U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1

Criminal Sexual Abuse; Attempt to Commit Criminal Sexual Abuse

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(a)       Base Offense Level:

(1)       38, if the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c); or

(2)       30, otherwise.

(b)      Specific Offense Characteristics

(1)       If the offense involved conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) or (b), increase by 4 levels.

(2)       If subsection (a)(2) applies and (A) the victim had not attained the age of twelve years, increase by 4 levels; or (B) the victim had attained the age of twelve years but had not attained the age of sixteen years, increase by 2 levels.

(3)       If the victim was (A) in the custody, care, or supervisory control of the defendant; or (B) a person held in the custody of a correctional facility, increase by 2 levels.

(4)       (A) If the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury, increase by 4 levels; (B) if the victim sustained serious bodily injury, increase by 2 levels; or (C) if the degree of injury is between that specified in subdivisions (A) and (B), increase by 3 levels.

(5)       If the victim was abducted, increase by 4 levels.

(6)       If, to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct, or if, to facilitate transportation or travel, by a minor or a participant, to engage in prohibited sexual conduct, the offense involved (A) the knowing misrepresentation of a participant's identity; or (B) the use of a computer or an interactive computer service, increase by 2 levels.

(c)       Cross References

(1)       If a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 had such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States, apply §2A1.1 (First Degree Murder), if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above.

(2)       If the offense involved causing, transporting, permitting, or offering or seeking by notice or advertisement, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct, apply §2G2.1 (Sexually Exploiting a Minor by Production of Sexually Explicit Visual or Printed Material; Custodian Permitting Minor to Engage in Sexually Explicit Conduct; Advertisement for Minors to Engage in Production), if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above.

(d)      Special Instruction

(1)       If the offense occurred in the custody or control of a prison or other correctional facility and the victim was a prison official, the offense shall be deemed to have an official victim for purposes of subsection (c)(2) of §3A1.2 (Official Victim).

 

Commentary

Statutory Provisions18 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2242.  For additional statutory provision(s), see Appendix A (Statutory Index).

Application Notes:

1.      Definitions.—For purposes of this guideline:

"Abducted", "permanent or life-threatening bodily injury", and "serious bodily injury" have the meaning given those terms in Application Note 1 of the Commentary to §1B1.1 (Application Instructions).  However, for purposes of this guideline, "serious bodily injury" means conduct other than criminal sexual abuse, which already is taken into account in the base offense level under subsection (a).

"Custody or control" and "prison official" have the meaning given those terms in Application Note 4 of the Commentary to §3A1.2 (Official Victim).

"Child pornography" has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8).

"Computer" has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1).

"Distribution" means any act, including possession with intent to distribute, production, transportation, and advertisement, related to the transfer of material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor.  Accordingly, distribution includes posting material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor on a website for public viewing, but does not include the mere solicitation of such material by a defendant.

"Interactive computer service" has the meaning given that term in section 230(e)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)).

"Minor" means (A) an individual who had not attained the age of 18 years; (B) an individual, whether fictitious or not, who a law enforcement officer represented to a participant (i) had not attained the age of 18 years, and (ii) could be provided for the purposes of engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) an undercover law enforcement officer who represented to a participant that the officer had not attained the age of 18 years.

"Participant" has the meaning given that term in Application Note 1 of the Commentary to §3B1.1 (Aggravating Role).

"Prohibited sexual conduct" (A) means any sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a criminal offense; (B) includes the production of child pornography; and (C) does not include trafficking in, or possession of, child pornography.

"Victim" includes an undercover law enforcement officer.

2.      Application of Subsection (b)(1).—

(A)    Definitions.—For purposes of subsection (b)(1), "conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) or (b)" is engaging in, or causing another person to engage in, a sexual act with another person by:  (A) using force against the victim; (B) threatening or placing the victim in fear that any person will be subject to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; (C) rendering the victim unconscious; or (D) administering by force or threat of force, or without the knowledge or permission of the victim, a drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance and thereby substantially impairing the ability of the victim to appraise or control conduct.  This provision would apply, for example, if any dangerous weapon was used or brandished, or in a case in which the ability of the victim to appraise or control conduct was substantially impaired by drugs or alcohol.

(B)    Application in Cases Involving a Conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c).—If the conduct that forms the basis for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) is that the defendant engaged in conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) or (b), do not apply subsection (b)(1).

3.      Application of Subsection (b)(3).—

(A)    Care, Custody, or Supervisory Control.—Subsection (b)(3) is to be construed broadly and includes offenses involving a victim less than 18 years of age entrusted to the defendant, whether temporarily or permanently.  For example, teachers, day care providers, baby-sitters, or other temporary caretakers are among those who would be subject to this enhancement.  In determining whether to apply this enhancement, the court should look to the actual relationship that existed between the defendant and the minor and not simply to the legal status of the defendant-minor relationship.

