U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4
Determining the Combined Offense Level
The combined offense level is determined by taking the offense level applicable to the Group with the highest offense level and increasing that offense level by the amount indicated in the following table:
| Number of Units | Increase in Offense Level |
| 1 | none |
| 1 1/2 | add 1 level |
| 2 | add 2 levels |
| 2 1/2 – 3 | add 3 levels |
| 3 1/2 – 5 | add 4 levels |
| More than 5 | add 5 levels. |
In determining the number of Units for purposes of this section:
(a) Count as one Unit the Group with the highest offense level. Count one additional Unit for each Group that is equally serious or from 1 to 4 levels less serious.
(b) Count as one-half Unit any Group that is 5 to 8 levels less serious than the Group with the highest offense level.
(c) Disregard any Group that is 9 or more levels less serious than the Group with the highest offense level. Such Groups will not increase the applicable offense level but may provide a reason for sentencing at the higher end of the sentencing range for the applicable offense level.
Commentary
Application Notes:
1. Application of the rules in §§3D1.2 and 3D1.3 may produce a single Group of Closely Related Counts. In such cases, the combined offense level is the level corresponding to the Group determined in accordance with §3D1.3. 2. The procedure for calculating the combined offense level when there is more than one Group of Closely Related Counts is as follows: First, identify the offense level applicable to the most serious Group; assign it one Unit. Next, determine the number of Units that the remaining Groups represent. Finally, increase the offense level for the most serious Group by the number of levels indicated in the table corresponding to the total number of Units. Background: When Groups are of roughly comparable seriousness, each Group will represent one Unit. When the most serious Group carries an offense level substantially higher than that applicable to the other Groups, however, counting the lesser Groups fully for purposes of the table could add excessive punishment, possibly even more than those offenses would carry if prosecuted separately. To avoid this anomalous result and produce declining marginal punishment, Groups 9 or more levels less serious than the most serious Group should not be counted for purposes of the table, and that Groups 5 to 8 levels less serious should be treated as equal to one-half of a Group. Thus, if the most serious Group is at offense level 15 and if two other Groups are at level 10, there would be a total of two Units for purposes of the table (one plus one-half plus one-half) and the combined offense level would be 17.Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1990 (amendment 350); November 1, 2023 (amendment 824); November 1, 2025 (amendment 836).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 689
cases (91 in the last 5 years), 1989–2026 · leading case: United States v. Aaron Hernandez, 690 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Aaron Hernandez, 690 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2012). “The PSR used the higher of Hernandez’s two adjusted offense levels to determine his total offense level—28—and it then added a one-level multi-count adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. With a total offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of II, Hernandez’s…”
United States v. Leniear, 574 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2009). “Otherwise, U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 “requires the imposition of a discounted enhancement based on the number and severity of the counts.”
United States v. Jarvis, 883 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 2018). “The court applied the grouping rules under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, calculated a total offense level of 30, and then granted credit for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in an adjusted total offense level of 27.”
United States v. Marvin Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2002). “8 *1240 Applying the multiple-count adjustment of U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, the probation officer calculated the greater adjusted offense level at 37, with a 5-level increase reflecting Groups 9 through 14, for a combined adjusted offense level of 42.”
United States v. Ernesto Quintieri, Carlo Donato, 306 F.3d 1217 (2d Cir. 2002). “9 See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. Thus, having had both opportunity and incentive to mount this challenge the first time around and having failed to do so, Donato cannot do so now.”
United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009). “See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. Sarras had a combined adjusted offense level of 43.”
United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2010). “Based on these findings, the district court conducted a unit analysis under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 and then subtracted three levels because Eubanks accepted responsibility, thus finding that Eubanks’ total offense level was 32.”
United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2012). “See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(b). But because Broxmeyer’s resulting total offense level of 44 exceeded the highest offense level listed in the Sentencing Table, the district court treated Broxmeyer’s offense level as 43, see U.”
United States v. Aleo, 681 F.3d 290 (6th Cir. 2012). “[4] One level was added pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. [5] Three levels were subtracted for acceptance of responsibility.”
United States of Am., Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Jack William Tocco, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant, 306 F.3d 279 (6th Cir. 2002). “Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, therefore, the district court calculated Tocco’s offense level for the applicable underlying racketeering activity at 13; as this is less than 19, the district court concluded that Tocco’s base offense level for the Count 1 RICO conspiracy was 19.”
UNITED STATES of Am., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael CALOZZA, Defendant-Appellant, 125 F.3d 687 (9th Cir. 1997). “” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. That base is increased by units from other groups with the same or fewer points.”
United States v. Munoz-Tello, 531 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2008). “The probation office arrived at this figure by departing upward four levels—to a total offense level of 27-—on the ground that this situation could be analogized to “the rules of grouping multiple counts under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, and other similar convictions such as Involuntary…”
— U.S.S.G. §3D1.4(2002) — 1 case
United States v. Jones, 254 F. App'x 711 (10th Cir. 2007).
— U.S.S.G. §3D1.4(a) — 76 cases
United States v. Verbickas, 439 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2006).
United States v. Ernesto Quintieri, Carlo Donato, 306 F.3d 1217 (2d Cir. 2002). “9 See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. Thus, having had both opportunity and incentive to mount this challenge the first time around and having failed to do so, Donato cannot do so now.”
United States v. Breshawn Hamilton, 66 F.4th 1267 (11th Cir. 2023).
United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009). “See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. Sarras had a combined adjusted offense level of 43.”
United States v. Daniel Fleischer, 971 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2020).
— U.S.S.G. §3D1.4(b) — 21 cases
United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2012). “See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(b). But because Broxmeyer’s resulting total offense level of 44 exceeded the highest offense level listed in the Sentencing Table, the district court treated Broxmeyer’s offense level as 43, see U.”
United States v. Arthur Morrison, 153 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1998).
United States v. Danny Nick Porter, United States of Am. v. Thomas Lynn Porter, 909 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1990).
United States v. Michael D. Stubbs, 279 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2002).
United States v. Ramon Gaytan, Jr., 648 F. App'x 508 (6th Cir. 2016).
— U.S.S.G. §3D1.4(c) — 44 cases
United States v. Aaron Hernandez, 690 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2012). “The PSR used the higher of Hernandez’s two adjusted offense levels to determine his total offense level—28—and it then added a one-level multi-count adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. With a total offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of II, Hernandez’s…”
United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000 (11th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Harlan Brent Gullickson, 981 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1992).
United States v. Alexander Herbert Luscier, Jr., 983 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir. 1993).
United States v. Sandoval, 6 F.4th 63 (1st Cir. 2021).
— U.S.S.G. §3D1.4(e) — 1 case
United States v. Malki, 609 F.3d 503 (2d Cir. 2010).
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