U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1
Robbery
§2B3.1. Robbery
(a) Base Offense Level: 20
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) If the property of a financial institution or post office was taken, or if the taking of such property was an object of the offense, increase by 2 levels.
(2) (A) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 7 levels; (B) if a firearm was used to convey a specific (not general) threat of harm (e.g., pointing the firearm at a specific victim or victims; directing the movement of a specific victim or victims with the firearm) or to make physical contact with a victim (e.g., pistol whip; firearm placed against victim’s body), increase by 6 levels; (C) if a firearm was brandished or possessed, increase by 5 levels; (D) if a dangerous weapon was otherwise used, increase by 4 levels; (E) if a dangerous weapon was brandished or possessed, increase by 3 levels; or (F) if a threat of death was made, increase by 2 levels.
(3) If any victim sustained bodily injury, increase the offense level according to the seriousness of the injury:
| Degree of Bodily Injury | Increase in Level | |
| (A) | Bodily Injury | add 2 |
| (B) | Serious Bodily Injury | add 4 |
| (C) | Permanent or Life-Threatening Bodily Injury | add 6 |
| (D) | If the degree of injury is between that specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B), add 3 levels; or | |
| (E) | If the degree of injury is between that specified in subparagraphs (B) and (C), add 5 levels. | |
Provided, however, that the cumulative adjustments from application of paragraphs (2) and (3) shall not exceed 11 levels.
(4) (A) If any person was abducted to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape, increase by 4 levels; or (B) if any person’s freedom of movement was restricted through physical contact or confinement, such as by being tied, bound, or locked up, to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape, increase by 2 levels.
(5) If the offense involved carjacking, increase by 2 levels.
(6) If a firearm, destructive device, or controlled substance was taken, or if the taking of such item was an object of the offense, increase by 1 level.
(7) If the loss exceeded $20,000, increase the offense level as follows:
| Loss (Apply the Greatest) | Increase in Level | |
| (A) | $20,000 or less | no increase |
| (B) | More than $20,000 | add 1 |
| (C) | More than $95,000 | add 2 |
| (D) | More than $500,000 | add 3 |
| (E) | More than $1,500,000 | add 4 |
| (F) | More than $3,000,000 | add 5 |
| (G) | More than $5,000,000 | add 6 |
| (H) | More than $9,500,000 | add 7. |
(c) Cross Reference
(1) If a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 had such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States, apply §2A1.1 (First Degree Murder).
Commentary
Statutory Provisions: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951, 2113, 2114, 2118(a), 2119. For additional statutory provision(s), see Appendix A (Statutory Index).Application Notes:
1. Definitions.—“Firearm,” “destructive device,” “dangerous weapon,” “otherwise used,” “brandished,” “bodily injury,” “serious bodily injury,” “permanent or life-threatening bodily injury,” and “abducted” have the meaning given such terms in the Commentary to §1B1.1 (Application Instructions).“Carjacking” means the taking or attempted taking of a motor vehicle from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation.
2. "Dangerous Weapon".—Consistent with Application Note 1(E)(ii) of §1B1.1 (Application Instructions), an object shall be considered to be a dangerous weapon for purposes of subsection (b)(2)(E) if (A) the object closely resembles an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or (B) the defendant used the object in a manner that created the impression that the object was an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury (e.g., a defendant wrapped a hand in a towel during a bank robbery to create the appearance of a gun). 3. Definition of "Loss".—“Loss” means the value of the property taken, damaged, or destroyed. 4. Cumulative Application of Subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3).—The combined adjustments for weapon involvement and injury are limited to a maximum enhancement of 11 levels. 5. "A Threat of Death".—“A threat of death,” as used in subsection (b)(2)(F), may be in the form of an oral or written statement, act, gesture, or combination thereof. Accordingly, the defendant does not have to state expressly his intent to kill the victim in order for the enhancement to apply. For example, an oral or written demand using words such as “Give me the money or I will kill you”, “Give me the money or I will pull the pin on the grenade I have in my pocket”, “Give me the money or I will shoot you”, “Give me your money or else (where the defendant draws his hand across his throat in a slashing motion)”, or “Give me the money or you are dead” would constitute a threat of death. The court should consider that the intent of this provision is to provide an increased offense level for cases in which the offender(s) engaged in conduct that would instill in a reasonable person, who is a victim of the offense, a fear of death. Background: Possession or use of a weapon, physical injury, and unlawful restraint sometimes occur during a robbery. The guideline provides for a range of enhancements where these factors are present.Although in pre-guidelines practice the amount of money taken in robbery cases affected sentence length, its importance was small compared to that of the other harm involved. Moreover, because of the relatively high base offense level for robbery, an increase of 1 or 2 levels brings about a considerable increase in sentence length in absolute terms. Accordingly, the gradations for property loss increase more slowly than for simple property offenses.