(B)    Inapplicability of Chapter Three Adjustment.—If the enhancement in subsection (b)(3) applies, do not apply §3B1.3 (Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill).

4.     Application of Subsection (b)(6).—

(A)    Misrepresentation of Participant's Identity.—The enhancement in subsection (b)(6)(A) applies in cases involving the misrepresentation of a participant's identity to (A) persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct; or (B) facilitate transportation or travel, by a minor or a participant, to engage in prohibited sexual conduct.  Subsection (b)(6)(A) is intended to apply only to misrepresentations made directly to a minor or to a person who exercises custody, care, or supervisory control of the minor.  Accordingly, the enhancement in subsection (b)(6)(A) would not apply to a misrepresentation made by a participant to an airline representative in the course of making travel arrangements for the minor. 

The misrepresentation to which the enhancement in subsection (b)(6)(A) may apply includes misrepresentation of a participant's name, age, occupation, gender, or status, as long as the misrepresentation was made with the intent to (A) persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct; or (B) facilitate transportation or travel, by a minor or a participant, to engage in prohibited sexual conduct.  Accordingly, use of a computer screen name, without such intent, would not be a sufficient basis for application of the enhancement.

(B)    Use of a Computer or Interactive Computer Service.—Subsection (b)(6)(B) provides an enhancement if a computer or an interactive computer service was used to (i) persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct; or (ii) facilitate transportation or travel, by a minor or a participant, to engage in prohibited sexual conduct.  Subsection (b)(6)(B) is intended to apply only to the use of a computer or an interactive computer service to communicate directly with a minor or with a person who exercises custody, care, or supervisory control of the minor.  Accordingly, the enhancement would not apply to the use of a computer or an interactive computer service to obtain airline tickets for the minor from an airline's Internet site.

5.     Application of Subsection (c)(2).—

(A)    In General.—The cross reference in subsection (c)(2) is to be construed broadly and includes all instances where the offense involved employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, coercing, transporting, permitting, or offering or seeking by notice or advertisement, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct.

(B)    Definition.—For purposes of subsection (c)(2), "sexually explicit conduct" has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2).

Historical Note:  Effective November 1, 1987.  Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendments 91 and 92); November 1, 1991 (amendment 392); November 1, 1992 (amendment 444); November 1, 1993 (amendment 477); November 1, 1995 (amendment 511); November 1, 1997 (amendment 545); November 1, 2000 (amendments 592 and 601); November 1, 2001 (amendment 615); November 1, 2003 (amendment 661); November 1, 2004 (amendment 664); November 1, 2007 (amendment 701); November 1, 2008 (amendment 725); November 1, 2025 (amendment 836).


