Sentencing Guidelines » Chapter 6

U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4

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§6B1.4.     Stipulations (Policy Statement)

(a)       A plea agreement may be accompanied by a written stipulation of facts relevant to sentencing.  Except to the extent that a party may be privileged not to disclose certain information, stipulations shall:

(1)       set forth the relevant facts and circumstances of the actual offense conduct and offender characteristics;

(2)       not contain misleading facts; and

(3)       set forth with meaningful specificity the reasons why the sentencing range resulting from the proposed agreement is appropriate.

(b)      To the extent that the parties disagree about any facts relevant to sentencing, the stipulation shall identify the facts that are in dispute.

(c)       A district court may, by local rule, identify categories of cases for which the parties are authorized to make the required stipulation orally, on the record, at the time the plea agreement is offered. 

(d)      The court is not bound by the stipulation, but may with the aid of the presentence report, determine the facts relevant to sentencing.

 

Commentary

This provision requires that when a plea agreement includes a stipulation of fact, the stipulation must fully and accurately disclose all factors relevant to the determination of sentence.  This provision does not obligate the parties to reach agreement on issues that remain in dispute or to present the court with an appearance of agreement in areas where agreement does not exist.  Rather, the overriding principle is full disclosure of the circumstances of the actual offense and the agreement of the parties.  The stipulation should identify all areas of agreement, disagreement and uncertainty that may be relevant to the determination of sentence.  Similarly, it is not appropriate for the parties to stipulate to misleading or non-existent facts, even when both parties are willing to assume the existence of such "facts" for purposes of the litigation.  Rather, the parties should fully disclose the actual facts and then explain to the court the reasons why the disposition of the case should differ from that which such facts ordinarily would require under the guidelines.

Because of the importance of the stipulations and the potential complexity of the factors that can affect the determination of sentences, stipulations ordinarily should be in writing.  However, exceptions to this practice may be allowed by local rule.   The Commission intends to pay particular attention to this aspect of the plea agreement procedure as experience under the guidelines develops.  See Commentary to §6A1.2 (Disclosure of Presentence Report; Issues in Dispute).

Section 6B1.4(d) makes clear that the court is not obliged to accept the stipulation of the parties.  Even though stipulations are expected to be accurate and complete, the court cannot rely exclusively upon stipulations in ascertaining the factors relevant to the determination of sentence.  Rather, in determining the factual basis for the sentence, the court will consider the stipulation, together with the results of the presentence investigation, and any other relevant information.

Historical Note:  Effective November 1, 1987.

