Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14.1 (2026)

Limitation on malpractice actions

✓ current as of July 2026

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Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 9-1-13 and 9-1-14, an action for medical, veterinarian, accounting, or insurance or real estate agent or broker malpractice shall be commenced within three (3) years from the time of the occurrence of the incident that gave rise to the action; provided, however, that:

(1) One who is under disability by reason of age and on whose behalf no action is brought within the period of three (3) years from the time of the occurrence of the incident shall bring the action at any time up to twenty-one (21) years of age.

(2) One who is under disability by reason of mental incompetence, or otherwise, and on whose behalf no action is brought within the period of three (3) years from the time of the occurrence of the incident, shall bring the action within three (3) years from the removal of the disability.

(3) In respect to those injuries or damages due to acts of medical, veterinarian, accounting, or insurance or real estate agent or broker malpractice that could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence be discoverable at the time of the occurrence of the incident that gave rise to the action, suit shall be commenced within three (3) years of the time that the act or acts of the malpractice should, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, have been discovered.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 38 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1978–2026 · leading case: Jean Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hosp., 115 A.3d 938 (R.I. 2015).

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Jean Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hosp., 115 A.3d 938 (R.I. 2015). · cites it 185× “The Superior Court granted 1 General Laws 1956 § 9-1-14.1 provides in pertinent part as follows: “Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 9-1-13 and 9-1-14, an action for medical * * * malpractice shall be commenced within three (3) years from the time of the occurrence of the…”

Jean Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hosp., 89 A.3d 806 (R.I. 2014). · cites it 24× “In pertinent part, G.L.1956 § 9-1-14.1 provides that "an action for medical * * * malpractice shall be commenced within three (3) years *808 from the time of the occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action; provided, however, that: “(1) One who is under disability…”

Barrette v. Yakavonis, 966 A.2d 1231 (R.I. 2009). · cites it 11× “The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the action was time-barred by the limitations set forth in G.L. 1956 § 9-1-14.1. The plaintiff argued in response that, because subsection (2) of…”

Bowen Court Assocs. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 818 A.2d 721 (R.I. 2003). · cites it 8× “1956 *724 § 9-1-14.1? 1 We answer this question in the affirmative.”

Dowd v. Rayner, 655 A.2d 679 (R.I. 1995). · cites it 23× “Relying on this court’s holding in Bakalakis , on February 22, 1993, McGowan moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and for final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), contending that plaintiffs’ action against him was…”

Vigue v. John E. Fogarty Mem'l Hosp., 481 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1984). · cites it 18× “1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-1-14.1 [1] At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs argued that their action was based upon a theory of common-law negligence and not upon a statutory claim for medical malpractice that was governed by § 9-1-14.”

O'Sullivan v. Rhode Island Hosp., 874 A.2d 179 (R.I. 2005). · cites it 10× “1994) (applying the latent and potentially undiscoverable requirement to an action under G.L.1956 § 9-1-14.1). Contrary to these assertions, however, we conclude that no such prerequisite for tolling can be found in the plain language of the statute of limitations that is an…”

Charles S. Faber v. Francine A. McVay, 155 A.3d 153 (R.I. 2017). · cites it 12× “The Superior Court directed the entry of summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred under G.L. 1956 § 9-1-14.1, which sets forth a three-year limitation period for insurance malpractice claims.”

Foley v. St. Joseph Health Servs., 899 A.2d 1271 (R.I. 2006). · cites it 6× “G.L.1956 § 9-1-14.1. But, if the injury or damage “could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence be discoverable at the time of the occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action, suit shall be commenced within three (3) years of the time that the act or acts of…”

Rachal v. O'Neil, 925 A.2d 920 (R.I. 2007). · cites it 11× “Perhaps the most pervasive exception has been carved out by legislation comparable to Rhode Island’s § 9-1-14.1, under which a parent or next friend’s institution of a suit on behalf of a child for certain types of professional malpractice removes that child’s malpractice claims…”