 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 352 cases (35 in the last 5 years), 1991–2026 · leading case: United States v. Jim, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D.N.M. 2012).
United States v. Jim, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D.N.M. 2012). · cites it 69× “It points out that the application notes to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 provide that, “for the purposes of this guideline, ‘serious bodily injury’ means conduct other than criminal sexual abuse, which is taken into account in the base offense level under subsection (a).”
United States v. Richard Cole, III Jonathan Johnson, 359 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2004). · cites it 22× “1 On appeal, Cole presents the following arguments: (1) the district court erred when it utilized U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1, instead of U.S.S.G. § 2A4.”
United States v. Scott Hayward, 359 F.3d 631 (3rd Cir. 2004). · cites it 10× “4, instead of for attempted criminal sexual abuse under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1; (5) the District Court failed to grant Hayward’s request for a downward departure at sentencing because it did not understand that it had the authority to do so; and (6) the District Court should not have…”
United States v. Yazzie, 407 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2005). · cites it 8× “See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1, comment., App. Note 2. In applying § 2A3.”
United States v. Malek al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2015). · cites it 6× “al-Maliki Page 4 applied a four-level increase for use of force to engage in his sexual crimes, U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(1). Considering the nature of the offense, the negative psychological evaluation, and al-Maliki’s age and limited criminal record, the court sentenced him at the…”
United States v. William A. Beith, 407 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2005). · cites it 11× “§ 2423 (b) pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 (by way of the criminal sexual assault cross reference, U.”
United States v. Thomas Reid Decarlo, 434 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2006). · cites it 7× “U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 (Nov. 1, 2002). The specific Guidelines section and commentary in effect at the time of DeCarlo’s sentence did not define the term “victim.”
United States v. Chee, 514 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2008). · cites it 7× “1(b)(1) (two levels), and the abuse of a position of trust, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 (two levels). IV Aplt.”
United States v. Jorge Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2013). · cites it 4× “2, other provisions of the sentencing guidelines, including the guideline for “criminal sexual abuse,” see U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 comment. (n.1), repeatedly and consistently define a minor as a person under eighteen years of age.”
United States v. David William Scott, 426 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2005). · cites it 3× “See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(a) (2003). The PSI increased the offense level for each count by: (1) four levels under U.”
United States v. Wallace D. Archdale, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 229 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2000). · cites it 9× “and applied the cross reference to increase appellant’s base offense level from 15 to 27 under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 (1998). Appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the conclusion by the district judge that appellant used force against J.”
United States v. Deion Lockhart, 844 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2016). · cites it 5× “Therefore, the district court did not err in applying U.S.S.G § 2A3.1 to Gray. Gray’s sentence, which falls within the Guideline range, is presumptively reasonable, see United States v.”
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(1) — 1 case
United States v. Joe, 696 F.3d 1066 (10th Cir. 2012).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(a) — 31 cases
United States v. David William Scott, 426 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2005). “See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(a) (2003). The PSI increased the offense level for each count by: (1) four levels under U.”
United States v. Cerno, 529 F.3d 926 (10th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Kane, 639 F.3d 1121 (8th Cir. 2011).
United States v. Jason Guidry, 817 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 2016).
United States v. Duhon, 440 F.3d 711 (5th Cir. 2006).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(a)(1) — 1 case
United States v. Kruse, 618 F. Supp. 2d 981 (N.D. Iowa 2009).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(a)(2) — 20 cases
United States v. Papakee, 573 F.3d 569 (8th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Willie Greer, 872 F.3d 790 (6th Cir. 2017).
United States v. Thomas Szczerba, 897 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 2018).
United States v. Henzel, 668 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Papakee, 550 F. Supp. 2d 991 (N.D. Iowa 2008).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(a)(l) — 2 cases
United States v. Henzel, 668 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Knight, 116 F. Supp. 3d 439 (M.D. Penn. 2015).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b) — 9 cases
Demond L. Osley v. United States, 751 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2014).
United States v. Cryar, 232 F.3d 1318 (10th Cir. 2000).
United States v. Jim, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D.N.M. 2012). “It points out that the application notes to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 provide that, “for the purposes of this guideline, ‘serious bodily injury’ means conduct other than criminal sexual abuse, which is taken into account in the base offense level under subsection (a).”
United States v. Peshlakai, 618 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.N.M. 2007).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(1) — 58 cases
United States v. Malek al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2015). “al-Maliki Page 4 applied a four-level increase for use of force to engage in his sexual crimes, U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(1). Considering the nature of the offense, the negative psychological evaluation, and al-Maliki’s age and limited criminal record, the court sentenced him at the…”
United States v. Jim, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D.N.M. 2012). “It points out that the application notes to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 provide that, “for the purposes of this guideline, ‘serious bodily injury’ means conduct other than criminal sexual abuse, which is taken into account in the base offense level under subsection (a).”
United States v. Deion Lockhart, 844 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2016). “Therefore, the district court did not err in applying U.S.S.G § 2A3.1 to Gray. Gray’s sentence, which falls within the Guideline range, is presumptively reasonable, see United States v.”
United States v. Kane, 639 F.3d 1121 (8th Cir. 2011).
United States v. Carey, 589 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 2009).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(2) — 12 cases
United States v. David William Scott, 426 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2005). “See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(a) (2003). The PSI increased the offense level for each count by: (1) four levels under U.”
United States v. Wallace D. Archdale, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 229 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2000). “and applied the cross reference to increase appellant’s base offense level from 15 to 27 under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 (1998). Appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the conclusion by the district judge that appellant used force against J.”