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 168 cases (11 in the last 5 years), 1990–2026 · leading case: United States v. Aragon, 922 F.3d 1102 (10th Cir. 2019).
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United States v. Aragon, 922 F.3d 1102 (10th Cir. 2019). · cites it 6× “2002) (noting that the government “provid[ed] information to the Probation Department regarding” a defendant’s arguably relevant conduct “while recommending successfully to the district court that it not rely on that information in sentencing”); see also U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4, p.s.,…”
United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005). · cites it 2× “U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4; see also Green, 346 F.Supp.”
United States v. Martin Martinez-Noriega, 418 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2005). · cites it 4× “See U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4. Stipulations are supposed to identify, with “meaningful specificity,” a “sentencing range.”
United States v. Pamela Miller, 698 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 2012). · cites it 2× “U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(d). No. 10-5264/5432/5877/6084 United States v.”
United States v. Barnes, 602 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2010). · cites it 3× “U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4 deals with stipulations of facts in plea agreements generally and explicitly grants the authority to the parties to provide the district court with stipulated facts.”
United States v. John Sandles, 80 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 1996). · cites it 4× “U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4, Commentary. Nonetheless, the record here makes clear that in exchange for Sandies’ guilty plea to bank larceny, the government dismissed the pending charges of bank robbery, 18 U.”
United States v. Boris Granik, Alexander Iskolsky, & Semyon Bumagin, 386 F.3d 404 (2d Cir. 2004). · cites it 2× “1992) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4 and warning that prosecutors “may not compromise on factual issues when they have a good faith disagreement with the defense” or “sign a stipulation unless they have a good faith belief that the evidence supports the facts stated in the…”
United States v. Cole, 569 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2009). · cites it 2× “See U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(d). Accordingly, when the district court independently quantified the amount of drugs attributable to Cole based on information in the presentence report, it did not nullify the plea agreement.”
United States v. Michael Thoran, 819 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2016). “1993) (per curiam), (unpublished) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(d)). But it is not this court’s duty to supply reasons for the district court’s sentencing decision.”
United States v. Wiley, 509 F.3d 474 (8th Cir. 2007). · cites it 2× “The district court was free to reject the government's stipulation as artificially low, if the evidence warranted that conclusion (and if the government's advocacy did not breach the plea agreement).”
United States v. John David Easterling, A/K/A Donald Ray Doyle, 921 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1990). · cites it 2× “, which provides that “[t]he [sentencing] court is not bound by the stipulations]” contained in the plea agreement.”
United States v. Forman, 553 F.3d 585 (7th Cir. 2009). “See U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(d) (parties can stipulate to facts as part of plea agreement, but court is not obligated to accept stipulation); see also United States v.”
Show all 168 citing cases →
— U.S.S.G. §6B1.4(a) — 11 cases
United States v. Certified Env't Servs., Inc., 753 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2014).
United States v. Edward B. Gilliam, Jr., 987 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1993).
United States v. Donato Telesco, A/K/A Danny Telesco, & Scott Linskey, 962 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1992).
United States v. Charles W. Adams, 104 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 1997).
United States v. Zachary Davis, 521 F. App'x 81 (3rd Cir. 2013).
— U.S.S.G. §6B1.4(a)(1) — 3 cases
United States v. Ring, 811 F. Supp. 2d 359 (D.D.C. 2011).
United States v. Hunter, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (D. Utah 1998).
United States v. Ronald Rieco Shanks (11th Cir. 2025).
— U.S.S.G. §6B1.4(a)(2) — 5 cases
United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005). “U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4; see also Green, 346 F.Supp.”
Berthoff v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 2d 50 (D. Mass. 2001).
United States v. Moya, 730 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
Berthoff v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 2d 50 (D. Mass. 2001).
United States v. Phillips, 730 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
— U.S.S.G. §6B1.4(a)(3) — 4 cases
United States v. Martin Martinez-Noriega, 418 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2005). “See U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4. Stipulations are supposed to identify, with “meaningful specificity,” a “sentencing range.”
United States v. Petrushkin, 142 F.4th 1241 (9th Cir. 2025).
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 83 F. App'x 883 (9th Cir. 2003).
United States v. M. Martinez-Noriega (8th Cir. 2005).
— U.S.S.G. §6B1.4(b) — 1 case
United States v. Andrade, 242 F. App'x 274 (5th Cir. 2007).
— U.S.S.G. §6B1.4(b)(18) — 1 case
United States v. John D. Behler, 187 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 1999).
— U.S.S.G. §6B1.4(d) — 97 cases
United States v. Aragon, 922 F.3d 1102 (10th Cir. 2019). “2002) (noting that the government “provid[ed] information to the Probation Department regarding” a defendant’s arguably relevant conduct “while recommending successfully to the district court that it not rely on that information in sentencing”); see also U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4, p.s.,…”
United States v. Pamela Miller, 698 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 2012). “U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(d). No. 10-5264/5432/5877/6084 United States v.”
United States v. Cole, 569 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2009). “See U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(d). Accordingly, when the district court independently quantified the amount of drugs attributable to Cole based on information in the presentence report, it did not nullify the plea agreement.”
United States v. Michael Thoran, 819 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2016). “1993) (per curiam), (unpublished) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(d)). But it is not this court’s duty to supply reasons for the district court’s sentencing decision.”
United States v. Wiley, 509 F.3d 474 (8th Cir. 2007). “The district court was free to reject the government's stipulation as artificially low, if the evidence warranted that conclusion (and if the government's advocacy did not breach the plea agreement).”
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