As used in this chapter:
(1) “Adjudicative officer” means the deciding official, without regard to whether the
official is designated as an administrative law judge, a hearing officer or examiner,
or otherwise, who presided at the adversary adjudication.
(2) “Adjudicatory proceedings” means any proceeding conducted by, or on behalf of, the
state, administratively or quasi-judicially, which may result in the loss of benefits;
the imposition of a fine; the adjustment of a tax assessment; the denial, suspension,
or revocation of a license or permit; or which may result in the compulsion or restriction
of the activities of a party. Any agency charged by statute with investigating complaints
shall be deemed to have substantial justification for the investigation and for the
proceedings subsequent to the investigation.
(3) “Agency” means any state and/or municipal board, commission, council, department,
or officer, other than the legislature or the courts, authorized by law to make rules
or to determine contested cases; to bring any action at law or in equity, including,
but not limited to, injunctive and other relief; or to initiate criminal proceedings.
This shall include contract boards of appeal, tax proceedings, and employment security
administrative proceedings.
(4) “Municipality” means the individual cities and towns in the state of Rhode Island
and including, but not limited to, any city or town housing authority, fire, water,
sewer district, local or regional school district, public building authority, or other
municipal financed agency or department.
(5) “Party” means any individual whose net worth is less than five hundred thousand dollars
($500,000) at the time the adversary adjudication was initiated; and, any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or private organization doing business and
located in the state, which is independently owned and operated, not dominant in its
field, and which employs one hundred (100) or fewer persons at the time the adversary
adjudication was initiated.
(6) “Reasonable litigation expenses” means those expenses which were reasonably incurred
by a party in adjudicatory proceedings, including, but not limited to, attorney’s
fees, witness fees of all necessary witnesses, and other costs and expenses as were
reasonably incurred, except that:
(i) The award of attorney’s fees may not exceed one hundred fifty dollars ($150) per hour,
unless the court determines that special factors justify a higher fee;
(ii) No expert witness may be compensated at a rate in excess of the highest rate of compensation
for experts paid by this state.
(7) “Substantial justification” means that the initial position of the agency, as well
as the agency’s position in the proceedings, has a reasonable basis in law and fact.
Notes of Decisions
Henry Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review of the Town of Jamestown, 142 A.3d 191 (R.I. 2016).
· cites it 17× “” Even though the act provides a definition of the term “adjudicative officer,” see § 42-92-2(1), 11 plaintiffs argue that, when the two subsections of § 42-92-3 are read together, the clear import of the act is that, when a justice of the Superior Court rules on a request for…”
Campbell v. Tiverton Zoning Bd., 15 A.3d 1015 (R.I. 2011).
· cites it 9× “” Section 42-92-2(2) (emphases added). In administrative law, such a proceeding is one “in which the rights and duties of a particular person are decided after notice and an opportunity to be heard.”
Taft v. Pare, 536 A.2d 888 (R.I. 1988).
· cites it 8× “We affirm the award and further direct the District Court to allow respondent reasonable litigation expenses 4 includ *892 ing attorney’s fees, as defined in § 42-92-2(c), for the additional expenses necessarily incurred by respondent as a result of these proceedings.”
Krikorian v. Rhode Island Dep't of Human Servs., 606 A.2d 671 (R.I. 1992).
· cites it 2× “” Section 42-92-2(f) defines “[sjubstantial justification” as meaning that “the initial position of the agency, as well as the agency’s position in the proceedings, has a reasonable basis in law and fact.”
Amber Preston v. Town of Hopkinton (R.I. 2022).
“Preston’s appeal because she has not properly invoked the jurisdiction of this Court. The act provides that state and municipal agencies shall reimburse litigation expenses incurred by a party in -2- connection with certain substantially unjustified state or municipal actions.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-92-2(1) — 1 case
Henry Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review of the Town of Jamestown, 142 A.3d 191 (R.I. 2016).
“” Even though the act provides a definition of the term “adjudicative officer,” see § 42-92-2(1), 11 plaintiffs argue that, when the two subsections of § 42-92-3 are read together, the clear import of the act is that, when a justice of the Superior Court rules on a request for…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-92-2(2) — 3 cases
Campbell v. Tiverton Zoning Bd., 15 A.3d 1015 (R.I. 2011).
