(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), in the case of an offense under
21 U.S.C. § 841, § 844, § 846, § 960, or § 963, or
46 U.S.C. § 70503 or § 70506, the court shall impose a sentence in accordance with the applicable guidelines without regard to any statutory minimum sentence, if the court finds that the defendant meets the criteria in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)–(5) as follows:
(1) the defendant does not have—
(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;
(B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and
(C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense;
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in
21 U.S.C. § 848; and
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement.
(b) In the case of a defendant (1) who meets the criteria set forth in subsection (a); and (2) for whom the statutorily required minimum sentence is at least five years, the applicable guideline range shall not be less than 24 to 30 months of imprisonment.
Commentary
Application Notes:
1.
Definitions.—
(A) The term “violent offense” means a “crime of violence,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16, that is punishable by imprisonment.
(B) “Dangerous weapon” and “firearm,” as used in subsection (a)(2), and “serious bodily injury,” as used in subsection (a)(3), are defined in the Commentary to §1B1.1 (Application Instructions).
(C) “Offense,” as used in subsection (a)(2)–(4), and “offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan,” as used in subsection (a)(5), mean the offense of conviction and all relevant conduct.
2.
Application of subsection (a)(2).—Consistent with §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), the term “defendant,” as used in subsection (a)(2), limits the accountability of the defendant to his own conduct and conduct that he aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused.
3.
Application of Subsection (a)(4).—
(A) “Organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense”.—The first prong of subsection (a)(4) requires that the defendant was not subject to an adjustment for an aggravating role under §3B1.1 (Aggravating Role).
(B) “Engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise”.—“Engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise,” as used in subsection (a)(4), is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848(c). As a practical matter, it should not be necessary to apply this prong of subsection (a)(4) because (i) this section does not apply to a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 848, and (ii) any defendant who “engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise” but is convicted of an offense to which this section applies will be an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense.”
4.
Use of Information Disclosed under Subsection (a).—Information disclosed by a defendant under subsection (a) may not be used to enhance the sentence of the defendant unless the information relates to a violent offense, as defined in Application Note 1(A).
5.
Government’s Opportunity to Make Recommendation.—Under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), prior to its determination, the court shall afford the government an opportunity to make a recommendation.
See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f), (i).
6.
Exemption from Otherwise Applicable Statutory Minimum Sentences.—A defendant who meets the criteria under this section is exempt from any otherwise applicable statutory minimum sentence of imprisonment and statutory minimum term of supervised release.
Background: This section sets forth the relevant provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), as added by section 80001(a) of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and subsequently amended, which limit the applicability of statutory minimum sentences in certain cases. Under the authority of section 80001(b) of that Act, the Commission has promulgated application notes to provide guidance in the application of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
See also H. Rep. No. 460, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994) (expressing intent to foster greater coordination between mandatory minimum sentencing and the sentencing guideline system).
Historical Note: Effective September 23, 1994 (amendment 509). Amended effective November 1, 1995 (amendment 515); November 1, 1996 (amendment 540); November 1, 1997 (amendment 570); November 1, 2001 (amendment 624); October 27, 2003 (amendment 651); November 1, 2004 (amendment 674); November 1, 2009 (amendment 736); November 1, 2023 (amendment 817).
PART D – SUPERVISED RELEASE
Introductory Commentary
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 requires the court to assess a wide range of factors "in determining whether to include a term of supervised release, and, if a term of supervised release is to be included, in determining the length of the term and the conditions of supervised release." 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c). These determinations aim to make the imposition and scope of supervised release "dependent on the needs of the defendant for supervision." See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1983). In conducting such an individualized assessment, the court can "assure that [those] who will need post-release supervision will receive it" while "prevent[ing] probation system resources from being wasted on supervisory services for releasees who do not need them." Id. at 54; see also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 709 (2000) ("Supervised release departed from the parole system it replaced by giving district courts the freedom to provide postrelease supervision for those, and only those, who needed it . . . . Congress aimed, then, to use the district courts’ discretionary judgment to allocate supervision to those releasees who needed it most."). Supervised release "fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration." United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000). Accordingly, a court should consider whether the defendant needs supervision in order to ease transition into the community or to provide further rehabilitation and whether supervision will promote public safety. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(c), 3553(a)(2)(C)); see also S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1983) (indicating that a "primary goal of [a term of supervised release] is to ease the defendant’s transition into the community after the service of a long prison term for a particularly serious offense, or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a fairly short period in prison for punishment or other purposes but still needs supervision and training programs after release").
Historical Note: Effective November 1, 2025 (amendment 835).
Notes of Decisions
United States v. Nestor Barron, 940 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 2019).
· cites it 9× “Safety Valve Barron next contends that the district court erred in declining to apply the safety-valve provisions of U.S.S.G. §§ 5C1.2 and 2D1.1(b)(17). In general, if a defendant is convicted under 21 U.”
Jeffery Harris v. United States, 366 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2004).
