(a) If any person who has been previously convicted in this or any other state of two
(2) or more felony offenses arising from separate and distinct incidents and sentenced
on two (2) or more occasions to serve a term in prison is, after the convictions and
sentences, convicted in this state of any offense punished by imprisonment for more
than one year, that person shall be deemed a “habitual criminal.” Upon conviction,
the person deemed a habitual criminal shall be punished by imprisonment in the adult
correctional institutions for a term not exceeding twenty-five (25) years, in addition
to any sentence imposed for the offense of which he or she was last convicted. No
conviction and sentence for which the person has subsequently received a pardon granted
on the ground that he or she was innocent shall be considered a conviction and sentence
for the purpose of determining whether the person is a habitual criminal.
(b) Whenever it appears a person shall be deemed a “habitual criminal,” the attorney general,
within forty-five (45) days of the arraignment, but in no case later than the date
of the pretrial conference, may file with the court a notice specifying that the defendant,
upon conviction, is subject to the imposition of an additional sentence in accordance
with this section; provided, that in no case shall the fact that the defendant is
alleged to be a habitual offender be an issue upon the trial of the defendant, nor
shall it be disclosed to the jury. Upon any plea of guilty or nolo contendere or verdict
or finding of guilty of the defendant, a hearing shall be held by the court sitting
without a jury to determine whether the person so convicted is a habitual criminal.
Notice shall be given to the defendant and the attorney general at least ten (10)
days prior to the hearing. Duly authenticated copies of former judgments and commitments
which comprise the two (2) or more prior convictions and imprisonments required under
this section shall be prima facie evidence of the defendant’s former convictions and
imprisonments. If it appears by a preponderance of the evidence presented that the
defendant is a habitual criminal under this section, he or she shall be sentenced
by the court to an additional consecutive term of imprisonment not exceeding twenty-five
(25) years; and provided further, that the court shall order the defendant to serve
a minimum number of years of the sentence before he or she becomes eligible for parole.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
75
cases (
7 in the last 5 years), 1980–2025 · leading case:
State v. Burke, 811 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 2002).
State v. Burke, 811 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 2002).
· cites it 13× “The day after defendant was arraigned, the state filed notice that it would seek the imposition of an additional sentence for defendant as an habitual offender, pursuant to G.L.1956 § 12-19-21, as amended by P.L.1988, ch.”
State v. Peterson, 722 A.2d 259 (R.I. 1998).
· cites it 28× “On November 10, 1993, the Department of the Attorney General filed a notice of its intention to have Peterson declared an habitual offender, pursuant to G.L.1956 § 12-19-21. Originally, trial commenced in May of 1994, but a mistrial was declared.”
State v. Smith, 766 A.2d 913 (R.I. 2001).
· cites it 8× “The habitual criminals statute, G.L.1956 § 12-19-21, provides in pertinent part: “(a) If any person who has been previously convicted in this or any other state of two or more felony offenses arising from separate and distinct incidents and sentenced on two or more such…”
State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265 (R.I. 1998).
· cites it 8× “1956 § 12-19-21, 3 the habitual criminal statute.”
Pedro Reyes v. State of Rhode Island, 141 A.3d 644 (R.I. 2016).
· cites it 4× “The state also sought the imposition of an additional sentence on the ground that Reyes was a habitual offender under G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21. The conviction 4 To distinguish between the different Superior Court justices involved in the relevant proceedings, we refer to the justice…”
State v. Ramirez, 936 A.2d 1254 (R.I. 2007).
· cites it 6× “In addition, the trial justice sentenced the defendant to a consecutive twenty-five-year sentence as a habitual offender in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21, the habitual offender statute.”
State v. Brown, 9 A.3d 1232 (R.I. 2010).
· cites it 7× “On February 16, 2005, twelve days after the arraignment, the Attorney General served notice on defendant, informing him that, pursuant to G.L.1956 § 12-19-21, defendant was subject to the imposition of an additional sentence as a habitual criminal.”
State v. Werner, 851 A.2d 1093 (R.I. 2004).
· cites it 5× “The trial justice then sentenced the defendant to the maximum time in prison under the sentencing guidelines and, relying on the habitual offender statute, G.L.1956 § 12-19-21, declared that the defendant would not be eligible for parole until “the last day of [his] 45th year in…”
State v. Tregaskis, 540 A.2d 1022 (R.I. 1988).
· cites it 12× “1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 12-19-21, as amended by P.L. 1982, ch. 226, §§ 1, 2, the habitual-offender statute.”
State v. Daniel Tejeda, 171 A.3d 983 (R.I. 2017).
· cites it 4× “2 Analysis The defendant contends that the twenty-five-year sentence imposed in addition to the mandatory life sentence serves no useful purpose and does not advance the intent of the habitual offender statute, G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21. The habitual offender statute provides in…”
Lerner v. Gill, 463 A.2d 1352 (R.I. 1983).
· cites it 4× “A habitual criminal can be paroled by virtue of § 13-8-12 after serving at least five years of the twenty-five-year enhancement period described in § 12-19-21. [6] In March 1979, the time Lerner claims he became parole eligible, his source of relief was to be found in § 13-8-13.”
Page v. State, 995 A.2d 934 (R.I. 2010).
· cites it 4× “Page claimed on direct appeal that he had been sentenced pursuant to the habitual offender statute (G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21), whereas the ten-year concurrent sentence which he challenged on constitutional grounds was in fact imposed for having committed a crime of violence while…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-21(B) — 2 cases
State v. Burke, 811 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 2002).
“The day after defendant was arraigned, the state filed notice that it would seek the imposition of an additional sentence for defendant as an habitual offender, pursuant to G.L.1956 § 12-19-21, as amended by P.L.1988, ch.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-21(a) — 8 cases
State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265 (R.I. 1998).
“1956 § 12-19-21, 3 the habitual criminal statute.”
State v. Daniel Tejeda, 171 A.3d 983 (R.I. 2017).
“2 Analysis The defendant contends that the twenty-five-year sentence imposed in addition to the mandatory life sentence serves no useful purpose and does not advance the intent of the habitual offender statute, G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21. The habitual offender statute provides in…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-21(b) — 6 cases
State v. Smith, 766 A.2d 913 (R.I. 2001).
“The habitual criminals statute, G.L.1956 § 12-19-21, provides in pertinent part: “(a) If any person who has been previously convicted in this or any other state of two or more felony offenses arising from separate and distinct incidents and sentenced on two or more such…”
State v. Peterson, 722 A.2d 259 (R.I. 1998).
“On November 10, 1993, the Department of the Attorney General filed a notice of its intention to have Peterson declared an habitual offender, pursuant to G.L.1956 § 12-19-21. Originally, trial commenced in May of 1994, but a mistrial was declared.”
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