South Carolina Code
S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-260 (2026)
Notice to commission when payments have begun; suspension or termination of payments
✓ current as of May 2026
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(A) When an employee has been out of work due to a reported work-related injury or occupational disease for eight days, an employer may start temporary disability payments immediately and may continue these payments for up to one hundred fifty days from the date the injury or disease is reported without waiver of any grounds for good faith denial. Upon making the first payment, the employer immediately shall notify the commission, in accordance with a form prescribed by the commission, that payment of compensation has begun.
(B) Once temporary disability payments are commenced, the payments may be terminated or suspended immediately at any time within the one hundred fifty days if:
(1) the employee has returned to work; however, if the employee does not remain at work for a minimum of fifteen days, temporary disability payments must be resumed immediately; or
(2) the employee agrees that he is able to return to work and executes the proper commission form indicating that he is able to return to work; or
(3) a good faith investigation by the employer reveals grounds for denial of the claim; or
(4) the employee has been released by the treating physician to work without restriction and the employer offers comparable employment; or
(5) the employee has been released by the treating physician to limited duty work and the employer provides limited duty work consistent with the terms upon which the employee has been released; or
(6) the employee refuses medical treatment, as provided in Section 42-15-60, or refuses an examination or evaluation, as provided in Section 42-15-80, and the termination or suspension of benefits continues until the refusal ceases or the commission determines the refusal is justified pursuant to either Section 42-15-60 or 42-15-80.
(C) An employee whose disability payments have been terminated or suspended pursuant to this section may request a hearing to have the payments reinstituted. The hearing must be held within sixty days of the date of the employee's request for a hearing.
(D) If an employee has been declared as having reached maximum medical improvement, the employer may request a hearing to address the termination of temporary disability payments. The hearing must be held within sixty days of the date of the employer's request for a hearing.
(E) An employer may request a hearing at any time to address termination or reduction of temporary disability payments.
(F) After the one-hundred-fifty-day period has expired, the commission shall provide by regulation the method and procedure by which benefits may be suspended or terminated for any cause, but the regulation must provide for an evidentiary hearing and commission approval prior to termination or suspension unless such prior hearing is expressly waived in writing by the recipient or the circumstances identified in Section 42-9-260(B)(1) or (B)(2) are present. Further, the commission may not entertain any application to terminate or suspend benefits unless and until the employer or carrier is current with all payments due.
(G) Failure to comply with this section shall result in a twenty-five percent penalty imposed upon the carrier or employer computed on the amount of benefits withheld in violation of this section, and the amount of the penalty must be paid to the employee in addition to the amount of benefits withheld. However, the penalty does not apply if the employer or carrier has terminated or suspended benefits when the employee has returned to any employment at the same or similar wage.
HISTORY: 1962 Code SECTION 72-177; 1952 Code SECTION 72-177; 1942 Code SECTION 7035-21; 1936 (39) 1231; 1974 (58) 2265; 1982 Act No. 415; 1988 Act No. 410, eff March 28, 1988; 1996 Act No. 424, SECTION 6, eff June 18, 1996.
Editor's Note
1996 Act No. 424, SECTION 13, provides, in part, as follows:
"Section 13. Employers who have filed with the Workers' Compensation Commission a notice to reject the provisions of Title 42 before the effective date of the 1996 amendment will have until July 1, 1997, to comply with the provisions of the 1996 amendment relating to insuring their workers' compensation liabilities. Any employer who has rejected the terms of this title prior to approval of the 1996 amendment and has procured another form of employee benefits insurance shall comply, not later than July 1, 1997, with the provisions of the 1996 amendment relating to the insuring of its workers' compensation liabilities. Furthermore, nothing in the 1996 amendment shall affect or alter any cause of action, right, or claim accruing before the effective date of the 1996 amendment; however, any such cause of action, remedy, or claim accruing before the effective date of the 1996 amendment shall be governed by the law prior to the effective date of the 1996 amendment".
(B) Once temporary disability payments are commenced, the payments may be terminated or suspended immediately at any time within the one hundred fifty days if:
(1) the employee has returned to work; however, if the employee does not remain at work for a minimum of fifteen days, temporary disability payments must be resumed immediately; or
(2) the employee agrees that he is able to return to work and executes the proper commission form indicating that he is able to return to work; or
(3) a good faith investigation by the employer reveals grounds for denial of the claim; or
(4) the employee has been released by the treating physician to work without restriction and the employer offers comparable employment; or
(5) the employee has been released by the treating physician to limited duty work and the employer provides limited duty work consistent with the terms upon which the employee has been released; or
(6) the employee refuses medical treatment, as provided in Section 42-15-60, or refuses an examination or evaluation, as provided in Section 42-15-80, and the termination or suspension of benefits continues until the refusal ceases or the commission determines the refusal is justified pursuant to either Section 42-15-60 or 42-15-80.
(C) An employee whose disability payments have been terminated or suspended pursuant to this section may request a hearing to have the payments reinstituted. The hearing must be held within sixty days of the date of the employee's request for a hearing.
