U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2

Extortion by Force or Threat of Injury or Serious Damage

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(a) Base Offense Level: 18

(b) Specific Offense Characteristics

(1) If the offense involved an express or implied threat of death, bodily injury, or kidnapping, increase by 2 levels.

(2) If the greater of the amount demanded or the loss to the victim exceeded $20,000, increase by the corresponding number of levels from the table in §2B3.1(b)(7).

(3) (A)(i) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 7 levels; (ii) if a firearm was used to convey a specific (not general) threat of harm (e.g., pointing the firearm at a specific victim or victims; directing the movement of a specific victim or victims with the firearm) or to make physical contact with a victim (e.g., pistol whip; firearm placed against victim’s body), increase by 6 levels; (iii) if a firearm was brandished or possessed, increase by 5 levels; (iv) if a dangerous weapon was otherwise used, increase by 4 levels; or (v) if a dangerous weapon was brandished or possessed, increase by 3 levels; or

(B) If (i) the offense involved preparation to carry out a threat of (I) death; (II) serious bodily injury; (III) kidnapping; (IV) product tampering; or (V) damage to a computer system used to maintain or operate a critical infrastructure, or by or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national security; or (ii) the participant(s) otherwise demonstrated the ability to carry out a threat described in any of clauses (i)(I) through (i)(V), increase by 3 levels.

(4) If any victim sustained bodily injury, increase the offense level according to the seriousness of the injury:

	Degree of Bodily Injury	Increase in Level

(A)	Bodily Injury	add 2
(B)	Serious Bodily Injury	add 4
(C)	Permanent or Life-Threatening Bodily Injury	add 6

(D)	If the degree of injury is between that specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B), add 3 levels; or

(E)	If the degree of injury is between that specified in subparagraphs (B) and (C), add 5 levels.

Provided, however, that the cumulative adjustments from application of paragraphs (3) and (4) shall not exceed 11 levels.

(5) (A) If any person was abducted to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape, increase by 4 levels; or (B) if any person’s freedom of movement was restricted through physical contact or confinement, such as by being tied, bound, or locked up, to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape, increase by 2 levels.

(1) If a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 had such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States, apply §2A1.1 (First Degree Murder).

(2) If the offense was tantamount to attempted murder, apply §2A2.1 (Assault with Intent to Commit Murder; Attempted Murder) if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above.

Commentary

Statutory Provisions: 18 U.S.C. §§ 875(b), (d), 876(b), (d), 877, 1030(a)(7), 1951. For additional statutory provision(s), see Appendix A (Statutory Index).

Application Notes:

1. Definitions.—For purposes of this guideline:

"Abducted," "bodily injury," "brandished," "dangerous weapon," "firearm," "otherwise used," "permanent or life-threatening bodily injury," and "serious bodily injury" have the meaning given those terms in Application Note 1 of the Commentary to §1B1.1 (Application Instructions).

"Critical infrastructure" means systems and assets vital to national defense, national security, economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. A critical infrastructure may be publicly or privately owned. Examples of critical infrastructures include gas and oil production, storage, and delivery systems, water supply systems, telecommunications networks, electrical power delivery systems, financing and banking systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and rescue services), transportation systems and services (including highways, mass transit, airlines, and airports), and government operations that provide essential services to the public.

"Government entity" has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(9).

2. Threat of Injury or Serious Damage.—This guideline applies if there was any threat, express or implied, that reasonably could be interpreted as one to injure a person or physically damage property, or any comparably serious threat, such as to drive an enterprise out of business. Even if the threat does not in itself imply violence, the possibility of violence or serious adverse consequences may be inferred from the circumstances of the threat or the reputation of the person making it. An ambiguous threat, such as "pay up or else," or a threat to cause labor problems, ordinarily should be treated under this section.

3. Offenses Involving Public Officials and Other Extortion Offenses.—Guidelines for bribery involving public officials are found in Part C, Offenses Involving Public Officials. "Extortion under color of official right," which usually is solicitation of a bribe by a public official, is covered under §2C1.1 unless there is use of force or a threat that qualifies for treatment under this section. Certain other extortion offenses are covered under the provisions of Part E, Offenses Involving Criminal Enterprises and Racketeering.

