R.I. Gen. Laws
Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7 (2026)

Termination of parental rights

✓ current as of July 2026
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(a) The court shall, upon a petition duly filed by a governmental child placement agency or licensed child placement agency, or by the birthmother or guardian of a child born under circumstances referenced in subsection (a)(2)(viii) of this section, after notice to the parent and a hearing on the petition, terminate any and all legal rights of the parent to the child, including the right to notice of any subsequent adoption proceedings involving the child, if the court finds as a fact by clear and convincing evidence that:

(1) The parent has willfully neglected to provide proper care and maintenance for the child for a period of at least one year where financially able to do so. In determining whether the parent has willfully neglected to provide proper care and maintenance for the child, the court may disregard contributions to support that are of an infrequent and insubstantial nature; or

(2) The parent is unfit by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the child; such as, but not limited to, the following:

(i) Institutionalization of the parent, including imprisonment, for a duration as to render it improbable for the parent to care for the child for an extended period of time;

(ii) Conduct toward any child of a cruel or abusive nature;

(iii) The child has been placed in the legal custody or care of the department of children, youth and families and the parent has a chronic substance abuse problem and the parent’s prognosis indicates that the child will not be able to return to the custody of the parent within a reasonable period of time, considering the child’s age and the need for a permanent home. The fact that a parent has been unable to provide care for a child for a period of twelve (12) months due to substance abuse shall constitute prima facie evidence of a chronic substance abuse problem;

(iv) The child has been placed with the department of children, youth and families and the court has previously involuntarily terminated parental rights to another child of the parent and the parent continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services that would rehabilitate the parent and provided further that the court finds it is improbable that an additional period of services would result in reunification within a reasonable period of time considering the child’s age and the need for a permanent home;

(v) The parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances, which circumstances shall be abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse;

(vi) The parent has committed murder or voluntary manslaughter on another of his or her children or has committed a felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury on that child or another of his or her children or has aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or voluntary manslaughter;

(vii) The parent has exhibited behavior or conduct that is seriously detrimental to the child, for a duration as to render it improbable for the parent to care for the child for an extended period of time; or

(viii) The parent has been convicted of sexual assault upon the birthmother and parenthood is a result of that sexual assault, which shall be established by proving that the child was conceived as a result of a conviction for any offense set forth in § 11-37-2, § 11-37-6, or § 11-37-8.1. Conception as a result of sexual assault may be proved by DNA tests and upon conviction of the putative father, and after a fact-finding hearing establishing paternity, the father’s parental rights shall be terminated by order of the court. Termination of the parental rights of the father shall include the loss of all parental rights without limitation, including the adoption of the child. The father shall also have no right to any visitation with the minor child and shall have no right to any inheritance from a child conceived as a result of sexual assault as specified;

(3) The child has been placed in the legal custody or care of the department of children, youth and families for at least twelve (12) months, and the parents were offered or received services to correct the situation that led to the child being placed; provided, that there is not a substantial probability that the child will be able to return safely to the parents’ care within a reasonable period of time considering the child’s age and the need for a permanent home; or

(4) The parent has abandoned or deserted the child. A lack of communication or contact with the child for at least a six-month (6) period shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment or desertion. In the event that parents of an infant have had no contact or communication with the infant for a period of six (6) months the department shall file a petition pursuant to this section and the family court shall conduct expedited hearings on the petition.

(b)(1) In the event that the petition is filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (a)(2)(i), (a)(2)(iii), or (a)(2)(vii) of this section, the court shall find as a fact that, prior to the granting of the petition, such parental conduct or conditions must have occurred or existed notwithstanding the reasonable efforts that shall be made by the agency prior to the filing of the petition to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship so that the child can safely return to the family. In the event that a petition is filed pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(ii), (a)(2)(iv), (a)(2)(v), (a)(2)(vi), or (a)(4) of this section, the department has no obligation to engage in reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify a family.

(2) Any duty or obligation on the part of a licensed or governmental child placing agency to make reasonable efforts to strengthen the parental relationship shall cease upon the filing of a petition under this section. This provision shall not be construed and is not intended to limit or affect in any way the parents’ right to see or visit with the child during the pendency of a petition under this section.

(3) Upon the filing of a termination of parental rights petition, the agency has an affirmative duty to identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family for adoption or other permanent living arrangement for the child.

(c)(1) In considering the termination of rights as pursuant to subsection (a), the court shall give primary consideration to the physical, psychological, mental, and intellectual needs of the child insofar as that consideration is not inconsistent with other provisions of this chapter.

