U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2

Aggravated Assault

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(a)       Base Offense Level:  14

(b)      Specific Offense Characteristics

(1)       If the assault involved more than minimal planning, increase by 2 levels.

(2)       If (A) a firearm was discharged, increase by 5 levels; (B) a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was otherwise used, increase by 4 levels; (C) a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was brandished or its use was threatened, increase by 3 levels.

(3)       If the victim sustained bodily injury, increase the offense level according to the seriousness of the injury:
 Degree of Bodily InjuryIncrease in Level
(A)Bodily Injuryadd 3
(B)Serious Bodily Injury add 5
(C)Permanent or Life-Threatening Bodily Injuryadd 7
(D)If the degree of injury is between that specified in subdivisions (A) and (B), add 4 levels; or
(E)If the degree of injury is between that specified in subdivisions (B) and (C), add 6 levels.

However, the cumulative adjustments from application of subdivisions (2) and (3) shall not exceed 10 levels.

(4)       If the offense involved strangling, suffocating, or attempting to strangle or suffocate a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner, increase by 3 levels.

However, the cumulative adjustments from application of subdivisions (2), (3), and (4) shall not exceed 12 levels.

(5)      If the assault was motivated by a payment or offer of money or other thing of value, increase by 2 levels.

(6)       If the offense involved the violation of a court protection order, increase by 2 levels.

(7)       If the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) or § 115, increase by 2 levels.

 

Commentary

Statutory Provisions18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112, 113(a)(2), (3), (6), (8), 114, 115(a), (b)(1), 351(e), 1751(e), 1841(a)(2)(C), 1992(a)(7), 2199, 2291, 2332b(a)(1), 2340A. For additional statutory provision(s), see Appendix A (Statutory Index).

Application Notes:

1.      Definitions.—For purposes of this guideline:

"Aggravated assault" means a felonious assault that involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury (i.e., not merely to frighten) with that weapon; (B) serious bodily injury; (C) strangling, suffocating, or attempting to strangle or suffocate; or (D) an intent to commit another felony.

"Brandished," "bodily injury," "firearm," "otherwise used," "permanent or life-threatening bodily injury," and "serious bodily injury," have the meaning given those terms in §1B1.1 (Application Instructions), Application Note 1.

"Dangerous weapon" has the meaning given that term in §1B1.1, Application Note 1, and includes any instrument that is not ordinarily used as a weapon (e.g., a car, a chair, or an ice pick) if such an instrument is involved in the offense with the intent to commit bodily injury.

"Strangling" and "suffocating" have the meaning given those terms in 18 U.S.C. § 113.

"Spouse," "intimate partner," and "dating partner" have the meaning given those terms in 18 U.S.C. § 2266.

2.      Application of Subsection (b)(1).—For purposes of subsection (b)(1), "more than minimal planning" means more planning than is typical for commission of the offense in a simple form.  "More than minimal planning" also exists if significant affirmative steps were taken to conceal the offense, other than conduct to which §3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice) applies.  For example, waiting to commit the offense when no witnesses were present would not alone constitute more than minimal planning.  By contrast, luring the victim to a specific location or wearing a ski mask to prevent identification would constitute more than minimal planning.

3.      Application of Subsection (b)(2).—In a case involving a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury, the court shall apply both the base offense level and subsection (b)(2).

4.      Application of Official Victim Adjustment.—If subsection (b)(7) applies, §3A1.2 (Official Victim) also shall apply.

Background:  This guideline covers felonious assaults that are more serious than other assaults because of the presence of an aggravating factor, i.e., serious bodily injury; the involvement of a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury; strangling, suffocating, or attempting to strangle or suffocate; or the intent to commit another felony. Such offenses occasionally may involve planning or be committed for hire. Consequently, the structure follows §2A2.1 (Assault with Intent to Commit Murder; Attempted Murder). This guideline also covers attempted manslaughter and assault with intent to commit manslaughter. Assault with intent to commit murder is covered by §2A2.1. Assault with intent to commit rape is covered by §2A3.1 (Criminal Sexual Abuse; Attempt to Commit Criminal Sexual Abuse).

An assault that involves the presence of a dangerous weapon is aggravated in form when the presence of the dangerous weapon is coupled with the intent to cause bodily injury. In such a case, the base offense level and the weapon enhancement in subsection (b)(2) take into account different aspects of the offense, even if application of the base offense level and the weapon enhancement is based on the same conduct.