4. Cumulative Application of Subsections (b)(3) and (b)(4).—The combined adjustments for weapon involvement and injury are limited to a maximum enhancement of 11 levels.

5. Definition of "Loss to the Victim".—"Loss to the victim," as used in subsection (b)(2), means any demand paid plus any additional consequential loss from the offense (e.g., the cost of defensive measures taken in direct response to the offense).

6. Defendant's Preparation or Ability to Carry Out a Threat.—In certain cases, an extortionate demand may be accompanied by conduct that does not qualify as a display of a dangerous weapon under subsection (b)(3)(A)(v) but is nonetheless similar in seriousness, demonstrating the defendant's preparation or ability to carry out the threatened harm (e.g., an extortionate demand containing a threat to tamper with a consumer product accompanied by a workable plan showing how the product's tamper-resistant seals could be defeated, or a threat to kidnap a person accompanied by information showing study of that person's daily routine). Subsection (b)(3)(B) addresses such cases.

Background: The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, prohibits extortion, attempted extortion, and conspiracy to extort. It provides for a maximum term of imprisonment of twenty years. 18 U.S.C. §§ 875–877 prohibit communication of extortionate demands through various means. The maximum penalty under these statutes varies from two to twenty years. Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 875 involve threats or demands transmitted by interstate commerce. Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 876 involve the use of the United States mails to communicate threats, while violations of 18 U.S.C. § 877 involve mailing threatening communications from foreign countries. This guideline also applies to offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(7) involving a threat to impair the operation of a "protected computer."

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendments 112, 113, and 303); November 1, 1990 (amendment 316); November 1, 1991 (amendment 366); November 1, 1993 (amendment 479); November 1, 1997 (amendment 551); November 1, 1998 (amendment 586); November 1, 2000 (amendment 601); November 1, 2003 (amendment 654); November 1, 2015 (amendment 791); November 1, 2023 (amendment 824); November 1, 2024 (amendment 831); November 1, 2025 (amendments 832 and 836).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 114 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1990–2025 · leading case: United States v. Vigil, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D.N.M. 2007).

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United States v. Vigil, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D.N.M. 2007). · cites it 23× “1, and expressly excludes from grouping offenses that other guidelines cover, including U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.2 & 2B3.3. The Guidelines recognize that subsection (d) has the likelihood of being used-' most frequently, because “[i]t provides that most property crimes (except robbery,…”

United States v. Paul Corrado, United States of Am., Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Anthony Corrado, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant, 304 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2002). · cites it 9× “U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2, applic. note 2 (“An ambiguous threat, such as ‘pay up or else,’ .”

United States v. Keniel Thomas, 999 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 2021). · cites it 11× “In the plea agreement, the parties estimated his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines at 20, comprising a base offense level of 18, U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2; a two-level increase because his extortionate conduct included death threats, U.”

United States v. Alex Mussayek, A/K/A Tsion Mussayek, A/K/A Alexander Mussayel, A/K/A Alexander Mussyev Tsion \Alex\" Mussayev", 338 F.3d 245 (3rd Cir. 2003). · cites it 18× “The provision’s Application Notes refer to very generalized types of threats, such as threats “to cause labor problems,” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2, cmt. 2, or to cause death or serious bodily injury to many, as with a plan “to derail a passenger train or poison consumer products.”

United States v. George A. Vallejo, 297 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 2002). · cites it 4× “” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2, cmt. n. 2. Additionally, co-conspirators are responsible for “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.”

United States v. Johnson, 378 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2004). · cites it 12× “1 is to be applied to a defendant's sentence determination "[i]f a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.”

United States v. Lester Leroy Hummer, 916 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1990). · cites it 4× “The district court accepted the government’s contention that the $341,489 expended by Coca-Cola in responding to Hummer's extortion letters and tampering threats constituted a property damage factor not adequately taken into account by the Guidelines for either extortion…”

United States v. Robert Alcala, 352 F.3d 1153 (7th Cir. 2003). · cites it 6× “Notably, the district court did not apply an enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(3)(A) for carrying a firearm because Mr.”

