(a) Upon the commission’s own initiative or whenever an aggrieved individual or an organization
chartered for the purpose of combating discrimination, racism, or of safeguarding
civil liberties, or of promoting full, free, or equal employment opportunities, that
individual or organization being subsequently referred to as the complainant, makes
a charge to the commission that any employer, employment agency, labor organization,
or person, subsequently referred to as the respondent, has engaged or is engaging
in unlawful employment practices and that the unlawful employment practices have occurred,
have terminated, or have been applied to affect adversely the person aggrieved, whichever
is later, within one year, the commission may initiate a preliminary investigation.
(b) If the commission determines after the investigation that it is probable that unlawful
employment practices have been or are being engaged in, it shall endeavor to eliminate
the unlawful employment practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation,
and persuasion, including a conciliation agreement. The terms of the conciliation
agreement shall include provisions requiring the respondent to refrain from the commission
of unlawful discriminatory practices in the future and may contain any further provisions
that may be agreed upon by the investigating commissioner and the respondent, including
a provision for the entry in superior court of a consent decree embodying the terms
of the conciliation agreement. Nothing said or done during these endeavors may be
used as evidence in any subsequent proceeding.
(c) If, after an investigation and conference, the commission is satisfied that any unlawful
employment practice of the respondent will be eliminated, it may, with the consent
of the complainant, treat the charge as conciliated, and entry of that disposition
shall be made on the records of the commission.
(d) The commission shall not enter a consent order or conciliation agreement settling
claims of discrimination in an action or proceeding under this chapter unless the
parties and their counsel attest that a waiver of all or substantially all attorneys’
fees was not compelled as a condition of the settlement.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
17
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1980–2025 · leading case:
Horn v. S. Union Co., 927 A.2d 292 (R.I. 2007).
Horn v. S. Union Co., 927 A.2d 292 (R.I. 2007).
· cites it 16× “Section 28-5-17. Contrariwise, the RICRA contemplates a civil action.”
Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc., 45 A.3d 527 (R.I. 2012).
· cites it 9× “Specifically, plaintiff argues that G.L.1956 §§ 28-5-17 and 28-5-24.1 render the release document void as it applied to his pending FEPA claim.”
Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2004).
· cites it 3× “See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-17 (making the filing of an administrative charge a precondition to suit under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act).”
Moore v. Rhode Island Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 18 A.3d 541 (R.I. 2011).
· cites it 7× “The commission then will investigate the complaint, § 28-5-17(a); and, if it determines that the complaint is likely meritorious, “it shall endeavor to eliminate the unlawful employment practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion[.”
Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D.R.I. 2003).
· cites it 3× “Consequently, only those practices that occurred subsequent to November 16, 1999, fall within the relevant time period for purposes of Plaintiffs FEPA failure to promote claim. Of the male Autozone employees that the Plaintiff relies upon in support of her discrimination claim,…”
Power v. City of Providence, 582 A.2d 895 (R.I. 1990).
“Union cites to §§ 28-5-17, 28-5-18, and 28-5-24.1 as mandating the dismissal of a Superior Court action where the commission has not had the opportunity to negotiate a settlement on a FEPA claim.”
Place v. California Webbing Indus., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 157 (D.R.I. 2003).
· cites it 2× “See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-17 (2000). The relatively brief limitations period, common to anti-discrimination statutes, protects the accused by guaranteeing that they receive sufficient notice of the alleged violations to adequately investigate the claims while those claims are…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-17(a) — 6 cases
Horn v. S. Union Co., 927 A.2d 292 (R.I. 2007).
“Section 28-5-17. Contrariwise, the RICRA contemplates a civil action.”
Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2004).
“See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-17 (making the filing of an administrative charge a precondition to suit under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act).”
Moore v. Rhode Island Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 18 A.3d 541 (R.I. 2011).
“The commission then will investigate the complaint, § 28-5-17(a); and, if it determines that the complaint is likely meritorious, “it shall endeavor to eliminate the unlawful employment practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion[.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-17(b) — 2 cases
Horn v. S. Union Co., 927 A.2d 292 (R.I. 2007).
“Section 28-5-17. Contrariwise, the RICRA contemplates a civil action.”
Moore v. Rhode Island Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 18 A.3d 541 (R.I. 2011).
“The commission then will investigate the complaint, § 28-5-17(a); and, if it determines that the complaint is likely meritorious, “it shall endeavor to eliminate the unlawful employment practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion[.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-17(d) — 1 case
Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc., 45 A.3d 527 (R.I. 2012).
“Specifically, plaintiff argues that G.L.1956 §§ 28-5-17 and 28-5-24.1 render the release document void as it applied to his pending FEPA claim.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.