Subsection (b)(7) implements the directive to the Commission in subsection 11008(e) of the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Act (the "Act"), Public Law 107–273. The enhancement in subsection (b)(7) is cumulative to the adjustment in §3A1.2 (Official Victim) in order to address adequately the directive in section 11008(e)(2)(D) of the Act, which provides that the Commission shall consider "the extent to which sentencing enhancements within the Federal guidelines and the authority of the court to impose a sentence in excess of the applicable guideline range are adequate to ensure punishment at or near the maximum penalty for the most egregious conduct covered by" 18 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 115.

Historical Note:  Effective November 1, 1987.  Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendments 85 and 86); November 1, 1990 (amendment 311); November 1, 1995 (amendment 534); November 1, 1997 (amendment 549); November 1, 2001 (amendment 614); November 1, 2002 (amendment 637); November 1, 2004 (amendment 663); November 1, 2006 (amendment 685); November 1, 2007 (amendment 699); November 1, 2014 (amendment 781).


 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 511 cases (73 in the last 5 years), 1990–2026 · leading case: United States v. David J. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179 (6th Cir. 2000).
United States v. David J. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179 (6th Cir. 2000). · cites it 23× “§ 111 (b), and assigning a base offense level of 15 under the sentencing guideline for aggravated assault, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. 7 The sentencing report then applied three enhancements to *186 this base offense level: (1) a four-level enhancement under U.”
United States v. Michael J. Newman, 982 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1992). · cites it 17× “” See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, comment, (n. 1). Thus, the base offense level was set at 21, then adjusted upward four more levels, pursuant to U.”
United States v. Christopher Williams, 954 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1992). · cites it 13× “a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm,” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, comment (n.l), Williams argued that the upward adjustment for use of a dangerous weapon was redundant and constituted double punishment for the use of the metal chair.”
United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2008). · cites it 4× “USSG § 2A2.2(a). The base offense level of 14 was increased by five levels because the victim sustained serious bodily injury, USSG § 2A2.”
United States v. Tolbert, 668 F.3d 798 (6th Cir. 2012). · cites it 9× “The PSR references U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 Application Note 1, which provides that a dangerous weapon includes any instrument that is not ordinarily used as a weapon if such an instrument is involved in the offense with the intent to commit bodily injury.”
United States v. Reyes, 557 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2009). · cites it 11× “2(b)(2), and U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b) caps at ten levels the permissible cumulative enhancements pursuant to U.”
United States v. Michael Gabriel Duran, United States of Am. v. Leo Herman Monroe, Sr., 127 F.3d 911 (10th Cir. 1997). · cites it 12× “” USSG § 2A2.2 comment, (n. 1). Section 2A2.”
United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886 (10th Cir. 2005). · cites it 6× “As to each, the district court agreed, and applied a base offense level of 15, pursuant to USSG § 2A2.2, the aggravated assault guideline to each defendant.”
United States v. Stacey C. Koon, Cross-Appellee. United States of Am. v. Laurence M. Powell, Cross-Appellee, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994). · cites it 5× “In this case, the underlying offense was aggravated assault, which carries a base offense level of 15, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, to which was added 6 for a total of 21.”
United States v. Porter, 928 F.3d 947 (10th Cir. 2019). · cites it 7× “, not merely to frighten) with that weapon ; (B) serious bodily injury; (C) strangling, suffocating, or attempting to strangle or suffocate; or (D) an intent to commit another felony.”
United States v. Albert Hudson, 972 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1992). · cites it 8× “Compare U.S.S.G. §§ 2A2.2 and 2A2.4. The district court also imposed a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.”
United States v. Michael P. Roy, 408 F.3d 484 (8th Cir. 2005). · cites it 5× “See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, cmt. n. 1 (2003); U.S.S.”
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(3) — 2 cases
United States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2008).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(B)(3)(C) — 1 case
United States v. James (10th Cir. 2020).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(a) — 75 cases
United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2008). “USSG § 2A2.2(a). The base offense level of 14 was increased by five levels because the victim sustained serious bodily injury, USSG § 2A2.”
United States v. Anthony Evans, 883 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2018).
United States v. David J. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179 (6th Cir. 2000). “§ 111 (b), and assigning a base offense level of 15 under the sentencing guideline for aggravated assault, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. 7 The sentencing report then applied three enhancements to *186 this base offense level: (1) a four-level enhancement under U.”