The guideline provides an enhancement for robberies where a victim was forced to accompany the defendant to another location, or a victim’s freedom of movement was restricted through physical contact or confinement, such as by being tied, bound, or locked up.
Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective June 15, 1988 (amendments 14 and 15); November 1, 1989 (amendments 110 and 111); November 1, 1990 (amendments 314, 315, and 361); November 1, 1991 (amendment 365); November 1, 1993 (amendment 483); November 1, 1997 (amendments 545 and 552); November 1, 2000 (amendment 601); November 1, 2001 (amendment 617); November 1, 2010 (amendment 746); November 1, 2015 (amendment 791); November 1, 2018 (amendment 805); November 1, 2024 (amendment 831); November 1, 2025 (amendments 832 and 836).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 1,468
cases (178 in the last 5 years), 1989–2026 · leading case: United States v. Bates, 213 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2000).
United States v. Bates, 213 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2000). “" The commentary provides that "[w]hen an object that appeared to be a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or possessed, treat the object as a dangerous weapon for the purposes of subsection (b)(2)(E).”
United States v. Marquise Bell, 947 F.3d 49 (3rd Cir. 2020). “1(b)(4)(B) and a four- level enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D).1 After a three-level reduction for 1 Counsel also sought to have the offenses grouped in order to eliminate an additional one level enhancement.”
United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2010). “And while the district court specifically stated that it would have given the same sentence even if it found restraint *656 rather than abduction in Counts 12 and 14, this did not account for the erroneous four-level enhancement for otherwise using a dangerous weapon under…”
United States v. Oneal, 961 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2020). “2002) (“[T]he plain language of the commentary to USSG §§ 2B3.1 and 1B1.1 necessarily requires some ‘object’ to support a finding of possession of a dangerous weapon.”
United States v. Elianer Dimache, 665 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 2011). “In response, the government posits that Dimache’s conduct warrants the application of the USSG § 2B3.1 (b)(4)(B) enhancement, because the gun restrained the freedom of movement of the two bank tellers.”
United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2006). “These actions, the government contends, are sufficient to justify the enhancement.”
United States v. Tre Tate, 999 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2021). “See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 (Oct. 1987). When the Supreme Court has authoritatively interpreted a term as it is used in a particular field of law, the term acquires a “technical legal sense .”
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). “It appears that the dissent similarly would limit the scope of the "othe[r] use[s]" covered by USSG § 2B3.1(b) (2)(B). The universal view of the courts of appeals, however, is directly to the contrary.”
United States v. Antonio Donaby, 349 F.3d 1046 (7th Cir. 2003). “U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1. Although Donaby’s base offense level was increased because of several offense characteristics, Donaby only challenges the application of the specific offense characteristic involving the amount of “loss” attributed to the robbery.”
United States v. Dunigan, 555 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2009). “Instead, the defendant had “otherwise used” the shank under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1. 5 Id. In Paine , the defendant drew a weapon, pointed it at his target, put his finger on the trigger, and said, “I mean it.”