United States of Am., in No. 95-1109 v. Robert Boggi, in No. 95-1031, 74 F.3d 470 (3rd Cir. 1996). · cites it 4× “In doing so, the court overruled the Government’s argument that the applicable Guideline was U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2. This appeal and cross appeal followed.”

United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2012). · cites it 2× “3(B) provides for a court to "use the gain that resulted from the offense as an alternative measure of loss only if there is a loss but it reasonably cannot be determined,” which is this case.”

United States v. Eric Jones, 997 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1993). · cites it 12× “II The sentencing guideline that applies to appellant’s offense is U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2 (Nov. 1991). Under this guideline, the base offense level is 18.”

United States v. Antonio Ruben Inigo, United States of Am. v. Raul Armando Giordano, United States of Am. v. Bruno Skerianz, 925 F.2d 641 (3rd Cir. 1991). · cites it 3× “” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2, comment (n. 2). In addition, blackmail guideline § 2B3.”

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United States v. Paul Corrado, United States of Am., Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Anthony Corrado, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant, 304 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2002). “U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2, applic. note 2 (“An ambiguous threat, such as ‘pay up or else,’ .”

United States of Am., Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Jack William Tocco, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant, 306 F.3d 279 (6th Cir. 2002).

United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2012). “3(B) provides for a court to "use the gain that resulted from the offense as an alternative measure of loss only if there is a loss but it reasonably cannot be determined,” which is this case.”

United States v. Eric Jones, 997 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1993). “II The sentencing guideline that applies to appellant’s offense is U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2 (Nov. 1991). Under this guideline, the base offense level is 18.”

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United States v. George A. Vallejo, 297 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 2002). “” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2, cmt. n. 2. Additionally, co-conspirators are responsible for “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.”

United States v. Keniel Thomas, 999 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 2021). “In the plea agreement, the parties estimated his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines at 20, comprising a base offense level of 18, U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2; a two-level increase because his extortionate conduct included death threats, U.”

United States v. Mario J. Rainone, Gus Alex, & Nicholas Gio, 32 F.3d 1203 (7th Cir. 1994).

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United States v. Charles Johnson, III, 803 F.3d 610 (11th Cir. 2015).

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United States v. Paul Corrado, United States of Am., Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Anthony Corrado, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant, 304 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2002). “U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2, applic. note 2 (“An ambiguous threat, such as ‘pay up or else,’ .”

United States v. Paul Corrado (98-2269) Nove Tocco (98-2270) Vito William Giacalone (98-2365), 227 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2000).

United States v. Richard Messina, 131 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 1997).

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United States v. Alex Mussayek, A/K/A Tsion Mussayek, A/K/A Alexander Mussayel, A/K/A Alexander Mussyev Tsion \Alex\" Mussayev", 338 F.3d 245 (3rd Cir. 2003). “The provision’s Application Notes refer to very generalized types of threats, such as threats “to cause labor problems,” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2, cmt. 2, or to cause death or serious bodily injury to many, as with a plan “to derail a passenger train or poison consumer products.”

United States v. William A. White, 654 F. App'x 956 (11th Cir. 2016).

United States v. Robert Alcala, 352 F.3d 1153 (7th Cir. 2003). “Notably, the district court did not apply an enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(3)(A) for carrying a firearm because Mr.”

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United States v. Paul Corrado, United States of Am., Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Anthony Corrado, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant, 304 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2002). “U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2, applic. note 2 (“An ambiguous threat, such as ‘pay up or else,’ .”

United States v. Robert Alcala, 352 F.3d 1153 (7th Cir. 2003). “Notably, the district court did not apply an enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(3)(A) for carrying a firearm because Mr.”

United States v. Richard Messina, 131 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 1997).

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United States v. Lester Leroy Hummer, 916 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1990). “The district court accepted the government’s contention that the $341,489 expended by Coca-Cola in responding to Hummer's extortion letters and tampering threats constituted a property damage factor not adequately taken into account by the Guidelines for either extortion…”

United States v. Robert Robinson, 86 F.3d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

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Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.