United States v. Kane, 639 F.3d 1121 (8th Cir. 2011).
United States v. Yazzie, 998 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (D.N.M. 2014).
United States v. Patrick Savin, 349 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2003).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(2)(A) — 31 cases
United States v. Thomas Reid Decarlo, 434 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2006). “U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 (Nov. 1, 2002). The specific Guidelines section and commentary in effect at the time of DeCarlo’s sentence did not define the term “victim.”
United States v. Rodney Davis, 45 F.4th 73 (D.C. Cir. 2022).
United States v. Michael Clarence Ransom, 942 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1991).
United States v. Graham, 413 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2005).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(2)(B) — 13 cases
United States v. Ralph Wayne Angle, 234 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2000).
United States v. Delaney Poor Bear, 359 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2004).
United States v. Tyndall, 521 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Timothy Red Elk, 426 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Duane Levering, 441 F.3d 566 (8th Cir. 2006).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(3) — 17 cases
United States v. William A. Beith, 407 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2005). “§ 2423 (b) pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 (by way of the criminal sexual assault cross reference, U.”
United States v. Yazzie, 407 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2005). “See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1, comment., App. Note 2. In applying § 2A3.”
United States v. Joseph Harris, 999 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2021).
United States v. Josleyn, 99 F.3d 1182 (1st Cir. 1996).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(3)(A) — 25 cases
United States v. Yazzie, 407 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2005). “See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1, comment., App. Note 2. In applying § 2A3.”
United States v. Kane, 639 F.3d 1121 (8th Cir. 2011).
United States v. James Merle Blue, Sr., 255 F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 2001).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(3)(B) — 1 case
Anderson v. United States (E.D. Mo. 2025).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(4) — 16 cases
United States v. Jim, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D.N.M. 2012). “It points out that the application notes to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 provide that, “for the purposes of this guideline, ‘serious bodily injury’ means conduct other than criminal sexual abuse, which is taken into account in the base offense level under subsection (a).”
United States v. Antonio Rivera, 799 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2015).
United States v. Christopher Strong, Sr., 826 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 2016).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(4)(A) — 4 cases
United States v. Jim, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D.N.M. 2012). “It points out that the application notes to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 provide that, “for the purposes of this guideline, ‘serious bodily injury’ means conduct other than criminal sexual abuse, which is taken into account in the base offense level under subsection (a).”
United States v. Mitchell Dean Cree, 166 F.3d 1270 (8th Cir. 1999).
White v. United States (M.D. Fla. 2025).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(4)(B) — 19 cases
United States v. Deion Lockhart, 844 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2016). “Therefore, the district court did not err in applying U.S.S.G § 2A3.1 to Gray. Gray’s sentence, which falls within the Guideline range, is presumptively reasonable, see United States v.”
United States v. Jim, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D.N.M. 2012). “It points out that the application notes to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 provide that, “for the purposes of this guideline, ‘serious bodily injury’ means conduct other than criminal sexual abuse, which is taken into account in the base offense level under subsection (a).”
United States v. Thomas Szczerba, 897 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 2018).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(4)(b) — 1 case
United States v. Deion Lockhart, 844 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2016). “Therefore, the district court did not err in applying U.S.S.G § 2A3.1 to Gray. Gray’s sentence, which falls within the Guideline range, is presumptively reasonable, see United States v.”
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(5) — 32 cases
United States v. Richard Cole, III Jonathan Johnson, 359 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2004). “1 On appeal, Cole presents the following arguments: (1) the district court erred when it utilized U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1, instead of U.S.S.G. § 2A4.”
Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Joshua Scheu, 83 F.4th 1124 (9th Cir. 2023).
United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Christopher Strong, Sr., 826 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 2016).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(6) — 4 cases
United States v. Christopher Strong, Sr., 826 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 2016).
United States v. Graham, 413 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Maria Rojas, 541 F. App'x 449 (5th Cir. 2013).
United States v. First, 226 F. App'x 576 (6th Cir. 2007).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(6)(B) — 7 cases
United States v. David William Scott, 426 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2005). “See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(a) (2003). The PSI increased the offense level for each count by: (1) four levels under U.”
United States v. Joseph Laslie, 716 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
United States v. Collier, 493 F.3d 731 (6th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Slinkard (10th Cir. 2024).
United States v. Marion Yarbrough, 334 F. App'x 266 (11th Cir. 2009).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(b)(l) — 57 cases
United States v. Two Elk, 536 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Melvin Ellis Holly, 488 F.3d 1298 (10th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Denny Johnson, Sr., 860 F.3d 1133 (8th Cir. 2017).
United States v. Malek al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2015). “al-Maliki Page 4 applied a four-level increase for use of force to engage in his sexual crimes, U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(1). Considering the nature of the offense, the negative psychological evaluation, and al-Maliki’s age and limited criminal record, the court sentenced him at the…”
United States v. Dexter Morris, Jr., 494 F. App'x 574 (6th Cir. 2012).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(c) — 3 cases
United States v. Brent William Allery, 175 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 1999).
United States v. Kruse, 618 F. Supp. 2d 981 (N.D. Iowa 2009).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(c)(1) — 1 case
United States v. Miranda, 348 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2003).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(c)(2) — 3 cases
United States v. Christopher Sammons, 55 F.4th 1062 (6th Cir. 2022).
United States v. Kruse, 618 F. Supp. 2d 981 (N.D. Iowa 2009).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(d) — 1 case
United States v. Milton Milan, 304 F.3d 273 (3rd Cir. 2002).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.1(e)(2) — 1 case
United States v. Kruse, 618 F. Supp. 2d 981 (N.D. Iowa 2009).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.