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2004). “brandished or discharged it, whether he threatened death, whether he caused bodily injury, whether any such injury was ordinary, serious, permanent or life threatening, whether he abducted or physically restrained anyone, whether any victim was unusually vulnerable, how much…”
United States v. Bobby Perkins, 89 F.3d 303 (6th Cir. 1996). “To arrive at this offense level, the district court imposed a base offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1; a six-level increase under U.”
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(2)(B) — 1 case
United States v. Williams, 18 F. App'x 637 (9th Cir. 2001).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(2)(E) — 1 case
United States v. Williams, 18 F. App'x 637 (9th Cir. 2001).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(4) — 1 case
United States v. Samuel, Leon A., 296 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(4)(6)(A) — 1 case
Morgan v. United States (E.D. Tenn. 2019).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(B) — 1 case
United States v. Bobby Myers, Jr., United States of Am. v. Jarmal Lamar Myers, 66 F.3d 1364 (4th Cir. 1995).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(B)(1) — 1 case
United States v. Keith Wagner, 429 F. App'x 596 (6th Cir. 2011).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(B)(2) — 1 case
United States v. Jesse Riggins, 677 F. App'x 268 (6th Cir. 2017).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(B)(3) — 1 case
Ramirez-Burgos v. United States, 313 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2002).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(B)(3)(b) — 1 case
United States v. Anthony Richard Randolph, Jr., 93 F.3d 656 (9th Cir. 1996).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(B)(4)(A) — 1 case
United States v. Naeem Jones, 625 F. App'x 194 (4th Cir. 2015).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(a) — 187 cases
United States v. Ernesto Quintieri, Carlo Donato, 306 F.3d 1217 (2d Cir. 2002).
United States v. Eddie R. Carter, 410 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Archuleta, 865 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2017).
United States v. Felix Esteban Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2006).
United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2008).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(a)(2) — 1 case
United States v. Hao Tien Nguyen, 190 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1999).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(a)(2)(C) — 1 case
United States v. Murray (4th Cir. 1999).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(a)(2003) — 1 case
United States v. James R. Rockenback, 136 F. App'x 950 (8th Cir. 2005).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(a)(2004) — 1 case
United States v. Deandra Martez Square, 191 F. App'x 883 (11th Cir. 2006).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(a)(4) — 1 case
Dibiase v. United States (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b) — 30 cases
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). “It appears that the dissent similarly would limit the scope of the "othe[r] use[s]" covered by USSG § 2B3.1(b) (2)(B). The universal view of the courts of appeals, however, is directly to the contrary.”
United States v. Penson, 526 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 2008).
United States v. David J. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179 (6th Cir. 2000).
United States v. Jason E. Kushmaul, 147 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 1998).
United States v. Tre Tate, 999 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2021). “See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 (Oct. 1987). When the Supreme Court has authoritatively interpreted a term as it is used in a particular field of law, the term acquires a “technical legal sense .”
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(1) — 70 cases
United States v. Johnny Craig Harp, 406 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2005).
UNITED STATES of Am., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Melbourne SHAW, Defendant-Appellant, 91 F.3d 86 (9th Cir. 1996).
United States v. Edgeworth, 889 F.3d 350 (7th Cir. 2018).
United States v. Alfred Octave Morrill, Jr., 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993).
United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(1)(A) — 3 cases
United States v. Malone, 78 F.3d 518 (11th Cir. 1996).
United States v. Hogan (10th Cir. 1997).
United States v. Harris (4th Cir. 1996).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(1)(B) — 4 cases
United States v. Malone, 78 F.3d 518 (11th Cir. 1996).
United States v. Bruce C. Fox, 930 F.2d 820 (10th Cir. 1991).
United States v. Pendleton (4th Cir. 1997).
United States v. Wilson (4th Cir. 1999).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(1)(C) — 1 case
United States v. Karen J. Boyd, 924 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1991).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(2) — 121 cases
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). “It appears that the dissent similarly would limit the scope of the "othe[r] use[s]" covered by USSG § 2B3.1(b) (2)(B). The universal view of the courts of appeals, however, is directly to the contrary.”