United States v. Calbat, 266 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Michael Gabriel Duran, United States of Am. v. Leo Herman Monroe, Sr., 127 F.3d 911 (10th Cir. 1997). “” USSG § 2A2.2 comment, (n. 1). Section 2A2.”
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b) — 23 cases
United States v. William Milliron, 984 F.3d 1188 (6th Cir. 2021).
United States v. David J. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179 (6th Cir. 2000). “§ 111 (b), and assigning a base offense level of 15 under the sentencing guideline for aggravated assault, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. 7 The sentencing report then applied three enhancements to *186 this base offense level: (1) a four-level enhancement under U.”
United States v. Carolyn Jackson, 862 F.3d 365 (3rd Cir. 2017).
United States v. Robert A. Burke, 425 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Albert Hudson, 972 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1992). “Compare U.S.S.G. §§ 2A2.2 and 2A2.4. The district court also imposed a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.”
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(1) — 13 cases
United States v. Perrien, 274 F.3d 936 (5th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Lucas Denney, 98 F.4th 327 (D.C. Cir. 2024).
United States v. Freddie Sandoval, 325 F. App'x 828 (11th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Shawn Ruark (11th Cir. 2025).
United States v. Rivas (2d Cir. 2025).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(1)(A) — 1 case
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(2) — 32 cases
United States v. Christopher Williams, 954 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1992). “a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm,” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, comment (n.l), Williams argued that the upward adjustment for use of a dangerous weapon was redundant and constituted double punishment for the use of the metal chair.”
United States v. David J. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179 (6th Cir. 2000). “§ 111 (b), and assigning a base offense level of 15 under the sentencing guideline for aggravated assault, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. 7 The sentencing report then applied three enhancements to *186 this base offense level: (1) a four-level enhancement under U.”
United States v. Reyes, 557 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2009). “2(b)(2), and U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b) caps at ten levels the permissible cumulative enhancements pursuant to U.”
United States v. Albert Hudson, 972 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1992). “Compare U.S.S.G. §§ 2A2.2 and 2A2.4. The district court also imposed a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.”
United States v. Vigil, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D.N.M. 2007).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(2)(A) — 12 cases
United States v. Williams, 520 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Michael J. Newman, 982 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1992). “” See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, comment, (n. 1). Thus, the base offense level was set at 21, then adjusted upward four more levels, pursuant to U.”
United States v. Hill, William D., 131 F.3d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
United States v. Gerald Fleming, 8 F.3d 1264 (8th Cir. 1993).
United States v. Jollie Rocky Allen Smith, III, 997 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1993).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(2)(B) — 80 cases
United States v. Tolbert, 668 F.3d 798 (6th Cir. 2012). “The PSR references U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 Application Note 1, which provides that a dangerous weapon includes any instrument that is not ordinarily used as a weapon if such an instrument is involved in the offense with the intent to commit bodily injury.”
United States v. David J. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179 (6th Cir. 2000). “§ 111 (b), and assigning a base offense level of 15 under the sentencing guideline for aggravated assault, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. 7 The sentencing report then applied three enhancements to *186 this base offense level: (1) a four-level enhancement under U.”
United States v. Michael Gabriel Duran, United States of Am. v. Leo Herman Monroe, Sr., 127 F.3d 911 (10th Cir. 1997). “” USSG § 2A2.2 comment, (n. 1). Section 2A2.”
United States v. Calvin Dayea, 32 F.3d 1377 (9th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886 (10th Cir. 2005). “As to each, the district court agreed, and applied a base offense level of 15, pursuant to USSG § 2A2.2, the aggravated assault guideline to each defendant.”
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(2)(C) — 10 cases
United States v. William E. \Jack\" Street", 66 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 1995).
United States v. Bobby Lee Bellamy, 264 F.3d 448 (4th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Allen, 341 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2003).
United States v. Roberto Marcelo Almaguer, 146 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 1998).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(2)(c) — 3 cases
United States v. William Joseph Harris, 243 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Jones, 254 F. App'x 711 (10th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Harris (4th Cir. 2002).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(3) — 45 cases
Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 (2009).
United States v. Michael J. Newman, 982 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1992). “” See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, comment, (n. 1). Thus, the base offense level was set at 21, then adjusted upward four more levels, pursuant to U.”