· cites it 6× “Second, Harris’s trial counsel waived consideration of whether the “safety valve” provision under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 applied because he affirmatively declined to object to the PSR, which did not address this question, and otherwise failed to raise the issue at sentencing, despite…”
Unites States of Am. v. Veronica Pena-Sarabia, 297 F.3d 983 (10th Cir. 2002).
· cites it 11× “She sought relief from the mandatory minimum under the “safety valve” provisions of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. However, § 3553(f)(2) forecloses relief from mandatory minimum sentences for offenders who possess a firearm in connection with the offense.”
United States v. Hargrove, 911 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2019).
· cites it 12× “Hargrove argued that he qualified for the safety valve under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 and, therefore, his sentence should have been calculated without *1314 regard to the otherwise-applicable mandatory minimum.”
United States v. Keresztury, 293 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 2002).
· cites it 8× “is entitled to bring the instant appeal because the government’s conduct in contesting Keresztury’s right to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility — particularly the government’s insistence that Keresztury’s conduct between his plea and his sentencing voided the plea…”
United States v. Henry Vazquez Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019).
· cites it 4× “Valencia says that these provisions both unfairly deny benefits to Title 46 defendants, in violation of equal-protection guarantees, and violate the Fifth Amendment by requiring a defendant to forfeit his right to silence. Portocarrero adopts these arguments.”
United States v. Jeffrey Harris, 230 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 2000).
· cites it 9× “1(b)(1) because he never personally or constructively possessed a firearm, and played a relatively small role in the conspiracy, and that the district court should have adjusted his offense level downward two levels under the “safety valve” provision, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 and…”
United States v. Jerome Wayne Johnson, 375 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2004).
· cites it 5× “§ 3553 (f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, and thus be sentenced to less than the statutory minimum of five years.”
United States v. Trinity Rolando Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020).
· cites it 3× “1(b)(3)(C); (3) to his not receiving a two-level reduction under the “safety valve” provision of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2; and (4) to his receiving the two-level increase for obstruction of justice.”
United States v. Miranda Santiago, 96 F.3d 517 (1st Cir. 1996).
· cites it 8× “§ 3553 (f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. We find the record inadequate to justify the district court’s decision not to grant relief.”
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(1) — 37 cases
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(1f) — 1 case
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(2) — 37 cases
Unites States of Am. v. Veronica Pena-Sarabia, 297 F.3d 983 (10th Cir. 2002).
“She sought relief from the mandatory minimum under the “safety valve” provisions of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. However, § 3553(f)(2) forecloses relief from mandatory minimum sentences for offenders who possess a firearm in connection with the offense.”
United States v. Jeffrey Harris, 230 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 2000).
“1(b)(1) because he never personally or constructively possessed a firearm, and played a relatively small role in the conspiracy, and that the district court should have adjusted his offense level downward two levels under the “safety valve” provision, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 and…”
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(3) — 3 cases
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(4) — 15 cases
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(5) — 132 cases
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(6) — 1 case
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(A)(2) — 1 case
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(a) — 261 cases
United States v. Trinity Rolando Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567 (11th Cir. 2020).
“1(b)(3)(C); (3) to his not receiving a two-level reduction under the “safety valve” provision of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2; and (4) to his receiving the two-level increase for obstruction of justice.”
United States v. Henry Vazquez Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019).
“Valencia says that these provisions both unfairly deny benefits to Title 46 defendants, in violation of equal-protection guarantees, and violate the Fifth Amendment by requiring a defendant to forfeit his right to silence. Portocarrero adopts these arguments.”
United States v. Keresztury, 293 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 2002).
“is entitled to bring the instant appeal because the government’s conduct in contesting Keresztury’s right to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility — particularly the government’s insistence that Keresztury’s conduct between his plea and his sentencing voided the plea…”
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(a)(1) — 62 cases
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(a)(2) — 107 cases
United States v. Nestor Barron, 940 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 2019).
“Safety Valve Barron next contends that the district court erred in declining to apply the safety-valve provisions of U.S.S.G. §§ 5C1.2 and 2D1.1(b)(17). In general, if a defendant is convicted under 21 U.”
United States v. Hargrove, 911 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2019).
“Hargrove argued that he qualified for the safety valve under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 and, therefore, his sentence should have been calculated without *1314 regard to the otherwise-applicable mandatory minimum.”
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(a)(2)(same) — 1 case
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(a)(3) — 5 cases
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(a)(4) — 45 cases
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(a)(5) — 205 cases
United States v. Henry Vazquez Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019).
“Valencia says that these provisions both unfairly deny benefits to Title 46 defendants, in violation of equal-protection guarantees, and violate the Fifth Amendment by requiring a defendant to forfeit his right to silence. Portocarrero adopts these arguments.”
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(a)(l) — 66 cases
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(a)(l)(5) — 1 case
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(b) — 7 cases
United States v. Keresztury, 293 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 2002).
“is entitled to bring the instant appeal because the government’s conduct in contesting Keresztury’s right to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility — particularly the government’s insistence that Keresztury’s conduct between his plea and his sentencing voided the plea…”
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(b)(17) — 2 cases
— U.S.S.G. §5C1.2(l) — 9 cases
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