(2) The consideration shall include the following: If a child has been placed in foster family care, voluntarily or involuntarily, the court shall determine whether the child has been integrated into the foster family to the extent that the child’s familial identity is with the foster family and whether the foster family is able and willing to permanently integrate the child into the foster family; provided, that in considering integrating into a foster family, the court should consider:

(i) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining that environment and continuity for the child; and

(ii) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court determines that the child has sufficient capacity to express a reasonable preference.

(d) If the court finds that the parental rights of the parent should be terminated as specified in subsection (a), it shall by decree duly entered, appoint some suitable person to give or withhold consent in any subsequent adoption proceedings. In the case of petitions filed by licensed or governmental child placement agencies, the court shall appoint the agency to be the sole party to give or withhold consent to the adoption of the child and further vest the agency with all rights of guardianship over the child.

(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the introduction of expert testimony with respect to any illness, medical or psychological condition, trauma, incompetency, addiction to drugs, or alcoholism of any parent who has exhibited behavior or conduct that is seriously detrimental to a child, to assist the court in evaluating the reason for the conduct or its probable duration.

(f) The record of the testimony of the parties adduced in any proceeding terminating parental rights to a child shall be entitled to the confidentiality provided for in § 8-10-21 and more specifically shall not be admissible in any civil, criminal, or other proceeding in any court against a person named a defendant or respondent for any purpose, except in subsequent proceedings involving the same child or proceedings involving the same respondent.