“” Section 42-92-2(2) (emphases added). In administrative law, such a proceeding is one “in which the rights and duties of a particular person are decided after notice and an opportunity to be heard.”
Henry Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review of the Town of Jamestown, 142 A.3d 191 (R.I. 2016).
“” Even though the act provides a definition of the term “adjudicative officer,” see § 42-92-2(1), 11 plaintiffs argue that, when the two subsections of § 42-92-3 are read together, the clear import of the act is that, when a justice of the Superior Court rules on a request for…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-92-2(3) — 2 cases
Henry Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review of the Town of Jamestown, 142 A.3d 191 (R.I. 2016).
“” Even though the act provides a definition of the term “adjudicative officer,” see § 42-92-2(1), 11 plaintiffs argue that, when the two subsections of § 42-92-3 are read together, the clear import of the act is that, when a justice of the Superior Court rules on a request for…”
Campbell v. Tiverton Zoning Bd., 15 A.3d 1015 (R.I. 2011).
“” Section 42-92-2(2) (emphases added). In administrative law, such a proceeding is one “in which the rights and duties of a particular person are decided after notice and an opportunity to be heard.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-92-2(5) — 1 case
Henry Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review of the Town of Jamestown, 142 A.3d 191 (R.I. 2016).
“” Even though the act provides a definition of the term “adjudicative officer,” see § 42-92-2(1), 11 plaintiffs argue that, when the two subsections of § 42-92-3 are read together, the clear import of the act is that, when a justice of the Superior Court rules on a request for…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-92-2(6) — 1 case
Henry Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review of the Town of Jamestown, 142 A.3d 191 (R.I. 2016).
“” Even though the act provides a definition of the term “adjudicative officer,” see § 42-92-2(1), 11 plaintiffs argue that, when the two subsections of § 42-92-3 are read together, the clear import of the act is that, when a justice of the Superior Court rules on a request for…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-92-2(7) — 3 cases
Campbell v. Tiverton Zoning Bd., 15 A.3d 1015 (R.I. 2011).
“” Section 42-92-2(2) (emphases added). In administrative law, such a proceeding is one “in which the rights and duties of a particular person are decided after notice and an opportunity to be heard.”
Henry Tarbox v. Zoning Bd. of Review of the Town of Jamestown, 142 A.3d 191 (R.I. 2016).
“” Even though the act provides a definition of the term “adjudicative officer,” see § 42-92-2(1), 11 plaintiffs argue that, when the two subsections of § 42-92-3 are read together, the clear import of the act is that, when a justice of the Superior Court rules on a request for…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-92-2(a) — 1 case
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-92-2(c) — 2 cases
Taft v. Pare, 536 A.2d 888 (R.I. 1988).
“We affirm the award and further direct the District Court to allow respondent reasonable litigation expenses 4 includ *892 ing attorney’s fees, as defined in § 42-92-2(c), for the additional expenses necessarily incurred by respondent as a result of these proceedings.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-92-2(d) — 1 case
Taft v. Pare, 536 A.2d 888 (R.I. 1988).
“We affirm the award and further direct the District Court to allow respondent reasonable litigation expenses 4 includ *892 ing attorney’s fees, as defined in § 42-92-2(c), for the additional expenses necessarily incurred by respondent as a result of these proceedings.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-92-2(e) — 1 case
Taft v. Pare, 536 A.2d 888 (R.I. 1988).
“We affirm the award and further direct the District Court to allow respondent reasonable litigation expenses 4 includ *892 ing attorney’s fees, as defined in § 42-92-2(c), for the additional expenses necessarily incurred by respondent as a result of these proceedings.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-92-2(f) — 2 cases
Taft v. Pare, 536 A.2d 888 (R.I. 1988).
“We affirm the award and further direct the District Court to allow respondent reasonable litigation expenses 4 includ *892 ing attorney’s fees, as defined in § 42-92-2(c), for the additional expenses necessarily incurred by respondent as a result of these proceedings.”
Krikorian v. Rhode Island Dep't of Human Servs., 606 A.2d 671 (R.I. 1992).
“” Section 42-92-2(f) defines “[sjubstantial justification” as meaning that “the initial position of the agency, as well as the agency’s position in the proceedings, has a reasonable basis in law and fact.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.