United States v. Curtis Delaskio Moore, 997 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1993).
United States v. Lente, 323 F. App'x 698 (10th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Donald Lynn Baggett, 342 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2003).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(3)(A) — 36 cases
United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886 (10th Cir. 2005). “As to each, the district court agreed, and applied a base offense level of 15, pursuant to USSG § 2A2.2, the aggravated assault guideline to each defendant.”
United States v. Stacey C. Koon, Cross-Appellee. United States of Am. v. Laurence M. Powell, Cross-Appellee, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994). “In this case, the underlying offense was aggravated assault, which carries a base offense level of 15, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, to which was added 6 for a total of 21.”
United States v. Harper, 448 F.3d 732 (5th Cir. 2006).
United States v. Blanco, 27 F.4th 375 (5th Cir. 2022).
United States v. Lister, 229 F. App'x 334 (5th Cir. 2007).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(3)(B) — 39 cases
United States v. Michael J. Newman, 982 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1992). “” See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, comment, (n. 1). Thus, the base offense level was set at 21, then adjusted upward four more levels, pursuant to U.”
United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2008). “USSG § 2A2.2(a). The base offense level of 14 was increased by five levels because the victim sustained serious bodily injury, USSG § 2A2.”
United States v. Patrick Thompson, 60 F.3d 514 (8th Cir. 1995).
United States v. Eric Flores, 974 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2020).
United States v. Stacey C. Koon, Cross-Appellee. United States of Am. v. Laurence M. Powell, Cross-Appellee, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994). “In this case, the underlying offense was aggravated assault, which carries a base offense level of 15, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, to which was added 6 for a total of 21.”
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(3)(C) — 34 cases
United States v. Reyes, 557 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2009). “2(b)(2), and U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b) caps at ten levels the permissible cumulative enhancements pursuant to U.”
United States v. Tyrell Vincent Thin Elk, 321 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2003).
United States v. Floyd Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792 (3rd Cir. 1999).
United States v. Dominic E. Philiposian, 267 F.3d 214 (3rd Cir. 2001).
United States v. Zunie, 444 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2006).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(3)(D) — 10 cases
United States v. Harper, 448 F.3d 732 (5th Cir. 2006).
United States v. Michael J. Newman, 982 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1992). “” See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, comment, (n. 1). Thus, the base offense level was set at 21, then adjusted upward four more levels, pursuant to U.”
United States v. Alvin Stotts, 113 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 1997).
United States v. Tavares, 93 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 1996).
United States v. Carmen Cotto, 979 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1992).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(3)(E) — 14 cases
United States v. Michael P. Roy, 408 F.3d 484 (8th Cir. 2005). “See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, cmt. n. 1 (2003); U.S.S.”
United States v. Lente, 323 F. App'x 698 (10th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Terry L. Harlan, 368 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 2004).
United States v. Studnicka, 450 F. Supp. 2d 680 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
United States v. Warrior, 403 F. App'x 308 (10th Cir. 2010).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(4) — 5 cases
United States v. Lawrence Blackshire, 98 F.4th 1146 (9th Cir. 2024).
United States v. Walter Harrington, 946 F.3d 485 (9th Cir. 2019).
United States v. Campus (10th Cir. 2025).
United States v. Chavez (10th Cir. 2025).
United States v. Bigbeaver (9th Cir. 2026).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(5) — 3 cases
United States v. Paul Swallow, 891 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2018).
United States v. Brandon Banks, 480 F. App'x 314 (5th Cir. 2012).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(6) — 3 cases
United States v. Thomas, 669 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Octavio Huerta-Medina, 427 F. App'x 549 (8th Cir. 2011).
United States v. Brian Hutchins, 179 F. App'x 594 (11th Cir. 2006).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(7) — 7 cases
United States v. Montez Gaddy, 656 F. App'x 628 (4th Cir. 2016).
United States v. Campbell (10th Cir. 2021).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(8)(B) — 1 case
United States v. McIntosh, 232 F. App'x 752 (10th Cir. 2007).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(A) — 1 case
United States v. Warrior, 403 F. App'x 308 (10th Cir. 2010).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(b)(l) — 8 cases
United States v. Thomas C. Leahy, 169 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 1999).
United States v. Jennings, 855 F. Supp. 1427 (M.D. Penn. 1994).
United States v. Kramer, 943 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1991).
United States v. Freddie Sandoval, 325 F. App'x 828 (11th Cir. 2009).
— U.S.S.G. §2A2.2(c) — 1 case
United States v. Goins (2d Cir. 2025).
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