(g) In the event any child, the parental rights to whom have been finally terminated, has not been placed by the agency in the home of a person or persons with the intention of adopting the child within thirty (30) days from the date of the final termination decree, the family court shall review the status of the child and the agency shall file a report that documents the steps the agency is taking to find an adoptive family or other permanent living arrangement for the child, to place the child with an adoptive family, a fit and willing relative, a legal guardian, or in another planned permanent living arrangement, and to finalize the adoption or legal guardianship. At a minimum, this documentation shall include child specific recruitment efforts, such as the use of state, regional, and national adoption exchanges, including the electronic exchange system.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 193 cases (13 in the last 5 years), 1963–2025 · leading case: State v. Fritz, 801 A.2d 679 (R.I. 2002).
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State v. Fritz, 801 A.2d 679 (R.I. 2002). · cites it 46× “In determining that a parent's obligation to support ceases at the point when that person's parental rights have been terminated, the trial justice relied on § 15-7-7 and G.L. 1956 § 15-7.2-2. Section 15-7-7, which is entitled "Termination of parental rights," provides in…”
In Re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301 (R.I. 2003). · cites it 41× “On February 8, 2000, pursuant to § 15-7-7(a), DCYF petitioned the Family Court for a TPR decree with respect to both Mary Ann and Dennis.”
In Re Amber P., 877 A.2d 608 (R.I. 2005). · cites it 24× “On September 3, 2002, DCYF filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights pursuant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7. 5 Specifically, the department contended that Pandolfi was unfit as a parent by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the children, such as…”
In re Lauren B., 78 A.3d 752 (R.I. 2013). · cites it 29× “4 Pursu *755 ant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7(a), 5 DCYF alleged the following as grounds for termination: (1) Jones’s unfitness by reason of conduct seriously detrimental to Lauren and Stephanie; (2) the children’s placement with DCYF for at least twelve months with no substantial…”
In Re Gabrielle D., 39 A.3d 655 (R.I. 2012). · cites it 22× “See G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii), (a)(2)(iv), (a)(3), and (a)(4).”
In Re Kyle S., 692 A.2d 329 (R.I. 1997). · cites it 32× “On the basis of these voluntary terminations, DCYF filed a petition to terminate involuntarily respondents’ parental rights to Kyle pursuant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7(1 )(b)(iv), as amended by P.”
In Re John, 605 A.2d 486 (R.I. 1992). · cites it 27× “section 15-7-7 without there being a pending adoption petition?” We answer this question in the negative.”
In re Steven D., 23 A.3d 1138 (R.I. 2011). · cites it 14× “See § 15-7-7(a); see also In re Victoria L., 950 A.”
In Re Kelly S., 715 A.2d 1283 (R.I. 1998). · cites it 14× “Nonetheless, despite successful rehabilitative efforts, the trial justice focused her decision on the fact that in the nine years since mother’s actions concerning her older children first came to light, she “has yet to assume responsibility for what occurred.”
In re Violet G., 212 A.3d 160 (R.I. 2019). · cites it 8× “A finding of parental unfitness under § 15-7-7(a)(2) made by a trial justice is "entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless [it is] clearly wrong or the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence.”
In Re Julian D., 18 A.3d 477 (R.I. 2011). · cites it 24× “2007)); see also § 15-7-7(a). Ill Discussion A The Trial Justice’s Basis for Terminating Vallejo’s Parental Rights The procedure governing termination of parental rights is set forth in § 15-7-7(a).”
In Re Abby D., 839 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 2004). · cites it 12× “4 The statute further pro *1224 vides that, if the non-custodial natural parent refuses to consent to the adoption, then the Family Court may terminate that parent’s rights upon any of the grounds set out in § 15-7-7. The threshold question in this case is whether, pursuant to §…”
Show all 193 citing cases →
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(1) — 3 cases
In Re John, 605 A.2d 486 (R.I. 1992). “section 15-7-7 without there being a pending adoption petition?” We answer this question in the negative.”
In Re Christina V., 749 A.2d 1105 (R.I. 2000).
In re Nadene, 701 A.2d 1021 (R.I. 1997).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(1)(b)(ii) — 1 case
In Re Kelly S., 715 A.2d 1283 (R.I. 1998). “Nonetheless, despite successful rehabilitative efforts, the trial justice focused her decision on the fact that in the nine years since mother’s actions concerning her older children first came to light, she “has yet to assume responsibility for what occurred.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(1)(b)(iii) — 1 case
In Re Christopher H., 696 A.2d 940 (R.I. 1997).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(1)(c) — 1 case
In Re Christopher H., 696 A.2d 940 (R.I. 1997).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(2)(a) — 5 cases
In Re Kyle S., 692 A.2d 329 (R.I. 1997). “On the basis of these voluntary terminations, DCYF filed a petition to terminate involuntarily respondents’ parental rights to Kyle pursuant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7(1 )(b)(iv), as amended by P.”
