exercises the challenge." Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 A.2d 510, 531 (Pa. 2009). After such arecord is established, the trial court is to consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether challenges were used to exclude venire persons on account of race or gender. Commonwealth v. Spence, 627 A.2d 1176, 1182-1183 (Pa. 1993). In Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 546 A.2d 1101, 1104 (Pa. 1988), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Appellant did not make out aprima facie showing of improper use of peremptory challenges when the Commonwealth sought to peremptorily challenge twelve (12) of fourteen (14) minority potential jurors. The reasons for the strikes of three of the potential jurors were due to family members being victims or defendants of crimes. Id, at 1105. Another potential juror testified that she would not follow the judge's instructions, but then was rehabilitated through questioning. Id. These were all acceptable race-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes. In Commonwealth v. Bond, 652 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa. 1995), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the race-neutral reasons presented by the Commonwealth were 371Page acceptable when the reason stated was that the potential jurors had family members who had been arrested and charged with crimes. In Commonwealth v. Towles, 106 A.3d 591, 600 (Pa. 2014), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted the Commonwealth's race-neutral explanation that apotential juror indicated they were less likely to believe the testimony of a police officer as sufficient. In the instant case, this court acknowledges Appellant's efforts to rehabilitate the potential juror during voir dire. The potential juror expressed what appeared to be adeep seeded concern about police tactics and her general view that police would resort to lying or other improper conduct to get aconviction. The Trial court was made aware that the Commonwealth's case was based almost entirely on the testimony of alaw enforcement official. The trial court carefully scrutinized the reasons given by the Commonwealth in exercising the peremptory challenge for the potential juror while at the same time observing the demeanor of the Commonwealth attorney during his proffer of aracially- neutral reason for the peremptory strike. The trial court then concluded that the Commonwealth's race neutral explanation was rooted in its belief that, even after the counsel for the Appellant may have rehabilitated the potential juror such that amotion to strike for cause was not a viable action, the potential juror had a distrust for police officers that stemmed from her admitted belief that police officers lie and/or manipulate situations to get aconviction. The other race neutral reason that was found to be credible was the potential juror's history of having aclose friend that was convicted of adouble homicide crime through aprosecution that occurred in Beaver County and which led to 381Page that potential juror questioning the fairness of the trial system as it related to her friend. The potential juror's statements were thought by the Commonwealth to impair her ability to be impartial despite her outward answers to the contrary. Appellant failed to make out acase of purposeful discrimination and the proper course of action in this instance was to deny the Batson challenge. Appellant's Cross-Examination of Agent Jena regarding "missing witnesses" Appellant's sole complaint for this final assignment of error relates to the Trial court's evidentiary ruling which sustained the objection to Appellant's effort to have Agent Jena confirm that because the eight members of the SWAT team were not to be called as witnesses by the Commonwealth, that the jurors were not going to know what the testimony of the SWAT team members would be. That was aquestion that had already been asked by counsel for the Appellant on another occasion and was not objected to by the Commonwealth. Even counsel for the Appellant confirmed that fact when he said during the argument for that objection that he was not going much further with the inquiry that was the subject of the objection because "I think the points (sic) made. They didn't bring these people." Notes of January 8, 2020 Trial Testimony —Page 132. Just prior to that re-cross examination question to which the objection was lodged, counsel for Appellant pressed Agent Jena, without objection, to concede that: (1) the SWAT team members were not at trial to testify, (2) Agent Jena could not detail each action taken by every SWAT team member, and (3) the SWAT team members could have come to trial to describe their role in entering the home and securing the occupants. The objectionable question which is the basis of this final assignment of error was further 391Page preceded on cross examination by counsel for the Appellant where Agent Jena was asked to concede that: (1) the SWAT team members, if they were called as witnesses by the Commonwealth, could have testified to their own activities once they entered the home, (2) that the SWAT team members were not, however, going to be called as witnesses to provide that testimony, and (3) since the SWAT team members were not at the trial and were not to be called as witnesses, "these ladies and gentlemen here [the jurors] they're never going to hear from them right?" Notes of January 8, 2020 Trial Testimony — page 122. The Trial court is mindful that it was Agent Jena who spoke with the Appellant at the kitchen table when the Appellant admitted that there was agun under his mattress. Agent Jena then retrieved the gun from the place where the Appellant said the gun would be located. Agent Jena then took the written admission/statement from the Appellant which was read into the record. Agent Jena was the lead officer that day and his testimony was based on his observations. At no time did the Appellant show or contend that the SWAT team members were not available to be called as witnesses by the Appellant. At no time did the Appellant show that the SWAT team members refused to talk to counsel for Appellant prior to trial and at no time did the Appellant show that the SWAT team members would not have been amenable to process if summoned by counsel for the Appellant. As our Supreme Court has directed, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is committed to the trial court's sound discretion and its evidentiary rulings will only be reversed upon a showing that it abused that discretion. Such a finding may not be made 401Page "merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires aresult of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous." Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 603 Pa. 92, 112, 982 A.2d 483, 495 (2009). The following general rule is well settled: [W]hen apotential witness is available to only one of the parties to atrial, and it appears this witness has special information material to the issue, and this person's testimony would not be merely cumulative, then if such party does not produce the testimony of this witness, the jury may draw an inference it would have been unfavorable. (citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Jones, 317 A.2d 233, 237 (Pa. 1974); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 369 A.2d 314 (Pa. Super. 1976); Commonwealth v. Whyatt, 340 A.2d 871 (Pa. Super. 1975). It is equally established that the prosecutor is not obliged to call all eye witnesses to acrime, particularly where he believes after due investigation that awitness' testimony may be unreliable, unimportant, irrelevant, or merely cumulative. Commonwealth v. Smith, 324 A.2d 483 (Pa. Super. 1974); Commonwealth v. Paull, 378 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Super. 1977). The calling of witnesses is within the discretion of the prosecution under the general direction of the trial judge. Commonwealth v. Thurman, 76 A.2d 483 (Pa. Super. 1950). Here, the Trial court was justified in refusing to pen- nit the Appellant to continue to question Agent Jena with regards to SWAT team members that were at the scene on the date in questions. By the time that the Commonwealth attorney finally objected to this line of questioning, counsel for the Appellant had made that same point on anumber of 411 Page occasions. Counsel conceded as much when he said that his point was already made. Furthermore, the SWAT team members were equally available to both parties. All of the SWAT team and the Drug Task Force members were available to the Appellant through the subpoena process. The record also reflects that Appellant was also permitted to address the jury during closing argument about these other officers and that they were not called as witnesses by the Commonwealth. The trial court sustained the objection of the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth finally objected. By that time, the question to which the objection was sustaind, phrased slightly differently, was already asked. Under these circumstances, the objection was properly sustained. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, this Court respectfully submits that the allegations of error in this case are without merit and therefore this Court's holding should be affirmed. The Beaver County Clerk of Courts is hereby directed to file the record of these proceedings with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. An appropriate order shall follow. 2© SEP 21 PSI 2= 16 Re.p: tfully Submitted, 421Page IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BEAVER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL DIVISION COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : No. 557 of 2019 vs. 758 WDA 2020 DONTAE RAMONE PATRICK Shahen, Mitchell P. SEPTEMBER 21, 2020 AND NOW, this 21 St day of September, 20209, it appearing that the Appellant has filed aNotice of Appeal in the above-captioned case and it further appearing that the accompanying Memorandum Opinion satisfies the requirements of Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a). IT IS SO ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court, Criminal Division, transmit the record in the above captioned case to the Superior Court forthwith. N • w.. BY T RXi rn J) C) Mitchell P. ahee J --;- -e