United States v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210 (3rd Cir. 2007).
United States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Jefferson, 258 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Oneal, 961 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2020). “2002) (“[T]he plain language of the commentary to USSG §§ 2B3.1 and 1B1.1 necessarily requires some ‘object’ to support a finding of possession of a dangerous weapon.”
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(2)(4) — 1 case
United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2010). “And while the district court specifically stated that it would have given the same sentence even if it found restraint *656 rather than abduction in Counts 12 and 14, this did not account for the erroneous four-level enhancement for otherwise using a dangerous weapon under…”
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(2)(6) — 1 case
Hernandez-Albino v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 3d 10 (D.P.R. 2014).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(2)(A) — 58 cases
United States v. Williams, 51 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir. 1995).
United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477 (9th Cir. 1995).
United States v. Thomas Dewayne White, 305 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2002).
United States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Donald Douglas Franklin, Jr., United States of Am. v. William Edward Piers, 321 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 2003).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(2)(B) — 89 cases
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). “It appears that the dissent similarly would limit the scope of the "othe[r] use[s]" covered by USSG § 2B3.1(b) (2)(B). The universal view of the courts of appeals, however, is directly to the contrary.”
United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2010). “And while the district court specifically stated that it would have given the same sentence even if it found restraint *656 rather than abduction in Counts 12 and 14, this did not account for the erroneous four-level enhancement for otherwise using a dangerous weapon under…”
United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2006). “These actions, the government contends, are sufficient to justify the enhancement.”
United States v. Santiago Sanchez, 850 F.3d 767 (5th Cir. 2017).
United States v. Bobby Perkins, 89 F.3d 303 (6th Cir. 1996). “To arrive at this offense level, the district court imposed a base offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1; a six-level increase under U.”
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(2)(C) — 171 cases
United States v. Timothy Sanders, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016).
United States v. Villegas, 655 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2011).
United States v. Leslie Thomas Weadon, Jr, 145 F.3d 158 (3rd Cir. 1998).
United States v. Eddie P. Roberts, 253 F.3d 1131 (8th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Robert Bailey, 227 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2000).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(2)(C)(2018) — 1 case
Reece v. United States (N.D. Tex. 2024).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(2)(D) — 77 cases
United States v. Scott E. Smith, 981 F.2d 887 (6th Cir. 1992).
United States v. Marquise Bell, 947 F.3d 49 (3rd Cir. 2020). “1(b)(4)(B) and a four- level enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D).1 After a three-level reduction for 1 Counsel also sought to have the offenses grouped in order to eliminate an additional one level enhancement.”
United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2010). “And while the district court specifically stated that it would have given the same sentence even if it found restraint *656 rather than abduction in Counts 12 and 14, this did not account for the erroneous four-level enhancement for otherwise using a dangerous weapon under…”
United States v. Dunigan, 555 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2009). “Instead, the defendant had “otherwise used” the shank under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1. 5 Id. In Paine , the defendant drew a weapon, pointed it at his target, put his finger on the trigger, and said, “I mean it.”
United States v. Smalley, 517 F.3d 208 (3rd Cir. 2008).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(2)(E) — 115 cases
United States v. Bates, 213 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2000). “" The commentary provides that "[w]hen an object that appeared to be a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or possessed, treat the object as a dangerous weapon for the purposes of subsection (b)(2)(E).”
United States v. Tre Tate, 999 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2021). “See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 (Oct. 1987). When the Supreme Court has authoritatively interpreted a term as it is used in a particular field of law, the term acquires a “technical legal sense .”
United States v. Patrick L. Stitman, 472 F.3d 983 (7th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Oneal, 961 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2020). “2002) (“[T]he plain language of the commentary to USSG §§ 2B3.1 and 1B1.1 necessarily requires some ‘object’ to support a finding of possession of a dangerous weapon.”
