(a) Every action under this chapter, other than one brought under § 10-7-1.2, shall be brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the deceased
person, whether appointed or qualified within or without the state, and of the amount
recovered in every action under this chapter one-half (½) shall go to the husband
or widow, and one-half (½) shall go to the children of the deceased, and if there
are no children, the whole shall go to the husband or widow, and, if there is no husband
or widow, to the next of kin, in the proportion provided by law in relation to the
distribution of personal property left by persons dying intestate; except that no
person who is adjudged to be in willful contempt of being in excess of six (6) months
in arrears of an order to pay child support for the deceased individual shall be allowed
recovery pursuant to this chapter and a person so adjudged shall be deemed to have
predeceased the child for the purpose of determining distribution under the intestacy
statute.
(b) Every action brought under § 10-7-1.2 shall be brought by and in the name of the person or persons sustaining the loss
of society, companionship and/or consortium and the amount recovered shall go to the
person or persons who sustained the loss.
(c) Except as otherwise provided, every action brought pursuant to this chapter shall
be commenced within three (3) years after the death of the person. With respect to
any death caused by any wrongful act, neglect, or default that is not known at the
time of death, the action shall be commenced within three (3) years of the time that
the wrongful act, neglect, or default is discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have been discovered. Whenever any person or corporation is found
liable under §§ 10-7-1 — 10-7-4 the person or corporation shall be liable in damages in the sum of not less than
three hundred fifty thousand dollars ($350,000).
Notes of Decisions
Maureen O'Connell v. William Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422 (R.I. 2017).
· cites it 27× “Specifically, plaintiffs cited G.L. 1956 § 10-7-2 to request an additur to $250,000 — the statutory minimum corresponding with wrongful-death cases.”
O'Sullivan v. Rhode Island Hosp., 874 A.2d 179 (R.I. 2005).
· cites it 20× “5 After they were served, the Rhode Island Hospital defendants moved to dismiss *182 the case under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superi- or Court Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that the -wrongful death action against them was time-barred pursuant to the three-year statute of…”
Dawn M. Parrillo, Adm'x of the Est. of Daniel Santos v. Rhode Island Hosp., 202 A.3d 942 (R.I. 2019).
· cites it 24× “In Rhode Island, actions seeking recovery for a wrongful death must be commenced within three years of the date of death, except in situations where the wrongful death is alleged to have been "caused by any wrongful act, neglect or default which is not known at the time of…”
Com. Union Ins. v. Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1999).
· cites it 9× “Section 10-7-2 merely establishes a priority ladder to whom such damages should go.”
Sindelar v. Leguia, 750 A.2d 967 (R.I. 2000).
· cites it 8× “2, shall be brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the deceased person, whether appointed or qualified within or without the state, and of the amount recovered in every action under this chapter one-half Qk) shall go to the husband or widow, and one-half…”
Benner v. J.H. Lynch & Sons, Inc., 641 A.2d 332 (R.I. 1994).
· cites it 8× “The plaintiff contends that the appropriate statute of limitations is contained in the wrongful death act, § 10-7-2, as amended by P.L.1989, ch. 525, § 1, which provides that “[ejxcept as otherwise provided, every action brought pursuant to this chapter shall be commenced within…”
Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670 (R.I. 1997).
· cites it 4× “Although G.L.1956 § 10-7-2 clearly provides that the statute of limitations in a wrongful-death action is three years, plaintiffs argued that the statute of limitations was tolled in this case.”
Ashey v. Kupchan, 618 A.2d 1268 (R.I. 1993).
· cites it 6× “1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 10-7-2, as amended by P.L.1989, ch. 525, § 1.”
Iselin v. Ret. Bd. of the Employees' Ret. Sys., 943 A.2d 1045 (R.I. 2008).
· cites it 2× “1 (providing for the tolling of the period for bringing certain medical malpractice actions); § 9-1-19 (providing for the tolling of the period for bringing a cause of action for minors and persons of unsound mind, among others); G.L. 1956 § 10-7-2 (providing for the tolling of…”
Short v. Flynn, 374 A.2d 787 (R.I. 1977).
· cites it 5× “1956 (1969 Reenactment) §10-7-2, 2 requiring that every wrongful death action shall be commenced within 2 years after the death of the deceased person, should be construed “as a condition imposed upon the created right of action and not merely as a statute of limitations…”
Westfall v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Metro. Talc Co., 571 F. Supp. 304 (D.R.I. 1983).
· cites it 8× “At that time, the last sentence of R.I.Gen.Laws § 10-7-2 read, in pertinent part: “Provided, that every such action shall be commenced within two (2) years after the death of such person[.”
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