Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-103 (2026)
Seven-year period runs from time right accrued - Extent of possession
✓ current as of May 2026
- (a) No person or anyone claiming under such person shall have any action, either at law or in equity, for the recovery of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, but within seven (7) years after the right of action accrued.
- (b) No possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments shall be deemed to extend beyond the actual possession of an adverse holder until the muniment of title, if any, under which such adverse holder claims such lands, tenements or hereditaments is duly recorded in the county in which the lands are located.
Code 1858, § 2765 (deriv. Acts 1819, ch. 28, § 2); Shan., § 4458; Code 1932, § 8584; mod. C. Supp. 1950, § 8584; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-203.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 47
cases (10 in the last 5 years), 1982–2025 · leading case: Hightower v. Pendergrass, 662 S.W.2d 932 (Tenn. 1983).
Hightower v. Pendergrass, 662 S.W.2d 932 (Tenn. 1983). “This is an adverse possession case in which the question is, whether or not the permissive use of the disputed premises by the legal title holder, plaintiffs-appellants, amounts to such a re-entry as to oust the adverse holder and make unavailable the benefit of the seven year…”
Wilson v. Price, 195 S.W.3d 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). “(b) No possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments shall be deemed to extend beyond the actual possession of an adverse holder until the muniment of title, if any, under which such adverse holder claims such lands, tenements or hereditaments is duly recorded in the county in…”
Shearer v. Vandergriff, 661 S.W.2d 680 (Tenn. 1983). “The issue in this case is whether T.C.A. § 28-2-103 1 bars the action of the appel *681 lants to compel the removal of a fence which was erected by the appellees to prevent the appellants from using an easement 2 which was appurtenant to the land of the litigants.”
Cumulus Broad., Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d 366 (Tenn. 2007). “Section 28-2-103, which does not involve color of title, protects an adverse holder after a period of seven years but only as to that portion of the land in his actual possession.”
Cross v. McCurry, 859 S.W.2d 349 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). “We cannot agree and hold the applicable statute of limitations is T.C.A. § 28-2-103 which applies in cases of adverse possession without color of title.”
Paris v. Walker (In re Walker), 566 B.R. 503 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2017). “When the creditor has sought to recover the real property or rescind the transfer, courts have applied the limitations period for actions for the recovery of land taken by adverse possession, which is seven years.”
Cooke v. Smith, 721 S.W.2d 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). “In view of our concurrence with the trial court’s decree barring plaintiffs’ action by virtue of T.C.A. § 28-2-103 (1980) and vesting title in Albert Smith and Lucille Smith by virtue of 20 years adverse possession, it is not necessary that we consider the other issues presented…”
XI Props., Inc. v. RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 443 (Tenn. 2004). “Therefore, the defendant asserted that it could rely upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-103 (2000) as a defense to the plaintiffs’ action.”
Lemm v. Adams, 955 S.W.2d 70 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). “794 , 795 (1889); T.C.A. § 28-2-103 (1980). Citing Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-105 (1980), Adams contended that he additionally was entitled to legal title after seven years because his adverse possession of the disputed property was under color of title.”
Samuel Humphreys v. Bank of Am., 557 F. App'x 416 (6th Cir. 2014). “Dismissal of Fraudulent Inducement Claim Beginning with the fraudulent inducement claim, Humphreys contends that his claim would be timely if the district court employed Tennessee’s seven-year statute of limitations for adverse possession, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-103 (a), instead…”
Walker v. Moore, 745 S.W.2d 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). “By his second issue, defendant insists that he ousted his co-tenants holding possession, use, receiving rents and profits and paying taxes for more than seven years, thereby perfecting a defensive pos-sessory title under T.”
Peggy Mathes v. 99 Hermitage, LLC (Tenn. 2024). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-103 (a) (1980).1 Subsection (b) of that same section limits the adverse possessor’s claim to what he or she actually possesses, “until the muniment of title, if any, .”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-103(a) — 6 cases
Hightower v. Pendergrass, 662 S.W.2d 932 (Tenn. 1983). “This is an adverse possession case in which the question is, whether or not the permissive use of the disputed premises by the legal title holder, plaintiffs-appellants, amounts to such a re-entry as to oust the adverse holder and make unavailable the benefit of the seven year…”
Cooke v. Smith, 721 S.W.2d 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). “In view of our concurrence with the trial court’s decree barring plaintiffs’ action by virtue of T.C.A. § 28-2-103 (1980) and vesting title in Albert Smith and Lucille Smith by virtue of 20 years adverse possession, it is not necessary that we consider the other issues presented…”
Debbie Antista v. Barry Craft (Tenn. Ct. App. 2025).
Norma Jean Ford Griffin v. Donna Lester & The Unknown Heirs of Arthur Jean Henderson (Deceased) (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
Jack Jordan v. Frances J. Marchetti (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-103(b) — 1 case
Peggy Mathes v. 99 Hermitage, LLC (Tenn. 2024). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-103 (a) (1980).1 Subsection (b) of that same section limits the adverse possessor’s claim to what he or she actually possesses, “until the muniment of title, if any, .”
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