In Re Jean Marie W., 559 A.2d 625 (R.I. 1989).
In Re Nicole G., 577 A.2d 248 (R.I. 1990).
In Re Antonio G., 659 A.2d 672 (R.I. 1995).
In Re Christopher H., 696 A.2d 940 (R.I. 1997).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(2)(i) — 1 case
In re Nadene, 701 A.2d 1021 (R.I. 1997).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(3) — 2 cases
In Re Jean Marie W., 559 A.2d 625 (R.I. 1989).
In re Steven D., 93 A.3d 978 (R.I. 2014).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(5) — 1 case
In re Marie G., 550 A.2d 1058 (R.I. 1988).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(8) — 1 case
In Re Christopher H., 696 A.2d 940 (R.I. 1997).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a) — 36 cases
State v. Fritz, 801 A.2d 679 (R.I. 2002). “In determining that a parent's obligation to support ceases at the point when that person's parental rights have been terminated, the trial justice relied on § 15-7-7 and G.L. 1956 § 15-7.2-2. Section 15-7-7, which is entitled "Termination of parental rights," provides in…”
In re Lauren B., 78 A.3d 752 (R.I. 2013). “4 Pursu *755 ant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7(a), 5 DCYF alleged the following as grounds for termination: (1) Jones’s unfitness by reason of conduct seriously detrimental to Lauren and Stephanie; (2) the children’s placement with DCYF for at least twelve months with no substantial…”
In Re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301 (R.I. 2003). “On February 8, 2000, pursuant to § 15-7-7(a), DCYF petitioned the Family Court for a TPR decree with respect to both Mary Ann and Dennis.”
In Re Ariel N., 892 A.2d 80 (R.I. 2006).
In Re Amber P., 877 A.2d 608 (R.I. 2005). “On September 3, 2002, DCYF filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights pursuant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7. 5 Specifically, the department contended that Pandolfi was unfit as a parent by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the children, such as…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(1) — 3 cases
State v. Fritz, 801 A.2d 679 (R.I. 2002). “In determining that a parent's obligation to support ceases at the point when that person's parental rights have been terminated, the trial justice relied on § 15-7-7 and G.L. 1956 § 15-7.2-2. Section 15-7-7, which is entitled "Termination of parental rights," provides in…”
In re Rylee A. (R.I. 2020).
In re Rylee A. (R.I. 2020).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2) — 22 cases
In Re Amber P., 877 A.2d 608 (R.I. 2005). “On September 3, 2002, DCYF filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights pursuant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7. 5 Specifically, the department contended that Pandolfi was unfit as a parent by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the children, such as…”
In Re Devone S., 777 A.2d 1268 (R.I. 2001).
In Re Kelly S., 715 A.2d 1283 (R.I. 1998). “Nonetheless, despite successful rehabilitative efforts, the trial justice focused her decision on the fact that in the nine years since mother’s actions concerning her older children first came to light, she “has yet to assume responsibility for what occurred.”
In Re Alexis L., 972 A.2d 159 (R.I. 2009).
In re Violet G., 212 A.3d 160 (R.I. 2019). “A finding of parental unfitness under § 15-7-7(a)(2) made by a trial justice is "entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless [it is] clearly wrong or the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(f) — 1 case
In Re Samson P., 773 A.2d 889 (R.I. 2001).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(h) — 3 cases
In Re Kelly S., 715 A.2d 1283 (R.I. 1998). “Nonetheless, despite successful rehabilitative efforts, the trial justice focused her decision on the fact that in the nine years since mother’s actions concerning her older children first came to light, she “has yet to assume responsibility for what occurred.”
In Re Corryn B., 914 A.2d 978 (R.I. 2007).
In re Rita F., 64 A.3d 1220 (R.I. 2013).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) — 20 cases
In Re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301 (R.I. 2003). “On February 8, 2000, pursuant to § 15-7-7(a), DCYF petitioned the Family Court for a TPR decree with respect to both Mary Ann and Dennis.”
In Re Amber P., 877 A.2d 608 (R.I. 2005). “On September 3, 2002, DCYF filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights pursuant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7. 5 Specifically, the department contended that Pandolfi was unfit as a parent by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the children, such as…”
In re Amiah P., 54 A.3d 446 (R.I. 2012).
In Re Alvia K., 909 A.2d 498 (R.I. 2006).
In Re Izabella G., 196 A.3d 736 (R.I. 2018).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(ii) — 15 cases
In Re Kelly S., 715 A.2d 1283 (R.I. 1998). “Nonetheless, despite successful rehabilitative efforts, the trial justice focused her decision on the fact that in the nine years since mother’s actions concerning her older children first came to light, she “has yet to assume responsibility for what occurred.”
In Re MacKenzie C., 877 A.2d 674 (R.I. 2005).
In Re Corryn B., 914 A.2d 978 (R.I. 2007).
In Re Natalya C., 946 A.2d 198 (R.I. 2008).
In re Rita F., 64 A.3d 1220 (R.I. 2013).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii) — 18 cases
In Re Gabrielle D., 39 A.3d 655 (R.I. 2012). “See G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii), (a)(2)(iv), (a)(3), and (a)(4).”