United States v. Smalley, 517 F.3d 208 (3rd Cir. 2008).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(2)(F) — 197 cases
United States v. Billy Jack Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006).
United States v. James Wooten, 689 F.3d 570 (6th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Green, 405 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Andrew L. Hunn, 24 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 1994).
United States v. David Frank Jennings, A/K/A Mike Frank Stout, 439 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2006).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(2)(a) — 2 cases
United States v. Aaron Manuel Joseph, 130 F. App'x 357 (11th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Clark, 201 F. App'x 594 (10th Cir. 2006).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(2)(b) — 1 case
United States v. Kendrick Marquis Minton, 283 F. App'x 774 (11th Cir. 2008).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(2)(c) — 5 cases
United States v. Montes-Fosse, 824 F.3d 168 (1st Cir. 2016).
Jones v. Link, 493 F. Supp. 2d 765 (E.D. Va. 2007).
Veras v. United States (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
United States v. Vu Hoang Le, 69 F. App'x 373 (9th Cir. 2003).
United States v. Kirkhart (10th Cir. 1997).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(3) — 57 cases
Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 (2009).
United States v. Abdul-Aziz Rashid Muhammad, 948 F.2d 1449 (6th Cir. 1991).
United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2010). “And while the district court specifically stated that it would have given the same sentence even if it found restraint *656 rather than abduction in Counts 12 and 14, this did not account for the erroneous four-level enhancement for otherwise using a dangerous weapon under…”
United States v. Sawyer, 180 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 1999).
United States v. Jose P. Molina, 106 F.3d 1118 (2d Cir. 1997).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(3)(A) — 75 cases
United States v. Jefferson, 258 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Melvin Thomas Lewis, 18 F.4th 743 (4th Cir. 2021).
United States v. Larry Smith, 822 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 2016).
United States v. Kennth Jackson, 918 F.3d 467 (6th Cir. 2019).
United States v. Edmundo Zuniga, 720 F.3d 587 (5th Cir. 2013).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(3)(B) — 37 cases
United States v. Metzger, 233 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2000).
United States v. John Steven Reed, 26 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Fortier, 242 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Montgomery, 550 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Urbina-Robles, 817 F.3d 838 (1st Cir. 2016).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(3)(C) — 31 cases
Donald Duhart v. United States, 556 F. App'x 897 (11th Cir. 2014).
United States v. Geshik-O-Binese Martin, 777 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2015).
United States v. Patton, 927 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 2019).
United States v. Mitchell, 366 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2004).
United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282 (D. Mass. 2006).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(3)(D) — 6 cases
United States v. Moore, 402 F. App'x 778 (4th Cir. 2010).
United States v. Clark (5th Cir. 2003).
United States v. Harkum, 148 F. App'x 153 (4th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Brown, 47 F. App'x 50 (2d Cir. 2002).
United States v. McCracken, 320 F. App'x 723 (9th Cir. 2009).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(3)(E) — 1 case
United States v. Ricardo Eloi, 652 F. App'x 786 (11th Cir. 2016).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(4) — 33 cases
United States v. Tramain Hill, 963 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2020).
United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Rodney White, 222 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2000).
United States v. Jefferson, 258 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2010). “And while the district court specifically stated that it would have given the same sentence even if it found restraint *656 rather than abduction in Counts 12 and 14, this did not account for the erroneous four-level enhancement for otherwise using a dangerous weapon under…”
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(4)(13) — 1 case
United States v. Diaz, 523 F. App'x 790 (2d Cir. 2013).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(4)(A) — 90 cases
United States v. Archuleta, 865 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2017).
United States v. Tramain Hill, 963 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2020).
United States v. Lonnie Whatley, 719 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2013).
United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Reynos, 680 F.3d 283 (3rd Cir. 2012).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(4)(B) — 138 cases
United States v. Marquise Bell, 947 F.3d 49 (3rd Cir. 2020). “1(b)(4)(B) and a four- level enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D).1 After a three-level reduction for 1 Counsel also sought to have the offenses grouped in order to eliminate an additional one level enhancement.”