(D) If an employee has been declared as having reached maximum medical improvement, the employer may request a hearing to address the termination of temporary disability payments. The hearing must be held within sixty days of the date of the employer's request for a hearing.
(E) An employer may request a hearing at any time to address termination or reduction of temporary disability payments.
(F) After the one-hundred-fifty-day period has expired, the commission shall provide by regulation the method and procedure by which benefits may be suspended or terminated for any cause, but the regulation must provide for an evidentiary hearing and commission approval prior to termination or suspension unless such prior hearing is expressly waived in writing by the recipient or the circumstances identified in Section 42-9-260(B)(1) or (B)(2) are present. Further, the commission may not entertain any application to terminate or suspend benefits unless and until the employer or carrier is current with all payments due.
(G) Failure to comply with this section shall result in a twenty-five percent penalty imposed upon the carrier or employer computed on the amount of benefits withheld in violation of this section, and the amount of the penalty must be paid to the employee in addition to the amount of benefits withheld. However, the penalty does not apply if the employer or carrier has terminated or suspended benefits when the employee has returned to any employment at the same or similar wage.
HISTORY: 1962 Code SECTION 72-177; 1952 Code SECTION 72-177; 1942 Code SECTION 7035-21; 1936 (39) 1231; 1974 (58) 2265; 1982 Act No. 415; 1988 Act No. 410, eff March 28, 1988; 1996 Act No. 424, SECTION 6, eff June 18, 1996.
Editor's Note
1996 Act No. 424, SECTION 13, provides, in part, as follows:
"Section 13. Employers who have filed with the Workers' Compensation Commission a notice to reject the provisions of Title 42 before the effective date of the 1996 amendment will have until July 1, 1997, to comply with the provisions of the 1996 amendment relating to insuring their workers' compensation liabilities. Any employer who has rejected the terms of this title prior to approval of the 1996 amendment and has procured another form of employee benefits insurance shall comply, not later than July 1, 1997, with the provisions of the 1996 amendment relating to the insuring of its workers' compensation liabilities. Furthermore, nothing in the 1996 amendment shall affect or alter any cause of action, right, or claim accruing before the effective date of the 1996 amendment; however, any such cause of action, remedy, or claim accruing before the effective date of the 1996 amendment shall be governed by the law prior to the effective date of the 1996 amendment".
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 27
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1977–2023 · leading case: Jervey v. Martint Env't, Inc., 721 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012).
Jervey v. Martint Env't, Inc., 721 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012). “(Martint) and General Casualty Insurance Company (collectively, Appellants) appeal the circuit court’s order vacating in part and affirming in part the order of the Appellate Panel of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, arguing the court erred in finding: (1) section 42-9-260…”
Fredrick v. WELLMAN, INC., 682 S.E.2d 516 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009). “Propriety of fraud defense Fredrick asserts that Wellman’s fraud defense was not properly before the single commissioner at the November 15, 2006 hearing because (1) the fraud defense was time-barred due to Wellman’s failure to assert this defense within 150 days from the date…”
Smith v. South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health, 494 S.E.2d 630 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997). “In accordance with the mandate of S.C.Code Ann. § 42-9-260, 2 regulations 67-504 and 67-507 set forth the procedure for suspending or terminating workers’ compensation benefits.”
Martin v. Rapid Plumbing, 631 S.E.2d 547 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006). “Even if Rapid Plumbing could have stopped temporary total disability benefits, it failed to follow the proper procedure for doing so as outlined by section 42-9-260 and regulation 67-504. Rapid Plumbing terminated the compensation on August 10, 2002, but failed to file and serve…”
Pollack v. S. Wine & Spirits of Am., 747 S.E.2d 430 (S.C. 2013). “Moreover, the Commission found Appellant was terminated for cause stemming from violations of company policy and stated: Pursuant to S.C.Code § 42-9-260, an employer is required to pay temporary total disability benefits when the employee is out of work due to a reported…”
Smith v. SC Dep't of Mental Health, 517 S.E.2d 694 (S.C. 1999). “S.C.Code Ann. § 42-9-260 (1985) specifically provides that “[t]he Commission shall provide by rule the method and procedure by which benefits may be suspended or terminated for any cause, but such rule shall provide for an evidentiary hearing and Commission approval prior to…”
Sanders v. MeadWestvaco Corp., 638 S.E.2d 66 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006). “Under section 42-9-260, Westvaco was entitled to have its request to terminate temporary total benefits heard within 60 days of filing the request.”
Hendricks v. Pickens Cnty., 517 S.E.2d 698 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999). “§§ 42-9-10, -20, -30 (1976); S.C.Code Ann. § 42-9-260 (1996); 25A S.C.”
Whitten v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins., 468 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1977). “The proper remedy for such a violation is clearly provided for under the Act by way of the aforementioned § 72-159 or § 72-177 of the 1962 Code (§ 42-9-260 of the 1976 Code 2 ). Finally, the Full Commission’s Order of September 10, 1976, stated the following: In passing and to…”
Cranford v. Hutchinson Constr., 731 S.E.2d 303 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012). “]” S.C.Code Ann. § 42-9-260(A) (Supp.2011). Once temporary disability payments have commenced, these benefits “may be terminated or suspended immediately at any time within the one hundred fifty days if .”
