Sentencing Guidelines » Chapter 5

U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2

Home Detention

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Home detention may be imposed as a condition of probation or supervised release, but only as a substitute for imprisonment.

 

Commentary

Application Notes:

1.      "Home detention"means a program of confinement and supervision that restricts the defendant to his place of residence continuously, except for authorized absences, enforced by appropriate means of surveillance by the probation office. When an order of home detention is imposed, the defendant is required to be in his place of residence at all times except for approved absences for gainful employment, community service, religious services, medical care, educational or training programs, and such other times as may be specifically authorized. Electronic monitoring is an appropriate means of surveillance for home detention. However, alternative means of surveillance may be used if appropriate.

2.      The court may impose other conditions of probation or supervised release appropriate to effectuate home detention.  If the court concludes that the amenities available in the residence of a defendant would cause home detention not to be sufficiently punitive, the court may limit the amenities available.

3.  The defendant's place of residence, for purposes of home detention, need not be the place where the defendant previously resided.  It may be any place of residence, so long as the owner of the residence (and any other person(s) from whom consent is necessary) agrees to any conditions that may be imposed by the court, e.g., conditions that a monitoring system be installed, that there will be no "call forwarding" or "call waiting" services, or that there will be no cordless telephones or answering machines.

Background: The Commission has concluded that electronic monitoring is an appropriate means of surveillance for home detention. However, in some cases home detention may effectively be enforced without electronic monitoring, e.g., when the defendant is physically incapacitated, or where some other effective means of surveillance is available. Accordingly, the Commission has not required that electronic monitoring be a necessary condition for home detention. Nevertheless, before ordering home detention without electronic monitoring, the court should be confident that an alternative form of surveillance is appropriate considering the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s case.

In the usual case, the Commission assumes that a condition requiring that the defendant seek and maintain gainful employment will be imposed when home detention is ordered.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendments 271 and 302); November 1, 2018 (amendment 811).