Jose Bustamante v. Hector R. Oshiro, M.D., 64 A.3d 1200 (R.I. 2013). · cites it 13× “The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs’ suit was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice, G.L. 1956 § 9-1-14.1. The basis of this claim was that plaintiffs became aware of the alleged acts of malpractice on June 2,…”

Bakalakis v. Women & Infants' Hosp., 619 A.2d 1105 (R.I. 1993). · cites it 10× “1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-1-14.1, as amended by P.L.1984, ch. 236, § 1, that service of process upon them was insufficient; and that plaintiffs had failed to use due diligence in investigating their claim so that they were now prevented from raising it.”

Show all 38 citing cases →

— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14.1(1) — 5 cases

Jean Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hosp., 115 A.3d 938 (R.I. 2015). “The Superior Court granted 1 General Laws 1956 § 9-1-14.1 provides in pertinent part as follows: “Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 9-1-13 and 9-1-14, an action for medical * * * malpractice shall be commenced within three (3) years from the time of the occurrence of the…”

Jean Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hosp., 89 A.3d 806 (R.I. 2014). “In pertinent part, G.L.1956 § 9-1-14.1 provides that "an action for medical * * * malpractice shall be commenced within three (3) years *808 from the time of the occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action; provided, however, that: “(1) One who is under disability…”

State v. Med. Malpractice Jt. Underwriting Ass'n, 941 A.2d 219 (R.I. 2008).

State v. JUA, 941 A.2d 219 (R.I. 2008).

Parenteau v. Women & Infants' Hosp., 117 A.3d 415 (R.I. 2015).

— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14.1(2) — 8 cases

Barrette v. Yakavonis, 966 A.2d 1231 (R.I. 2009). “The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the action was time-barred by the limitations set forth in G.L. 1956 § 9-1-14.1. The plaintiff argued in response that, because subsection (2) of…”

Charles S. Faber v. Francine A. McVay, 155 A.3d 153 (R.I. 2017). “The Superior Court directed the entry of summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred under G.L. 1956 § 9-1-14.1, which sets forth a three-year limitation period for insurance malpractice claims.”

Foley v. St. Joseph Health Servs., 899 A.2d 1271 (R.I. 2006). “G.L.1956 § 9-1-14.1. But, if the injury or damage “could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence be discoverable at the time of the occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action, suit shall be commenced within three (3) years of the time that the act or acts of…”

Jose Bustamante v. Hector R. Oshiro, M.D., 64 A.3d 1200 (R.I. 2013). “The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs’ suit was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice, G.L. 1956 § 9-1-14.1. The basis of this claim was that plaintiffs became aware of the alleged acts of malpractice on June 2,…”

— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14.1(3) — 1 case

Rhode Island Recovery & Transp., LLC, a Rhode Island Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Carriage Ins. Agency, Inc., an Ohio Ltd. Liab. Co., d/b/a Recovery Ins. Servs. (D.R.I. 2026).

— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14.1(a) — 4 cases

Dowd v. Rayner, 655 A.2d 679 (R.I. 1995). “Relying on this court’s holding in Bakalakis , on February 22, 1993, McGowan moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and for final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), contending that plaintiffs’ action against him was…”

Bakalakis v. Women & Infants' Hosp., 619 A.2d 1105 (R.I. 1993). “1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-1-14.1, as amended by P.L.1984, ch. 236, § 1, that service of process upon them was insufficient; and that plaintiffs had failed to use due diligence in investigating their claim so that they were now prevented from raising it.”

Rachal v. O'Neil, 925 A.2d 920 (R.I. 2007). “Perhaps the most pervasive exception has been carved out by legislation comparable to Rhode Island’s § 9-1-14.1, under which a parent or next friend’s institution of a suit on behalf of a child for certain types of professional malpractice removes that child’s malpractice claims…”

— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14.1(b) — 2 cases

Arnold v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 956 F. Supp. 110 (D.R.I. 1997).

Zuccolo v. Blazar, 694 A.2d 717 (R.I. 1997).

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