United States v. Elianer Dimache, 665 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 2011). “In response, the government posits that Dimache’s conduct warrants the application of the USSG § 2B3.1 (b)(4)(B) enhancement, because the gun restrained the freedom of movement of the two bank tellers.”
United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2006). “These actions, the government contends, are sufficient to justify the enhancement.”
United States v. Gene Howell, 17 F.4th 673 (6th Cir. 2021).
United States v. Chris Parker, 241 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2001).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(5) — 61 cases
United States v. Bates, 213 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2000). “" The commentary provides that "[w]hen an object that appeared to be a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or possessed, treat the object as a dangerous weapon for the purposes of subsection (b)(2)(E).”
United States v. Parnell Harold Boucha, 236 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Antonio Donaby, 349 F.3d 1046 (7th Cir. 2003). “U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1. Although Donaby’s base offense level was increased because of several offense characteristics, Donaby only challenges the application of the specific offense characteristic involving the amount of “loss” attributed to the robbery.”
United States v. Bobby Perkins, 89 F.3d 303 (6th Cir. 1996). “To arrive at this offense level, the district court imposed a base offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1; a six-level increase under U.”
United States v. Cedric Wright, 993 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2021).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(6) — 30 cases
United States v. Rojas, 531 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2006). “These actions, the government contends, are sufficient to justify the enhancement.”
United States v. Felix Esteban Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2006).
United States v. McCraney, 612 F.3d 1057 (8th Cir. 2010).
United States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 2009).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(6)(A) — 1 case
United States v. Carrillo Figueroa, 34 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 1994).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(6)(B) — 7 cases
United States v. McCarty, 36 F.3d 1349 (5th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Chad Austin, 239 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001).
United States v. Corey Allen Wilson, A/K/A Jugs, 198 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 1999).
United States v. Thomas Everett Fairless, Jr., 975 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1992).
United States v. Cruz Santiago, 12 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1993).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(6)(D) — 1 case
United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477 (9th Cir. 1995).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(7) — 30 cases
United States v. Chad Austin, 239 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001).
United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065 (11th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Antonio Donaby, 349 F.3d 1046 (7th Cir. 2003). “U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1. Although Donaby’s base offense level was increased because of several offense characteristics, Donaby only challenges the application of the specific offense characteristic involving the amount of “loss” attributed to the robbery.”
United States v. Vigil, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D.N.M. 2007).
United States v. Tony Si, 343 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(7)(A) — 2 cases
United States v. Walker, 89 F.4th 173 (1st Cir. 2023).
United States v. Capanelli, 270 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(7)(B) — 29 cases
United States v. Johnny R. White, 443 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2006).
United States v. Lata, 415 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005).
United States v. Lawrence P. Peters, 435 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2006).
United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005).
United States v. Moore, 130 F. App'x 728 (6th Cir. 2005).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(7)(C) — 17 cases
United States v. Nelson, 793 F.3d 202 (1st Cir. 2015).
United States v. Urbina-Robles, 817 F.3d 838 (1st Cir. 2016).
United States v. Joel Thomas, Jr., 843 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2016).
United States v. Cover, 199 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2000).
United States v. Aikens, 358 F. Supp. 2d 433 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(7)(C)(2013) — 1 case
United States v. Urbina-Robles, 817 F.3d 838 (1st Cir. 2016).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(7)(D) — 6 cases
United States v. Felix Esteban Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2006).
United States v. Bernard Watson, 189 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 1999).
United States v. Rojas, 531 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Kaleem Stephens, 717 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2013).
United States v. Savoca, 156 F. App'x 545 (4th Cir. 2005).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(7)(E) — 8 cases
United States v. Tony Si, 343 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2003).
Hernandez-Albino v. United States, 16 F. Supp. 3d 10 (D.P.R. 2014).