 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 40 cases (12 in the last 5 years), 1990–2024 · leading case: United States v. Joel Wright, 46 F.4th 938 (9th Cir. 2022).
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United States v. Joel Wright, 46 F.4th 938 (9th Cir. 2022). · cites it 3× “” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (c).”
United States v. Kathleen Kremser Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997). · cites it 3× “U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2. Chapter 5, Part B (“Probation”) contains a similar proviso: Home detention may be imposed as a condition of probation or supervised release, but only as a substitute for imprisonment.”
United States v. William Gilchrist, 130 F.3d 1131 (3rd Cir. 1997). · cites it 4× “Therefore, the government maintains that when Appellant entered into a plea agreement providing for one month home detention, the imposition of a period of supervised release was, or should have been, within his reasonable expectations.”
United States v. T.M., 330 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2003). “” See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2; U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(e)(2); see also United States v.”
United States v. Lopez-Pastrana, 889 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2018). “1(e)(3) (stating, under the heading "Schedule of Substitute Punishments": "[o]ne day of home detention for one day of imprisonment"); U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2 ("Home detention may be imposed as a condition of probation or supervised release, but only as a substitute for imprisonment .”
United States of Am., Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Jim Gee & William C. Norris, Defendants-Appellants/cross-Appellees, 226 F.3d 885 (7th Cir. 2000). “U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2 states that "Home detention may be imposed as a condition of probation or supervised release, but only as a substitute for imprisonment.”
United States of Am., Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Nancy Ruth Iversen, Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee, 90 F.3d 1340 (8th Cir. 1996). “3 Further, the fact that home detention may be imposed “only as a substitute for imprisonment^]” see U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2 (emphasis added); see also 18 U.”
United States v. Brian Floss, 42 F.4th 854 (8th Cir. 2022). “” USSG § 5F1.2 (emphasis added). The plain meaning of these governing provisions makes clear what common sense teaches -- home detention may be a form of “confinement,” but it is not “imprisonment.”
United States of Am., Cross-Appellee v. Denny L. Goff, 6 F.3d 363 (6th Cir. 1993). “The guidelines plainly provide that home detention, established in U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2, is a sentencing option only available for sentences no longer than ten months.”
United States v. Omar Jahal Daggao, A.K.A. Omar Jahal Ali-Daggao, 28 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 1994). “…However, alternative means of surveillance may be used as long as they are as effective as electronic monitoring. U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2, Commentary (n. 1).”
United States v. Edward Bello, Also Known as Jason Hink, Also Known as Jerome Hink, Also Known as Joseph Fulano, 310 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2002). “” See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2. The Guidelines suggest that the imposition of such conditions as part of a sentence of home detention might be appropriate where “the amenities available in the residence of a defendant would cause home detention not to be sufficiently puni tive.”
United States v. Patricia Robertson, 709 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2013). “Tribal law prohibits alcohol consumption by Indians within the Reservation boundaries. It is reasonable to require Robertson to comply with tribal law while confined to her home as a more lenient alternative to incarceration.”
United States v. Eric Leaphart, 98 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1996). “See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2. Here, the Magistrate Judge decided to sentence Leaphart to the maximum possible term of imprisonment.”
United States v. Campbell, 738 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D. Neb. 2010). “1), to be followed by six months of home confinement (see U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2) under electronic monitoring, together with 100 hours of community service.”
United States v. Flowers, 983 F. Supp. 159 (E.D.N.Y 1997). “See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2; see also Steven J. Rack-mill, An Analysis of Home Confinement as a Sanction, in Criminal Justice: Concepts and Issues 229, 229-239 (Chris W.”
United States v. Arnold Taylor, 78 F.4th 1132 (9th Cir. 2023). “TAYLOR 3 does not fit within the Guidelines definition of home detention, which may only be imposed as a substitute for imprisonment (U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2). COUNSEL Douglas J. Beevers (argued), Assistant Federal Public Defender; Heather E.”
United States v. Porat, 17 F.3d 660 (3rd Cir. 1994). · cites it 2× “2 provides: "Home detention” means a program of confinement and supervision that restricts the defendant to his place of residence continuously, except for authorized absences, enforced by appropriate means of surveillance by the probation office.”
United States v. Edward Delloiacono, A/K/A Michael Devine, Edward Dello Iacano, 900 F.2d 481 (1st Cir. 1990). · cites it 2× “” U.S.S.G. §§ 5F1.2; 5B1.4(b)(20), p.s. “Home detention” is defined as a program of confinement and supervision that restricts the defendant to his place of residence continuously, except for authorized absences, enforced by appropriate means of surveillance by the probation…”
United States v. Larry G. Thomas, 68 F.3d 392 (10th Cir. 1995). “Defendant also points to U.S.S.G. §§ 5F1.2 and 5B1.4(b)(20) which permit home detention as a condition of probation “but only as a substitute for imprisonment,” *394 and to U.”
United States v. Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Minnesota 1990). “U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2. 2. The defendant shall comply with all federal, state, and local laws.”
United States v. Helen Bass, 233 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 2000). · cites it 2× “See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2 Background Note (“in the usual case, the Commission assumes that a condition requiring that the defendant seek and maintain gainful employment will be imposed when home detention is ordered”).”
United States v. Shaw, 150 F. App'x 863 (10th Cir. 2005). “The court sentenced Shaw to four months imprisonment and two years of supervised release, recommending that Shaw serve his four month sentence in a halfway house. As a special condition of supervised release, the court ordered Shaw to serve four months of home confinement.”
United States v. K, 160 F. Supp. 2d 421 (E.D.N.Y 2001). “See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2; see also Steven J. Rackmill, An Analysis of Home Confinement as a Sanction, in Criminal Justice: Concepts and Issues 229, 229-39 (Chris W.”
United States v. Fiume, 643 F. App'x 25 (2d Cir. 2016). “Home detention is a distinct condition that is significantly more onerous than GPS monitoring.”
United States v. Greer, 375 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Wis. 2005). “U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2. My use of home confinement in the present case, while not pursuant to § 5C1.”
United States v. Ronald Minor, 440 F. App'x 479 (6th Cir. 2011). · cites it 2× “” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2, commentary (n. 1) (emphasis added).”
United States v. Clark, 361 F. Supp. 2d 502 (E.D. Va. 2005). “’ ” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2, App. Note 1. Ordering Clark to remain on Fort Eustis for six months does not restrict him to his place of residence, nor is it possible to ensure that he actually remains within the confines of the Fort.”
United States v. K, 160 F. Supp. 2d 421 (E.D.N.Y 2001). “See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2; see also Steven J. Rackmill, An Analysis of Home Confinement as a Sanction, in Criminal Justice: Concepts and Issues 229, 229-39 (Chris W.”
United States v. Joel Wright (9th Cir. 2022). · cites it 3× “” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (c).”
Kaetz v. The United States of Am. (D.N.J. 2022). · cites it 3× “3(e)(2) (emphasis added); see also U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2 (same). From those statements, Kaetz concludes that his six-month period of home detention is a “substitute” for six of the 16 months of imprisonment imposed by the District Court.”
United States v. Murphy, 685 F. App'x 643 (10th Cir. 2017). “) He also points out that home detention should "ordinarily” be enforced through use of electronic monitoring, which the judge imposed,, See USSG § 5F1.2, comment, (n.l). We see the argument as a distinction without a difference.”
United States v. Kim Millbrook (7th Cir. 2021). “Home detention is a substitute for imprisonment, not a type of reduction, see U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2, and the Bureau of Prisons, not the courts, determines an inmate’s custodial placement.”
United States v. Clayton (D.D.C. 2021). “§ 3582 (c)(1)(A), with home detention as a condition of supervised release, see U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2 (“Home detention may be imposed as a condition of probation or supervised release, but only as a substitute for imprisonment.”
United States v. Ortiz (2d Cir. 2021). “” See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2 cmt. 1. 17 Nevertheless, the Government does not oppose a limited remand to permit the 5 1 District Court to amend the judgment to specify that Ortiz is permitted to leave 2 his place of home detention for such absences as approved.”
William Kaetz v. United States (3rd Cir. 2022). “3(e)(2) (emphasis added); see also U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2 (same). From those statements, Kaetz concludes that his six-month period of home detention is a “substitute” for six of the 16 months of imprisonment imposed by the District Court.”
United States v. Pryer (D.D.C. 2024). “” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2 cmt. n. 1. The defendant is “required to be in his place of residence at all times except for approved absences for gainful employment, community service, religious services, medical care, educational or training programs, and such other times as may be…”
Barhoumi v. United States (E.D. Mo. 2022). “The United States contends that if home detention is not considered “imprisonment” under § 3583(a), it should not be considered “imprisonment” under § 3583(h).”
Grimm v. Salmonson (E.D. Tex. 2024). “Sentencing Guidelines § 5F1.2 and so the time he spent on home confinement should be counted toward his sentence.”
United States v. Alvear, 93 F. App'x 319 (2d Cir. 2004). “” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2. One day of home detention, where authorized, qualifies as a substitute for one day of imprisonment.”
United States v. Nancy Ruth Iversen (8th Cir. 1996). “1(a)(1) authorizes sentences of probation for Zone A offenses; it is silent as to whether home detention may be a condition of probation for Zone A offenses. As we have noted, however, Application Note 1 expressly provides for home detention as a condition of probation for Zone…”
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