In Re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413 (R.I. 2002).
In Re Natalya C., 946 A.2d 198 (R.I. 2008).
In re Amiah P., 54 A.3d 446 (R.I. 2012).
In Re Dayvon G., 10 A.3d 448 (R.I. 2010).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iv) — 7 cases
In Re David L., 877 A.2d 667 (R.I. 2005).
In Re Diamond I., 797 A.2d 1076 (R.I. 2002).
In Re Micaela C., 769 A.2d 600 (R.I. 2001).
In Re Kelly S., 715 A.2d 1283 (R.I. 1998). “Nonetheless, despite successful rehabilitative efforts, the trial justice focused her decision on the fact that in the nine years since mother’s actions concerning her older children first came to light, she “has yet to assume responsibility for what occurred.”
In Re Mercedes V., 788 A.2d 1152 (R.I. 2001).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(v) — 2 cases
In Re MacKenzie C., 877 A.2d 674 (R.I. 2005).
In re Rita F., 64 A.3d 1220 (R.I. 2013).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(2)(vii) — 20 cases
In Re Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202 (R.I. 2006).
In re Violet G., 212 A.3d 160 (R.I. 2019). “A finding of parental unfitness under § 15-7-7(a)(2) made by a trial justice is "entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless [it is] clearly wrong or the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence.”
In Re Charles L., 6 A.3d 1089 (R.I. 2010).
In re Briann A.T., 146 A.3d 866 (R.I. 2016).
In Re Diamond Y., 915 A.2d 1283 (R.I. 2007).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(3) — 70 cases
In Re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301 (R.I. 2003). “On February 8, 2000, pursuant to § 15-7-7(a), DCYF petitioned the Family Court for a TPR decree with respect to both Mary Ann and Dennis.”
In re Steven D., 23 A.3d 1138 (R.I. 2011). “See § 15-7-7(a); see also In re Victoria L., 950 A.”
In Re Gabrielle D., 39 A.3d 655 (R.I. 2012). “See G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii), (a)(2)(iv), (a)(3), and (a)(4).”
In re Lauren B., 78 A.3d 752 (R.I. 2013). “4 Pursu *755 ant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7(a), 5 DCYF alleged the following as grounds for termination: (1) Jones’s unfitness by reason of conduct seriously detrimental to Lauren and Stephanie; (2) the children’s placement with DCYF for at least twelve months with no substantial…”
In Re Natalya C., 946 A.2d 198 (R.I. 2008).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(4) — 33 cases
In Re Abby D., 839 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 2004). “4 The statute further pro *1224 vides that, if the non-custodial natural parent refuses to consent to the adoption, then the Family Court may terminate that parent’s rights upon any of the grounds set out in § 15-7-7. The threshold question in this case is whether, pursuant to §…”
In re Lauren B., 78 A.3d 752 (R.I. 2013). “4 Pursu *755 ant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7(a), 5 DCYF alleged the following as grounds for termination: (1) Jones’s unfitness by reason of conduct seriously detrimental to Lauren and Stephanie; (2) the children’s placement with DCYF for at least twelve months with no substantial…”
In Re Shanelly C., 785 A.2d 1129 (R.I. 2001).
In Re Craig G., 765 A.2d 1200 (R.I. 2001).
In Re Julian D., 18 A.3d 477 (R.I. 2011). “2007)); see also § 15-7-7(a). Ill Discussion A The Trial Justice’s Basis for Terminating Vallejo’s Parental Rights The procedure governing termination of parental rights is set forth in § 15-7-7(a).”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(8) — 1 case
In Re Samson P., 773 A.2d 889 (R.I. 2001).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(S) — 1 case
In Re Delicia B., 762 A.2d 1201 (R.I. 2000).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(iv) — 1 case
In Re Diamond I., 797 A.2d 1076 (R.I. 2002).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(a)(l) — 5 cases
State v. Fritz, 801 A.2d 679 (R.I. 2002). “In determining that a parent's obligation to support ceases at the point when that person's parental rights have been terminated, the trial justice relied on § 15-7-7 and G.L. 1956 § 15-7.2-2. Section 15-7-7, which is entitled "Termination of parental rights," provides in…”
In re Jah-nell B., 116 A.3d 784 (R.I. 2015).
In Re Nicole B., 703 A.2d 612 (R.I. 1997).
In Re Dennis P., 749 A.2d 582 (R.I. 2000).
In Re Jason L., 810 A.2d 765 (R.I. 2002).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(b) — 3 cases
In Re Destiney L., 21 A.3d 279 (R.I. 2011).
In Re Frederick, 546 A.2d 160 (R.I. 1988).
In Re Jose Luis RH, 968 A.2d 875 (R.I. 2009).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(b)(1) — 31 cases
In Re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301 (R.I. 2003). “On February 8, 2000, pursuant to § 15-7-7(a), DCYF petitioned the Family Court for a TPR decree with respect to both Mary Ann and Dennis.”
In Re Gabrielle D., 39 A.3d 655 (R.I. 2012). “See G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii), (a)(2)(iv), (a)(3), and (a)(4).”
In re Steven D., 23 A.3d 1138 (R.I. 2011). “See § 15-7-7(a); see also In re Victoria L., 950 A.”
In re Violet G., 212 A.3d 160 (R.I. 2019). “A finding of parental unfitness under § 15-7-7(a)(2) made by a trial justice is "entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless [it is] clearly wrong or the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence.”
In re Briann A.T., 146 A.3d 866 (R.I. 2016).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(b)(2) — 8 cases
In Re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301 (R.I. 2003). “On February 8, 2000, pursuant to § 15-7-7(a), DCYF petitioned the Family Court for a TPR decree with respect to both Mary Ann and Dennis.”
