U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4
[Deleted]
Historical Note: Section 3D1.4 (Determining the Combined Offense Level), effective November 1, 1987, and amended effective November 1, 1990 (amendment 350), November 1, 2023 (amendment 824), and November 1, 2025 (amendment 836), was deleted effective November 1, 2026 (amendment 840).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 689
cases (91 in the last 5 years), 1989–2026 · leading case: United States v. Aaron Hernandez, 690 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Aaron Hernandez, 690 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2012). “The PSR used the higher of Hernandez’s two adjusted offense levels to determine his total offense level—28—and it then added a one-level multi-count adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. With a total offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of II, Hernandez’s…”
United States v. Leniear, 574 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2009). “Otherwise, U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 “requires the imposition of a discounted enhancement based on the number and severity of the counts.”
United States v. Jarvis, 883 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 2018). “The court applied the grouping rules under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, calculated a total offense level of 30, and then granted credit for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in an adjusted total offense level of 27.”
United States v. Marvin Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2002). “8 *1240 Applying the multiple-count adjustment of U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, the probation officer calculated the greater adjusted offense level at 37, with a 5-level increase reflecting Groups 9 through 14, for a combined adjusted offense level of 42.”
United States v. Ernesto Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217 (2d Cir. 2002). “9 See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. Thus, having had both opportunity and incentive to mount this challenge the first time around and having failed to do so, Donato cannot do so now.”
United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009). “See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. Sarras had a combined adjusted offense level of 43.”
United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2010). “Based on these findings, the district court conducted a unit analysis under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 and then subtracted three levels because Eubanks accepted responsibility, thus finding that Eubanks’ total offense level was 32.”
United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2012). “See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(b). But because Broxmeyer’s resulting total offense level of 44 exceeded the highest offense level listed in the Sentencing Table, the district court treated Broxmeyer’s offense level as 43, see U.”
United States v. Aleo, 681 F.3d 290 (6th Cir. 2012). “[4] One level was added pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. [5] Three levels were subtracted for acceptance of responsibility.”
United States v. Jack William Tocco, 306 F.3d 279 (6th Cir. 2002). “Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, therefore, the district court calculated Tocco’s offense level for the applicable underlying racketeering activity at 13; as this is less than 19, the district court concluded that Tocco’s base offense level for the Count 1 RICO conspiracy was 19.”
United States v. Michael CALOZZA, 125 F.3d 687 (9th Cir. 1997). “” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. That base is increased by units from other groups with the same or fewer points.”
United States v. Munoz-Tello, 531 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2008). “The probation office arrived at this figure by departing upward four levels—to a total offense level of 27-—on the ground that this situation could be analogized to “the rules of grouping multiple counts under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, and other similar convictions such as Involuntary…”
U.S.S.G. §3D1.4(2002): 1 case
United States v. Jones, 254 F. App'x 711 (10th Cir. 2007).
U.S.S.G. §3D1.4(a): 76 cases
United States v. Verbickas, 439 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2006).
United States v. Ernesto Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217 (2d Cir. 2002). “9 See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. Thus, having had both opportunity and incentive to mount this challenge the first time around and having failed to do so, Donato cannot do so now.”
United States v. Breshawn Hamilton, 66 F.4th 1267 (11th Cir. 2023).
United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009). “See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. Sarras had a combined adjusted offense level of 43.”
United States v. Daniel Fleischer, 971 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2020).
U.S.S.G. §3D1.4(b): 21 cases
United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2012). “See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(b). But because Broxmeyer’s resulting total offense level of 44 exceeded the highest offense level listed in the Sentencing Table, the district court treated Broxmeyer’s offense level as 43, see U.”
United States v. Arthur Morrison, 153 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1998).
United States v. Danny Nick Porter, United States of Am. v. Thomas Lynn Porter, 909 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1990).
United States v. Michael D. Stubbs, 279 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2002).
United States v. Ramon Gaytan, Jr., 648 F. App'x 508 (6th Cir. 2016).
U.S.S.G. §3D1.4(c): 44 cases
United States v. Aaron Hernandez, 690 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2012). “The PSR used the higher of Hernandez’s two adjusted offense levels to determine his total offense level—28—and it then added a one-level multi-count adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. With a total offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of II, Hernandez’s…”
United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000 (11th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Harlan Brent Gullickson, 981 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1992).
United States v. Alexander Herbert Luscier, Jr., 983 F.2d 1507 (9th Cir. 1993).
United States v. Sandoval, 6 F.4th 63 (1st Cir. 2021).
U.S.S.G. §3D1.4(e): 1 case
United States v. Malki, 609 F.3d 503 (2d Cir. 2010).
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