U.S.S.G. § 8C1.1
Determining the Fine – Criminal Purpose Organizations
If, upon consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the organization, the court determines that the organization operated primarily for a criminal purpose or primarily by criminal means, the fine shall be set at an amount (subject to the statutory maximum) sufficient to divest the organization of all its net assets. When this section applies, Subpart 2 (Determining the Fine – Other Organizations) and §8C3.4 (Fines Paid by Owners of Closely Held Organizations) do not apply.
Commentary
Application Note:
1. "Net assets," as used in this section, means the assets remaining after payment of all legitimate claims against assets by known innocent bona fide creditors. Background: This guideline addresses the case in which the court, based upon an examination of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the organization, determines that the organization was operated primarily for a criminal purpose (e.g., a front for a scheme that was designed to commit fraud; an organization established to participate in the illegal manufacture, importation, or distribution of a controlled substance) or operated primarily by criminal means (e.g., a hazardous waste disposal business that had no legitimate means of disposing of hazardous waste). In such a case, the fine shall be set at an amount sufficient to remove all of the organization's net assets. If the extent of the assets of the organization is unknown, the maximum fine authorized by statute should be imposed, absent innocent bona fide creditors.Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1991 (amendment 422).
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2. DETERMINING THE FINE – OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 35
cases, 1991–2017 · leading case: United States v. Arturo Garcia Parra & Magdalena Correa, 402 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Arturo Garcia Parra & Magdalena Correa, 402 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2005). “This enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 8C1.1 is perhaps the easiest to support in the record.”
United States v. Jason S. Mise, 240 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2001). “The district court properly denied Mise’s motion to dismiss after correctly holding that Mise had not presented evidence that he made an application to register his pipe bomb or evidence that registration is a legal impossibility; the district court did not err in giving a…”
United States v. Donna A. Hatchett, 31 F.3d 1411 (7th Cir. 1994). “Based on her highly suspect trial testimony, including her claim that she was opposed to drug trafficking, that she had informed the police about Felicia’s drug dealing, and that she did not participate in the transaction with Agent La-tham, 2 the presentence report recommended…”
United States v. Ronald D. Alexander, 292 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2002). “l(b)(l) for possession of a dangerous weapon and (2) pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 8C1.1 for obstructing or impeding the administration of justice.”
United States v. Alvarado, 615 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2010). “” *923 The district court did not clearly err in finding Alvarado’s conduct amounted to obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 8C1.1. During Alvarado’s initial change of plea hearing, Alvarado acknowledged he was guilty of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, and Alvarado…”
United States v. Espinoza, 338 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2003). “Obstruction-of-justice enhancement Finally, we consider whether Defendant’s sentence was properly adjusted upward two levels for obstruction of justice under USSG § 8C1.1. That section states: If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or…”
United States v. Nam Xuan Ngo, 132 F.3d 1231 (8th Cir. 1997). “In applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines the court declined to adjust downward for acceptance of responsibility under U.”
United States v. Bedolla-Zavala, 611 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2010). “U.S.S.G. § 8C1.1. The district court, accepting the recommendations of the PSR, ruled that Application Note 4(h) instructed that the enhancement applied under the circumstances.”
United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466 (4th Cir. 2002). “See United States Sentencing Guidelines § 8C1.1. It is clear that Tri-City was conceived in crime and performed little or no legitimate business activity, and as such, the forfeiture of all of its assets is not excessive under Bajakaji-an’s “grossly disproportional” standard.”
United States v. Rex Allen Kirkland, 985 F.2d 535 (11th Cir. 1993). “” U.S.S.G. § 8C1.1, comment. (n.3(d)). He argues that an investigation conducted by an employee of a bank is not “official.”
United States v. Patient Transfer Serv., Inc., 465 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2006). “It was also unclear whether PTS had been found to be a criminal purpose organization under U.S.S.G. § 8C1.1 (fines should divest such a defendant of all its net assets).”
United States v. Michael Hill, 943 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1991). “Hill was assessed with a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. § 8C1.1, by intimidating Dobbins, based on the statement of Dobbins’s mother that he continually attempted to telephone Dobbins collect two or three times a week after he was in custody.”
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