In Re Frances, 505 A.2d 1380 (R.I. 1986).
In Re Raymond C., 864 A.2d 629 (R.I. 2005).
In Re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413 (R.I. 2002).
In Re Tara P., 836 A.2d 219 (R.I. 2003).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(b)(3) — 2 cases
In Re Jason L., 810 A.2d 765 (R.I. 2002).
In re Ann Marie, 504 A.2d 464 (R.I. 1986).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(b)(Z) — 1 case
In re Rita F., 64 A.3d 1220 (R.I. 2013).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(b)(i) — 2 cases
In Re John W., 682 A.2d 930 (R.I. 1996).
In Re Michael A., 552 A.2d 368 (R.I. 1989).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(b)(l) — 22 cases
In Re Amber P., 877 A.2d 608 (R.I. 2005). “On September 3, 2002, DCYF filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights pursuant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7. 5 Specifically, the department contended that Pandolfi was unfit as a parent by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the children, such as…”
In re Lauren B., 78 A.3d 752 (R.I. 2013). “4 Pursu *755 ant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7(a), 5 DCYF alleged the following as grounds for termination: (1) Jones’s unfitness by reason of conduct seriously detrimental to Lauren and Stephanie; (2) the children’s placement with DCYF for at least twelve months with no substantial…”
In Re Destiny D., 922 A.2d 168 (R.I. 2007).
In Re Gabrielle D., 39 A.3d 655 (R.I. 2012). “See G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7(a)(2)(iii), (a)(2)(iv), (a)(3), and (a)(4).”
In Re William, Susan, & Joseph, 448 A.2d 1250 (R.I. 1982).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(c) — 10 cases
In Re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574 (R.I. 1987).
In Re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200 (R.I. 1989).
In Re Rene B., 544 A.2d 137 (R.I. 1988).
In Re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413 (R.I. 2002).
In Re John W., 682 A.2d 930 (R.I. 1996).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(c)(1) — 1 case
In re Cody, 706 A.2d 1336 (R.I. 1998).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(c)(l) — 2 cases
In Re Raymond C., 864 A.2d 629 (R.I. 2005).
In re Cody, 706 A.2d 1336 (R.I. 1998).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(c)(l)(2)(ii) — 1 case
In Re Amber P., 877 A.2d 608 (R.I. 2005). “On September 3, 2002, DCYF filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights pursuant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7. 5 Specifically, the department contended that Pandolfi was unfit as a parent by reason of conduct or conditions seriously detrimental to the children, such as…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(d) — 5 cases
In Re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301 (R.I. 2003). “On February 8, 2000, pursuant to § 15-7-7(a), DCYF petitioned the Family Court for a TPR decree with respect to both Mary Ann and Dennis.”
In Re David, 427 A.2d 795 (R.I. 1981).
in the Interest of A.G. & F.G., Child. (Tex. App. 2015).
in the Interest of S. R.- M. C. (Tex. App. 2015).
in the Interest of K.I.B.C., a Child (Tex. App. 2015).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(g) — 2 cases
In Re David L., 877 A.2d 667 (R.I. 2005).
In Re Rachon W., 750 A.2d 963 (R.I. 2000).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(l)(a) — 3 cases
In Re John, 605 A.2d 486 (R.I. 1992). “section 15-7-7 without there being a pending adoption petition?” We answer this question in the negative.”
In re Oscar C., 598 A.2d 1093 (R.I. 1991).
In Re Kyle S., 692 A.2d 329 (R.I. 1997). “On the basis of these voluntary terminations, DCYF filed a petition to terminate involuntarily respondents’ parental rights to Kyle pursuant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7(1 )(b)(iv), as amended by P.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(l)(b) — 2 cases
In Re Kelly S., 715 A.2d 1283 (R.I. 1998). “Nonetheless, despite successful rehabilitative efforts, the trial justice focused her decision on the fact that in the nine years since mother’s actions concerning her older children first came to light, she “has yet to assume responsibility for what occurred.”
In re Richard M., 673 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1996).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(l)(b)(i) — 1 case
In re Richard M., 673 A.2d 67 (R.I. 1996).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(l)(b)(ii) — 1 case
In Re Nicole B., 703 A.2d 612 (R.I. 1997).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(l)(b)(iv) — 1 case
In Re Kyle S., 692 A.2d 329 (R.I. 1997). “On the basis of these voluntary terminations, DCYF filed a petition to terminate involuntarily respondents’ parental rights to Kyle pursuant to G.L.1956 § 15-7-7(1 )(b)(iv), as amended by P.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(l)(c) — 5 cases
In Re Antonio G., 657 A.2d 1052 (R.I. 1995).
In Re Nicole B., 703 A.2d 612 (R.I. 1997).
In re Lori Ann D., 666 A.2d 403 (R.I. 1995).
In re Ruddy T., 650 A.2d 1238 (R.I. 1994).
In re Amanda M., 706 A.2d 1344 (R.I. 1998).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(l)(d) — 1 case
In Re John, 605 A.2d 486 (R.I. 1992). “section 15-7-7 without there being a pending adoption petition?” We answer this question in the negative.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-7-7(l)(e) — 1 case
In Re Antonio G., 657 A.2d 1052 (R.I. 1995).
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