United States v. Valentin Cedeno, 471 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2006).
United States v. Grey, 369 F. App'x 331 (3rd Cir. 2010).
United States v. Grey, 369 F. App'x 331 (3rd Cir. 2010).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(7)(F) — 4 cases
Albanese v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 2d 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
United States v. Capanelli, 270 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Andre Mims v. Warden, F.C.I. Miami, 620 F. App'x 715 (11th Cir. 2015).
United States v. Andre Mims, 330 F. App'x 897 (11th Cir. 2009).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(7)(G) — 3 cases
United States v. Hopkins, 151 F. App'x 448 (6th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Son Van Ly, 225 F. App'x 685 (9th Cir. 2007).
Dibiase v. United States (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(7)(H) — 1 case
United States v. Mojica Baez, 229 F.3d 292 (1st Cir. 2000).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(7)(c) — 1 case
United States v. Keiya Mershon, 322 F. App'x 232 (3rd Cir. 2009).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(8)(C) — 1 case
United States v. Geshik-O-Binese Martin, 777 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2015).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(A) — 1 case
United States v. Carl L. Ledford & Shane A. Thomas, 218 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2000).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(S)(C) — 1 case
United States v. Chance Bonner, 469 F. App'x 119 (3rd Cir. 2012).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(l) — 80 cases
United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477 (9th Cir. 1995).
United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2014).
United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Marcus Franklin (03-2439) Jamaal Clarke (03-2440), 415 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Penson, 526 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 2008).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(l)(A) — 1 case
United States v. James Gustav Hogan, 116 F.3d 442 (10th Cir. 1997).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(l)(B) — 2 cases
United States v. Scott Nale, 101 F.3d 1000 (4th Cir. 1996).
United States v. Corey Allen Wilson, A/K/A Jugs, 198 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 1999).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(l)(C) — 1 case
United States v. Brenda Jane Plumley, 993 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir. 1993).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(c) — 19 cases
United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena, 612 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2010).
United States v. Lowell, 2 F.4th 1291 (10th Cir. 2021).
United States v. Battle, 289 F.3d 661 (10th Cir. 2002).
United States v. Matos-Quinones, 456 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2006).
United States v. Martinez-Bermudez, 387 F.3d 98 (1st Cir. 2004).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(c)(1) — 17 cases
United States v. Hill, 63 F.4th 335 (5th Cir. 2023).
United States v. Hill, 35 F.4th 366 (5th Cir. 2022).
United States v. Manuel Gamez, A.K.A. Manuel Gamez-Rubio, Gustavo Gamez, Manuel Flores-Falvez, Manuel Gomez-Rubio, Manuel Flores-Galvez, 301 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2002).
United States v. Marcell Shavers, 955 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2020).
United States v. Rodriguez Rivera, 473 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2007).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(c)(l) — 6 cases
United States v. Rodriguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2012).
United States v. Lester Michael Weasel Bear, Jr., 356 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2004).
United States v. Iralee French, Jr., 719 F.3d 1002 (8th Cir. 2013).
United States v. Gary Duane Harris (99-5846) Anthony Charles Gaines (99-5858), 238 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D. Mass. 2003).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(c)(v) — 3 cases
United States v. John Lanny Lynch, 437 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2006).
United States v. John Lanny Lynch, 367 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2004).
United States v. Lynch (9th Cir. 2006).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(e) — 4 cases
United States v. Vega-Molina, 407 F.3d 511 (1st Cir. 2005).
United States v. Matos-Quinones, 456 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2006).
United States v. Eduardo Ruben Perez, 225 F. App'x 854 (11th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Rodríguez-Ramos, 27 F. Supp. 3d 281 (D.P.R. 2014).
— U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(e)(l) — 3 cases
United States v. Rodriguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2012).
United States v. Lebron-Cepeda, 324 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2003).
United States v. Lester Michael Weasel Bear, Jr., 356 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2004).
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