Carpentino v. Transp. Ins., 609 F. Supp. 556 (D. Conn. 1985). “Ann. § 440.20(8)-(9) (West 1984) (award increased by up to 20% plus 12% interest); Ga.”
Hardee v. Bruce Johnson Trucking Co., 360 S.E.2d 522 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987). “As to the first issue, we adopt the reasoning and authority of the full commission; we quote: Section 42-9-260. Notice to Commission when payments have begun; suspension or termination of payments.”
— S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-260(A) — 4 cases
Jervey v. Martint Env't, Inc., 721 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012). “(Martint) and General Casualty Insurance Company (collectively, Appellants) appeal the circuit court’s order vacating in part and affirming in part the order of the Appellate Panel of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, arguing the court erred in finding: (1) section 42-9-260…”
Cranford v. Hutchinson Constr., 731 S.E.2d 303 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012). “]” S.C.Code Ann. § 42-9-260(A) (Supp.2011). Once temporary disability payments have commenced, these benefits “may be terminated or suspended immediately at any time within the one hundred fifty days if .”
Robles v. Party Reflections, Inc. (S.C. Ct. App. 2019).
Harrington v. Hopewell Health Care Ctr. (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).
— S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-260(B) — 4 cases
Jervey v. Martint Env't, Inc., 721 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012). “(Martint) and General Casualty Insurance Company (collectively, Appellants) appeal the circuit court’s order vacating in part and affirming in part the order of the Appellate Panel of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, arguing the court erred in finding: (1) section 42-9-260…”
Fredrick v. WELLMAN, INC., 682 S.E.2d 516 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009). “Propriety of fraud defense Fredrick asserts that Wellman’s fraud defense was not properly before the single commissioner at the November 15, 2006 hearing because (1) the fraud defense was time-barred due to Wellman’s failure to assert this defense within 150 days from the date…”
Winfrey v. Archway Servs., Inc. (S.C. Ct. App. 2017).
Harrington v. Hopewell Health Care Ctr. (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).
— S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-260(B)(1) — 2 cases
Fredrick v. WELLMAN, INC., 682 S.E.2d 516 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009). “Propriety of fraud defense Fredrick asserts that Wellman’s fraud defense was not properly before the single commissioner at the November 15, 2006 hearing because (1) the fraud defense was time-barred due to Wellman’s failure to assert this defense within 150 days from the date…”
CompTrust v. Whitaker's, Inc. (S.C. Ct. App. 2007).
— S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-260(B)(l) — 1 case
Cranford v. Hutchinson Constr., 731 S.E.2d 303 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012). “]” S.C.Code Ann. § 42-9-260(A) (Supp.2011). Once temporary disability payments have commenced, these benefits “may be terminated or suspended immediately at any time within the one hundred fifty days if .”
— S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-260(C) — 1 case
Harrington v. Hopewell Health Care Ctr. (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).
— S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-260(E) — 2 cases
Fredrick v. WELLMAN, INC., 682 S.E.2d 516 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009). “Propriety of fraud defense Fredrick asserts that Wellman’s fraud defense was not properly before the single commissioner at the November 15, 2006 hearing because (1) the fraud defense was time-barred due to Wellman’s failure to assert this defense within 150 days from the date…”
Clemmons v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., 772 S.E.2d 517 (S.C. Ct. App. 2015).
— S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-260(F) — 6 cases
Fredrick v. WELLMAN, INC., 682 S.E.2d 516 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009). “Propriety of fraud defense Fredrick asserts that Wellman’s fraud defense was not properly before the single commissioner at the November 15, 2006 hearing because (1) the fraud defense was time-barred due to Wellman’s failure to assert this defense within 150 days from the date…”
Jervey v. Martint Env't, Inc., 721 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012). “(Martint) and General Casualty Insurance Company (collectively, Appellants) appeal the circuit court’s order vacating in part and affirming in part the order of the Appellate Panel of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, arguing the court erred in finding: (1) section 42-9-260…”
Smith v. SC Dep't of Mental Health, 517 S.E.2d 694 (S.C. 1999). “S.C.Code Ann. § 42-9-260 (1985) specifically provides that “[t]he Commission shall provide by rule the method and procedure by which benefits may be suspended or terminated for any cause, but such rule shall provide for an evidentiary hearing and Commission approval prior to…”
Davis v. Unihealth Post Acute Care, 741 S.E.2d 770 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013).
Samuel Rose v. Chris Thompson (S.C. Ct. App. 2022).
— S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-260(G) — 3 cases
Martin v. Rapid Plumbing, 631 S.E.2d 547 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006). “Even if Rapid Plumbing could have stopped temporary total disability benefits, it failed to follow the proper procedure for doing so as outlined by section 42-9-260 and regulation 67-504. Rapid Plumbing terminated the compensation on August 10, 2002, but failed to file and serve…”
Winfrey v. Archway Servs., Inc. (S.C. Ct. App. 2017).
Shiver v. Palmetto Health Richland (S.C. Ct. App. 2017).
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